

Comparative studies

CIVILIZATIONS

CULTURES

LIFEWORLDS



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MYKOLAS ROMERIS UNIVERSITY

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CHAPTER I

CIVILIZATIONS AND CULTURES

Introduction

We must explicate various problematic areas in the comparative study of cultures and their underlying civilization morphologies. The problem of “translation” from one culture into another is faced by every researcher of texts, regardless of the type or topic the texts may contain. Resultantly, a resolution must be found in another, all pervasive domains, which contains a great variety of cultures: civilization. The essay opens a methodology capable of accessing cross-disciplinary and cross-cultural analyses of texts at the level of civilizations and their comparisons.

The term “culture” has become iconic, ranging from lyric poetry to nomadic. In brief, everything is culture and culture is how everything acquires meaning. The language about culture is equally instructive: there is multi-culturalism, there are rights to discursive spaces – and their granting, there are pop and post-pop cultures, MTV discourses, and even corporate techno-discourses and cultures. All in all, these facets are the media of currency and legitimating and provide the dynamics of culture as multiple incomprehension – not because of the pronouncements of various deaths – death of subject, poetry, philosophy, identity, text, humanism, modernity, all the divinities and their mothers, and even death of death. The latter, as we all know is modern. Despite all this, there seem to be other phenomena that, while not officially articulated, are intended by cultural texts and even practices. Such phenomena are, pursuant to some of the major scholars, such as Weber, Dumont, Sorokin, Toynbee, Lauf, Dumezil, Kavolis, Eisenstadt, civilization. This is to say cultures belong to civilizations and are comprehensible as hermeneutical readings that signify civilizational phenomena. Indeed, it could be claimed that the hermeneutical readings may range from myths through various theoretical pronouncements. What is at issue is that the followers of culturalism and multi-culturalism miss their own positions due to the problematics of regarding everything as culture. In this sense, the following essay is designed to decipher civilizational phenomena by reading some myths that are prevalent in the

West. What such a reading proposes is this: the contemporary West seems to be locked in a confrontation between two civilizations which have been expressed by mythological stories, i.e. read through myths. It is known that the term myth has been articulated in indefinite ways, from fable through scientific theories, to everything is a mythical story. Yet it is also the case that culturalism regards myths as cultural stories whose meaning is independent of any other concerns: it is purely and even arbitrarily constructed. I shall address the notion of construction in subsequent sections; meanwhile, the very notion of culture, as used in the so-called critical cultural scholarship, must be taken under serious consideration in order to avoid the numerous implicit moralizings and universalizations.

Cultural Problematics

Cultural anthropology has to contend with the following issues, specifically the ones that require methodological access to the cultural phenomena and their multiplicity, and the presumed objectivity which is required as a guarantee to truth claims by theorists of culture. First, it is claimed that any member of a given group belongs to and understands itself within and in terms of its own culture. But this would mean that there cannot be any privileged persons who could escape their own cultural understanding in order to see it from outside. How does one alienate oneself from one's culture, if the very culture regards itself as alienating? One is already stuck in a cultural position and hence cannot claim to have any culturally impartial attitude. Indeed, the very comprehension of impartiality is an aspect of a given culture. Second, the major solution to this issue may be offered by some of the major comparative theories. The latter want to argue that it is possible to understand one's own culture from the vantage point of comparison with another culture. This suggests that one knows another culture by being immersed in it and hence having obtained a similar comprehension as the natives. This is to say, from this position one may claim that it is possible to see one's own culture in terms of the limits that the other culture offers. The other culture is, after all, radically different, and we understand ourselves and the other in terms of the difference. Given this complex claim, it is impossible to offer a methodology that would allow us understanding

our own culture, since, seen from the culture of the other; our culture is already incorporated and interpreted in terms of the other culture., this means that neither one picks up another culture as a limit of one's own and interprets it in terms of one's own cultural grammar and hence has not escaped a problem of seeing one's culture at its limit, or one adopts the other culture and translates one's own culture in terms of the grammar of the other culture. In neither case has one gained any methodological access to one's own, and indeed to the other's culture. To speak pedagogically, if I am going to lecture on another culture, and claim that it is radically different from my own, I shall do so in terms of my language that is comprehensible to the audience to which I am communicating. Both the audience and I understand the other culture by giving it our own cultural context and grammar of interpretation. The same can be said in reverse when talking in terms of the other culture about our culture; in this case what we would get is the other's incorporation of our culture into their context and grammar, and hence without offering anything more than their cultural frame – but comprehensible only to those who are part of, or have been immersed in the culture of the other. Third, we face, what could be called, the hysteria of objectivity. By hysteria I mean the shock that objectively speaking other cultures have to be treated as equivalent to our own, leading to the efforts that deny other cultures their due and right to speak. This is to say, the scientific modern Western pronouncement that everything has to be treated with objective impartiality, requires the positing of our own culture as one among others, having no value claim to be privileged in its various pronouncements.

But this is the hysterical point: the claim to scientific objectivity is one aspect of Western modern culture and belongs to the interpretive context of this culture. Hence, the very claim to Western scientific superiority, as having methods to access all phenomena objectively, is a culture bound position that cannot be universal. After all, objectively speaking, other cultures, as equal, have very different understandings that do not include such tandems as objectivity or for that matter subjectivity. Culturally objectively speaking, we cannot deny them their different reading of cultural, and indeed all other phenomena. To say that the others are wrong would be tantamount to saying that we have a

criterion of the right culture which belongs only to one culture. But in this sense, one abolishes the treatment of other cultures as given objectively and equivalently. We then would posit our culture as universal and require that all others interpret themselves in terms of our own requirements. Yet, by the claim of treating all other cultures objectively and without prejudice, we have just offered a position that requires (1) the treatment of other cultures not as they are but as they are interpreted in terms of one culture's requirements, or (2) of surrendering our cultural prejudice of objectivity, and allowing other cultures to have a voice that does not regard them as inferior. Given this setting, we revert back to the problematic mentioned above: how can one claim to know the other objectively when one has imposed one's own cultural component of objectivity on others and hence not only did not understand the other culture, but failed to escape one's own culture. In this sense, the very claim to be able to treat one's own culture objectively, is to accept this very culture without any objectivity, since one already lives and accepts the terms of their own culture.

A usual approach to civilization studies (employed by most of the above mentioned scholars) demands the inclusion of two broad conceptions: first, there is a requirement to discover the broadest morphologies which determine social and cultural parameters. If problems arise within social and cultural domains, the problems must be resolved at the level of such morphologies. Thus, according to Eisenstadt, (we shall expand on his thinking subsequently) the morphology of Islam is sensate-idea-tional. Any interpretive questions arising at any level of social, aesthetic, commercial, legal life must be resolved at the level of this morphology. Second, in order to signify civilizations and not only societies and cultures, one must attend to the symbolic designs of social systems which combine into broadest and most encompassing morphologies – civilizations. This comprehension of civilization does not seem to be adequate, since through social structures and symbolic designs appear phenomena that do not play a role as if they were a "broader morphology," but the very way that cultures, as interpretive devices of the world, also signify directly the civilization phenomena. The latter are signified by varieties of texts, such as social systems, theories, myths, even symbolic designs as interpretive, but which are not composed of

accumulation of interpretive texts. These phenomena are not to be considered as “deep structures,” as if they were some founding rules, but are phenomena precisely because they are the very sense and foreground of the varieties of interpretive texts. It may be the case that the civilization phenomena may be resisted by a particular cultural text, but the resistance shows the significance of civilization phenomena.

Methodologically speaking, civilization analyses have a task of tracing the characteristics of these phenomena, since the latter, as phenomena, comprise, in turn, an access to cultural texts. Any comparative analyses of cultures also provide a way of contrasting and correlating civilization phenomena. Moreover, the latter must be broader than any specific culture, despite the fact that they are not founding phenomena. Indeed, they are broader because they are phenomena and not localizable or ontic reality. Some of the more interesting cultural texts – to which I shall attend shortly – are mythological formations and their dramatic enactments. It could even be said that speaking about various moralities, they too, in most cases, appear as mythological and dramatic depictions. It must be emphasized nonetheless, that mythological morphologies and their dramatic enactments do not comprise civilizations, but a way of signifying or intending the civilization phenomena. In the very process of interpreting the world, myths, and emphatically dramatic myths constitute their correlative civilization phenomena. These phenomena usually are proposed by scholars of civilizations who propose theories capable of encompassing and grounding all civilizations.

It has been shown that there is no direct and demonstrable connection between theoretical thought and the domain of life world experience of things, cultural objects, and even language. The experienced phenomena are external to theories and the conjunction between them has no necessity. The conjunction requires a conjoiner whose understanding must be broader than the theory and its selected perceptual aspects. The conjoiner is a reflecting process that performs the task from a vantage point of interest, whether the latter is culturally prejudged, linguistically prescribed or part of a historical tradition. In this sense, an application of a theory does not yield pure objective perceptual phenomena, but one that is interpreted by the theoretical requirements and finally by some

contextual interest. The latter is usually understood in cultural, historical or linguistic terms.

The scientist, or the theorizing subject, as cultural and historical, is also a factor in the domain of investigation. The philosopher, if he/she is a part of culture or his/her own history, cannot claim to obtain the given phenomena without changing them. The very philosophical explanation that assumes historical or cultural position will itself transform the subject matter of such explanation. While being shaped by historical and cultural contexts, the explanations offered will also change the contexts. In turn, if a theory is part of a culture and history and is shaped by them, then no theory is sufficiently broad to encompass and offer the position of a final interpretation. It is only one aspect of a historical tradition, a culture or a language. As Apel once pointed out, if positivism were to offer two contesting meta-languages, each claiming to account for all the usages of a given language, then the debate between them would involve a language that is broader than either meta-language. Indeed, this can also be said of historical-philosophical hermeneutics that posits a historical tradition as the unsurpassable ground of all understanding of things and being itself, it too is a historically contingent position that may belong to a specific historical period of a specific tradition and hence cannot offer a universal claim. Another context, of the same tradition, might not have a historicizing language and hence no such understanding, not to speak of entirely different traditions.

Perhaps the most pronounced way of this manner of theorizing, i.e. proposing a universal explanation that intended to overcome the problems of inherence in a historical tradition or linguistic culture was offered by positivism and is still offered by mainstream analytic mode of theorizing. In the first case, there is an a priori position that posits a reality in itself that is untainted by historical traditions and can be accessed by appropriately constituted method. But this means that all experiences in and of the world have to be discarded or reduced to the posited reality. Yet these positions do not escape the issue of the last interpreter to the extent that the method, formulated as mathematical logic, does not in any way imply a direct access to the posited reality. The method must be applied from an evaluative position which, for these trends, is pragmatic. What works for human benefit – at the price that humans

must also be reduced to the same reality? In brief, such reality does not offer itself in its purity but in terms of what we can make of it, and thus to transform it through our pragmatic intervention. Even Habermas, who understood well the instrumental nature of modern positivistic methodology, hoped to break out of the hermeneutical context by positing science, such as psychology, that can treat our traumas objectively. Yet as we know, these sciences are not ontological but normative: they are designed to make us function normally. The latter is, of course, a prescriptive behavior in a context of a specific society, culture, or historical tradition.

All that we have attained so far is that a given theory or a selected method cannot be by themselves the last moment of interpretation, since they are either one aspect of a given historical tradition, culture, or language or are interpreted by some evaluative point of interest which might be seen as the last point of interpretation. Moreover, the very objectivity that is being sought is not attainable since every effort to reach it leads to the understanding that it is compelled to change in accordance with the point of interest that may be laden with numerous interpretations or with the very process of application of theory to reality that is radically selective of what will count as objective among the various ontological options and thus posits an a priori decision what will be the data of a given theory. That is to say, all other data will not be tolerated as objective and dismissed as theoretically redundant, perhaps subjective. But such a position will not include a justification for the principle of selectivity of the required ontology or its own position. If an explanation is to be universal, then it must be explained by the selected ontology and the prescriptive methodology. If not, then neither the theory nor a methodology, posing as a theory in its formal-quantitative language, can be all-encompassing and provide the domain of the final interpreter.

From what has been said so far it can be concluded in one regard that the subject, or the last interpreter, who constructs theories, correlates them to selected phenomena, and evaluates such correlation, cannot be, in principle, investigated by any of the empirical sciences. If this were the case, then the very subject of selectivity, correlation and interpretation would be selected as an object of another subject of selectivity and

interpretation leading to an infinite regress. In brief, the last interpreter, the selecting and correlating awareness cannot be a subject-matter of any specific objective science and theory, and resultantly the last interpreter is inaccessible by theories and methodologies of any philosophy or science. To avoid this conclusion, all one has to do is to proclaim that the last interpreter is a language of a historical tradition and hence the subject becomes either redundant or is determined by her language and in other variants by her culture, historical context and even psychological upbringing. Even the sense of the subject depends on a cultural and/or linguistic context in which one resides. This general hermeneutical position is taken for granted by culturalism, legalisms, and historicisms. No doubt, such a position seems plausible given the variety of meanings ascribed to subject or what is deemed to be a subject.

To state this issue in terms of a general hermeneutical principle, any theory, any method, any meaning of anything, including the subject, emerges as an aspect of its historical tradition and in turn points back to it, thus forming a hermeneutical circle. Any theory that offers an explanation of everything, converges into the historical horizon of that tradition; the latter is broader than the explanatory theory. But such a circle also intimates that all awareness is a result of a language, culture, customs, and even prejudices of a historical tradition within whose horizons the human dwells. All is interpretation; even the most admired strict sciences do not offer access to the way things are; afar all, if one looks at scientific language, one notes that its logic and structure is not derived from experienced phenomena. In brief, it is different from such phenomena and thus when applied, it becomes an interpretation. Of course, we must make a note here: if one claims that a given language is distinct from the experienced phenomena, then one must also admit that she has an awareness of things that is not bound by language; otherwise the distinction between language and things could not be made. Let us leave this issue aside for a moment and point out that the hermeneutical circle, interpreted as language, culture, or tradition, claiming to be the last interpreter, cannot be cognizant of itself. If language is the medium in which all events, theories, methods are understood, in which selectivity and designation of what is real, unreal, objective and subjective appears, then language cannot be a subject matter of any phi-

losophy or theory, since the latter would be one aspect within the vast linguistic tradition. If culture were the last vestige to be posited as the condition for all interpretations, then such a culture could not become an object of any theory, philosophy, or method. If a tradition and its horizons comprise the dimension in which we dwell, then such a tradition could not be grasped by any theory about a tradition, since such a theory again would be a minor aspect of it. It could be said that even the very notion of a hermeneutical circle and convergence of horizons of a tradition and of an interpreter would have to be one claim within a given tradition. All these claims, by virtue of their self-destruction, become necessarily contingent. And yet, left to their own devices, they seem to be epitome of necessity.

Some claim that cultural hermeneutics comprise partial civilizational phenomena, and, as mentioned above, there are theories that attempt to combine such partial aspects into more unified theories in order to propose broader civilization morphologies. Yet what is noticeable in such efforts is their partiality as hermeneutical constitution of civilization phenomena. This is to say, such efforts reveal that the very proposed theories are another interpretive way of signifying civilization phenomena. Thus, if one pays close attention to the above mentioned civilization theorists, including more current ones such as Dumont and Eisenstadt, to be considered shortly, one notes their pre-judgments. First, each civilization scholar is closely tied to modern Western categories for analytical tools as cultural interpretive modes of the analysis of all civilizations; second, each theorist takes some specific civilization as “normal” and regards others as deviations; finally, there is inadequate attention to the problematics that various theories, be they sociological, psychological, economic, historical, are interpretations that signify phenomena that are specific to a singular civilization. Moreover, it behooves us to note that even at a superficial level closer attention should be paid to the unnoticed relationships among theories within a given civilization. For example, Kavolis points out that if we take Freud’s division of a person into *Id*, *Ego*, *Superego*, we also note that such a division is social class division: low, middle, and high classes. Just as *Id* strives toward *ego*, and *Ego* is subject to *Superego*, so does the lower class battle to reach a middle class status, under the requirements of the upper class. But

in this sense, the various theories are translatable into hermeneutical understandings that signify civilization phenomena. These phenomena then transgress the boundaries of the various cultures and theories that constitute them through their very activity of interpretation. This also suggests that the civilization phenomena are not derived from cultural and theoretical hermeneutics or from their generalization. All of these comprise the processes, conceptions, intentionalities that constitute civilizations. It could be pointed out that such phenomena coincide with sense making; this is not to say that civilization phenomena are some sort of individualistic or intersubjective presences; it is the very sense that emerges with the cultural and theoretical hermeneutics. We shall devote an entire chapter for this topic.

It has been well established that not all traditions are historical, not even some that belong to the Western civilization. Hence, it is necessary to explicate the philosophical aspects that gave rise to the conception of what, in the modern West, is called history. The subject matter that is at issue is one of ontology. The latter is reserved for the exposition of the basic principles that constitute the very essence of nature. The latter has been a debate within and among major schools of philosophy, yet all of them will have to be explicated at the level wherein the necessity for history arises. Despite some variations, classical Greek thought understood all natural events from their **limits** (*peras*). Every being is determined to be a specific kind of being by the limit which cannot be transgressed. Whether the limit is located in *topos noitos* (the place of ideas), or is the *morphe* (the inherent form of a thing) in each case they are the very essence of a given thing. In turn, the essence of a being is what comprises its very purpose, its Alpha and Omega, its intelligibility such that from the very inception of a given being, the form, the essence, is what determines the way the given being will unfold its *dynamis, kinesis*, its dynamics, the shape of its movement. The dynamics, therefore, is intelligible at the outset because it manifests its own form as the very purpose of its unfolding. In this sense, every being has its own purpose, which is its own essence. This means that the necessity of all beings is inherent in them. Contingency or accidental encounters do not alter the essence of beings. An animal, engaged in the unfolding of its essence as its purpose, such as grazing, may encounter a lightning, which too is unfolding

its essence, would encounter an accident. The latter may be mechanical, but not essential to the beings of either event. Moreover, any notion of evolution is excluded a priori. A being does not evolve from previous beings nor does it evolve from itself by addition of elements from other events. In the former case, a parent does not produce something essentially higher than itself. It is the rule of *aitia*, an efficient cause, since the result can be equal, but never more than its cause. In the second case, a being, as a result of its essential cause, cannot evolve, since at the very outset it contains its essence that will unfold to full actuality, but it will not change in itself. A monkey will produce monkeys and cannot be a cause of something more. In turn, beings have no histories, apart from differences in the unfolding of their essence. A human may become a carpenter, a baker, a scientist, but these factors do not change the essence of what a human being is; they are accidental encounters in specific settings. In brief, a human is born and will die a human. That we have Herodotus and Thucydides as “historians” does not mean that there is anything necessary in “historical” accounts. Such accounts depict chancy encounters, accidental intersection, which is subtended by the pursuit of human telos as human essence. In this sense, historical events, such as encounters of armies, will be essentially forever the same, regardless of time and place. Essentially, there is no difference between Alexander, Napoleon, Bush or Hitler, battle of Gorillas or charge of elephants; they all pursue their essential natures. It would be nonsensical to speak of the history of Alexander or a history of a snail.

The ontological shift in modern philosophy toward mechanistic atomism strips all essential structures from nature and replaces all beings with a sum of material parts functioning in accordance with mechanical laws. Therefore, no beings of nature have any purpose. This ontological conception of all nature leaves one entity, the human as a thinking subject, who has purposes. But such purposes have nothing to do with the real, material world, including human bodies that function mechanically. Moreover, such thinking and its purposes have no fixed rules or laws; it is basically volunturistic. Hence human actions, directed by will, make their way that is distinct from the world of ontologically posited reality. Humans make history as a purposive process, which might aim at some final end. The latter has been depicted by various utopian images, in-

cluding some versions of Marxism. If material events are counted in this purposive history, they are not ontologically material, but practically, i.e. what can we make of the indifferent, mechanical, and purposeless stuff for our aims and presumed needs. We know the rest of the modern story as a progress of technology and human mastery of the material environment (including the material human as part of the environment). We also know the story of the metaphysics of the will pervading all modern philosophies in such guises as power, autonomy, arbitrariness, and force adherence to personality cults (such as Judaism, Christianity and Islam). We also know the story of the efforts to impute into consciously constructed events some sort of causal connections and thus make history into science. Moreover, we have been told that historical writing is based on research and therefore is scientific. There is also a plethora of proposals to ontologize history by presuming that it is explainable in terms of some basic biochemical components, specifically genetic and evolutionary biology. Finally, there are even voices proclaiming the end of history. Such efforts are premised on a specific confusion between theoretical, continuous time, and historical time, wherein the latter, as phenomenon of human awareness, has no necessary continuous connections.

Critique of Historical Reason

The notion that history is human and not natural phenomenon leads to the way that modern Western thought had to account for time. All events, depicted mechanically, follow a causal sequence. What is given now can be explained by previous causes. Yet at present the previous causes are no longer available; they require an introduction of awareness of the past, called memory. The future not being at present also requires an awareness which is called projection of temporal possibilities. Both are, of course, phenomena of consciousness. The latter must provide temporal connections, so well recognized by Kant, Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, and finally Sartre. Some, such as Hegel, realized that human memory and projection are inadequate to account for past events which are beyond human memory. Hence an introduction of an absolute consciousness, a sort of all encompassing, eternity, manifests itself in a continuous historical time. Such an eternity is incompatible with temporality

to the extent that eternity, as an infinite position, cannot be divided into historical, temporal periods, without ceasing to be infinite. Kierkegaard made sport of Hegel on this point. Once the infinite collapses, what remains are contingent, historical events, having no necessary connections, apart from human memory and projected future. To save the day, scientific reason introduces the method of quantification and the ability to measure mathematically (presumed to be objective operation) of events of the past and expected events of the future. All is well, but the problem is not solved – only postponed. First, how can a subject, living in the present, extend its measures on the past if the latter is no longer and the future is not yet? What does one measure? Second, mathematical devices are not temporal and do not provide any clues whether what is being measured is in the past or in the future. Hence, one has to assume awareness of the past and of the future which, as was seen, are not given except in the present awareness. Space is no mystery; all spatial events are present now, deployed one next to the other but, as material, they do not signify their past or their future. Hence, once again, the significations of both are conscious phenomenon.

Historical reason encounters broader issues. Assuming that there is a continuous historical process, having a future aim as its final purpose that is posited as a necessary condition for necessary connections between temporal events, the assumption results in a positing of historical rules, be they dialectics of Hegelian or Marxian brands, or some presumed evolution. In brief, future final purpose is posited as a condition for the invention of necessary rules of historical development. It is significant that the final purpose is in and part of history and hence one aspect of history and thus defers the very notion of a final purpose. After all, one historical event cannot be the aim of the whole. A far this “final event” is reached; history does not cease and thus abolishes such an event as final. This outcome forces the thinkers of historical reason to posit a transcendent historical aim above or beyond history. Such transcendence cannot be historical and properly must be designated to be eternal. The results of this transcendent view are as follows: first, the best that can be obtained from it is a changeless dialectical structure or system and hence in principle static, yielding no historical development; second, transcendent, infinite being is unknowable by contingent historical actors

(well noted by Kierkegaard) and thus cannot be a source of claims as to whither of human destiny; third, infinity has no temporal orientation and would not be an indices of a purposive direction of history; fourth, historical consciousness cannot escape self-destruction in terms of its claim to be universal and all inclusive, because, one, if all consciousness is historical (expressed pedagogically as an accumulation of knowledge) and must be historically contextualized, then such a conscious claim is equally historical and must be understood within its historical context; and two, the very ontology, which gave rise to the conception of mechanical world, is equally historical. Hence, if the mechanical universe were to be reinterpreted as one of having open meaning, i.e. signitive, then historical consciousness would cease to be relevant. These aspects place current historical consciousness at a complete loss and a crisis. No doubt, the wrestling with this crisis led numerous philosophical and scientific efforts into all sorts of metaphysical postulates of infinity, and cosmic order, all attempting to find some permanent component, even an eternal recurrence, as a saving grace. Theories are proposed and discarded like spring fashions, continuously disclosing our confusion.

The understanding of history, therefore, is premised on modern Western ontology which is not available to other civilizations and therefore cannot be used a priori as a silent assumption. Does India or China have histories, and if so, what kind? Tao is not a divinity which humans must seek as their purpose, and the coming and passing of all events have no specific direction and hence no aim. The time of India is oceanic-rhythmic, offering no utopian future or nirvana. This suggests that civilizations have different modes of time awareness which need not include "historical time." These suggestions are necessary to avoid impositions of concepts on others which neither have them nor need them.

CHAPTER II

COMPARATIVE THEORIES

Sociologists, specifically those who have historical orientation, are prone to claims that the current upsurge of search for national or even ethnic identities are temporary. Nationalities that claim to be based on ethnicity, are a recent product of the modern West and, as all other temporal entities, are doomed to vanish. Yet such claims fail to account for the surge of nationalisms and their insistence on reclaiming their own identities. The task of this section is to outline various civilization comparative theories in order to note their adequacy with respect to national cultures and in turn to point to their own prejudgments that might not be sufficient to explicate “the others” as civilization ally and culturally different. This requires the placement into civilization context even of Western secular civilization with its enlightenment and democracy as one among other civilizations. No theory based on this civilization can be privileged as a standard for the others. Thus one major caution: any attempt to “export” a civilization by any means would be a presumption that only “we” know how the rest of the world should live. Even the much lauded “modernization” and even the more famous “postmodernism” should not be given any precedence, since they might be only one type of modernization and quite different from other types. There are good indications to support this position. In China, Confucian teachings were modernizing and Taoism was its post modernity; Islam was modernizing, and Sufism was its inherent postmodernism. Each modernization claims to have found some universal set of standards which include all humanity: thus modern West proposes “universal human rights”, based on universal humanism and secularism, Islam offers universal Sharia under one Khalifat, each having their own postmodern extensions. Even designations of the philosophies of other civilizations must be avoided; Western tradition is, in principle, philosophical, and thus it would be inappropriate to burden other traditions with such designations. To call Hinduism, Confucianism, Buddhism, Medieval theologies, shamanic pronouncements philosophical would be an imposition of external and thus unfitting terms – one could even say it would

be an insult. Resultantly, we shall avoid such insults and treat the others in their own right. In turn, we shall have to insist that the theories we shall survey do the same; barring that, we shall not spare our critical remarks.

There is no question that current debates concerning civilization phenomena are playing on the background of Western modern modernization; some civilizations are regarded as engaged in efforts to extricate themselves from and even retard modernization – this would be the case with Mid-Eastern civilization (composed of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam), while others are moving at full speed to catch up and even surpass the West and hence enter “world history” as equals – the cases of China and India. No doubt, in all cases there are admixtures of tradition and novelty, the latter being Western modernity while the former a search for roots in order to have a revolution that recoups the past. Here, the major scholars enter the scene with their hypotheses and offer theoretical bases for their explication of diverse civilizations. There is a tendency among scholars of civilizations to offer an encompassing and yet “clean models” of symbolic designs that compose civilization awareness, even if such models range from binary to quadrennial formations. Sorokin’s research presents an example of the binary type that separates civilization awareness into two major regions: ideational and sensate, each assuming different variations within the parameters of a specific civilization. Thus we have empiricism and rationalism in Modern West and pure transcendence, in contrast to polluting rescendance in Hinduism. Nonetheless, for him Oriental awareness is basically ideational, even if Confucian mode of awareness allowed for mixtures. The same can be said of Islam, apart from a couple of periods that allowed the sensate awareness some space. According to him, the ideational emphasis is a hindrance to dynamic tension and resultantly to modernization. The West, in contrast, is dynamic due to the tension and constant shift between ideational and sensate awareness. The shifts are regarded sequentially; as soon as modality of consciousness is exhausted, it switches to the other and re-dynamizes- the entire civilization process.

It is somewhat out of character for a student of civilizations to proclaim that the Western mode of awareness is standard, while other modes are abnormal and are deviations from the dynamics of the West.

Sorokin overstates his case by accepting only the modern awareness of the West as a standard and interprets other periods – even in the West – along the modern lines. Even classical Greek thought was a constant mixture of the two regions, and the mixture at times had no sensate components, even if there were such theses as atomistic materialism. Moreover, Medieval West was no paradigm of dynamics, while China, of the same period, was an explosive society that could have “walked across Europe” in a month. Hence, a closer look at diverse periods of different civilizations would open more complex formations than the ones suggested by Sorokin. There is another issue that requires greater caution. Modern West and its obvious dynamics is not a constant shifting between sensate-empirical, and rationalist-ideational formations, but a continuous creation-transformation of ideational factors. Modern West’s empiricism is not at all “sensate” since the “empirical” awareness is designated as “subjective” and is irrelevant for scientific pursuits. What is relevant is a creation of an ontology that posits homogeneous material parts (inaccessible to any senses) to be treated quantitatively. This means that the quantitative-ideational domain is created by the humans and can be transformed and recreated at will and applied on the homogeneous (equally ideational) material domain in order to shape it in terms of ever newly invented formal structures. This creativity is premised on the “will to master” the environment, including humans, technologically. This will to master, appearing in various modern guises as will to power, is the dynamic surge that defers the Sorokin binary structure. Moreover, there is no account by Sorokin what is the “medium” that allows the shift from sensate to ideational awareness. After all, purely empirical sense awareness is inexhaustible, colorful, resonating with sounds that can suggest new songs, new colorful paintings, just as the ideational is to be continuously formed into new “logical” problems and continue indefinitely. Critically speaking, Sorokin’s acceptance of modern West as “normal” is not even adequate for the West, not to speak of other civilizations.

Another theorist, who follows a binary, even if more complex structure, is Dumont. He suggests that complex civilizations are distinguished by their dominant ideologies, composed of a network of symbols that legitimate the relationship of individuals to a society in a hierarchi-

cal pattern. The traditions in which the individual is subject to society are normal. The modern Western type, where the individual is prior to society, and is the legitimating source of the latter, is abnormal. His claim rests on pragmatic considerations: normal means a type which best preserves continuity and stability. Basically, an all-pervasive ideology, subordinating all power, must be at the top of a hierarchy, while the lower level of practical, daily activities, must keep power and ideology separate. Of course the separation varies; it may appear as a distinction of a priest and ruler, for example, the case of India, or church and state in the Medieval West. In case of threats from the lower level, they can be integrated at the higher level by ideological images. Since modern West does not have such a structure, it is in a constant state of dissolution that leads to momentary creations of dictatorships to lend some semblance of structure. In this way, the modern West is radically deficient, while India can be a standard for a normal civilization. It is important to note that his comparison of Western modernity with traditional India can provide a means to criticize only the modern West.

No doubt there is something about longevity of a civilization that might lend it an image of stability and continuity, but the case of India does not offer itself as such an image. Traditional India, as can be found not only in the Vedas, but also in Ramayana and Mahabharata, is pervaded by cosmic energies, erotic tensions, playful yet bloody battles between Aryan patriarchal divinities and Dravidian maternal forces; there is no hierarchy, since in that world any figure, no matter how “high” may fall and become “low”, while the latter, by virtue of its efforts at purification, may reach celestial heights. Precisely this play (*lila*) of cosmic forces (*shakti*) that allowed this tradition to oust the British empire. As Churchill complained, how is it that a naked fakir has chased us out of India? There being multitudes of divinities of all sorts, male and female, and each guru, capable of declaring himself a divinity, no “Priest” was and could be on top of the hierarchy of civilization. Even today, India has no problems of absorbing the Western modernity and its “instability” into its own instability and thus dynamic continuity. A better candidate for Dumont’s stable civilization would be the Mid-Eastern civilization, starting with the Persian absolute hierarchy of positions and one autocratic power, wherein the ruler and priest-divinity are one, and his

law is changeless. The variants of this mode of awareness extend through Judaic-Christian-Islamic monotheisms, reaching into autocratic Byzantine empire and Soviet Union with its absolute hierarchy of positions and power. In this mode of awareness, there is no distinction between the priest and the ruler, so obvious in the proclamations of the divine right of kings, or the identity of the head of church with the head of the state. Indeed, its continuity has been remarkable, although one of its pillars, Soviet autocracy, has lost its grip precisely due to the continuous instability of the West. The other pillar, Judaism-Christianity and Islam, is still holding firm against the great Satan, the modern Secular West, although in all sorts of modified ways that must inevitably accept the creative dynamics of secularism for its survival.

Dumont's criticism of modern Western individualism as a source of instability becomes contradictory to the extent that it fails to take into account the built-in reflective self-correction of modern West. The latter allows an awareness of human fallibility and demands that the established dictatorships on the basis of popular and individualistic demands be dismantled equally on individualistic basis because such dictatorships violated individual rights. This is to say, the individual comprises a criterion that destroys autocratic claims to infallibility. Thus modern West, having been accused of slavery and colonialism, was the first to admit that such practices are unacceptable not only in the West, but universally. Meanwhile, the much lauded hierarchical, autocratic civilization, having engaged in the same practices, will not admit its wrongdoings and, despite all evidence, continues to claim infallibility. After all, how could a civilization, being identical to divine law and will, the laws of dialectics and historical reason, ever be mistaken? In this sense, its continuity is premised on stability that can neither accept changes nor tolerate challenges. If we are to take Dumont's proposed standard of civilizations, the hierarchical structure and other modes of awareness as deficient, then we would also have to accept a very stagnant and self-defeating civilization, since any dynamics would have to be borrowed from others, introducing a "virus" in its very core for survival. Subsequently we shall explore this intersection between civilizations that offer more fundamental ways of accessing their uniqueness and the possibility for their comparisons.

While a member of a modern world, Weber offers a more complex framework for the continuity and transformation of civilizations. According to him, complexity does not require some ideal integration. Rather, the continuity depends on struggles among diverse groups, associations of groups, social organizations and various ideologies. Some coherence may be found at the level of some cultures belonging to a civilization, yet what holds a complex civilization together are the processes that manage the struggles in ways that the latter do not destroy the continuity of a civilization. These processes provide benefits and are enforced against those with less benefits. Those with less benefits comprise a source of transformations which are more complex than a mere uprising. According to Weber, important transformations, such as emergence of Western modernity, depend on a conjunction of elements that appear very rarely. There is a requirement of attainable ethos addressed to dissatisfied groups and their unique imagination of the future and practical interests, legal system and community or kinship structures. Hence in the Medieval West there is a tension and a balancing between the spiritual or organized church and the monastic community, and between a unique voluntarism of the feudal state, with a limited covenant and an autonomous bureaucracy possessing a general power of coercion. But in the development toward modernity, this is also the source of Western abnormality. Once it reaches maturity, it loses the positioning of various, even if unequal parts, and becomes dominated by a homogeneous logic of rationalization; it becomes an iron cage. If normal is less rational, then it will appear in the guises of the ant modern, postmodern and archaic. The current appearance of nationalisms tends toward archaisms that are ethnocentric and bear traces of sacrality tensed against modernizing secularism. It might be added that the inclusion of postmodernism among the irrational rejection of modernism's rationalism is correct if we disclose another level of Western modernity: metaphysics of the will where everything, including the environment and human beings, are constructs without any rules – arbitrary. This is precisely the point of numerous post-moderns: all discourses, cultures and life worlds are arbitrary constructs having no basis in anything.

Although it might seem that all required factors needed to understand civilizations are in place, the question arises whether Weber is bound by modern Western categories that might not be adequate to

the modes of awareness of other civilizations and their transformations. First, the notion of modern Western rationality must be modified by the fact that such rationality in no wise corresponds to classical reason that constitutes one major pillar of Western philosophical civilization. That reason was Socratic, capable of maintaining an open domain for debating any question, position, or claim in an effort to understand things as they are. Modern rationality is instrumental, quantitative and in principle technological “at the service of humanity’s salvation.” If it is an iron cage, it is so because it does not allow any other rationality to have a “scientific voice.” This suggests that Weber’s understanding of modern civilization is inadequate to encompass even Western civilization, not to speak of various other civilizations. As to the forces that transform civilizations, we may suggest that Mid Eastern civilization and its transformations did not change its basic configuration and were not powered by classes with less benefits in a society. They all were premised on the edict to constantly re-establish that very civilization whose members have drifted away from its true calling: bringing the entire humanity to kneel before the only lord, the lord of lords, king of kings, and a complete autocracy. It must be recalled that the current tensions of the Mid East, drawing in other civilizations, is a family war within one civilization.

Meanwhile, another theorist of civilizations, Eisenstadt, argues that Weber’s thesis is inadequate to encompass complex designs of civilizations, because this thesis is basically sociological and fails to provide an all encompassing format for them all. For Eisenstadt, civilization symbolisms are designed to relieve the tension between the transcendent and the mundane regions. At this level, he operates with a binary structure. Civilizations exhibit various solutions to this tension: a contemplation of an other-worldly transcendence, characteristic of Hinduism and Buddhism; mundane ethical action in case of Confucianism and secularism, and the nexus between transcending and this worldly action. Thus in Islam there is a strong separation of military action and political practice from an ordered transcending orientation. Islam can accept Western modernization in military and other practical spheres. A different form of this nexus can be found in medieval Europe and early modernity, present in the interconnection of two salvations: the Faustian and the Promethean or this worldly and other-worldly salvation.

According to Eisenstadt, symbolisms are invented with a power to transform a social order, but the extent to which a transformation occurs depends on the direction taken by the social order. Framed by the tension between the transcending and the secular domain, the social order may tend toward the transcending and contemplative, or to this worldly, toward their separation or their nexus. Regarded socially, such moves depend on successive, symbolic separation of peripheral from central activities, and the vertical hierarchy of social positions. Given this symbolic arrangement there appear various possible alliances that can modify a civilization to yield a solution to this primal tension. In social settings, elites can ally themselves – the political and the religious; religious elites may ally themselves with some segments of a gullible population, and ruling elites might join the bureaucratic class. Of course if we introduce the factor of Western modernization that is entering every civilization, how would the binary tension address such a phenomenon? After all, modernization has both formal and ontological transcendences with neither being other worldly or perceptually this worldly.

A more serious issue appears with Eisenstadt's claim that civilizations mediate between other worldly transcendence and this worldly affairs. If a particular society, at the level of its fundamental symbolic designs, is identical with its civilization, then the notions of transcendence and worldliness belong to that civilization; in brief, civilization cannot be some sort of mediation between already given two realities. According to any scholar of civilizations, there are no factors that could be outside of them, and therefore all the founding conceptions, whether transcendence, resurgence, or nexus of the two are aspects of one civilization – in Eisenstadt's case, Mid Eastern civilization with some Western factors mixed in. Thus it is an obvious Western interpretation of India when he claims that Hinduism and Buddhism comprise transcendent and contemplative other worldliness. We should be cognizant that Buddha was not a divinity, and that he did not offer "salvation" in some other world.⁵ No one worships Buddha as if he could help to reach nirvana; the latter is a state of awareness that all is in flux, and that any effort to maintain a semblance of stability is *Maya*. The latter includes all Hindu "divinities" whose presence is available as long as we desire such presence. Moreover, such divinities are, in the main, symbolic of cosmos and not some entities to which humans can

appeal. Shiva, after all, is a cosmic dancer and symbolizes the entire dynamics of cosmos conceived as rhythmic, play-full, even divinities come and go – despite their longevity – as cosmic symbols. This means that the divinities do not “transcend” but are symbolic of the cosmic levels in which everything is involved; the humans are a momentary conjunction of playful, erotic, terrifying cosmic energies which will dissolve everyone back into the play of such energies.

There is a tacit consensus, since the beginning of modern Western thought and its end in post modernity, which it makes no sense to speak of “essences.” All the previous categories, regarded as revealing an essence of something, must be surrendered as mere constructs and, if they should be used, then only as conveniences and not representations of some ontological ground. Even such a venerable category of all modern theories as “matter” has dissolved into a zoological garden of particles, events, processes and even chaos. There is no such a thing as “human essence” or some essential difference between “organic” and “inorganic” processes. No arguments will be offered for or against this modern/postmodern “no essence” essentialist metaphysics, even if such arguments could be devastating to this metaphysics. What is at issue is not a quest for some relative or even ultimate reality but the varied phenomena of rituals and their role in human life. We shall not even give credence to Wittgenstein’s pronouncement that “humans are ritualistic beings.” After all, birds perform “ritual” dances in total solitude and hence without any purpose. Indeed, if rituals are to be understood in their “essence” without any presumption of all sorts of essences, including “human essence,” and its variant “human society,” then all the numerous metaphysics explaining ritual will have to become redundant or, to speak with some postmodern writers, just different forms of rhetorical rituals. In this sense everything is ritual and, resultantly, there are no rituals if they cannot be distinguished from another sphere of awareness. Yet it is equally undeniable that peoples of most diverse cultures engage in rituals without regarding everything as ritual. Just as most peoples, apart from Western postmodern metaphysics, see the difference between myths and fables, so do most peoples understand the mentioned difference between rituals and daily life. While it is impossible to explicate all the theories concerned with rituals, some of the basic prejudgments that pervade most theories will be offered.

Social Ethnology

With the dawn of modern Western metaphysics, social sciences promised to explain all forms of human life across continents and civilizations. The latter is taken to be the broadest social unit even if most of social researchers from the West of other peoples were concerned with small ethnic groups – the exotic – who would offer an “innocent” and primary structure of society and the “purity” of their rituals. In brief, we wished to understand the spiritual world of the primitives. Such a wish rests on the notion that all the modern complexities cover over the direct ritualistic awareness that is common to all societies practicing rituals. Of course, it is also methodologically admitted that there might be an unbridgeable gap between cultures, and between those that are contemporary and the primordial human societies. This is specifically obvious with respect to the mentioned “wish.” When an ethnologist wants to describe such an alien society, he engages in mystification. Yet it is also the case that such mystification is of the same status as an insight into an alien culture. During the process of acquiring an understanding, the experienced will be equally overwhelmed by the “originality” of its own and the other’s mode of being. This “originality” opens another “primal” awareness of being in a domain belonging neither to the “primitive” nor to the ethnographer, and yet being a condition for ethnographer’s research. Such a “primal awareness” dominates all theoretical imagination and can be deciphered in the texts of sociologists and ethnographers, such as the well known theoretician Durkheim and a field researcher Malinowski. They present a classic case both of theorizing and research and, in a final analysis, the limits that have not been transgressed either by social theory or ethnographic research. This is not to say that their efforts are irrelevant or to be discarded; rather, they become methodologically viable as ways of **tracing cosmic** awareness pervading rituals.

It is interesting to note that the other, as alien and difficult to understand need not be “the primitive” but can belong to the same society that splits into two irreconcilable groups, as happened in the French revolution. Without going into detail, for Durkheim all efforts at reconciliation failed, including the most famous promises by scientific sociology of

Comte who maintained that the progress of reason has moved beyond the primitive and the metaphysical and can offer “scientifically impartial” solutions to any social problem. 6 After all, neutrality can address any issue and find “rational harmony” in the consensus building among radically opposed parties. The obvious problem is with science: both sides, the revolutionaries of July 1830 till Paris Commune of 1871, and the bourgeoisie claimed scientific foundations for their positions and hence having neutrality as the ground for their divergent demands. In principle, no science can overcome social divisions, all the way to individual interests, and thus cannot yield collective solidarity. Thus, it might be necessary to reverse the premise of science that starts with divisions and begin with a community as the basic component of scientific research. After all, even if individuals are the concrete functions in a society, the latter transgresses individuals by its continuity and maintenance of self-identification for succession of generations. Any theoretical positing of collective consciousness is to be regarded epistemologically, since the reason for this postulation is recognition of the limitations of individual awareness which, as a matter of course, comprises a hindrance for social research. This move by Durkheim seems to offer a basis for his search for solidarity. This first move toward solidarity is possible because of modern division of social labor which, by its increased differentiation, also reveals increased interdependence and hence comprises automatic solidarity. Yet it is also well known that modern division of labor separates persons into classes and increasing differentiation, forcing each individual to look out for his well being – forcing the creation of selfish individualism and fragmentation. In brief, modern production does not offer solidarity.

Given this situation, social theorists and ethnographers have to seek for another ground of solidarity. While numerous researches were focused on mythologies, they did not seem to offer a solution, since they were at the level of imagination and stories and hence did not provide a more pure form of communal participation. While myths were equated with religion, for Durkheim one must discover “primal religion” given in rituals wherein mythological stories would provide support but not a basis for such a “religion.” Fortunately for social theorists, seeking to understand the means to maintain social solidarity, were offered ethno-

graphic evidence of “primary” religious rituals which, in their “purity” would provide a standard for all variants of solidarity. Here one has to rely on the researches of aborigines by ethnographers such as Spencer, Gillen, Strehlow, and especially Frazer who named the primal “religion:” **totemism**. Totemic cults belong to clans and are characterized by a specific name that is not individual but accrues to the clan and is drawn from some natural being whose name also designates an entire type of beings and not an individual entity. The totem can be embodied in an emblem, whether it is some sketch in sand, a piece of uniquely shaped wood, a polished stone. During a ritual the members of a clan attempt to transform themselves into a semblance of the totem which, of course, has a “higher” standing and requires of the clan members to reach for its likeness: thus the need in rituals for costumes, paints, hair styles, adornments, all the way to body transformations. The chosen object that is inhabited by the totem is “holy.” Here holiness is not some unique characteristic of the object, but what is “engraved” in it as a symbol that elevates it to an entirely different dimension.

But totem alone, with its magical name, is not the sole source of ritual; in background there appears the ruling “ancient” who has “called” the clan or tribe into being; he gets invested with materially recognizable shape and guarantees identity to his “descendants.” The most significant attention of the tribe focuses on its “holy” possessions whose loss would spell total disorientation and destitution of all life from which the tribe could never recover. The reason for such a shocking state is this: there would be a loss of a tension and correlation between the “sacred” and the profane. This tension/correlation is present in all rituals and comprises the division of life into the holy and mundane. Religions take the experienced world and divide it in two dimensions to which all things belong. The sacred things are those that are protected by edicts and separation. Mundane things must not mix with the sacred and must be strictly separated from them. It is, of course, obvious that the mundane things are invested with the rules of the sacred region through which they find a place in the group’s life. While the sacred things may look as any other, their special place as sacred gives them a special status. Rituals belong to the rules of action in face of the sacred things and also in important social relationships, such as marriage, social position, and even procre-

ation. While the separation between these domains is deemed absolute, power comes from the totemic side.

It is significant that the basic aspect of "religion" is neither the belief in gods, spirits, or natural things; to have a religious experience is more than some passing thing, image or uncommon appearance; it is rather bound on a constant, even if experienced as alien energy, force, that can flow in and pervade all awareness, including feelings, and power that can set a member of a clan or the clan itself above all things. It is totally impersonal force that enters into play and propagates itself through things. Holy things are those that have been touched and pervaded by this anonymous force. Among the prototypes of this awareness are Melanesian *Mana* or the *Wakan* and *Orenda* of North American native tribes. The encounter with this alien force is given solely in a trans-individual sphere. According to theorists of social organization and to ethnographers, this special sphere is that of social life which is forever present and inescapable among the clans and tribes of Australian aborigines. The awakened energies appear far superior to the singular and compel the individual to accept them as of extra-human origin. Such an experience is possible when the singular is transformed; the normal, daily routine, that seems to be inescapable, becomes overturned and the singular is moved by forces which no longer allow the individual to recognize himself. When this transformation propagates itself through all members, there appears a collective transformation as a birth of religion. It could be said that at this moment social life swings between ritualistic movement and daily habits. In the latter, all surroundings have specific expressive characteristics that are habitually recognizable: some are attractive, some disgusting, others imposing, distant, loveable, boring, exciting, and so on. Yet with ritual arise entirely different characteristics wherein the surroundings and the humans transform themselves; humans and things are no longer "themselves." The adornments, the masks, movements, nonsensical shouts, reveal this radical transformation and entrance into a different sphere. Here everything is intense, vibrant, uncanny, pervaded by forces invisible in daily life. To enter this sphere he must engage in ritual and thus become totally other with extraordinary powers, modes of being and feeling.

How is it that these forces must assume a totemic form? It is said that an animal or a plant lends its name to a tribe and acts as a protective

presence. In the presence of its name, the members of a tribe are awed and transpose their feelings of awe, force, and extraordinary sense of unity with the animal in a way that the animal becomes a symbol possessing this force. Totem is a creature that shifts toward a symbolic presence through ritual transformation of the members of the tribe. They all become one with the totem animal and thus belong one to the others as the children of the same founding elder. Yet the totem elicits much more than just cohesion of the tribe. All things become members of the tribe, from grasses to stars, such that each has a place and destiny in the tribal rituals. In ritual humans become one with the totemic animal, with the creatures of the waters, with trees of the forests, with shapes of hills and desert dunes. There appears, then a genealogical relationship between completely diverse things which comprise a bond of solidarity across the universe and reveal trans-human characteristics – compacted into some symbol. In the ritual presence of the totem one does not have a part of the surrounding nature as a property or possession of the tribe. The tribe itself is brought into a cosmic totality; in the presence of the totem nature, society and cosmos close into a symbolic oneness. This means that the things that are outside of daily needs become involved in all human affairs and comprise a system of signs where each thing points to all other things and thus mutually assign their rank and order. All of the cosmos is designed, according to social theories, to master nature, either through magic or science, in favor of human social continuity, solidarity, and well being. Speaking for all social theorists, Luhmann points out that under this interpretation the cosmic sense of ritual is, as a matter of course, premised on “purposive rationality.”⁸ Contemporary biology does not even notice its methodological embodiment of modern metaphysics of the will into “laws” of genetic substance. The genetic “drives” use everything as means – including rituals – to proliferate a continuity of a given species. Hence ritual and its promotion of “social solidarity” guarantee the continuation of the species and not the individual. Here even biological events follow “purposive rationality.”

Is it possible to extricate the understanding of rituals from such an interpretation? Another researcher who has pushed his investigations of the “others” to the limit is Malinowski. He notes that every ritual, beginning with primal magic to funeral rites, from initiation and baptism to

holy mass, comprise primordial wonder. The general understanding that all rituals must contain a basic wonder, cannot be regarded as some phenomenon of human infancy or primitive ignorance as an effort to explain the world in a pseudo-scientific manner. Humans require wonder due to their concrete experience of their physical and psychological limitations and the efforts to break out of such limits that is their experience of death. And myths, enacted in rituals, are the way that one experiences reality. ⁹ Thus they are not fictions but lived awareness which arose out of its own accord “in immemorial times” and continue to be lived as the most basic formations of social life. All the social rules and roles, the edicts and sanctioning are mythological. Myth appears in ritual anytime rules of life require legitimating. Thus mythical stories present a primordial, grander and more relevant reality by which the contemporary life, destiny and activities of humans are determined. Indeed, myths provide the very motives for living and dying. While in the West there is a notion that such legitimating and rules are historical, for primal mythical life they are “mythical chart” and are present in all rituals and indeed daily life. After all, the telling of the stories of the “ancient ones” is contemporaneous with the modes of life of a tribe or a “community” of believers. It is more so if the rituals and their mythical stories are to be regarded cosmically where the paths of the planets, the stars, sun, the seasons, are also intertwined in the rituals and stories. These are the primal backgrounds of today’s astrology and astronomy, wherein both weave in the cosmic paths in their own discourses. Indeed, every piece of landscape, every rock or bush, every murmur of the brook is inhabited by spirits, persons, heroes, dangerous or benevolent forces such that the landscape is pervaded with meaning. Here the meaning is not projected by individuals but is found, rediscovered as obvious and “natural.” From this follows that human activities, such as gardening, raising of animals and children, growing old and healing, must belong and adhere to the entire mythical chart in order to be meaningful, appropriate and successful.

Be that as it may, neither myths nor rituals are identical with the world of mundane things that fulfill human direct survival needs. Even if ritual is interpreted purposively, it still traces a domain that has no purposive features. This is the case can be surmised from the way that even

“higher beings” that inhabit this “sacred domain” have a place in the cosmos, but are not sources of it. We should also recall that the methodological issue opened a question of a primal awareness that appears at the moment of encounter with the culturally other. There opens up a background that allows for the identity of each and their difference in such a way that the latter is broader than either culture. Another concern that shows up is the way the best efforts of social theorists and ethnographers introduce into other cultural worlds, without any critical evaluation, specific concepts: survival of the tribe, practical needs, death experience and the symbolic efforts to transcend it, and even a two world hypothesis. In this context, the methodological questions cannot be avoided, specifically those that touch interpretation of others. Since the others, including their rituals and myths, comprise a “text,” then the latter must be understood in its own “context.” For Western understanding this also means that each text is located in its own historical context. If the researcher lives in his own historical and cultural context, and uses the latter to interpret all others, then he commits the mistake of reading the others out of his and not their own contexts and, resultantly, does not recognize the other. Moreover, the horizon of the researcher absorbs the other without residua and therefore does not open a required difference between his and the other’s culture and fails to disclose a more fundamental awareness that does not belong to either, although is a condition for the recognition of both in their differences. Across all methodological requirements, whether positivistic, hermeneutical, semiotic or even phenomenological, there appears a “background” awareness that has no specific location or cultural determination.

First manner in which this background appears is a researcher’s awareness of his/her own limitations, individual, cultural and theoretical; such a limitation is a reflective moment from the other, even if the ways of living of the other are initially proclaimed to be incomprehensible, totally alien and dramatically objectionable. Second point appears if and when the researcher attempts to “explain” the other and discovers that the ways of the other resist and are resilient to any explanation. For example, the head hunters of Iran Jaya cannot be explained by the most revered theories of the West, from modern through postmodern, even when the rituals of the head hunters would seem to have a “purpose.” All

the modern libidinal, economic, all the postmodern desire laden proclamations of the French, shattered on the spears and holism of these hunters. In brief, the latter set an absolute limit to purposive and even causal explanations. Third aspect shows up when the other and the researcher recognize their differences from each other and, through the differences, their own identity; the latter is not a clear or sharp awareness, but simply an amorphous presence that indicates a sense of things as belonging to a different cosmos. It is not the things present to perception that are different, not the divinities/demons shining through masks or deploying the dancing limbs, but their sense, their origin and destiny that appear framed in and on a background that does not coincide with the researcher's understanding. And we suspect what this vague background is a cosmos that cannot be signified or subsumed under any purposes, since all purposes are only a minor aspect within this cosmic background. Thus, a fourth way to understand the cosmos deployed in rituals is to note an essential presence of purposeless phenomena. This may be evidenced in a spontaneous deviation of gestures-movements from those prescribed by ritualistic purposes or movements that simply articulate the bodily possibilities without any of them pointing to any specific end. Most importantly, the rituals in most cases do not achieve their supposed purpose and turn out to be a mere habitual performance. As someone suggested, the "shouting of words" in face of a volcano never stopped the volcano, and any intelligent cat would spit at such a nonsensical human preoccupation. And yet the preoccupation continues as if it made sense and achieved its purpose. Thus we are left with a question of the "essence" of ritual beyond any purposes.

My venerable teacher, E. Fink, wrote a text entitled "Spiel als Welt-symbol" wherein "symbol" here does not represent anything, does not signify a place, a time or a being in a world, but is the world wherein the purposes, directions, times and places can make sense. I shall not articulate his thesis, but take of from where he left of. What is central for understanding of ritual is that it is a symbolic activity which is a direct presence of the world in its self-articulation. To make this clear, a distinction has to be made between all sorts of metaphysics/ontologies and world. It has been maintained through most varied and numerous disciplines, from philosophy, theology, sciences, that all understanding

must have “reasons” which account for human activity. In most cases such reasons are ascribed to “purposes.” Why do we have rituals? Because they serve a purpose to hold a society together, or to defeat our fear of death, or to defeat the enemies, and to maintain our health. It is equally the case that the achievement of purposes requires means, such that the latter comprise appropriate sequence of causal powers. Such a sequence is semiotic, where one thing is a sign pointing to other things and thus has a meaning. This metaphysical account is coextensive with the most primitive magic wherein activity disappears, since any causal sequence abolishes the very awareness of activity and replaces it with simple movement in space and time. Only when the activity becomes symbolic that it extricates itself from purposive causal series and appears in its own right as self-deployment without a purpose. To speak philosophically, it is possible to show that there is a radical difference between purposive-causal interrelationships present through signs and an activity of founding whose aim is itself and as an activity it cannot be subjected to any purposes for “the sake of ” which our “movements” are performed. Movements of a body belong to an “organized body” while action comprises articulated body which is a deviation from and redundant to organized body. The latter is symbolic as a presence of activity over movement and of world over the sum of things and purposes. Ritualistic body is an active-articulated body that directly presents the world; it could be regarded as playful without “play intention.”

In the previously discussed totemism, the first intimation is the abolition of the singular in its identity with the powers of some animal – a bear – but in its very identity the singular becomes “all things” and everywhere-every time such that the primacy is placed on non-positional relationships whose presence as a cosmos is without direction or purpose. Hence every magical ritual is a symbolic transparent with the whole. All sorcery, enchantment, bewitchment work in this way. This means that all culturally comprised activities, as articulated-ritualistic body, obtain cosmic transparency. While numerous metaphors are used, wherein the activity is interpreted as a Mask of some other being, another world, more basically ritual activity is a direct trace of a cosmos. How are we to understand the latter is a protracted problematic in myth, science, and philosophy. Without entering into protracted arguments with an entire

tradition of great figures, human and divine, one thing can be claimed without a contradiction: under whatever interpretation, cosmos is an a priori condition of every human thinking and action, of every divine, demonic, and mythological presence; all of them depend on a cosmos wherein they assume their places, destinies, purposes and deaths.

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CHAPTER III

HERMENEUTICS

The term “hermeneutics” was coined in the Seventeenth Century. The philosophical lexicon by Rudolph Gocklenius, *Lexicon Philosophicum*, (1613) contains an article on hermeneutics under the Greek term “hermeneia”. It shows the function of this term in medieval theology and jurisprudence, and shows its technical uses. Its earlier forms appeared in Greek thought, inclusive of Plato and Aristotle. In Plato’s *Laws* there is a discussion of arts, one of which is interpretation; it attempts to illuminate the cryptic sayings of divinities without making any claim to truth. In Aristotle one mode of speaking is interpretive. Subsequently hermeneutics was developed into an auxiliary discipline of philosophy, theology, and jurisprudence, devising specific rules for the explication of texts. This development also included major crises of Western thought, specifically during various confrontations of distinct texts and traditions. There was a confrontation between Hellenic allegorical thought with the Judeo-Christian historical-prophetic orientation. It appeared in the efforts to transmit Greek education to the Latin world in order to overcome linguistic barriers. Hermeneutics appeared in the efforts to pass on to subsequent century’s Roman jurisprudence, Greek philosophy, and Biblical texts. Finally, the efforts were made by Schlegel and Schleiermacher to free hermeneutics from its auxiliary role and present it as a universal theory of understanding.

The general view that hermeneutics presents is that all explicit human thought, including philosophy, is founded on an implicit understanding. Such an understanding includes all divisions of human thought and activity, from philosophy, through psychology, arts, sociology, religion, economy, to physical sciences to the extent that the latter assume human understanding and also the divisions of the world into specific domains implicit in this understanding. This means that the understanding contains implicit prejudgments as divisions of various domains that sciences and humanities take for granted. Such an understanding is much broader than any area of sciences and humanities. Moreover, it must deal with other domains, such as architecture, since they too are aspects of human world and have an architectural and social meaning. Indeed, it has been

suggested that architecture is a concrete embodiment of a given social “spacial” system. The arrangements of human life into socially assigned roles is evident in the places and hierarchies that humans occupy in their architectural places. Hence, the understanding of architecture requires the prejudgments of social divisions of a given population. The exposition of the various prejudgments is the task of hermeneutics.

At the level of prejudgments, various writers divide hermeneutics into specific philosophical domains. Thomas Seebohm, for example, claims that hermeneutics can be divided into four basic concerns: first is the methodological concern for interpreting texts. As we shall see, this concern is very important because the understanding of a given text is a complex process of deciphering of layers of meaning. Second is the conception of a general theory of understanding. Can understanding be universal and include all traditions, or is it bound to a specific tradition and its prejudgments? Is the meaning of “understanding” as interpretation limited to theoretical concerns of the Western philosophy and its various divisions into sciences, humanities, and their subdivisions, or can it cover prejudgments of other traditions? The reason for these concerns appears in the studies of other traditions. For example, Indian tradition might have prejudgments wherein the division into sciences and humanities is not a given; that tradition might divide the world into cosmic eroticism and practical action in terms of powers and the search for ultimate dissolution of the individual. Hence, the term “understanding” might be “particular universal” stemming from the Western tradition. Third is the sense philosophical hermeneutics of fundamental ontology wherein a question is raised of the meaning of **Being** in distinction to the varieties of beings that are in the world. It is claimed that the entire Western thought is premised on this distinction. Subsequently we shall suggest arguments why and how such a distinction arose and why it is significant. Fourth addresses the question of interpretation of symbols that attempt to “read” the domains of the latent and the unconscious. Here one could have psychoanalysis, both Freudian and Jungian, and various types of mythological and mystical pronouncements. As a fifth, we could include historical hermeneutics. This type is concerned with temporal development of some text that contains problems and their continuous resolutions. The resolutions may open entirely different conceptions that were not available in the original text. An example of this type

would be the development of a particular science, such as geometry from Euclidean to Non-Euclidean. The latter opens up the conception of space that is very different from the Euclidean. It is claimed, nonetheless, that a full understanding of Non-Euclidean geometry requires a historical study of Euclidean type and the non-necessity of some of its postulates. We shall discuss these hermeneutical types and issues in greater detail.

First, let us learn some essential aspects of the methodical type of hermeneutics. This type was already known in classical Greek philosophy as the “art of grammar.” It included grammar in the narrow sense of the word, but also other aspects for the professional interpretation of texts, such as philology and under it rhetoric. The development of modern methodic hermeneutics led to the construction of specific rules (in professional terms they are called “canons”) that were regarded as essential for objective understanding of texts. The first rule states that a text must be understood in the context of the contemporary public and not in the context of the interpreter. The argument is this: while the meaning of terminology of a text might be clear for the contemporary audience, an intervening historical distance would surely add other meanings and hence create distortions. This is important not only for the interpretation of texts from different historical periods, but also for translations of one language into another.

The second rule (canon) states that the understanding of the whole of the text presupposes the understanding of the parts and conversely. At times this is called the “hermeneutical circle.” This rule also implies that the parts and wholes relationship is larger than the parts and the whole of a text. The text is also a part of a whole language and its social and cultural context of a given historical period. Now we can be more precise and say that this rule consists of four divisions: first, the whole to which a text belongs is a language in which the text is written. Second is the historical context in which the language and the text belong. We have to understand the events of the times to which the text and the language refer. The third whole is the totality of the works written by an author in its temporal and historical unfolding. This whole is represented by a style of an author or a school of authors (the specific use of language characteristic of an author or a school, and the changes in the style of such texts that are still recognizable to be of the same author or school). Fourth is the whole as a text and the parts that belong to it. These divisions are arranged in a hierarchy

of relationships. The first is called "grammatical" level, the second is the "historical" level, the third is called the "individual" level, and the fourth is called the "generic" level. At this level one investigates the genre and the intentions of the authors. The first and second are subsumed under the concept of "lower hermeneutics," while third and fourth belong to the "higher hermeneutics." This conceptualization, as we shall see presently, has a very serious purpose regarding the truth and the falsity of texts or their parts.

What writers on methodical hermeneutics propose to demonstrate is not whether a text or its parts are true or false in some epistemological or ontological sense concerning "reality," but to what extent we can trust our reading of texts in a surer way with respect to their historical contexts. This means that we cannot guarantee a true interpretation of a text, but we can show that a given text is interpreted in a false way. What does this mean? If we read an author's or a particular writing school's text (higher hermeneutics), we cannot say whether our interpretation of the text is true with respect to its historical and linguistic context. Yet we can say with certainty that the text is false since it does not belong in the context of the given language or other texts (lower hermeneutics). It must be noted that the terms "true" and "false" are not used in an ordinary sense of a proposition that refers to a state of affairs, events, facts, and even "reality." For methodical hermeneutics these terms play a role in the interpretation of texts. Hence, if you were to say that you are reading a text of Homer, with all sorts of heroes and divinities, we would not ask you to prove the existence of such heroes or divinities; we would ask you to check whether the text is Homeric. Does it fit in the ancient Greek context, ancient Greek language, and other Greek texts that might depict similar heroic and mythological events. If the text does not fit, then your interpretation of it as Homeric is false. While this text might have an author and belong to a genre (higher hermeneutics), it is falsified by the context, language, and other texts of a historical period (lower hermeneutics). This procedure can be applied even to singular terms as parts of a text.

It is also important to point out that methodic hermeneutics must be separated from a critical engagement with a text. If you wish to review the text analytically and critique it for logical inconsistencies, or argue that various claims seem outlandish, unbelievable, and even nonsensical; such an effort has left the parameters of methodical hermeneutics. Before

this type of engagement you must figure out what this text says in its own language, its relationship to other texts of its time. But here we must point to an exception. Critical approach can apply to a very specific type of texts: methodical hermeneutics calls such texts **eminent** or works of geniuses. Writers such as Plato, Kant, Jung, Newton, Peirce, set a novel tone to human thinking. It would be very difficult to place them in their own linguistic contexts and in relation to other texts of their historical period. Eminent texts are ones to which we refer as if they comprised a new beginning, a set of options previously unavailable and even incomprehensible. We can notice how such great figures struggled to invent vocabularies, styles of expression, and arguments to make their cases. This is not to say that they do not bear traces of previous thinkers and their writings; rather, they took such writings and gave them a different context and meaning. Who could think, after Newton, about the rotations of the moon and falling apples without interpreting them in terms of the laws of gravity?

We should refine the issue of what comprises an eminent text. While major civilization traditions agree in general about the great texts (for example the set of fifty plus selected writings called *The Great Books of the Western World*), various cultural groups within this civilization may hold one of their texts to be eminent. Thus, one cultural group of this civilization holds *The New Testament* to be an eminent text, while some other cultural group may regard Hitler's *Mein Kampf* as an eminent text. Usually these types of texts are a basis for a faithful followers and are formed around a personality who comprises a focus for personality cults. Methodical hermeneutics must treat all such cultural eminent texts as equivalent. No doubt, one group will claim that the eminent text of the other group is false, immoral, mystical, and even evil. All that we can say methodologically is whether such texts are understandable for the audiences to which they are addressed and the temporal context wherein such texts are articulated.

The next type of hermeneutics is concerned with the question of Being. The reason that this type of hermeneutics becomes significant rests on the awareness of the differences between things, events, states of affairs, all sorts of objectivities and subjectivities, in short beings and Being. Being must be explicated in its own right apart from explanations of the totality of things, events, etc. While the difference has been noted since the ancient Greek thought, beginning most likely with Parmenides, its current hermeneutical

interest was influenced by Martin Heidegger. Let us look at the way that this difference has arisen and what sorts of problems it presents. In Western tradition, it is common to inquire about things, objects and events in order to discover “what” they are, their essential nature or structure. It is taken for granted that when we ask “What is a human,” or “What is matter” or “What is a mind” we can give definitions that capture some essential characteristics of these beings. The Greek philosophers, nevertheless, noticed a specific and significant problem: language indicates that whenever we attempt to define any being, we not only attempt to discover its basic characteristics, but we also say that such a being IS. Apart from having some essential features, every being somehow participates in **Being**. In turn, the latter is different from any particular being and its characteristics.

Given this state of affairs, the ancient Greeks took on the task of devising the ways to understand this **being** that is different from all other beings. They were certain that there is a radical difference between beings and BEING, but then, according to Heidegger, they made a fatal mistake: they asked the same question that they used to interpret all beings: What is Being. The point is this: if **Being** is different from all beings, then it is inappropriate to ask the same question of **Being** that we ask of beings. And yet since the same question was asked, then **Being** was interpreted in terms of “What” and hence the essential differences between beings and **Being** was lost. **Being** became one of the beings, even if it was designated as the “highest” being. Because of the interpretation of everything, including **Being** in terms of “what something is”, the difference was forgotten and the question of **Being** was neglected.

What are the options to ask the question of **Being** without interpreting it in terms of the “what” of beings? First, we can notice one specific option in human knowledge: either we know the essence of beings eternally, or we know such beings temporally. If we accept the first option, then our search for knowledge would end as soon as we have propositions purporting to give “and essential truth” of any being once and for all. But no one, so far, has given us such a truth. This is evident from history: many truths were offered and none of them survived critical debates. Hence, the second option can be taken as more plausible: the essence of any being is temporal and hence our knowledge is open to a range of possibilities. This means that if we speak about a specific

being and want to know what it is, we are also in a position to open the future possibilities of what else can this being be. In this sense, we can speak of **Being** as an open horizon of future possibilities of the **Being** of beings. Any final propositions are open to possible future challenges.

What is significant in this conception of the relationship of beings and **Being** is the inclusion of us as beings that are not definable essentially, but are open to the possibilities of our future being. We too are temporal and temporary. The implications of this interpretation are important. First, all our future possibilities are temporal, and we cannot escape our own temporal being. This means that the closest possibility that we must accept is our own non-being – death. Second, the possibility of death also implies that our knowledge of “all the future possibilities of being”, is also limited. In this sense, we cannot claim to have understood all the options of our future, and the possibilities of all beings. Third, in face of this situation, we cannot postpone our current commitments, since tomorrow might not come. The possibility of our non-being demands that we live fully at the present.

The next hermeneutical conception is that of the *latent*. Various aspects of human understanding belong here. The psychological domain of interpreting dreams is preeminent in this area. The efforts to understand mythological symbols, and symbolic understanding in general are part of this area. Also, the efforts to articulate hidden meaning in scientific work, such as parallel universe theories, suggesting that what we are attempting to understand can only be expressed by mathematical models that can never be verified. We know that something is there, but we shall never see it, apart from our mathematical formulations. In general terms, what is not present in some empirical fashion but is given by inference can claim symbolic status.

Civilizational Hermeneutics

The task of explicating hermeneutics, appropriate to the study of civilizations and their relationships, can be aided by some well known terminological markers, such as “historically effective consciousness,” or “efficient history,” in which every interpreter stands and into which the interpreter converges. Moreover, such efficient history, in most general terms, comprises a tradition, and in still more general terms, a tradition is a theory, regardless of how many theories are within it. This claim is not made ligh-

tly: it rests on the arguments that there is no such fortune as to allow us to access “the reality” and that all claims to such an access are interpretations; there are no phenomena that are not interpreted. In this sense to be imbedded in a tradition is to be immersed in a theory. Given this state of affairs, the first question that hermeneutics asks is this: when does a tradition end or, shall we say, when the tradition of a particular text ends. The following numerous answers fit as an answer offered by hermeneutics.

1. A tradition ends, in the simplest sense, with the last person who refers to the text, or in the present in which the question is raised. Any other position, which in any way refers to the text, such as reading someone else’s work about it stands, at the present, in the efficient history. If this is the case, then there will never be a “true” or final interpretation, unless all references to the text cease. Methodological hermeneutics could only point out some errors, but cannot say that the interpretation is a correct one. This is to say, methodical hermeneutics can only “falsify” by showing that the lower cases of this hermeneutics, such as the grammatical and the historical levels, resist the addition of readings to the text that these levels do not permit. Thus a mistake in grammar, or a meaning of a term in its context, is a wrong reading; but there is no final say about the right reading. Most hermeneutics, at this level, usually regard a tradition that contains “eminent” texts to which other texts refer. It is to be emphasized that the term “true” or correct has no trans-textual meaning. It is simply stated that a text about another text can be falsified, but never verified once and for all. What is significant is that other peoples of the same tradition might claim that there are other eminent texts that the first, eminent texts and their interpretation would regard as unfit, evil, unwarranted, and completely false: De Sade, Hitler, etc. Yet no doubt, some literary traditions will consider such texts as eminent and true. Two such traditions can coexist, and they may coexist by mutual references to each other as false. In this case, there might not be a convergence of a horizon, unless another interpretation attempts to unify them: historical-philological method might attempt such a feat by claiming neutrality.

Speaking more concretely, some of the traditional texts tend to fade out, cease to function as “significant” in a given context, and thus the only

preservation that is accorded to them is done by philological method. The latter can be a catalyst for various renaissances of texts – a sort of archaic movements that proclaim the genuine truths that have been forgotten and neglected. New ageism have this tendency, yet such tendencies are always destructive – as one modification of the thirteenth hermeneutic – to the extent that the “dead languages,” although preserved by philological method in archival depositories, are framed in the current living languages and hence are taken out of their own contexts. They are a species that have vanished, and reappear only in a dramatically reconstructed genetic pool. For example, after the Renaissance, Scientific and Political Enlightenment, and Reformation, medieval literature virtually vanished. What sealed its fate in the past and the libraries of the monasteries was that the art of printing became the means of communication. The literature of the Renaissance was correlated to and had a direct access to this new technology. The rest was consigned to manuscripts which, apart from being written in a peculiar Latin, also contained numerous abbreviations and other peculiarities, and was nigh impossible to decipher. What we have as “Neo-Scholasticism” is a concoction of parts into a whole that belongs to our reading, to our modern age.

This might become clearer if we compare another tradition similar to the one above. The cultic reformist and mystical dervish movement entered a region and dominated cultural life. The literary tradition which belonged to that region was suppressed as false, godless, and evil; it was the tradition of *Fall-safa*, the philosophers. Algazzalis eminent text, *The Destruction of the Philosophers*, marks the beginning of the end. The literature of the philosophers survived and was influential only in Latin translation in Europe. The texts in Arabic are still there, packed away, but until very recently only western scholars had a philological interest in them. There were in the 19th. and first half of the 20th. century, no Arabic arabists interested in some kind of systematic edition of the FALSFA. In this sense, the basis for a revival of *Falsafa* is still missing, and even if it occurs, the intersection of modern philosophical literature will frame the questions of that tradition in different wholes.

Here, we can formulate the first canon of civilizational hermeneutic: **a suppressed tradition fades out and its revival spells the death of its unity, since it will be framed by a context alien to it. In brief, the power for its survival will be borrowed.**

1. There is a death of a tradition by violence: one culture conquers another and suppresses it completely, specifically if the conquering culture has a monopoly of text production. One example is what happened to Mediterranean culture after Doric invasion. Worldviews, values, truths here belong to the sphere of myths. What we know about the old culture comes from archeology, such as the palaces of CRETE, or the ruins of TROY. But the contents of their way of life are given us in Greek mythology. We have to guess, surmise, infer by indirection to get some diffused notion of the *chthonic* goddesses and gods. It is of note that the very term *chthonic* is already a demeaning word: goddesses and gods of the dead, of the world of shades, of the underworld. It is a world that we can imagine, dream about, but not access. The maternal, as the underworld, is regarded here, as conquered. It lives in shapes of monsters and Minotaurs. This life nonetheless exercises a power that the conquering tradition cannot help but borrow in order to preserve its own vitality. This borrowing appears in numerous revitalizing rituals, wherein the conquering tradition must increase and invest its energies in maintaining the vigilance against those powerful foes, the demons to be suppressed, expiated, and yet demons inhabit the very image and dominate the recesses of the psyche.
2. Another, and perhaps more dramatic example of the conquering culture appear in the confrontation of Rome with the Celtic and Druid traditions. Rome tolerated the myths of others, as long as the others obeyed the secular goddess – Rome itself. Yet this tolerance had a limit. Britain was conquered by Claudius, well educated and most tolerant emperor – at least in comparison to others, such as Nero or Caligula. Thus what happened is not a result of excesses of a power hungry and deranged personality, but one that expressed the best in the character of Roman culture. Claudius' edicts were simple: myths, which promoted the practice of human sacrifice, and promoted head hunting, have to be eradicated, because they are inhuman, false to the nature of persons, and to the laws of peoples (*jus gentium*). Thus the eradication of the druids began, ending with their destruction. After Rome accepted the cult of Christianity, the latter completed the task; it

was better equipped than the Romans at extermination. Except for few archeological traces and few medieval SA-GAS, which are less than what is left of pre-Doric world, we know nothing apart from the Mists of Avalon. These examples allow us to formulate the second rule of comparative civilization hermeneutic:

The principle issue of this type of hermeneutic is: in case of the confrontation of the Doric with the early Mediterranean, the Doric culture had only a rudimentary literary culture. Thus a partial merger of motifs was possible in the medium of more tolerant and less controllable oral tradition. But in the case of the clash between Rome and the Celts, the latter had no literary tradition, while Rome had a highly developed one which had a grammatical and syntactical permanence that allowed what is possible and what is not. Second rule: **A complete and irrevocable suppression, leaving almost no traces, presupposes that the new tradition has a total control of the production and preservation of texts.** The same happens if the suppression is done by conquest, specifically in conquered places. Nothing was left after the conquest of Byzantium by Turks, i.e. by Islam, although the literatures survived outside the region, some in Russia, and some in the West. Similar case could be made for the **reconquista** in Spain, whose literatures survived in Islam outside of Spain. Yet the suppression of the culture locally was as radical as it could be. The suppressed tradition denied the power to the other – the death of self identity.

3. A more complex case, where the other retains power in very fascinating ways, is present in the confrontation of cultures that possess literary traditions. One main example, in the Western world, is the case of Christianity: first by the breakdown and a conquest of Rome by a mid-eastern cultures, and then the rejection in Rome of its own literary tradition, and that means of the Hellenic tradition, Christianity rejects and suppresses paganism, and more precisely the literary traditions of Hellenism which were more than pagan. This literary tradition was subsumed under the title “paganism” shows the virulence of this suppression. We surmise that large amount of texts, of which we know only the titles, are lost forever.

The suppression was well defend by the apologists, the early church fathers and the early councils before Christianity became secular power. The acts of destruction followed, most significant among which was the burning of the library of Alexandria. This is to say, in order to root out Hellenism, it was not enough to destroy the temples. A literary tradition had to be destroyed. Therefore, the burning of libraries, books, and the producers of books became an enduring tradition. The end of this destruction is marked by the forced expulsion of philosophers and Hellenistic scholars from Athens and other capitals by Justinian. They went to Persia, and via this exodus the cultural heritage of Hellas could have its renaissance in medieval scholasticism and later in European renaissance. Plato was back on the scene. The suppression of other literary traditions – at times called heretical – is a characteristic Christian attitude toward other literary traditions. This attitude, having become a tradition, can be adopted and extended by cultural influences. Thus in the twentieth century the Russian Revolution engaged in the destruction of texts as well as the writers of them; Nazis did the same, and Chinese cultural revolution repeated this Christian tradition. In this sense, 20th. century has seen some of the most archaic methods to deal with literary traditions that are regarded as condemnable.

Let us return to the other modification, i.e. a confrontation of two traditions that are literary, yet incapable of complete destruction. This is the case at another level when Christian efforts to destroy completely the Greco-Roman tradition had to “internalize” some of the latter. How does the supervening tradition “store” suppressed texts, or what is suppressed in texts, for further use This is possible due to the fact that in a given literary tradition there is a split up into rivals among texts. Thus in the West, the initial rivalry is between cultic texts and philosophy/science. Here, Plato called the poet the **hermeneus** of the gods and the **rhapsodies** the hermeneus of the poet. In *Epinomis* Plato speaks of the hermeneutical art as necessary to interpret signs as portents of the future, and also to interpret the laws of the first law givers. Since the poet, as a producer of myths among Greeks is also a prophet, there is a claim that hermeneus combines a literary and legal traditions. This articulation is given by a philosopher and is immediately followed by partial, yet basic suppression. The hermeneus does not know the word and the truth which is revealed to him; the law givers might be deceitful or hermeneus might be inadequate to the task of

revealing the true meaning of law or divine edicts. But then who knows the truth, the philosopher? The critique of mythology assumed its radical finality by Stoics and Epicureans. Not only that myth does not have a place in philosophy, but that they are false and immoral.

This was the Hellenistic civilization which also dominated the Roman Empire. Here, (1) political and legal tradition and power separated itself from other literary traditions. Thus in the Roman Empire one could follow any literary tradition as long as one recognized that the political and juridical tradition existed separately and needed no justification from any other tradition. (2) The literary tradition of philosophy internalized mutual rejection, although not suppression of other truths. We love Plato and Aristotle, but we love wisdom more, and hence can argue against either or both. (3) A new morphology emerged: uncommitted reports of all kinds of facts, events, and opinions. The Hellenistic tradition, and through it the Roman empire, internalized diverse literary traditions which became a topic of “histories.” What these histories required is a new “art” to manage them, and thus to have a unified literary tradition; the latter became philology. The modern renaissance, as universal wisdom, originates with the ancient art of grammar – the philological hermeneutics. Here, the ideal of humanity and empire became identical and Claudius, who went after the Celts, was its exemplary expression.

Having become mid-eastern, Rome’s church fathers rejected the Hellenistic tradition, although they were educated in it. By winning, they had to use the techniques of the conquered, and the technique was the art of grammar to be applied to the scriptures. The second move was determined by the principle of **hairesis**. But to identify a heresy one needs logic to show the differences between true and false. Technology for this was offered by classical philosophy – such as modified Aristotelian categories. The result: rigid system of dogmas. In this context, most of the philosophical heritage, that found its way in Christian heritage, appears in disguise. What happens to this heritage is well exemplified in Slavic literature; there no sources were available to make comparisons, and hence all the traces of Hellenistic tradition were regarded as authentic ideas of church fathers. Yet these very ideas had the power to initiate Renaissance.

Here, a new system was developed that became a tradition. A set of texts in writing was developed by highly educated persons. These texts

were also designed to eliminate **heresies** and thus to determine rigid standards for all aspects of life. Compared to Hellas, this was archaic, since its center had one eminent text, purportedly reporting an eminent event: the New Testament. Eminent text is constantly appealed to as the final arbiter of all other claims. This means that the text becomes dominating and exclusive. Yet, as just pointed out, it already incorporated the logics of the philosophers both as rigorous means of thinking and as heresy. And this arrangement lends power to the suppressed tradition, leading the oppressive tradition into a crisis.

We can now formulate the third rule of the civilization hermeneutic: **If a conquering literary tradition suppresses another strong literary tradition, then it is forced to incorporate the conquered tradition and attempt to use it against the conquered tradition. Yet the very use can turn against the conquering tradition and thus create a crisis.**

The first crisis in this new tradition appeared in medieval times. One began to sense the temporal distance between various accumulating interpretations of the eminent text. As noted, the clergy and the councils developed their dogmas by using the philosophical techniques. In turn, the efforts to get back to the “original text” involved the same philosophical techniques which supposedly were capable of showing which interpretations are true and which are not. Hence, Abelard’s **sic et non** (this and not that) to show that some of the church fathers interpretations contained contradictions either within their own texts, or in contrast to other churchly texts. This is a fascinating power of the suppressed. The philosophical texts were false, evil, to be burned, they are in excess of the truths of the father and the son, yet these very “excessive” truths were used by the church fathers to establish their position, and thus were built into their texts. Lo and behold, medieval are using the same philosophical truths to realign their own texts and find them in excess in terms of what they suppose to possess: concordance. Yet in either case, it is the philosophical residuum that reveals the excess of itself and any text that will be involved in using it. No concordia was possible when faced with a double access; hence, following their own interests, the Averroists developed a theory of a double truth: there are truths of reason and science, and there are divine truths that are based on will and should be accepted on faith by will. The two do not coincide,

indeed they contradict. The double truth is a recognition that either side is too much for the other and their intermixing will continuously lead to crises. Barring that, one could solve the confrontation if one divided the world into two domains: philosophy and-science to deal with the world as it is, while the state, the law, ethics, will be the province of the divine will. This stretches into modernity through Descartes and Hobbes.

This could be stated as follows: the Hellenic tradition could tolerate contradictions, and was under no obligation to avoid them; indeed, to produce contradictions belongs to the structure of this literature. Thus, any authority could be abandoned in favor of open debate concerning any subject matter, and it was abandoned. On the other side, the side of the will, reformation had no choice but to proclaim that divine will is a matter of individual will and its faith. Hence, there are no supervening rules that would determine the encounter between two wills. Seen on this ground, the tradition that attempted to mix philosophical literature with the eminent Christian text was false and evil – one more time. What Luther did not realize is that this move would itself create a tradition; thus reformation soon had its fathers, but the act that created this tradition could be repeated and turned against itself, revealing its own excess and superfluity in two ways: first, any effort to limit the interpretation of will encountering another will by some “authority” would be immediately discarded: Protestantism split and split... Thus each individual’s will is a final arbiter, and therefore the eminent text can be in excess over itself: there are as many eminent texts as there are readers – creating, what Diltheys called, a “universal falsehood.” It is to be recalled that this tradition of the WILL was once supposed to be the basis of juridical state and morality, but with the endless schisms, each person is her own moral criterion and a criterion of the reading of the eminent text.

The Circle

It has been said that hermeneutical thinking in general constitutes a circle. Each text in a context implies the context and the latter implies the text. Regardless how far we stretch the hermeneutical understanding, we shall have to admit this rule. Parts imply the whole and the whole is given through the parts. Yet what we noticed in our suggestions so far is the feature of the thirteenth hermeneutic: efforts to suppress a text, a culture, a tra-

dition by another. This suppression can be absolute – the destruction of the tradition and the people and hence all the readings about the tradition will be presented by the victorious literatures. In short, such a reading includes the other in its own circle without residua. We also noticed that in another modification, the residua remains and are relegated to a site which is designated to be lower, yet having an overwhelming vitality to challenge and threaten the suppressing tradition. This agonal component lends strength to the victor by being within the rules, but not quite controllable by them. Trojan women, Clytemnestra, the Sirens, and the Nymphs, constantly are included in the circle of literary texts written by the suppressing patriarchs, but the inclusion is never complete. The women are more cunning and form secret and unpredictable conspiracies that lurk through entire texts of the patriarchs. With all the power at their disposal to control events by textual inscriptions, such events are reproduced consistently as not completely controllable. Then we found still another modification wherein the suppressed tradition and its developed literatures become necessary aspects of the suppressing tradition. The latter must use the former in order to demonstrate its truths and in this sense borrows the power of the literatures that are being condemned. In this sense the condemning literature, in its presumed supremacy, proves the presence of the other and its superiority, and indeed to such an extent, that the suppressing tradition begins to write its texts in terms of the suppressed. This is the encounter between Greco-Roman and one version of Mid-Eastern traditions: the episteme of Hellenic Athena and the word of the Father. As was noted, she constantly resumed her power by being incorporated as a necessity for the very survival and, at the same time, constant self-abolition of the suppressing tradition. Here the circle of the suppressing tradition gets transformed into the circle of the suppressed till finally, as we saw, the suppressed tradition acquires complete emancipation and forces the other to fragment itself and to become excessive to itself. The father can no longer maintain its power and the mothers show up as priests.

Yet there is another tradition, that of India, which adds another level to the thirteenth hermeneutic. No doubt, this tradition includes the modifications we have noted, but apart from such modifications, it contains its own uniqueness. It has two fully developed hermeneutical circles in its literatures, and hence two theories. We recall that tradition is basical-

ly a theory. What is radical about this tradition is its demonstration that the presumably oppressed literature is found to be an inextricable and integral part of the oppressing tradition. Indeed, I hope to show that it is the “transcendental” condition for the possibility of that tradition. This is to say, while the oppressive aspect constantly maintained itself as the “transcendental” ground, what is the actual case is the reverse. Another aspect of this tradition is this: it includes the previously mentioned major hermeneutic – the interrogative. The eminent text, the Mahabharata, comprises an answer to a silent question.

One central claim referring to this eminent text is that of Vedanta: the eternal presence of the absolute (Purusha), which lies behind and beyond all phenomena. Here one regards Mahabharata as a tracing of liberation (mukti) from Maya. This liberation forms its own hermeneutical circle that attempts to subsume everything under itself. At the first level, it is a theory of transcendence, of going beyond the merely phenomenal to reach the ultimate one. At this transcendent level there is formed a circle of texts each mutually supporting the others, and each becoming a part of the whole. The latter is centered in one text of MAHABHARATA, the BHAGAVAD-GITA, as the eminent text. It purportedly unifies the entire story and has no contradictions (Radhakrishnan – different views in Hinduism are complementary and not contradictory). This text is regarded as the jewel and center of the entire Indian tradition and it teaches the way that all parts are connected to form a transcendent hermeneutical circle. One can readily see this in the titles such as BHAGAVAD-GITA AS IT IS, by His Divine Grace, A.C. Bhaktivedanta Swami Prabhupada. Regardless of the impossibility to use terms such AS IT IS, what is relevant for our investigation are the terms that form this circle. Lord **Krishna** is the **supreme personality of godhead**, supreme cause of all causes, and a supreme object of worship. **Arjuna** who glimpses the supreme, transcendent unlimited cosmic form of Krishna, the **Virataroop**, is made to realize the inconsequentiality of his actions. **Bhakti**, is a pure devotional servant **Purushotaman**, the supreme soul/being, **Sat**, that is equally Brahmann. They are also coextensive with **Dharma**, law, that is permanent and transcends the phenomenal vicissitudes. **Jnana**, pure knowledge that is liberated from the mosaic, lilaic, practical (maternal) immersion in the polluted world. Other aspects could be added, including yogic practices of purification to reach and merge into

the transcendent. All that had to be pointed out is the Vedantic hermeneutical circle as the mutually affirming texts of transcendence.

A note aside should be added for understanding of one of the hermeneutics: reading texts in their contexts. What one notices in reading the Gita is the emphasis on law and duty, on purity and devotion, on submission and obedience, and on pure “objectivity” of the transcendent terms. This hermeneutical circle seems to be coextensive with the British imperial context and hence the proclaimed Pedantic tradition may well be read from the context of colonialism. The question that could be raised is this: is the reading of Gita even by his Divine Grace Swami Prabhupada a hermeneutic of suppression of the Hindu Gita? This would call for a special and protracted investigation.

Meanwhile, let us turn to another matter; from our brief delimitation of the Vedantic hermeneutical circle as transcendent and beyond any materiality, there appeared hints of multiplicity that breaks up the one, and pollution of the pure terms, such as Krishna. After all, his **Virataroop**, the cosmic form, is **Maya**, a **magic** designed to get Arjuna to commit himself to war, and thus to engage in **karma**, activity and Maya attachment. Given that this transcendent hermeneutic circle cannot escape the attachments, the move is made to reach beyond the transcendent, to the ultimate ground that is neither this nor that, neither one nor many, and thus is purely transcendental condition for all else. All the characterizations of the one and the many must be detracted from the transcendental; it has nothing that one could recognize, and hence it would be impossible to say that IT is hidden by the world of Maya-shakti, or Kama-lila, or even maga-kala. To use common parlance, the transcendental ground is **ineffable**. Indeed, it is not only not this nor that, but **neti-neti**. It is an absolute transcendental epoche that abolishes the epoche. What does this move accomplish and what claims does it want to make? It wants to say that the transcendental source is bereft of any aspects, even those of the transcendent hermeneutical circle, and that it is the ground of all – it creates the highest figures and the **cosmic** aspects of **Maya**, **shakti**, **lila**, **Kama**, **kali**. And this is the moment of truth: the transcendental, as the condition of all, borrows the conditions from another source in order to claim to be the very transcendental condition.

The moment of truth, the torpedo fish effect, reveals the effort by one aspect of a tradition to form an all encompassing universality by complete

suppression of the other, i.e. by proclaiming that the other is completely outside, cannot touch or reach the Vedantic transcendental, and yet by a reversed move, it also claims that the multiplicity and the cosmic dimensions are its own powers. This reversal shows that the conditions of the very possibility of the transcendental are the cosmic, such that the cosmic domains of **Maya, Shakti**, etc., are the transcendental conditions for the possibility of all events, entities, and encounters. But what is obvious, is that these conditions are **pracritic, maternal**. The unavoidable reversal of the Vedantic transcendental move grants also the unavoidability of the maternal as the transcendental. What does this mean: the efforts to suppress the maternal tradition had to use constantly the means and powers of the maternal as the very conditions for the suppression. This is to say, such efforts were and are within the maternal hermeneutical circle as the all pervasive, inescapable, transcendental. While striving to encompass the cosmos by positing total transcendence of the cosmic, the Vedantic transcendental posture becomes completely absorbed in the excessive cosmic powers on which it is premised. Hence the maternal dimensions of **Maya, Lila, Shakti, Kama, kala**, form a hermeneutical circle that has always been the transcendental and founded both the Vedantic transcending and transcendental moves. In brief, the maternal excess is what allows the transcendental Vedanta to struggle as a power against other powers. The liberation from the cosmic makes sense only because the simplicity of the absolute is constantly over determined by the maternal, the plus-ultra. The latter is not a denial of an absence that can be made present once Maya is unveiled, but what is stubbornly co-present, even in the active play of Brahman itself. It is also the **Shakti** of Siva without which Siva is **sava**, a dead corpse; s/he exists only through her. The very effort to escape it would require its force.

Self-initiation

Perhaps now it is possible to flow one more time with the eminent text MAHABHARATA and, on the grounds of the maternal transcendental, to note more precisely the inextricable inherence of this maternal in all events, such that it needs no extrinsic legitimacy. This also refocuses the eminent text on another aspect apart from BHAGHAVAD GITA: it is the disrobing of the main figure *Draupadi* – that concentrates all events and reveals the

maternal as borrowed power and yet as the genuine transcendental condition for the Hindu tradition. The poet *Veda Vyasa* sets a tone for the interrogative hermeneutics, suggesting that the entire texts can be understood if it is to be regarded as an answer to a question: not what or why, but how did it all come about? Here we encounter text: while the king is expecting a birth of a son, Draupadi is born in full blossom from her own fire (**agni**), and thus is self-birthing, and gives no deference to any of the patriarchal figures. She is the irresistible **Kama** for whose hand numerous warriors strife; she mocks them and plays with their passions, and thus she is **Lila**; she has power over their desires and thus she is **Shakti**; she promises and withholds, and thus she is **Maya**. What is to be noted is that the Satrya – the warrior cast, as the very essence of patriarchy – are not effects of her as a cause of their actions. They too are swayed by these maternal dimensions in ways that they do not recognize. She marries five brothers. Thus the question WHY will not do; these all pervasive dimensions are how all things are and happen, whether human or transcendent. They are not external causes but the maternal given in and through everything.

The patriarchal side is, nonetheless, the upholder of the transcendent domain, including **dharma**, the law. Yet for her Kamic, Lilaic, etc. presence, and because they too are immersed in passions, the warriors break their laws, ending in a dice game where finally Arjuna, one of her five husbands, having lost everything, wages Draupadi. Instead of being her protectors as demanded by law, they degrade her in a passionate strife for pride and power. In brief, while **dharma** is transcendence and belongs to the Vedantic hermeneutical circle, it is absorbed into the maternal powers and hence demonstrates the all presence of this transcendental condition. She is to be disrobed, her sari unwound. Yet no matter how much the sari is unwound, it continues to be inexhaustible by virtue of the presence of Krishna who upholds the Dharma. At this moment it would seem that Krishna, as the transcending presence is on the side of other transcending terms, including Dharma, yet the same Krishna, during the battle, advises the breaking of laws in order to win the battle as a way of enhancing the maternal power. Krishna's actions thus are subject to her pervasive presence. He too is engaged in the activities that are lilaic, mayaic, and kamic. It would make no sense within the Vedantic context to convince Arjuna to go into battle if the destiny of life were to transcend all worldly engage-

ments. And he convinces Arjuna not by revealing his total purity, absolute distance without power, attraction, or passion, but as Virataroopa, as terrifying and awe-inspiring cosmic presence. This is what compels Arjuna to join the blood feud to fertilize the maternal.

Meanwhile, back in the royal hall where the disrobing is taking place Draupadi's sole voice silences the patriarchal assembly. She speaks of law, **dharmā** and its breaking, **a dharmā**. She is, thus in charge of both, the ground of both, and her voice is the power over the Vedantic hermeneutic-cal circle – indeed to such an extent that she demonstrates the pervasiveness of the cosmic dimensions that cannot be set aside. The patriarchal assembly knows well that it too is caught and cannot escape the maternal transcendental. In brief, the disrobing scene is the central revelation of the entire MAHABHARATA of the maternal as the transcendental. And thus this is how things came about. The epic is the tracing of the maternal all the way to the Vedantic transcendental and its self-abolition as the ultimate Maya, i.e. an effort to hide emptiness by the denial of the very power that does the revealing and the hiding. Here the thirteenth hermeneutic reveals the failure of suppression while pushing it to the ultimate limit – the suppression without qualifications of the maternal. The more one wanted to extricate from this cosmic transcendental domain, the more one got entangled in it. Thus the Great War was not for the negation of the maternal, but in fact submersion in it completely.

We can now formulate the fourth rule of the civilizational hermeneutic: **a tradition may be founded on an eminent text that reveals a tension between two hermeneutical circles: one comprises a transcendent, trans-cosmic movement, the other a resendent, cosmic submersion. While the former aims to be the transcendental, it must submerge into the latter as cosmic-transcendental.**

Draupadi is the narrative of the maternal transcendental as cosmic and not as ontological or metaphysical circle of transcendence. Draupadi, as a pervasive narrative of *Mahabharata* reverses the Vedanta circle yet in another way. She demonstrates that the transcendent domain into which the singular dissolves and vanishes makes no sense, to the extent that the Vedanta transcendental is regarded as neither one nor the many, and hence the singular, as one among the many cannot dissolve into the ONE. In turn, if one sheds all the material parts and hence dissolves into the cosmic dimen-

sions, then indeed there was never a given permanent self to be achieved by purification. Purification means, then, that if every living aspect of one's being is discarded all the way to the "pure," then there is nothing left and all that one was has dissolved into the maternal domain. This seems to be a reading of the Vedanta text wherein all the transcending terms and images are constantly interested to dissolve themselves, including those of whom they are in charge, back into the maternal. Indeed, the Vedanta ultimate, the transcendental, beyond the beyond, is posited as one more Mayaic aspect to attract and to inspire devotion and commitment. And it is Draupadi, in all of her dimensionality, that attracts, enlivens, and dissolves in her **kala, Maya, Shakti, Lila, Kama** sway in which she too is immersed and dissolved. In this sense we cannot take her as a representation of a female, but as a multi-faceted trace of the maternal. After all, toward the end of the epic she too is told, that "it is not for you that these events are happening."

This rule of civilization hermeneutic shows that the suppressed circle has inevitably possessed the requisite functions without which the suppressing could not act even within its own circle. the latter is constantly overdetermined by an excess which it cannot contain, and indeed from which it cannot extricate. Given sufficient interest and acumen, it would be important to note whether this Hindu maternal transcendental condition is all encompassing, i.e. can subsume all other modifications of the thirteenth hermeneutic dealt with above. Moreover, is it sufficiently broad also to include Zen and Tao. Such a task is still outstanding.

Remarks

No doubt, civilization hermeneutic, comprising an access to textual-cultural morphologies, can help articulate one major domain of interpretive encounters. The latter provide a serious background for the understanding of current debates concerning discursive power and its shifting vicissitudes. But it must be clear that such discursive battles already presume literary traditions with well developed means to both subject and resist, destroy, incorporate, and to be absorbed by alternative discourses. Yet I suspect that some of the modifications of the civilization hermeneutic have also shown that most textual encounters do not destroy the other without residua, superfluity, and hence may acquire a power within or over the destructive texts. 60

CHAPTER IV

CULTURAL ETHNOLOGY

Introduction

While civilization theories yield the broadest efforts at analyzing the basic formations and symbolic designs of sense making structures and processes, more currently there is a trend that claims preeminence over all others – post modernity. Hence, it is necessary to include one of the major proponents of this trend and to disclose the problems inherent in this trend's claims to universality. We have selected Foucault as a prime example of this trend; despite variations on the postmodern theme, Foucault is a prime example of claims that have to do with cultures.

Foucault seems to follow Durkheim, at least to the extent of giving ethnology a special place in the human sciences, not for reasons of anthropological research but as a methodological ploy. Its task is not to decipher the historically established cultural experiences, but to extricate the unconscious compositions and norms which enable the cognitive experience of cultural beings. In Foucault's sense, ethnology is distinguished from the older humanities, and from the current social sciences, insofar as it investigates the human not as something given, but as something that is produced by the cognitive and normative codifications of a culture. Ethnography may be regarded as more fundamental, since it brings to awareness the cultural conditions of science, the "cultural unconscious." The latter must not be confused with any of the psycho-analytic schools, simply because such schools, as scientific, presuppose the codes of the cultural unconscious. Indeed, even psychiatry as a science depends on cultural codes. Given this foundation, the task for us is to extricate Foucault's theory of society and its value for the critique of power.

The difficulties of such an undertaking are not directly accessible to a literal reading of Foucault's work. One immediate problem is methodological. As is well known, in the sixties his writings, basically his *MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION*, *THE BIRTH OF A CLINIC*, and *THE ORDER OF THINGS*, sketch the basic development of modernity and epistemic structures. But how can these works be united under ethnology with his later works, such as *ARCHEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE*,

and THE ORDER OF DISCOURSE, which are fundamentally metatheoretic investigations? Moreover, ethnography as a method is a structural component of Western modernity to which Foucault belongs, and yet a method that emerged in the analyses of alien cultures. If ethnography is a science, does it not code foreign phenomena in terms of modernity? It seems that a resolution to these paradoxes must be found at another level, the social. First of all, Foucault proposes that the task is to take an "external" position to all culturally produced phenomena in order to note the process of their emergence. Second, ethnology as a method must also be investigated with respect to its emergence in another constellation, in modern society. What Foucault attempts to accomplish is to treat his civilization phenomena equally from an external vantage point from which ethnology treats all foreign cultures. Yet a full cognizance is given to the fact that ethnology as a method applied to itself and other cultures is concurrently a social phenomenon. The theoretical advantage which Foucault promises by this move is an effort to treat one's own culture as any other culture. Obviously he must demonstrate the possibility of taking such an external view, specifically in light of the claim that one's own comprehension and categorical framework is intimately connected with one's own culture which one attempts to investigate. The problem can be avoided only when one can show that sociology in a given society can repeat in principle the same scientific achievement which must be generated by ethnography in its confrontation with alien society. Such a premise leads to those social theories which contend that within one society there can be social groups with such disparate conceptions of reality and daily affairs, that they would face one another as alien cultures. Given this theoretical postulate, which Foucault does not share, it makes sense to follow research initiated by American cultural sociology proposing ethnography of layered culture. Here, the problem of sociology can be located as an exact analogue of the problem of ethnography, since it is assumed that a social research encounters the "second" culture as equally foreign, as ethnography would encounter some archaic culture. (S. Hall. D. Hobson, A. Lowe, CULTURE, MEDIA, LANGUAGE. WORKING PAPERS IN CULTURAL STUDIES, 1972-79).

Foucault does not take into consideration the theoretical hypothesis of an existence of diverse cultural worlds within a society, and hence has

to contend with the issue of a possibility for taking an external view to his own social milieu. As will be seen subsequently, Foucault's implicit linguistic theory, termed "discourse" and "episteme," is designed to decipher the leading modes of thought assumed by a society during a given historical period. Yet this move is not yet sufficient to "alienate" oneself from one's own modes of thought in which one finds oneself. This is one of the theoretical difficulties: in order to estrange oneself from a culture so that the latter appears as any alien culture, one must propose methodical functions which would be in a position to purify one's own theory from the culturally given modes of thought and to yield a character of neutrality. He could justify such a claim by showing that his method has the ability to assume such neutrality, i.e. an ability to exclude his own cultural epistemic and discursive categorizations, frameworks, and codifications. Whether he succeeds is partially our question.

The Point of Departure

The impetus to take up an ethnology of his own culture stems for Foucault from literary texts of Blanchot and the convergence of French literary avant-gardism which were seen by Foucault as "external thinking." Such thinking maintains itself apart from any subjectivity and, by revealing its limits, shows dispersion and finally an absence of subjectivity. The avant-gardism of that time is bent on showing the vanishing of the subject. The world is depicted in an alien way where the human is submitted to the libidinal anatomy, the silent rules of a language, or a nameless sequence of daily events. Once events become detached from the subject, the latter appears to dissolve under the weight of alien forces in whose context the subject follows predetermined vectors. Such literature constitutes aesthetic alienation wherein the events are detached from the horizon of human meaning and are made into a meaningless succession of objectivities. Every cross section of social activity appears to resist any interpretation.

For Foucault this literature reveals a possibility of a speech which excludes the subject. Here the events no longer allow a privileged position to the individual subject, a center of experience. No longer surveyable, the active events make of the subject a contingency of processes which he cannot master. This would be the case with a given language.

This is the result, for Foucault, of the avant-garde literature. His aim, then, is to make such events sociologically more precise and fruitful for the ethnologically conceived social theory. The concept that the individual is subordinated to discursive rules which surpass the capacities of individuals, is for Foucault a key permitting a distanced view toward Western cultural system. Although in an indirect way, Foucault assumes a literary model on which to base his social theory. For him the literary efforts demonstrate that not only in literature, but in the entire modern Western culture, the active subject was the predominant nerve center of such a culture. Distance from the subject shown by literature offers a theoretical possibility for assuming a viewpoint outside culture. This argument signifies the point of departure and solution of the methodological operations by which Foucault presumes to be able to extricate his social theory and to offer a position apart from the horizon of thought of the modern culture. The point of inception is, thus, the critique of modern tradition's concept of subjectivity, with its attendant notions of objectivities and the insistence on relating the objectifications back to subjectivity. This "philosophy of reflection" was traced by Foucault in *THE ORDER OF THINGS* and *ARCHEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE*. The theoretical uniqueness of reflective philosophy is explicated initially at the scientific level. He points to a historical transition between the sign system comprising the reality of classical times that begins to fall apart due to scientific incursions in organic nature and in social phenomena which are not reducible to the sign systems of the classical world. The subject appears in the center because the transformation of the entire epistemic system allows the subject to be treated not only from its side but also as an object of knowledge, i.e. the subject is the transcendental condition for the possibility of empirical knowledge of the world and the subject. The subject is at once the active factor of knowledge and a substantial component of the world. It is a cross section of both orders, a self-knowing center of the world. In contrast, the classical thought regarded the human as a sign user, but not as a function of the world. Thus the classical view could not offer such an imperial position where the subject is the enslaved sovereign, an observed observer. (Lawson, 1985)

In the modern episteme the human has a dual role of being both the subject and object of knowledge. In this sense the domains of reality,

such as economic riches or cultural forms of language, seen previously only as sign systems, can now appear as historical modes of being of the human. The world now becomes divisible into as many spheres as are required for human self fulfillment. All these are regularities announcing human existence. What interests Foucault in the break between the classical and the modern traditions is the dispersal of the fundamental concept of the subject through the appearance of the numerous scientific branches in modernity. Here he discovers the principal difficulties that result from the new researches. The progressive self reflection of the subject not only encounters conditions of existence which are independent of consciousness, but also domains in the individual activity which are beyond consciousness. Significantly, Foucault neither attempts to explain the dissolution of an established world view, nor does he interrogate the force of validity found immanent in the theoretical model of reflection. His historical model is descriptive. Another world view that would be immanent to the problems of scientific development discontinuous phases are described wherein epoch making modes of thought yield revolutionary new modes that cannot be explained from the immanent problematics in the previous mode. Each mode of thought encompasses a specific number of categorical determinants entire reality. This is an index of diverse styles of rationality and constitutes an inevitable skepsis concerning scientific progress.

An inevitable question arises from this “relativism” and “historicism.” What is the rationality on the basis of which one can classify and analyze the different types of rationalities? This forces Foucault to abandon the descriptive theory of his ORDER OF THINGS, and moves him to the ARCHEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE. Here the argumentation is directly related to methodological justification of the process employed in the historical research of Western knowledge. Indirectly, the work presents an attempt to apply the discovered categories for the purification of the social level from all philosophical subjectivity. Indeed, he begins with a brief critique of the concept of reflective subject. Foucault surmises the main error of reflective subject from its consequences exemplified by Hegel. From the strategy of reflective philosophy one is led to a compulsion to grasp the entire history as a product, in the same way as the world of objects which the human surveys reflectively

as a result of his objectifications. The totality of historical events are then submitted to the same activity of the subject as is the world of experience. The singularity of the subject assumes the activity of producing the objects of possible experience, leading to the hidden notion of historical continuity. All events in the historical process become transparent to the subject as steps which had to be assumed in the process of self realization. Here even Marxian materialism makes the same mistake. While Hegel serves as a model of this view, he also claims that this view is compatible when it is identified with a social class and its interests to which historical events are tied. Obviously, Foucault overlooks the factual historical differentiations that arise between ontological claims, methodological suppositions, and normative projections of the historical subject. He takes for granted that all such differences can be subsumed under the "discourse of continuity." Be that as it may, the discourse in the theories of history is transpositions of the results of the epistemic self-reflections of the ego's constitutive activities. Thus the previous cultures become regarded as forms of expression of human experience, as objectivities of a spirit, or as hidden product of labor of a social class. Thus the historically alien becomes an accessible component of one's own subjectivity. But the tendency of the thesis of discursive continuity is to impose itself on all areas, including the social area. Thus the social world appears as an achievement of self objectivation of subjects through practical activities, leading to the postulation of all sorts of mythical figures such as class. At any rate, there is an ontological underpinning of an interconnected sense which is not borne out by the various dispersions of events across what we call the historical time. In order to dispense both with social and historical continuities and interconnections, Foucault must keep clear in his new conceptions of the traditional reflective philosophy. Instead of lending credence to the singular subject, as the constitutive ground of discrete historical events, he now eliminates any trace of the subject per se, in order to abolish this model of thought. What comes to the fore are two contesting models: DOCUMENT and MONUMENT. Documents are written signs of the past and must be interrogated with regard to their meaning. In order to grasp their meaning, it is assumed that documents are records of intentional objectifications of a subject. From this Foucault concludes that this kind of history can be understood

od as a creation of a singular subject. This conclusion is plausible under the condition that each symbolic expression is self evident as a product of a homological project of sense. Only in this way can a document appear as an objectivation of a singular subject, or a univocal collectivity, leading to the notion of history as a diachronical arrangement of intentional acts of signification. The result would be quite different if the interconnection of meanings found in a historical document were to be regarded poli-centrally as an interaction of various subjects. Here history would have to be regarded hermeneutically, and would have to contend with a plurality of diverse subjects. (Mickunas) This possibility is disregarded by Foucault. The concept of MONUMENT is posited as a counter to DOCUMENT. The former stems from the history of archeology and is only indirectly of symbolic value. Primarily, its original form can be reconstructed only archaeologically, only through the technical labor of collecting the dispersed material elements. The success of this type of archeological labor must be tested by criteria of functional arrangement of the reconstructed monument. The reconstruction of the monument has one aim: to decipher the MONUMENTAL TEXT objectively, without recourse to its sense interconnections. To the extent that a written document becomes a monument, it loses its symbolically mediated expression and turns into a written work composed of text elements empty of any significance. Tradition is then encountered not as meaning laden symbolic interconnection, but as an array of empirical signs. As he points out, the document is no longer an inactive matter through which one attempts to reconstruct what the humans have said or thought; rather, one seeks to determine units, series, manifolds, relationships in the network of the text. Thus as a monument, the document no longer contains an intentional content. It represents empirically found construction of textual elements. The elements are to be organized and classified under functional viewpoint.

Obviously this turn did not arise in a vacuum, but is a result of semiotic arguments against the French representatives of phenomenology. The efforts were made to generalize the concept of sign systems, and to demonstrate the validity of this turn in various disciplines, against the sense constitution of a subject. What is assumed is a pre-signitive system of linguistic signs to which the signifying acts of the subject are

subordinated. Thus Foucault's ARCHEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE is to be read on the basis of the concept of MONUMENT. Here, the interpretation of documents is subsumed under various levels of sign relationships which are external to any meaning. The order of language is not a result of meaning giving acts of subjects, but a product of arbitrarily arranged signs. (Hollenstein) The composition of a system, in which signs are determined by mutual differentiations, decides what the subject can understand and experience as significant, leading to the assumption of an all pervasive subject. Only the transformation of documents into monuments abolishes such an illusion. These arguments permit the articulation of Foucault's methodological "plan." First of all, he does not attempt to discover the weak points of the philosophy of reflection in order to correct them, but attempts to replace it by an entirely different model. With this, the sign system becomes the transcendental condition for the constitution of sense and for any experience of the world.

The cognitive order of the social world must be conceived as a subjectless sign system. Resultantly, the intellectual history cannot be regarded as a process of learning and addition by the subjects. Since the slightest elements of individual thought are caught in the ontological schema of pregiven order of signs, the rules that order the arbitrary signs become the "subject" of history. Yet history does not change due to the discovery of epistemic problems in science, since such problems cannot arise due to the prefiguration of all epistemic functions by the sign system. Thus the illusion of continuity is abolished by the discontinuity of arbitrary signs under which the humans obtain a particular experience of the world. Here, Foucault's concept of MONUMENT corresponds to his ARCHEOLOGICAL METHOD. The latter precludes the discovery of any homogeneous traces among factual phenomena. Each historical monument is a text that needs not be submitted to an overarching homogeneity which would provide some semblance of continuity. The "new" history makes this continuity problematic by pointing to the specificities of the given textual forms, the segments which are initiated and dropped, the various hierarchical deployments of functions and temporal shifts of texts, and the incongruities between texts of a given historical period. Yet this does not mean that Foucault wants to end with a mere plurality of textual differences. Indeed, there is economy, institutions,

sciences, religions, literatures, etc., yet the task is to discover what relationships can be deciphered between them, what vertical systems they compose, and what correlations and dominances they reveal.

At this juncture it is possible to suggest that the above discussed problem of extricating the researcher from his/her tradition seems to be resolved. Ethnology is now transferred to the investigations of the entire history within the context of archeology as monumental. The researcher is deemed to be in a position of an external observer of texts which need not have any meaning. The text is an alien composition of pre-signitive functions, requiring neither understanding nor interpretation of sense. The claim is that this methodological ploy precludes any requirement of symbolic access. Even one's own language can be purified of meaning and accessed purely as an arbitrary structure of functional components. All that is required is a replacement of the categories of interpretation which are laden with the conceptions of an active subject. In brief, the method is in a position to achieve its aims as soon as it is detached from anthropologisms. It is deemed that the very process of such an undertaking will yield the categories which are anthropologically free, which do not involve any meaning of any historical society or text.

Given this direction, it is possible to decipher Foucault's concrete procedure which stems from Barthes' work. First, the research material is articulated into smallest elements, and second, the divided material is investigated in terms of the rules which relate the elements. The newly discovered groupings yield the possibility of reconstructing the structure of the analyzed domain of objectivity, i.e. of the monument. Foucault, of course, does not follow Barthes suggestions uncritically. He sees two interrelated tasks: the text must be seen without any presuppositions of scientific typologies, and only then can it be articulated into elements. The first task is achieved through categorical bracketing which excludes all concepts which attach to symbolic meanings and their implications of subjectivity. Any term, regardless how innocent, is to be excluded if it implicates a basis in the subject's activity. Thus even such all inclusive terms as TRADITION, EVOLUTION, WORK, BOOK, are subject laden. After all, books and works are "products of man." All are seen as manifestations, changes of mind, and re-evaluations of a unitary subject. Once this veil is removed, then the pure signs and their arrangements will come to evidence as discursive events.

Once the exclusion of these categories is performed, then it is possible to articulate the material into elements. Foucault, of course, presumes that the process of exclusion is coextensive with the appearance of the elements in their raw evidence. This evidence consists of a chaotic mass of linguistic expressions, as an unsurveyable multitude of discursive events. They are the raw stuff from which a cultural episteme can be composed from the archeological viewpoint.

The difficulty that must be faced inheres in his meaning of “expression” (ENONCE). In order to get to the difficulty, it is necessary to recall the key role that this concept plays in the ARCHEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE. The task of this “work” is to develop a categorical framework for a theory of cultural knowledge which would be in a position to grasp a text prior to any hermeneutical understanding, including the understanding offered by his own language. What Foucault promises is not only an explanation of elementary units such as words of a linguistic system, but also of complex epistemic systems whose elemental units are verbal groups, such as pronouncements concerning states of affairs. While semiological structuralism is concerned with single words, or even phonemes, Foucault is forced by his argument to deal with statements, since only at this level the elemental components of conceptual complexes are accessible. In brief, expression must be regarded at the propositional level. On his own principles, he cannot treat an expression as a meaningful combination of words. Expression is a component of linguistic use or speech, and not simply an element of language. In expression, the signs are ordered with a view of making a claim, and thus one must allot a function to the subject, since the latter alone can array the signs in view of making a claim. In addition, the meaning of signs in expression assumes an intention of a validity claim which is no longer determined by its linguistic position, but also by the signified states of affairs. But this violates the view point from which semiotic structuralism draws its force. After all, an expression can no longer be regarded as an autonomous entity of internal relationships, if it is regarded as possessing a referential relationship. As soon as an expression is regarded as a linguistic element which is structured by signifying view, we cannot analyze it solely as a function within a complex of meaningless signs, but only with respect to the meant states of affairs. Foucault seems to be

aware of this danger by attempting to define the expression by abolishing meaningful characteristics.

It is difficult to follow his efforts at a definition of an expression, guided by the view of expression as a meaningless element. He attempts to extricate it from the grammatical unit of a sentence, from the logical unit of a proposition, and from the pragmatic unity of a linguistic act. Although he attempts to define "expression" as "graphics," as "accumulation curve" as a "pyramid," he does this to show the inadequacies of such efforts. He finally settles on the term "existence" which he sees to be common to all expressions. Expression is an existential function from which one can decipher by analysis or by intuition whether or not it yields a sense, and what rules it follows in order to be a sign. Indeed, the notion whether an expression yields a sense excludes in its definition any individual signification and any states of affairs; rather, a simple combination of two signs can be regarded as an expression. But this too is inadequate, as he himself shows with an example of alphabetical series. Yet this already claims that the letters are ordered grammatically on the basis of a given language. Thus Foucault can claim that an expression is a basic element of a text if he already assumes that it has intentional signification. The identification of an expression as an element of a text is tied to hermeneutical presuppositions. In this sense, the efforts to treat expressions as semiotic units, is doomed to failure. Expression is either free of any significative direction, and thus it is not different from any arbitrary combination of signs, or it is distinguished in a symbolic interconnection by meant states of affairs. Of course Foucault wants to escape this dilemma and continues to claim that an expression is an existential function which marks a determinate and empty place that can be filled by individuals, i.e. it prescribes a position which the individual must assume in order to constitute a meaning. In the final analysis Foucault seems to assume that expressions are meaningful, then purifies them from meaning, and consequently reintroduces meaning by positing an individual capable of using the expression meaningfully. These two moves are, obviously, always taken for granted in order to make sense of the "purified" expression, and indeed the latter is never extricated in its purity, but only continuously framed in a constantly reintroduced intentionality of Foucault, such that he uses expressions to signify the pure expressions as states of affairs of his own propositions.

Apart from expression, Foucault introduces a broader term, called DISCOURSE. The term, as it is borrowed from semiotics, means a system of interrelated expressions. The relationship between expressions is regulated temporally and in accordance with rules. The emphasis of analysis must be placed on the rules which combine expressions into a system. Such anonymously given rules are to be uncovered, and the success of the uncovering can be regarded as a criterion of Foucault's success. The uncovering of the rules seems to be coextensive with Foucault's concept of MONUMENT in that both promise a subject free domain of research, and presumably a culturally free vantage point. But this would mean that the rules connecting the expressions should not belong to a specific culture, because this would immediately reintroduce the connecting subject as a valid rule of modernity. Obviously, it would be most instructive to analyze the problematics of the rules of discourse, i.e. rules of connection among expressions. Partially, the problematics originate with the definition of expression. Since expressions, in their pure externality, are regarded as presignitive facts, the rules that govern them cannot be accounted for by either the considerations of expressions, or by some subject, or by the states of affairs. What are then the rules of formation capable of connecting expressions into a discourse? They cannot be a consensus among subjects, since such a consensus is intersubjective, and no mode of subjectivity, not even a collective one, is admissible. The rules cannot be habits of human activity that connect expressions, since habits are also excluded from providing a continuity of history and society.

This is the issue on which ARCHEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE centers. What turns out to be a more interesting issue that prevents even a discursive solution to the above articulated questions, is the impossibility of naming a series of unified expressions which would offer themselves as an issue to be resolved theoretically. There are no issues of phenomena to be resolved, apart from the expressions and their discursive rules; but the expressions themselves do not require, and indeed cannot require, continuity and unification, and hence cannot be deemed as problematic. In this sense, for example, madness cannot be regarded as experience but as a discursive allocation. Failing this, Foucault attempts other ploys, including "style, concept, and theme," as means to explicate the unity of discourse. Yet such tandems seem to reduce the discursive

wealth to a two dimensional surface. How does then Foucault bring the disparate expressions into some order?

Foucault has no doubt that one is faced with almost unsurmountable difficulties. Even such a tandem as a "theme" can hardly be extricated from its immersion in various discourses. He seems to resort to the notion that it is possible to describe a specific number of expressions having a similar system of distribution, in cases such that objects, types of expression, concepts, the thematic decisions, can define a regularity, thus allowing us to agree that we are encountering a discursive formation. The rules of formation will be called the conditions which subtend the elements of this division. Yet precisely at this juncture that we are not told what are these conditions that integrate a specific number of expressions into a similar system of distribution, that relate objects, styles, concepts, and themes into a discourse. All that one can decipher is that there are various levels of discourse. Yet these levels, as parts of a discourse, do not exhibit any "motivation" toward one another and toward any relationship with one another. Indeed, the discourse itself does not seem to be "motivated" to relate various parts of speech. And Foucault is quite aware of this quandary; he says so: indeed, these discourses consist of signs, but they use these signs for more than a MERE signification of affairs. This MORE makes them irreducible to speech and language. This is what must be discovered. Finally Foucault announces what he thinks is most basic: THE RULES OF DISCOURSE DEFINE THE MASTERY OF OBJECTS. The power function of discourse yields the secret of the rules. Yet at the same time it is the theoretical element which violates the original framework of semiological episteme.

At this juncture it could be said that the power function of discourse is a means by which Foucault attempts to extricate the discursive practice from representational and communicative functions. Indeed, discourse does not depend on some immanent rules of linguistic usages, but on objective social relations where language fulfills a function of grasping and controlling the environmental and social processes. Thus singular expressions are ordered in discursive clusters on the basis of a common activity initiated for mastery of some object. The discursive order is enforced by social rules which are found in a functional domain of power strategies.

It is of note that Foucault gives two hardly reconcilable meanings to discourse: on the one hand, there is an attempt to argue that the functional rules inhere in the discursive formation, allowing then the appearance of a self-regulating and dynamic system of expressions, a "discursive praxis." The latter does not name an activity of a speaking subject, but an operation of purposive rationality of a self-maintaining system following its own functional imperatives. Obviously, the elements among which the discursive praxis establishes relationships are not only linguistic expressions; the term "expressive style" includes the social domains from which the discursive expressions emerge. Thus the style includes institutional morphologies, and social positions. This is obvious from his discussions of medicine. The discourse here constitutes a related combination of institutional strategies, cognitive procedures, and functional differentials.

These reflections lead to the view of discursive praxis as a regulated combination of institutionalized techniques and even cognitive procedures which are unintended result of anonymous processes. The latter are inherent in institutional strategies of activities and cognitive potentials, combining in an epistemic order capable of controlling social and natural environments. All this is counter to the initial thesis that discourse is purely systemic combination of linguistic expressions. Be that as it may, the more fundamental issue is the connection between the various institutional strategies, the cognitive structures, and concrete praxis. This is specifically crucial in light of the claim that discourse is extremely flexible and accommodating to the establishment of domination as well as an expression of desires. It is capable of handling ruling interests and emotional drives. Both these factors, "power" and "demand," seem to be outside of discourse, although the latter lends itself to the establishment of both. This is to say, the institutional strategies allow the production, control and selection of discourse, such that power is exercised by the processes of cultural control of possible themes of discourse, the scientific structuration of discursive content, and the social regulation of discursive participants. It is to be noted that despite the power and desire factors which seem to dominate discourse, the latter is more preeminent, since it structures the ways in which power and desire can be said. Power and desire are strategic media which or-

ganize the discursive praxis, although the latter has already prescribed the parameters wherein such organization occurs. Obviously one can decipher a tension between these two trends. The discourse rules over a system of expressions which comes into existence with the need to unify expressions under a common function of domination of reality: system of expressions is dominated by power interests. In turn, the discourse must be an already pregiven symbolic system before power interests and desires can begin to use it. In the latter case, discourse is always pregiven for any efforts to employ it in the play of power and desire. In the former case, discourse is a product of operations dominated by power interests. Foucault seems to accept both without any attempt to show their mutual functioning. This is precisely the issue which the *ARCHEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE* has not mastered.

Foucault seems to accept the modern efforts to deal with the world without a subject, and a model for such an approach in this century is semiotics. At the same time, he has to transgress his semiotic assumptions by introducing the discursive connections through power and desire, and by an effort to “alienate” the very system of discourse in order to survey it with detachment. What is the position of this “detachment” is left outside of his analyses. But any theory, claiming an all encompassing scope, should be able to account for all factors, activities, functions, and systemic requirements.

Having gone through the discursive analyses, Foucault moves to the concept of power as a paradigm of society. This shift is in part motivated by the problematics of the “rise of individual” in the context of modernity. The ontologizing problematics of analyzing discursive signification without the signifying subject and signified object, leaves the only avenue: fortuitous recourse to institutional demands. All this changes once Foucault shifts to social analyses. The discourse was initially regarded as a prop for social integration, offering a cognitive continuity. Yet with the constant failure to explain adequately the changes in discursive practice, Foucault is slowly forced to recognize the background forces of society. The change of perspective results also from Foucault’s understanding of Nietzsche in terms of deciphering the social effects which subtend the institutional processes that maintain the continuity of a social system. One common object of the constitutive impulses which flow undistur-

bed into society, is discourse. Society is, thus, interpreted as a system nourished by two affects: POWER and DESIRE, with discourse being an ever-present stream of linguistic events and constituting an object of strategic controversies. In turn, the institutional division of a society is to be understood as a social maintenance of strategies and techniques through which social groupings attempt to embody in the medium of discourse the striving effects of power and desire. This dualistic conception is somewhat vague; it mixes life philosophies and theories of domination. This mixture forced Foucault to present a monistic concept of POWER. This conjunction did not arise solely from theoretical reflections, but in the main was precipitated by the failed revolution of 1968. He noted that no critique of the system has made any impact; the system survived the onslaught of the population and retained its power. This moved Foucault to claim that social systems are intersection of powers wherein epistemologies take over the task of enhancing power. Thus discourses are social systems which owe their source to the strategic demands of an established power and in turn work reflectively back in support of such power. But this move, of course, goes beyond Foucault's semiotic analysis of society and, in place of investigation of epistemic systems of a culture in terms of its sign relationships; there appears an undertaking to decipher the relationship between the empirical components of a social system, and the epistemic structures and relationships of power. This shift is acknowledged by Foucault in his interview with Fontana and Pasquin.

The theoretical shift, even if not explicitly admitted, is quite radical: the epistemic order is transformed into an order of domination, of power. What is Foucault's concept of power? Of note is his explicit rejection of the "model of language and sign." He now argues that the "historicity that determines as it sweeps us along is one of war; it does not belong to the order of language: power relations and not sense-relations. History does not have sense, although this does not mean that it is incoherent or absurd; to the contrary, it is intelligible and must be analyzed in smallest detail. Its intelligibility corresponds to the battles, strategies and tactics." He develops his concept of power against two other theories, the social theory of Marxism and the classical political theory of power. Their failure rests on their conception of power which is premodern; the latter

assumes that power is either structured in acceptable ways or imposed violently by a sovereign or centralized institutions. In both cases one must contend with a power possessing actor capable of using appropriate means to impose strictures that allow the actor to realize his power purposes. The classical political science thinks of the possession of power in accordance with a juridical contract model as a transmission of rights, while the Marxian theory of domination assumes the appropriation of state machinery by a social class, Foucault offers a strategic power model, resulting from the naturalistically conceived theory of power of Nietzsche and its translation into social theory.

Foucault argues against the conception of a social subject who is in possession of power means. For him power is not a fixed ability or an enduring property of an individual or a group, but as an open product of strategic controversies between subjects. The acquisition of and claim to social power does not reside in a form of one-sided appropriation and exercise of a given group's rights and the use of the instruments of violence, but in the continuous struggle among the social actors. This is borrowed from Nietzschean concept of the multitude of power relationships. In *SEXUALITY AND TRUTH* Foucault defines power as a relationship of a multitude of forces which occupy and organize a given area. At times the powers align themselves into a system; at times they become contradictory and isolate themselves one against another. The strategic activities of the social participants are regarded as a continuous process wherein the constitution and exercise of power is rooted. Any one-sided striving for purposive fulfillment immediately solicits confrontations among the groups and subjects.

Power comes from below, i.e. it does not rest on a universal matrix of global division into the rulers and the ruled. Rather, one must seek power in the relationships of means of production, family, groups, and institutions, all constituting criss-crossing splits and divergences that are tensed one against another. Of course, the confrontations can develop into momentary and yet repeatable confrontations among individuals and groups. Social power appears in elementary situations of interaction wherein the subjects confront one another in terms of diverse purposes, each attempting to persist in the achievement of his purpose. Power, then, is not the strategic confrontation itself, but results from the

success of one of the subjects to decide the confrontation in his favor. In this sense, each collectivity is in an unavoidable war. "Between man and woman, between teacher and student, between the knower and the ignorant, function power relationships that do not stem from some sovereign or grand power with respect to individuals. The individuals are the mobile and concrete ground wherein power is anchored; they constitute the condition for the possibility of functioning power." (DISPOSITIONS OF POWER) The social is the incessant process of strategic conflicts of action; society is a strategic intersubjectivity of war.

Foucault is not interested in the elemental situations of the social battle, but mainly in the complex power intersections. His analysis is focused on the ways in which the process of the strategic confrontations among the actors yield a social system of interrelated power positions comprising orders of domination. This rejects the Marxian notion of an economic class ruling through the controls of the political state. For Foucault, a social order of domination, irrespective of its character, is incapable of being directed from a centralized activity of political apparatus of power, since it has emerged from a series of strategic successes of activities and exists on the basis of successful exercise of situational conflicts of actions. In order to have a better appreciation of Foucault's opposition to Marx, we must analyze the model of activity of the struggle.

Foucault attempts to grasp the construction and reproduction of complex power intersections on the basis of a strategic model of action. He begins with a global conception which regards the emergence of social power relationships as a process such that the power positions acquired in situations and different places, comprise an interconnected network without a center. A dominant system constitutes itself horizontally, i.e. under a fictional view of a synchronic cross-section of continuous struggles where every moment the acquired successes in the social battles extend themselves into a singular aim. A power system is in a certain sense a momentary conjunction of similar successful acts, occurring at different places in a social world. To the extent that such intersecting successes in the same situation are made to repeat themselves, one can speak of a substituent continuity of a power system. In general, it becomes a temporally permanent system of locally acquired and acclaimed power positions.

Given this model, it is clear that a theory that lends the state apparatus any power in society is false at the outset. Thus no social conjunction of powers can be maintained through central activity of a state functions; rather the decentered engagements of different actors in numerous situations of struggle is what supports and maintains the system. Although the traditional view of power assumed an application of centrally directed imposition of means of suppression and manipulation of consciousness, it had to presume that such a centralized power attains stability only when it is successful in exercising power in various locations and situations, i.e. when it finds already preexisting social struggles and thus complicity with another power. Power systems must be already established on the basis of social conflicts at a pre-state level, and must have already structured hierarchies of successes, before a state system of domination can find an area for exercising its power functions.

The critical arguments, stemming from the model of strategic activity, were seen by Foucault as a contribution to the French debates on Marxism. Principally he objects to Althusser and his “ideological state machinery,” although from these considerations one could also find ways of evaluating Adorno. After all, Adorno restricts social domination to the purposive rationality as an activity of a centralized machinery of rulership. In contrast, Foucault offers a MICROPHYSICS OF POWER that is capable of tracing power in strategic confrontations of ordinary life. There are no univocal relationships but numerous confrontations and disturbances, conflicts, transitory and evanescent that threatens to transform power. The transformations of micro-powers do not face ALL OR NOTHING, where controls are assumed over all events, with either a total rejuvenation or disruption of institutions. Power consists of episodes completely enmeshed in a historical net. Foucault is consistent in drawing his descriptive analysis. The model of strategic activity requires that the confluence of powers constitute only a momentary system. The latter must shift in order to maintain its presumed stability and hence must change. There are no stable and global systems, but only a battle without cessation. This is not to say that state is unimportant. Yet obviously the state cannot enter all power relationships, and it can operate only on the basis of already established social powers. The state is a superstructure in relationship to a series of power nets that pervade the body, sexuality, fa-

mily, modes of relationship, knowledge, technologies, etc. Yet this power and its functions of prohibition can operate by being rooted in all kinds of domains of diffused and non-defined power relations.

These arguments enter the French Marxian controversy and is one of the principle counters to Althusser's theory of ideological state machinery. This can be understood if we disregard for a moment his obscure model and suggest that his argument is focused upon a "microphysics of power." This requires the tracing of the strategic controversies in the practical arena; they cannot be reduced to univocal relationships and are numerous, multilayered points of confrontation, constantly threatening power relations. In this sense, each point of power is in a net and is constantly exposed to dissolution and transformation, requiring incessant use of self-enhancing means at various levels and from numerous domains. These domains conjoin themselves into semi-permanent aggregates and become institutionalized. But this does not mean that the strategically composed activities are adequate for the social fabric. This could not lead to normative understanding and to the institutionalization of a momentary winner's power. This is to say, the explanation must rest with at least two other options: first, the mutual acceptance of some normative rules, and second, a constant elevation of power in face of strategic confrontations. If the latter is to be affirmed, then the former becomes an illusion used as strategic means for the struggles.

This leads us to the second point in Foucault's understanding of power: strategic means. In this context, he sees the two major traditional conceptions to be inadequate, i.e. force and ideology. Thus one either uses force or deception. Against ideology he offers not only historical evidence, but also argues theoretically. His view is that force and ideology fail to account for the integration of complex modern societies. Even the Parsonian notion of "common values" must be rejected. Foucault argues that social fabric must remain unstable, since the social confrontations over power positions cannot be brought to stability by values. An order of power which is regarded as some kind of unity of stable can minimize its instability by introducing technical means for the enhancement of power. For Foucault the Parsonian question must be reversed: what kind of means are used by modernity for power maintenance, specifically when it shows a lesser degree of instability then would be possi-

ble by means of ideology or force. Physical force and ideology, as means of power, reveal a common characteristic: they compel the opponent to give up his goal. Yet such means are clumsy, difficult to implement in all places and constantly. Foucault rejects even the argument that ideology can be effective in compelling an acceptance of alien goals as one's own. In contrast to such external and internal repressive means, Foucault introduces the category of "productivity." This is to say, power consists of productive efficiency and strategic wealth.

This category is borrowed from Nietzsche's conception of creative activities of all kinds either as direct or sublimated expressions of a striving for power. Yet Foucault restricts this concept to modernity by showing that now the technicians of social power possess the capacity to release social energies. Specific techniques of social power can enhance and not suppress practical energies. This is not completely clear unless we show a close relationship between "norm, body and knowledge." Norm is an expression for the purpose of those power means which no longer use repressive, but take over productive functions. Technicians of power do not aim at a direct or indirect means of oppressing the aims of the strategic opponent; rather their aim is to route the social opponent through disciplining toward depletion. This procedure is called by Foucault "normative activity." Thus seen, norms of activity are rigidly reproduced schemata of activity, or an effort to produce such norms. Since 19th century there arose a series of mechanisms designed to establish disciplines, habits, and compulsions. Nonetheless these remain unclear without the second category – body. It contains the region of life toward which the modern technicians focus their means.

While at one level the subject is submitted to linguistic rules and norms, used by all as natural, at another level such norms are bodily. By forming the bodily movements, expressions, and gestures, the social system minimizes instability. This view becomes obvious with the understanding that modernity feeds on productivity as a bodily activity. Although one can speak of motor activities, the latter are also submitted to productive rules. This leads then to the regulation even of the organic processes: body shape, diet, health, exhaustion, recuperation, all designed to accommodate the rules of productivity. The social power can be measured by the extent to which it is capable of submitting the

body to the requisite rules of behavior and being. In this sense modern power techniques are no longer designed to oppress or to restrict the body, but to structure it by designs appropriate for modern social systems – improved bodies. Yet such improved bodies have to assume a uniformity and homogeneity: all designed for appropriate tasks, built to standards and requisite gestures. It is not a psychological conditioning of behavior that counts but a psychological conditioning that is elated by the submission of body for productivity. Here, psychic and bodily meanings are collapsed into one signification: one is “happy” because one’s body is capable of “performing” the structured and “productive” tasks; if one begins to lag, one is discarded. Thus youth and pliability must be worshiped. Body is a productive design, tooled and retooled, till its final break down.

The dynamics of drives, moods, spontaneities, are rejected in favor of organizing them along bodily “intelligences,” i.e. modes of operating. This is counter to any psychological region, since the latter is to be “corrected” for appropriate bodily activity and not for appropriate psychological feelings. The latter are equally submitted to psycho-chemistry, leading to an acceptance of “behavioral modifications.” This means that psyche is reduced to biology and the latter can be reshaped by chemistry and even “atomic” processes, making, in this sense, the entire bodily process accessible to the power needs of a system. Here birth, life, and death are at the disposal of the controlling interests. Indeed, such interests are beginning to extend into the very genetic and DNA compositions in order to pluck out the “deviant” formations prior to birth. One, in brief, is entering the age of bio-politics. Structuration, obedience, efficiency, speed, homogeneity, serialization, and fragmentation rule the times.

What once passed for “knowledge” can be seen now under the rubrics of political and biological technocracies. Research is designed to yield control mechanisms capable of pervading all facets, shapes, abilities, and forms of concrete activities. The linguistic and discursive practices have become coextensive with bodily praxis. Here scientific knowledge and its empirical data are mutually warranting; every hypothesis is made to work, and the funded sciences are continuations of discourses by empirical means, capable of securing and continuing the power forms over the individual. Indeed, the social actors are enabled to em-

ploy the strategic means provided by science for increasing reworking of the activities of the individual in conformity with systemic interests. In this sense one can no longer speak of instrumental rationality as something that is applied on external nature, but as a strategic requirement for social power confrontations. The sciences themselves are in the same social context; they too are in an incessant “competition” for supremacy and must submit their operations to the material codes of progress, relevance, economy, and progress. And this too requires fragmentation.

It is possible, now, to extend this concept of power toward institutions, whether they are pedagogical, political, economic, or aesthetic. They are an extended body following the same rules imposed and pervading the socialized – techno-biologized – body of the social members. Institutions must too be progressive and efficient, economic and behavioral, restrictive and homogeneous, i.e. normal and normalizing. In this sense, the distinctions of modernity between democratic and totalitarian systems vanish, and reach a conception of simply being “different systems” with the same techno-biological politic. Such a politic ceases to raise questions of “rights” and proposes functional requirements that call for the structuration of body politic in concreto. It has become obvious that once the choice has been made to design and introduce a particular bio-technique, the choice not to use it has been lost. The I.Q. pill must be taken if one is to maintain or enhance one’s position. And the latter too is an inscription of corporeal process all the way to the cell. This is neither internal nor external power, but the power imbedded in the ways one walks, acts, smiles, eats, makes “choices” among diets, and even thinks. Is this power shaped by mass opinion, or is mass opinion shaped by such a power? Perhaps the two are inextricably tied together, each enhancing and promoting the other. But here we have reached precisely the modern scientific enlightenment in its fragmented discourses, their productive magic and political technocracies. Foucault is very much a bearer of the ultimate manifestation of Western modernity.

CHAPTER V
TRANSCENDENTAL CONDITIONS
OF CIVILIZATIONAL STUDIES

Introduction

The numerous civilization theories tend to seek to accomplish a common task concerning human life world: explanation. While such a task is worthy of effort, there are other tasks that suggest other ways of regarding civilization: its ground in awareness, regardless of cultural and social origins. The latter two factors are premised on various and usually unarticulated eidetic modes of awareness: historical transmission of sense and meaning; pedagogical continuity of a tradition; some inherent natural and/or supernatural rules; and finally, the legalistic theses, i.e. language is not only the primary means, but is the essence of culture and, in turn, of civilization frameworks.

Our arguments are designed to show that awareness and basically its intentional structure has a greater explanatory capacity than its avoidance and replacement by the primacy of cultural life worlds and their languages. It is claimed that in principle, if one learns proper linguistic behavior, one need not be conscious, i.e. one need not introduce the hypothesis of awareness. In a certain sense, there may be a misunderstanding of intentionality by the advocates of various types of lingualisms. If one looks at the intentionality and corrects the inappropriate ways in which it is interpreted, one will find that the arguments on the side of cultural world priority may not hold. Indeed, intentionality might turn out to be correlated to a given cultural world as its linguistic, even if limited, expression. This will require a rejection of intentionalism interpreted as some sort of mental characteristic or a voluntarism. At the same time it will be argued that any terms designating some presumed internal states, such as psychological or biological desires, needs, or instincts, that are descriptive of intentional states and related to sundry “external” affairs, are equally redundant, comprising the residua of seventeenth century metaphysics. Moreover, concepts of cause and representation become redundant for any description of intentionality and its cultural means of communicating. This is to say, the latter has been, at times, associated with some of

the evolutionary ontologies as the presumed bases for linguistic concepts and semantics. These ontologies are residua of modernist mythologies of progress, with all of the tacit teleologies and eschatologies. One could even argue against the assumption that culture is a given and is sufficient to account for sense making. There is no a priori necessity for presuming that there IS culture and that it is concerned with meaning. Both maybe unjustified ontological speculations and are at best conveniences. Moreover, there is no a priori necessity to regard one cultural linguistic form, such as logical, propositional, given in one culture as superior over another without a tacit valuation or a point of not articulated interest.

Intentionality

It has been a part of a long history of Husserl scholarship maintaining a common claim that intentionality is a fundamental signifying function of awareness; it means something or other. The qualification of intentionality, in the context of cross cultural communication, is sense making. A close survey of this phrase offers an added picture. The term intentionality does not designate a pregiven state of affairs, but rather stakes out a problematic field. Thus, it is necessary to point out that the common definition of intentionality as “consciousness of...” is more than the notion of “intentional action,” or “deliberate engagement.” Such designations are still burdened by traditions of metaphysical clashes between proponents of determinisms and freedoms. Even if it were possible to regard intentionality as a function of wanting or willing, analyses would show that these tandems presume a more “neutral” delimitation.

Such delimitation is in line with Husserl’s suggestion that his life’s work was shaped by the discovery and analyses of a correlation between universal requirements on anyone’s part and the structure of a given object irrespective of its ontological status. The use of the term correlation instead of relationship suggests a difference between an one-to-one, i.e. act to object structure and a one-to-process composition. In this sense the object must be regarded as a constant, while the correlation to it may be variable. In turn, the correlation may be constant while the “object” may be variable. To see is to see something, to judge the same thing, to use it as a support for a hypothesis, to employ it for practical purposes, or even as a basis of theoretical interrogation. The object need not be a

“natural” entity. It can be a numerical system, an emotion, a complex state of affairs, or a problem to be resolved. All such “objects” can be maintained as identical, while our correlations to them can vary. The numerical system can be judged concerning its value for some task, or it can lead to speculative metaphysics with respect to the “whereabouts” of the existence of numbers. Such correlation variations can be subsumed under the term “intentionality.”

Our arguments are designed to defect any opposition from culturally committed lingualists with claims that awareness is either shaped by a cultural sign system or by some psychological states inherent in the human natural constitution. Thus in this sense some would argue that “intentional analyses” belong to the mind or internal states which, while not regarded causally, are at the base of human understanding. We want to show that such reductionisms miss the point of their own positions to the extent that they assume a diversity of types of intentionalities and their correlation to distinct kinds of objects, including the object called mind and its meant internal composition. This is to say, we can show that transcendental phenomenology is more objective than the positions offered by its cultural opponents. The sense of a specific type of objectivity sets the parameters to the structure of the intentionalities, and both can be regarded purely objectively. In short, the structure of the object is decisive concerning the objectivity of the intentional functions correlating to the object. No doubt, this correlation can be highly complex, requiring careful analyses, yet in principle such correlation is objective. Husserl, as a matter of fact, demonstrated that this mode of analysis of intentionality is a no speculative positivism.

An objective analysis extricates initially two levels of intentional correlation: the empirical, and the essential. The latter can not be construed ontologically as if there were some essential reality, but as a structural feature of a sense making process focused on the empirical comprising given means of expressing the essential. The structural features must not be confused with generalized concepts derived from empirical characteristics, since such features disregard the boundaries of typological designations. One can say “I see a group of objects” with total disregard to the metaphysics of family resemblance, since the group can consist of generically diverse objects. Yet it is not an a priori concept in another

metaphysically posited entity called mind. Not to speak of the irresolvable dilemmas concerning the “application” of the a priori concepts – or for that matter the presumably generalized concepts – to the singular cases, there is equally a sticky problem of reintroducing the unnecessary question of “meaning” as an explanatory tandem. How could one presume that a variety of individual objects could, in a flash, assume a “meaning?” These difficulties could be avoided with a turn to intentionality not as meaning, but as sense making. For example, a particular arrangement of objects, without regard to their generic characteristics, may be called a group. The latter is not a generalized category but an “essential” mode of making sense. It is neither a particular nor universal, and yet it has its own generality requiring no meaning for its sense making function. This avoids other difficulties, inclusive of inductive mysticism wherein after surveying singular objects one emerges with some other singular object, a linguistic term, and claims that the term obtains at a stroke some mysterious general feature. Indeed, sense making need not be regarded as a function of some entity or consciousness, but as a correlation in whose context even the so-called subject makes sense.

No doubt, objections might arise to the effect that if there is no one to intend, the term intentionality would cease to be meaningful. This objection is premised on a language possessing substantive terms and verbs, leading to a metaphysical assumption favoring “things” that act. Such a presumption is a convenience which has no necessary implications concerning the world. If this assumption is disregarded, it is possible to offer a delimitation of intentionality that simply makes sense to anyone. Intentional activities are not individualistic or private engagements that should lead to a generalization of them. They are either proper, make sense at the outset, or do not make sense. The activity is general and may be repeated and experienced by anyone.

It should be obvious that intentionality regarded in this manner is not representational, imagistic, or conceptual. This is to say, it does not “copy” the object, does not look like the object, and is no particular state of substantively conceived consciousness. This avoids a type of psychological assumption – modern representational as a part of modern Western cultural language, is a block to understanding cross cultural studies. Such a thesis requires that you and I guarantee that both of us

have the same internal states expressed in different languages and causally related to the “same thing.” In brief, my image in me and your image in you must be accessed as alike before we can claim mutual access to one another. Hence, there are inventions to fill this cultural and even personal gap: one speaks of empathy, of similar physiological, biological, etc. constructions. The point is that the activities correlated to the given objects are neither inner nor outer, neither similar to the objects under consideration nor their inner counterparts or images. They are correlational. Such a correlation extends all the way to theories as modes of anyone’s awareness accessible to all. One can say “let us regard the world as a sum of material parts” or as “projection of ideas” without raising the question which of these regards is true. Both can be deemed to be ways of making sense.

This kind of understanding of correlation excludes presumed distinctions between mentalist, such as a conscious activity in contrast to motor and even unconscious activities, and received materialism. Intentionalities understood in this way can be seen metaphorically as **vertical**: they are directed, in complex shifts, toward the objects. Verticality has neither temporal nor spatial topoi; we can look toward future events, predicted by science, expected in daily engagements, or attend to galaxies “above” us. Whether such intentionalities were enacted by ancient Chinese astronomers, or contemporary scientists, the enactments can be reiterated by anyone and anytime. Thus vertical intentionalities are not correlations to something from a position of above toward the below, from left to right, and from forward to backward, but toward a given objectivity. Vertical intentionalities are, in principle, **appositional** and thus accessible to anyone.

There are, of course, powerful arguments, pointing out that intentionalities are both intersubjective and belong to a cultural life world. Indeed, too many have pointed out that Husserl’s turn to the analyses of life world may be an admission of the inadequacy of the transcendental delimitation of awareness that I have sketched. I am well aware of this issue. As a matter of fact it could be argued that despite Husserl’s contention that modern sciences have constituted an artificial layer over the doxa of the life world, all the efforts to perform an epoche on what the sciences have constituted, did not reveal **the**, but simply another cultural

life world, perhaps the medieval before the scientific, and prior to both, perhaps a mixture of Greco-Roman and Mid-Eastern. In brief, what was discovered are a variety of life worlds each having its own cultural modes of living, speaking, dancing, worshipping, socializing and dying. To speak bluntly and, perhaps, within some cultural life world, life worlds are relative. This is a common thesis of social and cultural anthropologists, with an added notion that each of us is subject to our own culture which far surpasses our own intentionalities. In a way this thesis lends priority to the we over the I. As we are aware, the hermeneutical turn is also premised on this conception of the more of the historically effective consciousness over the singular consciousness. One could even go so far as to argue that this singular consciousness recognizes itself only in face of, and in contrast to the other.

Having said this much, it is also important to note another aspect, usually buried in the foreground, in the rush to reveal the primacy of cultural life worlds: that in the process of delimiting such cultural life-worlds, we are not constituting our inherence in them, but our awareness of them. This is the point concerning both the inadequacy of the Ego, and the notion that the **Ur-ego** is a requisite awareness that constitutes itself in the correlation to cultural lifeworlds. This suggests that the consciousness we are tracing is not cultural – even if we use terms such as consciousness that are borrowed from a specific culture. If we say that a cultural life-world is premised on the priority of the we over the singular, we are also saying that there is an awareness of the way both options may engage in articulating a given lifeworld. But the awareness of either must be traced from the given life worlds in order to note the “how” of this awareness, its self-constituting intentionality. The point is quite simple: it may be the case that some cultural life worlds have expressive means to claim the transcendental region as geological – I see, I think, I perceive, while other such worlds may regard the we to be the constitutive background. Yet in each case, there is the given awareness of the world that is accessible to either cultural life world, despite the cultural limitations of expression. We shall return to this issue subsequently.

The rule of such intentionality is “the living present” consisting of permanence and change. While the object remains permanent, the functions correlated to it may change. In turn, we can repeat the same acts,

holding them as permanent (not necessarily viewed as timeless), while offering a variation of objects. The vertical intentionalities are prelinguistic in the sense that no question of meaning is raised. If one were to say that a meaning of an object depends on the meaning of linguistic concepts, one would still assume the sense making process. The argument, based on linguistic signification, at times takes a turn toward cultural relativism. Hence the object “cow” might mean “holy” in some of the Hindu cultural traditions, or it might mean “product” in capitalist market economy. Regardless of these meanings, it makes sense for anyone, Hindu or otherwise, to see this object as identical, given from various perspectives and exhibiting different sides, requiring our movements around the object. One cannot transgress this sense making process by a mere linguistic definition and walk through this object, i.e. one may not be arbitrary. The given structure of the object dictates the requisite access to it if the performance of this access is to make sense. Indeed, one can change linguistic expressions, use distinct cultural semantics to exemplify this object, yet such linguistic usages will have to correlate to the requirements of a given object.

Cultural Expressions

Cultural expressions can be regarded as means of articulating the vertically maintained objectivities. As is well known in phenomenology, the term “objectivity” includes anything to which we orient ourselves, inclusive of cultural objectivities such as works of arts, mythical figures, scientific theories, and spring rituals. These expressivities are to a great extent linguistic, and articulate the sense of the vertical intentionality. In order to accommodate the vertical intentionalities, language must be regarded as signficative and dialogical, i.e. to speak is to speak to someone about something. Language, taken concretely, makes sense as dialogical, and despite the variety of its cultural types and rules, it follows the triadic structure of dialogue. No doubt, dialogical structure can be expanded to include more than two persons and more than one linguistic level. This extension of dialogue can be called **polycentric**. We perceive with the intentional orientations of others as they do with ours. One can address a crowd about some issue; one can even argue with members of one’s own or of other traditions who lived in a remote past. Thus one

can say “I disagree with Plato’s argument about justice” without being regarded as making no sense due to the empirical absence of Plato. We know what Plato said in his works about the given subject matter. Even if we claim that Plato was mistaken, we still claim that he was mistaken about the subject matter such as justice. In turn, we are able to recognize not only the subject matter of discourse, but also the various levels of speaking and can make appropriate judgments concerning the fitness of a given terminology.

This suggests that discourses can be addressed in their own right and investigated in their own structures and rules. This is to say that our intentional activity is shifting to expressive compositions comprising the horizontal articulation of a given objectivity or a subject matter. This, for me, is an argument concerning the priority of intentionality over culturally available means of expression. Only the granting of this priority opens the possibility of articulating these means. Without the intentional correlation to a specific structure of objectivity, there would be neither criterion by which to judge the appropriateness of a given structure of expression, nor a particular communication with persons of other cultures. Questions, such as “what do you mean by this gesture or this word” would not even arise.

All language is **about** something, and is equally capable of articulating that something in various ways and at different levels of human engagement with the objects of the environment and culture. This articulation is horizontal, in the sense of serial succession of signs, terms, conventional marks or sounds. Such an articulation does not embody any meaning, but is designed to extend and to complicate the sense maintained in the vertical intentionalities. At one level language could be structured as a predicative judgment, at another it might be an explanation of some pragmatic function of the object, at yet another, it would place the object in a system of exchange values, or aesthetic and cultural appreciation. Obviously, all such articulations would have to make sense with respect to a given object and context. The linguistic combination of marks or sounds, even if patterned by “rules” of verbal games or by linguistic forms, do not reveal any sense. This is to say, the “solution” to the problem of sense making cannot be had at the level of the presumed linguistic rules. The latter are metaphysical postulates without any

warrant or demonstration. No doubt, various philosophical directions of “lingualism” attempt to answer the question of sense making by showing the difference between marks, sounds, gestures, and the rules of their composition. Yet in the final analysis such ventures fail precisely at the juncture at which the rules are postulated as another set of objects for analysis to which some sense must be added. Such ventures lead to a fruitless regress.

The point is that the question of sense, even at the linguistic level, has always been a redundancy whose exclusion avoids the spilling of innocent ink. In brief, such questions make no sense. What make sense are questions concerned with the possible modes of cultural or horizontal articulation of the vertical intentionalities. In order to come to terms with the composition of horizontal expressivities, some of the salient western traditional metaphysical assumptions must be surrendered. One of those assumptions culminated with Kant and his question as to the nature of conceptual understanding. Since a concept does not seem to be an aspect of the empirical, then it must be a structure of some non-empirical type that can provide a form, a unity for the “blind” phenomena. It seems then that such concepts are either “in us” or in language. Resultantly, one engages in conceptual analyses under the presumption that there are “concepts” offering some “universal” calling card. It could be that the so called concepts are residua of Platonic metaphysics imported through the back door of unsuspecting philosophical discourse. This takes place even under the guise of generalization or universalization, leading to the claim of obtaining a universal proposition. Yet if one observes the so called universal proposition empirically (and how else could one observe such propositions in the context of intensionalism that rejects intentionality as some type of mental state in the interiority of an empirical subject, without, at the same time, introducing some metaphysical epiphenomenon), then one will discover a set of marks or noises, each in its own right a singular, empirical datum. A singular datum, or a succession of singular data, will not lead to anything more than the singular data. As Husserl has shown in his *Logical Investigations*, given empirical prejudgments, neither universality nor generality are exhibited among such data. Indeed, even the assumed meaning is not available among these data without intentionality.

Given these concerns, the usual ploy is to reintroduce in some way the traditional metaphysics of concepts, forms, and even linguistic rules. This presumed necessitation originates with the traditional and indeed uncritical assumption that the “empirical” is a singular datum, containing no generality, and the latter must have its source elsewhere. This elsewhere have been the bone of contention and the source of extremely clever constructions of metaphysics. Where are the universals, the concepts, the forms, the rules and the laws that can be instantiated by most diverse empirical impressions, or empirical inner states. The presumption of factual singularity and conceptual generality is completely unwarranted. Our discussion of intentionality has shown clearly that the objects of the world are available neither as singular nor as universal – conceptual or formal, even if such objects are parts of language, but bear a generality of their own and thus are accessible to anyone even interculturally. Language is a complex articulation of such generality and bears general characteristics of its own. In brief, generality does not require metaphysical postulation of something “beyond” the factual, but is the very composition of an object that calls for activities and language that are general; the latter comprise a sensible and systematic access to an object without empirically conceived epistemic entities and blocks. In this sense, even linguistic functions need not be seen as either individual marks or sounds, or as somehow formed by or even comprising instantiations of rules. The marks and the sounds have their own generalities as bearers of intentional orientation that transgress the traditional views of particularity and universality.

The cultural domain may be regarded as a generality that subtends the metaphysics of single objects and universal propositions. A statement such as “People are funny that way” does not say “All people” and hence provide a pure extensional definition, and yet it does not designate some intentional concept and an individual. Phenomenology, thus, locates language, and by extension cultural worlds, between the universal and the singular and investigates them as articulations of intentionally constituted sense of given objectivities and their extension toward various modes of human engagement with such objectivities. Yet the connection between intentional and cultural remains unjustified without indicating that the former is not simply an obvious object,

but a system of intentional activities and hence requiring some sort of explication. In this sense the cultural explication traces the intentional implications and possible variations. It can be said that the explication is between the experienced and the object that is being experienced as a systematic process of sense making and exploration. Thus the claims of phenomenologist's of language assume some credence. To enhance this credence it ought to be shown that language is neither a system of terms and rules that refer purely to a pregiven set of objects nor is it merely a tool for expressing thought, but occupies a position between the intentional activities and their correlative object.

The Nexus

One issue leading to this intermediary position is concerned with the last interpreter. Is it the individual who is the final and ultimate arbiter of sense? Some would maintain this position by pointing out that language, specifically if it is deemed to be theoretically laden, does not suggest any connection between itself and the so called factual domain. There must be another factor that connects language and fact, and does so from a vantage point of interest. Thus, the application of language to facts does not yield objectivity, but objectivity that becomes explicated from a vantage point of interest. This leads directly to a second issue. The user of language, while relating language to objects, not only influences language, but is at the same time part of the linguistic tradition and hence is subjected to it. This is to say; given this state of affairs it is impossible to make language an object of investigation without influencing this object and hence transforming it. When one insists on claiming that all language must have a "factual" base, one has assumed a metaphysical standpoint of interest and thus selects linguistic tandems from a much broader linguistic field and makes a claim that the selected tandems are "objective." The residua must then be "explained" on the basis of the selected "factual" language and thus transformed. Here the interest is metaphysical and thus is assumed a priori. Yet in such a case the metaphysical vantage point of interest is regarded as the final "interpreter" of all other modes of speaking, making other cultural languages either inaccessible or non-factual. But such an interpretation is equally a falsification of what it interprets in the sense that the subject matter of

investigation is not only preformed a priori, but is regarded from a vantage point of a specific intentionality – in this case a deliberately enacted position of a specific type of metaphysical interest and reductionism. Thus, while dealing with language, one assumes one of its aspects and then changes other aspects to suit the selected ones. The latter are, nonetheless, some aspect of one language of one culture and cannot claim universality in the sense of speaking for all cultures.

The process of selection is in fact posited in the background, but not accounted for, although it functions as the last interpreter. In principle, the latter is the intentional process accessible to all. It is taken for granted that the selection assumes an awareness of the choice of metaphysical base, e.g. empirical-factual, it assumes equally an awareness of other possible objectivities in order to reject them as either “not there,” or as merely subjective, or residua of unenlightened and even primitive cultures, and thus assumes an objective awareness of this subjectivity. What such an engagement leaves out is the intentional activities of selecting, differentiating, judging, reducing, and explaining objectivity in terms of another. These intentional activities are none other than transcendental. They are the processes of mediation that are not mediated.

Next issue consists of the “superfluity” of the traditional language over the selected aspects of it for constructing either an explanation or a structure under which all culturally and indeed cross-culturally transmitted linguistic expressions could be subsumed. Yet, as numerous current textual investigations indicate, the superfluity can neither be subsumed under, nor remain without some influence on the selected terminology. In this sense, the last interpreter cannot be designated as the “objective theorist” but a fund of cultural modes of speaking and social interactions providing connections between statements formed for “factual” designation. If one takes the rules of language, the terms ordered by such rules, and the factual designation, one will not be able to show connections among a variety of statements without a background of cultural and contextual customs. For example, a string of sentences “How are you?”, “It is a fine day,” “Will you be playing tennis today?” has no indicated rule in the sentences concerning their connection. Indeed, one sentence does not imply the others. This suggests that there is much more to concrete linguistic process than the “well formed” sentences,

supposedly derived from, and designating empirical facts. In brief, the cultural life world, inhabited by transcendently constituted sense connections, provides the immediate foreground of understanding this issue also implies that the speaker, even the theorist of language, cannot achieve a total extrication from the varieties of linguistic interactions and survey such interactions from outside, without the assumption of an intentional analyses that yield the constitutive activities of the sense of the connections among sentences.

From what has been said so far, it follows that the dialogical and polycentric intending and theorizing process, as a last interpreter who selects linguistic usages and thus designates facts and evaluates such designations, cannot be investigated by such selected and theoretically interpreted terms. Were this the case, then the very subject of intention, selectivity and valuation would be selected as a factual datum of another subject of selectivity and intended as a fact. Such a move is not a solution, but simply a shift to another last interpreter that escapes, meanwhile, any interpretation. As noted above, the answer would be that since the subject of intention and selectivity cannot be an object of this selectivity, then it can be disregarded as irrelevant. The claim, then, can be made that cultural a world with all its linguistic structures ought to be regarded as the process of selectivity and designation of what would be deemed as factual. Yet in this case a cultural world can never become an object of any discipline, since it surpasses any selected restriction to fit one discipline. This is to say, if such a world is assumed to be the process of selectivity, then it cannot be explicated by any, not even a philosophical discipline. After all, if culture is the most primal intentional process of selectivity, correlation of theories to facts and interpretations, then all such theories and interpretations are parts of culture, but no one theory can make the entire process into its own object, since such a theory would be but one facet of cultural structures and rules. In other words, if the cultural process is the very social and historical process and if all theories of awareness are internal to this process, then none of them can rise above and be an external surveyor of this process. If the latter assumption would be, nonetheless, affirmed then one would revert back to the last interpreter, the cultural process as the unmediated medium. But precisely the positing by the proponents of the primacy

of this process over poly-centric intentionality assumes cultural worlds to be objects of their own intentional concerns. Here culture becomes a correlate, or an object, of intentionality. The latter, then, becomes the immediate, or the unmediated nexus. The latter, nonetheless, can become equally problematic due to the available cultural modes of articulation. For example, the modern designation of subject, even when it is regarded as transcendental subjectivity, may be restricted to the limitations of the senses of the term and hence result in controversies and misunderstandings. After all, the very articulation of phenomenology is constantly pitted against, and is compelled to use, the various available senses of the term "subject." This is precisely the point of argumentative access to various hermeneutics and their claims that the meaning of terms, such as subject, belong within the horizons of a given tradition, a given cultural world. Such claims posit the tradition as the unmediated mediation, the all encompassing nexus that is always more than any subject could encompass. Essentially speaking, all forms of culturalism would have to maintain this type of claim.

The discussed issues suggest a constant fluctuation between two noematic contents: first is the intentional, transcendental and polycentric event as the last interpreter, the unmediated mediation that can never be designated either as a subject in any traditional sense or an object; and second, the cultural process, leading to the notion that all means of communication comprise an in-between domain as a mediation of both the intending and interpreting subject and the objects. In phenomenological terms, we have a tension between the phenomena of vertical intentionality and its articulation in horizontal process of cultural life world. In cultural terms, phenomena, including vertical intentionalities, have a meaning within the context of horizontal articulations.

Yet we have suggested that the vertical intentionality is correlated to its own specific object as a systematic core for exploration requiring specific activities on the side of the polycentric subject who engages in various explorations; such a subject equally selects from the fund of cultural process the domain that would be appropriate for a systematic designation of the system of exploration. This way of understanding avoids historicizing of culture and the assumption that all knowledge is purely a cultural interpretation. We would suggest added ways in which in-

tentionality may assume precedence over culture. As noted above, the essential claim of the latter is that no subject is capable of encompassing the horizons of a cultural tradition. The subject is always in the medium of the MORE of the cultural world over the intentional.

Transcendental phenomenology would accept the *de facto* state of the preeminence of cultural media. Yet the methodological position of this phenomenology points out that the proponents of culturalism perform a tacit phenomenological *epoche* when they focus on certain cultural structures in order to suggest their appropriateness for a particular region of objectivity. The simple distinction between propositional sentences and other forms of discourse suggest that the former relate to intentional noemata as tandems of empirical verifiability, while the latter may designate subjective-psychological states. The latter also assume a noematic status of being given vertically and expressed in horizontal, non-objective sentences. In this sense, both forms of language assume an intentional ground toward a specific region of objectivity that provides a criterion for the differentiations among linguistic usages. After all, Western proponents of cultural priority would not accept the view that the propositional mode of speaking is equivalent to the poetic speaking, without abolishing their prejudgment that the former is appropriate to all natural sciences, and the latter being more akin to human sciences. If this were not the case, then, in the final analysis, communicative claims would be reduced to rhetorical differences, and culturalism would become strife among numerous rhetorical efforts to evoke acceptance or rejection, without any focal criterion concerning the appropriateness of a given linguistic structure to a given subject matter. Scientific discourses could as well be designated as bad poetry, while poetics could become the ultimate explanatory theory. Indeed, if culturalism is credited with the ultimate power of designating objectivities at will, then it would follow that culture creates, within itself, its criteria for noematic content. But this reverts language to one of its archaic forms: magic. In its archaic form the latter becomes identical with the events that the speaking “makes.” While this form of speaking may still function among the faithful adherents of technocracy and religious transubstantiation, it need not make adequate sense in other regions.

We may advance other phenomenologically relevant arguments that show the assumption of the primacy of intentionality. In the general thesis of culturalism it is pointed out that language is prior to any noematic-objective content, because the structure of cultural world is different from the structure of any empirical and/or natural objectivity. Language is not derived from, but, as a matter of fact, determines the meaning of empirical and natural factors. This contention can be enhanced by pointing out that even the proponents of empiricism and naturalism do not agree on the meaning of these terms and their counterpart objectivities. This suggests that no such counterpart is given and thus does not dictate the language which articulates them. Indeed, the very articulations determine the meaning of these objectivities. For phenomenology, these claims are, in principle, circular. To state that there is a structural difference between a designating mode of speaking, and the designated object, is to recognize, equally, an awareness of the object irrespective of its designation. Thus, the culturally specific linguistic interpretation, with its diverse modalities of meanings, constitutes variants, granting the intentional presence OF the given objectivities. This is to say that the arguments among the empiricists concerning the status of an empirical datum such as color, leading some to contend that it is purely subject bound impression, and compelling others to argue that it is part of an objective explanation in terms of light waves, assumes the primacy of the givenness of the color irrespective of its location or explanatory discourse. We grant the awareness of color despite its variant meanings and explanations.

The various issues enunciated so far suggest that the last interpreter is a constant conjunction of objective intentionality and a universe of traditionally transmitted cultural mediations. They are the “inner-social” field of temporal development, and neither can assume a privileged position. In turn, neither of the selected intentional activities and their selected statements is in a position to encompass the entire field of intentional acts and cultural processes. To be able to perform such a feat, one would have to assume a non-temporal posture; yet the latter must be rejected as metaphysical. The latter too is one intentional activity selective of cultural expressions that may be meaningful, but in the final analysis restricted to this metaphysical sense. This suggests that the meaningful language is metaphysical, but such language does not correlate to sense making in-

tentional activities and sensible expressions of all cultures, although the intentional signification is accessible cross-culturally.

The deliberations on intentionality and cultural life worlds are indicative of the exclusion of various traditional blocks, not the least of metaphysics, a priori assumptions such as thoughts, concepts, forms, and ideas, and their attendant relegation of language as an external clothing of something that is pregiven. In turn, it is unnecessary to hold that intentions are some pure presence that can be expressed univocally by any cultural terms. As noted above, every intention not only correlates to something, to some object, in one act, but is a polycentric system of activities engaged in explicating the object and completely involved in cultural expressions. In this sense cultural world is not an a priori set of rules but a concrete and practical activity of sense making. In brief, it is praxis in process without the mythology of progress, and includes both, the vertical, systematic, active intentionalities and the sense making cultural expressions. The latter are neither subjective nor objective, but comprise a medium of explication of what can be designated as subjective and objective contents on the grounds of transcendental polycentric sense-making process. The latter is the domain of phenomenological investigations.

Although the charge that the cultural domain is more than any researcher can encompass and therefore cannot be an object of any investigating intersubjectivity, is serious and includes the claims of numerous theses of the primacy of culture, historical tradition, and even society over the researcher, phenomenology can defend its stance on various grounds. First, the researchers, engaged in their own cultural studies engage in a tacit epoche by showing that they have an objective access to their own and other cultures and society. In brief, they assume a transcendental position that enables them to show the various structural limits of their own cultures, and the differences from other cultures. If this were not the case, then their research would be equally culture bound and would exhibit their own inability to offer objective analyses even of their own culture. The same regard is true of historicizing and sociologizing theses. The position that the members of a culture, society or a historical tradition are irrevocably enmeshed in the various structures, cannot be a universal claim since it excludes the polycentric researcher who makes this claim. Second, the performance of phenomenological

epoche, allows one to attend to specific aspects and their precise compositions of a given culture, history, and tradition, without the requisite claim that such attention must be all-encompassing. It is possible to focus on a specific noema and to decipher its essential and complex composition, and if need be its relationships to other noemata. One can show the composition of a specific economy, specific legal designs, show where the latter may be economically interest laden, mythologically relevant, and politically adequate or inadequate. One can also show various transformations of the sense of the phenomena from one domain to another. The condition for the possibility of such researches is the epoche of sciences and human disciplines and the a-positional consciousness of tolerance. Third, phenomenological reflexivity includes the position of the polycentric researcher. The latter exhibits the limits of intentional analyses vis-à-vis a specific domain of objectivity and resultantly can either show the ways in which such a position is appropriate or appropriate to a given subject matter. Moreover, in cases of signitive sense making processes, where the intended objectivity does not arise apart from the constitutive activities, as is the case of non-Euclidean systems, it is possible to show how certain intentionalities “shape” the very objectivity in question. Yet phenomenology is most careful to point out that while some intentionalities are required for this signitive domain, once the domain is established and becomes a part of tradition, they are accessible for anyone’s reiteration and learning. Finally, fourth, the advantage of the inclusion of the intentional position of the polycentric subject, the theoretician, allows one to read how certain phenomena are reconstituted. The various economic theses of the Nineteenth century resignified the socio-political systems in a way that transformed the very fabric of awareness and elicited practical movements to transfigure both socio-economic and political systems. Indeed, without inclusion of such intentional awareness, and the ways it has resignified multiple relationships among noematic essential compositions, we would not comprehend the economic and socio-political changes.

The phenomenological thesis, articulated so far, suggests that intentionalities are not reducible to specific individual, traditionally called the subject, but are analyzable in numerous modifications. One may have a theoretical intentionality that claims to be universal explanatory system.

Obviously, such intentionality can be checked for its own consistency. If the theorizing subject claims that all contents are culturally determined, then such a subject excludes its own determination and precludes the universality of the thesis. If cultural world is granted to be the pregiven, tacit background which constitutes the structures of all intentionalities, then it cannot claim an ability to grasp this background. Yet, the proponents of this stance assume a transcendental argumentation and posit their own thesis as an objective and universal content, accessible to all. In this sense, they assume an intentional position without the required explication of such an intentional position. Barring the explication of this unthematized intentionality, such a thesis becomes incomplete; it leaves the sense making activities that are in the background of the intentional constitution of this very thesis. Intentionalities may be idiosyncratically singular, claiming that all intentionalities are constituted autonomously and creatively, and thus all correlative objectivities are tied to an arbitrary will of the individual. Despite this popular subjectivism, the claim is eidetically universal and can be both transcendently accepted or contested by anyone.

This is very much in accord with the phenomenological awareness that any and all intentionalities and their either pregiven objectivities or the objectivities arising in the process of constitution, are reiterable and accessible to anyone. This can extend to include the deconstructionist stance that it is demonstrable that there was never a text and never a subject, that it can be demonstrated that they have never had a presence. This is akin to mathematical demonstration that something cannot be demonstrated. Such a claim is transcendental, all the while assuming that its intentionality is accessible to all. Obviously, this position leaves its own transcendental claims unattended. The latter may constitute a vertical intentionality of a constant flux, exhibited horizontally by the texts without parameters. If such intentionality is left out of consideration, then the purely cultural position of the deconstructivists remains metaphysical. Despite the cultural variety and distinctions among textual contents, this position assumes as a given the invalidity of culturally differentiated phenomena, and claims that such textual differentiations cannot be maintained in reality. Only intentional analyses could show at what level of awareness and objective generality these cultural con-

tents lose their textual differentiations. Thus, as suggested above, there may be intentional generalities that may constitute various contents as permanent, and others as flowing, correlating to the modifications of the vertical and horizontal awareness. Yet without phenomenological articulation of such constitutive processes, correlated to their various objectivities, be they cultural or naturalistic, the theses of their deconstruction remains a metaphysical, and hence arbitrary prejudgment. In this sense, it seems that an escape from metaphysics continues to be the prerogative of phenomenology.

Given this fundamental understanding of intentionality and its diverse and clearly distinguishable enactments in correlation to their variety of levels of objectivities, it is impossible to charge phenomenology with the maintenance of any traditional conceptions of mentalistic or psychological subjectivism or any form of objectivism. Presumptions of such maintenance stem from the reading only of the cultural, traditionally bound modes of horizontal and variable expressions that assume the vertical modifications of awareness. The horizontal too is a taken for granted phenomenon that can appear across diverse cultural and/or specific traditional modifications. After all, the intentional claim that all phenomena are traditionally-linguistically laden is a vertical intentionality that uses most diverse modalities to demonstrate this claim. In this sense the introduction of mental intentions as being purely subjective, is one linguistic and culture specific expression of the assumption of intentionality. The reason for this restriction of intentionality to cultural modification is that a successful cultural media efface themselves in the process of making intentional sense of any object, leading to the conclusion that cultural world is all there is. Cultural means, nonetheless, assume sense as a specific and limited explication of the speaker's and the listener's intentionalities that articulate noematic sense correlated to proper objectivities. This unavoidable conjunction of intentionality and cultural means must discard the theory of speech acts which constitute meaning. Speech acts theory is one more version of saving the traditional metaphysics of mind; its exclusion, specifically in its reductionist bio-psychological and causal form, does not detract from the sense making praxis. Such metaphysics has not yet grasped the radicality of transcendental phenomenology. Although it is difficult to avoid ontolo-

gization and metaphysical pre-judgments, phenomenology, in principle if not always in practice, is in a position to extricate and distinguish the phenomena from such prejudgments, and indeed to explicate the intentional grounding of ontologization and metaphysics.

Postscript

Our analyses of intentionality show that the latter is not a subjective state but a requisite activity, engaged with all sorts of objects – from physical, to formal, and cultural – and comprises a domain accessible to anyone. Obviously this domain is not identical to, nor derivable from the objects with which it is concerned. The activity of exploring a physical object is not identical with the object; the activities of making judgments, correlating statements in terms of a valid rule of deduction is not identical with the rule. In turn, such activities are neither identical to, nor derivable from subjective-psychological states, or social-cultural and causally conceived conditions. They are completely intertwined in the cultural field of specific modes of speaking that are equally premised on activity of articulating and making sense of a given object. The “last interpreter” is an interface of polycentric awareness and cultural means, comprising a medium of both genetic activities and linguistic fields. No metaphysical tandems, such as intending minds or “things in themselves” are required. Indeed, no subjective acts such as generalizations are needed. Exploratory engagements and judgmental practices have their generalities that subtend the controversies of universal and particular.

The brief exposition does not deny additional analyses of intentionality with the attendant issues concerning meaning and the meant in cross cultural communication. No claim is made that the generality of language is adequate for all purposes; indeed, one can engage in numerous metaphysical and ontological speculations and add such tandems as universal forms, concepts, rules, etc. Yet the assumed basis of such tandems will remain the interface between polycentric intentionality and cultural lifeworld. Neither intentional generality nor cultural specificity is antithetical modes of awareness. They are inextricably joined and essentially correlated. Phenomenology simply points out that the awareness of the specificity of cultural media is correlative to the

awareness of the generality of intentionality. In the absence of the latter, the varieties of cultural conceptions fail to do justice to their own positions.

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CHAPTER VI

LIFEWORLD AND CULTURE

A cursory survey of works in a variety of disciplines shows a trend that tends to use the term LIFE-WORLD or LIVED WORLD as a BASIS from which to critique the positive sciences. The usual appeal to Husserl's KRISIS interprets the problematic of such a world in terms of its being the every day world, taken for granted prior to any scientific engagements. What is notable is that the LIFE-WORLD does not seem to differ from a daily natural attitude. No doubt, one can find *prima facie* passages in KRISIS to support such a reading. The issue, here, is not one of missing the point or bad faith by various interpreters, but of the notion that LIFE-WORLD is distinct from various human activities, such as sciences, and that the latter are founded upon life-world. Thus, the forgetting of the basis in the life-world lends sciences an overly unwarranted preeminence. In order both to critique and limit these sciences, it is essential to show their basis in such a life-world. Yet the very showing is not a self-evident venture but depends on a specific phenomenological orientation. Such concepts as ground of sense, origin of sense, sense overlay, and sense transformation, do not have a mundane meaning. They appear as traces of constitutive subjectivity; as a transcendental activity, the latter has a task of explicating both the life-world and the transcendental genesis of sense of such components as sciences within the life-world.

The very notion of life-world as a ground of science is not without its own problems. The rise of science to preeminence was a catalyst that initiated the problematic of history. If the life-world is to be regarded as the ground of sciences, and if the latter ought to be explicated in light of transcendental genesis, then the researches into such sciences must take place within the *epoche*, which is in the context of exclusion of any naturalistic or metaphysical prejudgments. The difficulties emerge when the constitution of sciences functions on the basis of an equally bracketed life-world. Thus the life-world and the sciences turn out to be traces of transcendental genesis. Is the difference between them of founded-founding, or a difference of noematic content, given "next" to each other, or, finally, an inextricable intertwining? In the latter case, the modern life-world itself may be basically constituted by the sense of sciences.

Is this a dilemma? Sciences must be interrogated in terms of their genesis in the life-world, and in turn such sciences, as traces of transcendental genesis, are equally constituents of the life-world; the recognition of such sciences requires the tracing of their sense in the life-world. The awareness of life-world as the genetic ground of sciences requires equally the awareness of life-world as constituted by scientific sense bestowing. Indeed, the validity of science for the life-world not only cannot be denied but must be extended. The numerous practical incursions of sciences into the daily world make the life-world completely bound up with scientific sense. This is to say, what constitutes the human environment is, to a great extent, a result of modern sciences. The life-world bears within itself the constituted sense of such sciences. Even if one were to use the terminology of “basis,” the life-world, in its concretion, is both a ground of sciences and a bearer of scientific imprint. It might be that the metaphor of ground is not only inappropriate but also misleading in a way that prevents a resolution of this impasse, specifically if the two sides of the dilemma belong to the constitutive activities of transcendental subjectivity. What appears to be a task for phenomenological investigations at this level is the tracing from the sense of the life-world, and from the sense of the sciences as traces, to their constitutive genesis in the transcendental subjectivity. Yet the tracing itself that establishes different functionings for each, the life-world and the sciences, constitutes, correlatively, another genesis not identical with the genesis of the systems of activities of either side. And yet this genesis seems to be the condition for the possibility of articulating both in their differentiation and correlation. In this sense, both would constitute the traces of their presupposed, although unthematized genesis. In brief, what shows up is a non-positional awareness. We shall focus on this genesis subsequently under the guise of transcendental history.

On the other hand, since life-world and science may be intertwined, for phenomenology this ought not to constitute a difficulty; the analysis of intentional-historical structures would reveal a genetic sense constitution of both. Thus, the mathematical, theoretical, and logical constructs have their experimental objectivity in the life-world where they maintain such objectivity imbedded in technical-experimental processes. At times there appears a misleading language when Husserl speaks of the “world of scien-

ce,” as if science were one thing covering over the other layer, called the life-world, implying that the latter is a ground for the former. Even if this regard would be historicized, one could point out that all scientific procedures are both theoretical and practical within the life-world. The theoretical side comprises the projects of scientific hypotheses, as well as their critical testing and empirical controls. Yet something novel occurs with the latter in its instrumentality: it becomes increasingly a part of sense intuition in the lived world and in turn it begins to alter the theoretical possibilities. At base, this technologization of science is what allows Husserl to speak of sense displacement and sense overlay of the life-world by sciences, and of scientific constitution of the life-world. One could even argue that the transformation of the environment into useful artifacts allows the latter to become the ground of modern life-world in such a way that the very transformation of all aspects of the environment and the human extends this ground toward an all encompassing scientific life-world without residua. We shall see the constitution of this modern world in the next chapter.

Given this context, the tracing of the sense of the modern life-world through the layers of scientific sense toward their transcendental constitution suggests that no prescientific and distinct life-world can be discovered as the ground of the world of sciences. The assumption of a changeless ground of life-world seems to be untraceable. This would mean that once the modern sciences have appeared on the scene, they have set in motion a historical process and thus have become, genetically speaking, a transcendental-historical phenomenon. In turn, the appearance of such sciences restructures the life-world and *eo ipso* precludes the presumption of a pre-scientific life world. If there is such a world, its sense constitution does not belong to our world and thus it is not pre-scientific life-world, but a very differently constituted life-world. If the sense of the latter is accessible, its genesis must be traced in its own right. What appears in this procedure of tracing is no longer a pure manifestation of the transcendental functioning of genetic constitution, but above all a comparative analysis of two life-worlds. Thomas Seebohm’s writings reveal a clear procedure of comparison as the ground of delimitation of a specific structure of awareness, yet in such a way that the procedure itself, as the condition of objective analysis, is not an aspect of any of the analyzed structures. This is not to claim that this background cannot be thematized.

What can be said of the problematic so far? First, there seems to be a closure that precludes the tracing of the presumed originary life-world as the basis of other sense functions. Second, it may be the case that one can speak of a variety of life-worlds, and thus allow sociology or cultural anthropology to have a final say concerning the structures of such worlds. This possibility was discussed in its profundity by Landgrebe's confrontation both with systems theory of Luhmann and the Critical School. Third, a problematic is opened with respect to the impossibility to see other life-worlds without subjecting them to the understanding of our own life-world. Fourth, the very questions raised point to a NON-POSITIONAL awareness that constitutes the access to the various life-worlds, their differences, and comparisons. It would then mean that the various life-worlds comprise traces of the transcendental functions and conditions of their constitution and claims to being. To reach such activities at this level would require an epoche of all life-worlds. Yet the very enactment of the epoche will have to shift to the extent that the epoche of the life-world of modern tradition may not be adequate to exclude the onto-logical or specific naturalistic prejudgments of other life-worlds.

This task is not without its difficulties. Even if we trace the genesis of modern sciences, we must relive the constitutive genesis of sense of specific sense configurations of sciences in order to trace them through various sedimentations all the way to the reconstitution of the originary scientific sense. This might be seen, initially, to be the historical task of the specific constitution of specific scientific structures during a given historical period. This historically transcendental approach may offer an access to the transformation of a life-world toward a scientifically reconstituted world. Of course, this does not yet demonstrate that there is the life-world apart from the one now being extended by the sciences and the one that the sciences left behind as, for example, the Medieval life-world. This is to say, the extension of sense by the scientific constructions and their overlay of the prior life-world does not imply that the previous life-world was and is the originary, while the scientific is an overlay over the originary. If this were the case, then one would have to show why the Medieval life-world is the ground, and the modern activities are an overlay over such a ground. If this position fails to reveal the life-world, then we are left again with a multiplicity of such worlds. The problem can be phrased in other terms: is

there a pure life-world that is not intertwined with layers of cultural sense? The Medieval peasant as well as the Taoist perform minimal rituals that are totally coextensive with the formation of the sense intuition. Hence neither science nor other cultural constitutions of sense would comprise an overlay of an originary life-world. Given this possibility, one is barred from finding an access to some originary life-world. Thus if the modern life-world is scientifically and technologically laden, then the constitution of modern life world is the very sense embodiments that constitute scientific-technological praxis. The functioning of transcendental subjectivity, as the genesis of sense is increasingly a complex and impossible process of those very sense constitutions that have assumed an embodied life of their own. In a manner of speaking, to trace the functioning of these embodied sense constitutions is to discover the ways they were intended initially. This is important in light of the possible claim that the embedded sense not only covers over the presumed originary life-world, but that it has assumed a life of its own. What would be such initial intentionality? One way of tracing this intentionality could be by showing how it is “working itself out” in myriads of ways, although such an intentionality remains invariant. This is to say, there is a traceable noema through modernity.⁸ Such a noema need not be constituted actively; rather, it is more lived than conceived. It seems that the phenomenological explication of such intentionality would be a worthy venture. The only suggestion that appears to be plausible is this: both Fink and Schabert would regard this intentionality to be empty in the sense that it has no vertical hold on any aesthetic tandem; any filling of this vertical intentionality must be first produced “horizontally” or in a sequence of steps. While the intentionality is empty, it is equally backed by a methodical and dogmatic metaphysics whose task is to legitimate the concrete construction of the horizontal filling. The dogmatic metaphysics is the assumed givenness of quantitative structures, procedures, and their “application.” Husserl has demonstrated that there can be empty, partially filled, and completely covered intentionalities; yet such filling depends on the immediately given “this there.” What appears to be specific about modernity is that the dominant intentionality is fillable in arbitrary ways. The filling depends on second level intentionalities, such as wants, projects, and designs. These horizontal intentionalities consist of technically produced life world in a way that this

life-world comprises a filling for the vertical, empty intentionality, whose invariant logic of filling is the logic of conditions-conditioned, or “if-then” structure. If we establish certain conditions, then we shall get the desired results we projected. Here the phenomenological analyses of the processes of APPLICATION OF QUANTITATIVE STRUCTURES ON THE SENSE FIELD OF AWARENESS ARE YET TO BE ACCOMPLISHED. How do the timeless and spaceless, unextended homogeneous quanta FIT the heterogeneous phenomena. APPLICATION AND FILLING ARE, to say the least, founded on the logic of corporeal systems of praxis and cannot be derived from the structure of the empty intentionality and its horizontal articulation of wants, projects, and possibilities. A specific structure of the “I can,” with its own intentionalities, pervades the horizontal network of modern life-world, with an assumed purposive and teleological structure. We shall see subsequently the way that modern science is in principle technical.

The very shift from the non-scientific to scientific life-world may be regarded as historical, and hence the question of ground may very well be transcendently-historical concept. Thus the function, ascribed to life-world as a sense foundation of sciences, is historically unfolded function. This ought not to mean that historicity is the sole issue; there is no doubt that whatever the life-world may be, it too comprises clues to its genesis. The relationship between the life-world as a clue and its historicity is seen by Husserl as the most universal problem. Yet the tracing of this relationship raises the question whether it is sufficient to be the basis for the connection between life-world and science. What is opened here is the problematic of using the life-world as if it were a trace similar to the traces constituted by scientific sense. This is to say the transcendental founding of both cannot give priority of one over the other, if such a distinction is still maintainable. If it is maintainable in the traditionally stated sense, then life-world is the universal and unthematized horizon of our prereflective life, and cannot be treated as one clue next to other clues of transcendental constitution. An implicit issue here is suggested by the difference between layers of thing constitution, theory-rationality-logic constitution, and life-world constitution. The latter cannot be read from the two former objectivities. This is suggested

by Husserl's reference not to the forgetfulness of Being but of World. The epoche that brackets Being may not be adequate to bracket the world.

The relationship between life-world and history requires complex researches and unpeeling of intertwined and overlaid phenomena. At the same time, the two non-regional ontologies, the life-world and history would constitute traces – although most radical and difficult to decipher – of the genetic constitution of their identifiable and equally differentiated compositions. This is to say, the tracing of the transcendental, the absolutely functioning subjectivity, could begin with the two, vaguely and yet constantly pregiven, dimensions. Such subjectivity seems to hover irrevocably in the background of all comparative analyses and tracings. The task is to trace how such comparisons collapse into the discovered sedimentations both of life-world and mundane history.

The inception of such tracings cannot begin elsewhere than the *LIVING PRESENT*. The latter has been investigated in its depth and complexity by Jose Huertas-Jourda.²⁹ Cross-cultural research of life-worlds suggest a reading of the living present in terms of the vertical and horizontal intentionalities which not only resist univocal interpretation, but rather exhibit a variety of typological modifications. First modification shows that both intentionalities can become either permanent or in flux. Thus, the vertical may assume a modification of being a permanent and repeatable act, object, world, in contrast to a myriad of changes and transformations, exhibited horizontally. In turn the flux can be maintained vertically as permanent and continuous change, while the horizontal may appear as diverse objects, acts, etc., that are in constant transformation. Given a specific life-world and its available means of expression, either the permanent or the changing may be designated as historical. This suggests that not all life-worlds will contain such expressions and resultantly they will not be designated as historical. Historical, thus, is one modification of either change or permanence, and, in turn, the modification of the vertical and the horizontal.

Diverse traditional and contemporary life-worlds manifest other modifications of both intentionalities of the living present. Some changes and activities may be seen as maintenance and enhancement of a given permanence. For example, given a life-world in which expressions of continuous and even lawful history are present, radical revolutions

may regard most dynamic activities as maintenance of the permanence of the laws of history. Other life-worlds, wherein the members see the world as an embodiment of eternally preordained laws of some divinity, may not have a history, and will regard their activities also as permanently preordained to carry out, to maintain, some eternal edicts. Other examples of such typological modifications can be adduced from texts and practices of members of diverse life-worlds and cultures.

Some changes may be regarded as disruptive of permanence. In such cases an availability of expressions such as history that is always changing would be regarded as disruptive of, for example, eternal, divine edicts, or scientific laws. The proponents of the latter will be compelled to separate “natural sciences” from the “human sciences,” while the former will regard historical events as a fallen state, in the power of some evil forces, inclusive of secular tolerance of historical diversities.

Life-worlds exhibit other typological modifications. In some life-worlds permanence may suppress change, spontaneity, random variations, and thus constitute an iron cage without escape. Such modification is present in theological gnosticisms, with their variants in predestination and teleology, in sundry philosophical determinisms, and utopian ideologies. This type could be regarded as disruptive of change. This modification requires no historical variation, since to know the determining factors, is to know that everything has already been written. Any spontaneity would have to escape completely such an iron cage, and thus to constitute a radical opposition.

Permanence may also be an enhancement for change. There are permanent institutions, such as democratic, where changes are not only permitted, but supported. Indeed, the very institutions of this type of life-world may be designated to be historical, basically in two variations. History may be continuous in the sense that one may deem it to be always searching for democracy. It may also be discontinuous, to the extent that there may be and novel and diverse inceptions of democratic institutions, leading to the awareness of diverse types of histories.

While it is possible to perform an *epoche* to decipher “pure” modifications of life-worlds as traces of the vertical-horizontal intentionalities and their permanence-change modifications, it is equally of note that the requisite researches are more complex. A particular culture is usually a complex of various types. One may have a permanent, secular

democracy, permitting all changes, and also tolerating theologies and sciences with their permanence of the iron cage type. In this sense, the meaning of life-world becomes coextensive with a culture, possessing both historical and nonhistorical modes of awareness. Such a cultural life-world is in a constant tension, where each mode of awareness strives to establish its own supremacy over others.³⁰ The transcendental solution that such cultures adopt is a tolerant consciousness.

In the final analysis, tolerant consciousness requires the *epoche* of all human sciences and cultural designs. Yet it is the transcendental APOSITIONALITY that allows the tracing of such sciences and designs to their transcendental constitutive genesis and their accessibility to any awareness. This would comprise an eidetic science of the relationship among life-worlds and either their possession or lack of histories.

This kind of understanding of correlation excludes presumed distinctions between mentalism, such as a conscious activity in contrast to motor and even unconscious activities, and received materialism. Intentionalities understood in this way can be seen metaphorically as VERTICAL: they are directed, in complex shifts, toward the objects. Verticality has neither temporal nor spatial topoi; we can look toward future events, predicted by science, expected in daily engagements, or attend to galaxies “above” us. Whether such intentionalities were enacted by ancient Chinese astronomers, or contemporary scientists, the enactments can be reiterated by anyone and anytime. Thus vertical intentionalities are not correlations to something from a position of above toward the below, from left to right, and from forward to backward, but toward a given objectivity. Vertical intentionalities are, in principle, APOSITIONAL and thus given to anyone.

There are, of course, powerful arguments, pointing out that intentionalities are both INTERSUBJECTIVE and belong to a CULTURAL LEIFEWORLD. Indeed, too many have pointed out that Husserl’s turn to the analyses of LEIFEWORLD may be an admission of the inadequacy of the transcendental delimitation of awareness that I have sketched. I am well aware of this issue. As a matter of fact, I have argued in a paper entitled LEIFEWORLD AND HISTORY that despite Husserl’s contention that modern sciences have constituted an artificial layer over the *doxa* of the life world, all the efforts to perform an *epoche* on what the sciences have cons-

tituted, revealed, simply another cultural life world, perhaps the medieval before the scientific, and prior to both, perhaps a mixture of Greco-Roman and Mid-Eastern. In brief, what was discovered were a variety of life worlds each having its own cultural modes of living, speaking, dancing, worshipping, socializing and dying. To speak bluntly and, perhaps, within some cultural life world, life worlds are relative. This is a common thesis of social and cultural anthropologists, with an added notion that each of us is subject to our own culture which far surpasses our own intentionalities. In a way this thesis lends priority to the WE over the I. As we are aware, the hermeneutical turn is also premised on this conception of the excess of the historically effective consciousness over the singular consciousness. One could even go so far as to argue that this singular consciousness recognizes itself only in face of, and in contrast to the other.

Having said this much, it is also important to note another aspect, usually buried in the foreground, in the rush to reveal the primacy of cultural life worlds: that in the process of delimiting such cultural life worlds, we are not constituting our inherence in them, but our awareness of them. This is Husserl's point concerning both the inadequacy of the Ego, and the notion that the UREGO is a requisite awareness that constitutes itself in the correlation to cultural life worlds. This suggests that the consciousness we are tracing is not cultural – even if we use terms as consciousness that are borrowed from a specific culture. If we say that a cultural life world is premised on the priority of the WE over the singular, we are also saying that there is an awareness of the way both options may engage in articulating a given life world. But the awareness of either must be traced from the given life worlds in order to note the HOW of this awareness, its self-constituting intentionality. The point is quite simple: it may be the case that some cultural life worlds have expressive means to claim the transcendental region as egological – I see, I think, I perceive, while other such worlds may regard the WE to be the constitutive background. Yet in each case, there is the given awareness of the world that is accessible to either cultural life world, despite the cultural limitations of expression. We shall return to this issue subsequently.

The rule of such intentionality is PEMAENCE AND CHANGE, the LIVING PRESENT. While the object remains permanent, the functions correlated to it may change. In turn, we can repeat the same acts,

holding them as permanent (not necessarily viewed as timeless), while offering a variation of objects. The vertical intentionalities are prelinguistic in the sense that no question of meaning is raised. If one were to say that a meaning of an object depends on the meaning of linguistic concepts, one would still assume the sense making process. This seems to be the point of Husserl's later works concerned with passive syntheses as prelinguistic sense-making. The argument, based on linguistic signification, at times takes a turn toward cultural relativism. Hence the object "cow" might mean "holy" in some of the Hindu cultural traditions, or it might mean "product" in capitalist market economy. Regardless of these meanings, it makes sense for anyone, Hindu or otherwise, to see this object as identical, given from various perspectives and exhibiting different sides, requiring our movements around the object. One cannot transgress this sense making process by a mere linguistic definition and walk through this object, i.e. one may not be arbitrary. The given structure of the object dictates the requisite access to it if the performance of this access is to make sense. Indeed, one can change linguistic expressions, use distinct cultural semantics to exemplify this object, yet such linguistic usages will have to correlate to the requirements of a given object.

Cultural Expressions

Cultural expressions can be regarded as means of articulating the vertically maintained objectivities. As is well known in phenomenology, the term "objectivity" includes anything to which we orient ourselves, inclusive of cultural objectivities such as works of arts, mythical figures, scientific theories, and spring rituals. These expressivities are to a great extent linguistic, and articulate the sense of the vertical intentionality. In order to accommodate the vertical intentionalities, language must be regarded as significant and dialogical, i.e. to speak is to speak to someone about something. Language, taken concretely, makes sense as dialogical, and despite the variety of its cultural types and rules, it follows the triadic structure of dialogue. No doubt, dialogical structure can be expanded to include more than two persons and more than one linguistic level.

Husserl calls such an extension of dialogue POLICENTRIC. We perceive with the intentional orientations of others as they do with ours. One can address a crowd about some issue; one can even argue

with members of one's own or of other traditions who lived in a remote past. Thus one can say "I disagree with Plato's argument about justice" without being regarded as somehow making no sense due to the empirical absence of Plato. We know what Plato said in his works about the given subject-matter. Even if we claim that Plato was mistaken, we still claim that he was mistaken about the subject-matter such as justice. In turn, we are able to recognize not only the subject-matter of discourse, but also the various levels of speaking and can make appropriate judgments concerning the fitness of a given terminology.

This suggests that discourses can be addressed in their own right and investigated in their own structures and rules. This is to say that our intentional activity is shifting to expressive compositions comprising the horizontal articulation of a given objectivity or a subject matter. This, for me, is an argument concerning the priority of intentionality over culturally available means of expression. Only the granting of this priority opens the possibility of articulating these means. Without the intentional correlation to a specific structure of objectivity, there would be no criterion by which to judge the appropriateness of a given structure of neither expression, nor a particular communication with persons of other cultures. Questions, such as "what do you mean by this gesture or this word" would not even arise.

All language is ABOUT something, and it is equally capable of articulating that something in various ways and at different levels of human engagement with the objects of the environment and culture. This articulation is HORIZONTAL, in the sense of serial succession of signs, terms, conventional marks or sounds. Such an articulation does not embody any meaning, but is designed to extend and to complicate the sense maintained in the vertical intentionalities. At one level language could be structured as a predicative judgment, at another it might be an explication of some pragmatic function of the object, at yet another, it would place the object in a system of exchange values, or aesthetic and cultural appreciation. Obviously, all such articulations would have to make sense with respect to a given object and context. The linguistic combination of marks or sounds, even if patterned by "rules" of the verbal games or by the linguistic forms, do not reveal any sense. This is to say, the "solution" to the problem of sense-making cannot be had at the level of the presumed linguistic rules.

The latter are metaphysical postulates without any warrant or demonstration. No doubt, various philosophical directions of “lingualism” attempt to answer the question of sense-making by showing the difference between marks, sounds, gestures, and the rules of their composition. Yet in the final analysis such ventures fail precisely at the juncture at which the rules are postulated as another set of objects for analysis to which some sense must be added. Such ventures lead to a fruitless regress.

The point is that the question of sense, even at the linguistic level, has always been a redundancy whose exclusion avoids the spilling of innocent ink. In brief, such questions make no sense. What makes sense are questions concerned with the possible modes of cultural or horizontal articulation of the vertical intentionalities. In order to come to terms with the composition of horizontal expressivities, some of the salient western traditional metaphysical assumptions must be surrendered. One of those assumptions culminated with Kant and his question as to the nature of conceptual understanding. Since a concept does not seem to be an aspect of the empirical, then it must be a structure of some non-empirical type that can provide a form, a unity for the “blind” phenomena. It seems then that such concepts are either “in us” or in language. Resultantly, one engages in conceptual analyses under the presumption that there are “concepts” offering some “universal” calling card. It could be that the so-called concepts are residu of Platonic metaphysics imported through the back door of unsuspecting philosophical discourse. This takes place even under the guise of generalization or universalization, leading to the claim of obtaining a universal proposition. Yet if one observes the so called universal proposition empirically (and how else could one observe such propositions in the context of intensionalism that rejects intentionality as some type of mental state in the interiority of an empirical subject, without, at the same time, introducing some metaphysical epiphenomenon), then one will discover a set of marks or noises, each in its own right a singular, empirical datum. A singular datum, or a succession of singular data, will not lead to anything more than the singular data. As Husserl has shown in his *LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS*, given empirical prejudgments, neither universality nor generality are exhibited among such data. Indeed, even the assumed meaning is not available among these data without intentionality.

From what has been said so far, it follows that the dialogical and polycentric intending and theorizing process, as a last interpreter, who selects linguistic usages and thus designates facts and evaluates such designations, cannot be investigated by such selected and theoretically interpreted terms. Were this the case, then the very subject of intention, selectivity and valuation would be selected as a factual datum of another subject of selectivity and intended as a fact. Such a move is not a solution, but simply a shift to another last interpreter that escapes, meanwhile, any interpretation. As noted above, the answer would be that since the subject of intention and selectivity cannot be an object of this selectivity, then it can be disregarded as irrelevant. The claim, then, can be made that cultural world with all its linguistic structures ought to be regarded as the process of selectivity and designation of what would be deemed as factual. Yet in this case a cultural world can never become an object of any discipline, since it surpasses any selected restriction to one discipline. This is to say, if such a world is assumed to be the process of selectivity, then it cannot be explicated by any, not even the philosophical discipline. After all, if culture is the most primal intentional process of selectivity, correlation of theories to facts and interpretations, then all such theories and interpretations are parts of culture, but no one theory can make the entire process into its own object, since such a theory would be but one facet of cultural structures and rules. In other words, if the cultural process is the very social and historical process and if all theories of awareness are internal to this process, then none of them can rise above and be an external surveyor of this process. If the latter assumption would be, nonetheless, affirmed, then one would revert back to the last uninterrupted interpreter, the cultural process as the unmediated medium. But precisely the positing by the proponents of the primacy of this process over poli-centric intentionality assumes cultural worlds to be objects of their own intentional concerns. Here culture becomes a correlate, or an object, of intentionality. The latter, then, becomes the immediate, or the unmediated nexus. The latter, nonetheless, can become equally problematic due to the available cultural modes of articulation. For example, the modern designation of subject, even when it is regarded as transcendental subjectivity, may be restricted to the limitations of the senses of the term and hence result in

controversies and misunderstandings. After all, the very articulation of phenomenology is constantly pitted against, and is compelled to use, the various available senses of the term “subject.” This is precisely the point of argumentative access to various hermeneutics and their claims that the meaning of terms, such as subject, belong within the horizons of a given tradition, a given cultural world. Such claims posit the tradition as the unmediated mediation, the all encompassing nexus that is always more than any subject could encompass. Essentially speaking, all forms of culturalism would have to maintain this type of claim.

The discussed issues suggest a constant fluctuation between two nematic contents: first is the intentional, transcendental and polycentric event as the last interpreter, the unmediated mediation that can never be designated either as a subject in any traditional sense or an object; and second, the cultural process, leading to the notion that all means of communication comprise an in-between domain as a mediation of both the intending and interpreting subject and the objects. In phenomenological terms, we have a tension between the phenomena of vertical intentionality and its articulation in horizontal process of cultural life world. In cultural terms, phenomena, including vertical intentionalities, have a meaning within the context of horizontal articulations.

Yet we have suggested that the vertical intentionality is correlated to its own specific object as a systematic core for exploration requiring specific activities on the side of the polycentric subject who engages in various explorations; such a subject equally selects from the fund of cultural process the domain that would be appropriate for a systematic designation of the system of exploration. This way of understanding avoids historicizing of culture and the assumption that all knowledge is purely a cultural interpretation. We would suggest added ways in which intentionality may assume precedence over culture. As noted above, the essential claim of the latter is that no subject is capable of encompassing the horizons of a cultural tradition. The subject is always in the medium of the MORE of the cultural world over the intentional.

The various issues enunciated so far suggest that the last interpreter is a constant conjunction of objective intentionality and a universe of traditionally transmitted cultural mediations. They are the “inner-social” field of temporal development, and neither can assume a privileged position.

In turn, neither of the selected intentional activities and their selected statements is in a position to encompass the entire field of intentional acts and cultural processes. To be able to perform such a feat, one would have to assume a non-temporal posture; yet the latter must be rejected as metaphysical. The latter too is one intentional activity selective of cultural expressions that may be meaningful, but in the final analysis restricted to this metaphysical sense. This suggests that the meaningful language is metaphysical, but such language does not correlate to sense-making intentional activities and sensible expressions of all cultures, although the intentional signification is accessible cross culturally.

The deliberations on intentionality and cultural life worlds are indicative of the exclusion of various traditional blocks, not the least of metaphysics, a priori assumptions such as thoughts, concepts, forms, and ideas, and their attendant relegation of language as an external clothing of something that is pre-given. In turn, it is unnecessary to hold that intentions are some pure presence that can be expressed univocally by any cultural terms. As noted above, every intention not only correlates to something, to some object, in one act, but is a polycentric system of activities engaged in explicating the object and completely involved in cultural expressions. In this sense cultural world is not an a priori set of rules but a concrete and practical activity of sense-making. In brief, it is praxis in process without the mythology of progress, and includes both, the vertical, systematic, active intentionalities and the sense-making cultural expressions. The latter are neither subjective nor objective, but comprise a medium of explication of what can be designated as subjective and objective contents on the grounds of transcendental polycentric sense making process. The latter is the domain of phenomenological investigations.

Although the charge that the cultural domain is more than any researcher can encompass and therefore cannot be an object of any investigating intersubjectivity, is serious and includes the claims of numerous theses of the primacy of culture, historical tradition, and even society over the researcher, phenomenology can defend its stance on various grounds. First, the researchers, engaged in their own cultural studies engage in a tacit epoché by showing that they have an objective access to their own and other cultures and society. In brief, they assume a transcendental position that enables them to show the various structural

limits of their own cultures, and the differences from other cultures. If this were not the case, then their research would be equally culture bound and would exhibit their own inability to offer objective analyses even of their own culture. The same regard is true of historicizing and sociologizing theses. The position that the members of a culture, society or a historical tradition are irrevocably enmeshed in the various structures, cannot be a universal claim since it excludes the polycentric researcher who makes this claim. Second, the performance of phenomenological epoche, allows one to attend to specific aspects and their precise compositions of a given culture, history, and tradition, without the requisite claim that such attention must be all-encompassing. It is possible to focus on a specific noema and to decipher its essential and complex composition, and if need be its relationships to other noemata. One can show the composition of a specific economy, specific legal designs, show where the latter may be economically interest laden, mythologically relevant, and politically adequate or inadequate. One can also show various transformations of the sense of the phenomena from one domain to another. The condition for the possibility of such researches is the epoche of sciences and human disciplines and the apositional consciousness of tolerance. Third, phenomenological reflexivity that includes the position of the polycentric researcher. The latter exhibits the limits of intentional analyses vis-à-vis a specific domain of objectivity and resultantly can either show the ways in which such a position is appropriate or inappropriate to a given subject matter. Moreover, in cases of signitive sense making processes, where the intended objectivity does not arise apart from the constitutive activities, as is the case of non-Euclidean systems, it is possible to show how certain intentionalities “shape” the very objectivity in question. Yet phenomenology is most careful to point out that while some intentionalities are required for this signitive domain, once the domain is established and becomes a part of tradition, they are accessible for anyone’s reiteration and learning. Finally, fourth, the advantages of the inclusion of the intentional position of the polycentric subject, the theoretician, allows one to read how certain phenomena are reconstituted. The various economic theses of the nineteenth century resignified the socio-political systems in a way that transformed the very fabric of awareness and elicited practical movements to transfi-

gure both socio-economic and political systems. Indeed, without inclusion of such intentional awareness, and the ways it has resigned multiple relationships among noematic essential compositions, we would not comprehend the economic and socio-political changes.

The phenomenological thesis, articulated so far, suggests that intentionalities are not reducible to specific individual, traditionally called the subject, but are analyzable in numerous modifications. One may have a theoretical intentionality that claims to be universal explanatory system. Obviously, such intentionality can be checked for its own consistency. If the theorizing subject claims that all contents are culturally determined, then such a subject excludes its own determination and precludes the universality of the thesis. If cultural world is granted to be the pregiven, tacit background which constitutes the structures of all intentionalities, then it cannot claim an ability to grasp this background. Yet, the proponents of this stance assume a transcendental argumentation and posit their own thesis as an objective and universal content, accessible to all. In this sense, they assume an intentional position without the required explication of such an intentional position. Barring the explication of this unthematized intentionality, such a thesis becomes incomplete; it leaves the sense making activities that are in the background of the intentional constitution of this very thesis. Intentionalities may be idiosyncratically singular, claiming that all intentionalities are constituted autonomously and creatively, and thus all correlative objectivities are tied to an arbitrary will of the individual. Despite this popular subjectivism, the claim is eidetically universal and can be both transcendently accepted or contested by anyone. This is very much in accord with the phenomenological awareness that any and all intentionalities and their either pregiven objectivities or the objectivities arising in the process of constitution, are reiterable and accessible to anyone. This can extend to include the deconstructionist stance that it is demonstratable that there was never a text and never a subject, that it can be demonstrated that they have never had a presence. This is akin to mathematical demonstration that something cannot be demonstrated. Such a claim is transcendental, all the while assuming that its intentionality is accessible to all. Obviously, this position excludes its own transcendental position unattended. The latter may constitute a vertical intentionality of a constant flux, exhibi-

ted horizontally by the texts without parameters. If such intentionality is left out of consideration, then the purely cultural position of the deconstructivists remains metaphysical. Despite the cultural variety and distinctions among textual contents, this position assumes as a given the invalidity of culturally differentiated phenomena, and claims that such textual differentiations cannot be maintained in reality. Only intentional analyses could show at what level of awareness and objective generality these cultural contents lose their textual differentiations. Thus, as suggested above, there may be intentional generalities that may constitute various contents as permanent, and others as flowing, correlating to the modifications of the vertical and horizontal awareness. Yet without phenomenological articulation of such constitutive processes, correlated to their various objectivities, be they cultural or naturalistic, the theses of their deconstruction remains a metaphysical and hence arbitrary pre-judgment. In this sense, it seems that an escape from metaphysics continues to be the prerogative of phenomenology.

Given this fundamental understanding of intentionality and its diverse and clearly distinguishable enactments in correlation to their variety of levels of objectivities, it is impossible to charge phenomenology with the maintenance of any traditional conceptions of mentalist or psychological subjectivism or any form of objectivism. Presumptions of such maintenance stem from the reading only of the cultural, traditionally bound modes of horizontal and variable expressions that assume the vertical modifications of awareness. The horizontal too is a taken for granted phenomenon that can appear across diverse cultural and/or specific traditional modifications. After all, the intentional claim that all phenomena are traditionally-linguistically laden is a vertical intentionality that uses most diverse modalities to demonstrate this claim. In this sense the introduction of mental intentions as being purely subjective, is one linguistic and culture-specific expression of the assumption of intentionality. The reason for this restriction of intentionality to cultural modification is that a successful cultural media efface themselves in the process of making intentional sense of any object, leading to the conclusion that cultural world is all there is. Cultural means, nonetheless, assume sense as a specific and limited explication of the speaker's and the listener's intentionalities that articulate noematic sense correlated to

proper objectivities. This unavoidable conjunction of intentionality and cultural means must discard the theory of speech acts which constitute meaning. Speech acts theory is one more version of saving the traditional metaphysics of mind; its exclusion, specifically in its reductionist bio-psychological and causal form, does not detract from the sense making praxis. Such metaphysics has not yet grasped the radicality of transcendental phenomenology. Although it is difficult to avoid ontologization and metaphysical prejudgments, phenomenology, in principle if not always in practice, is in a position to extricate and distinguish the phenomena from such prejudgments, and indeed to explicate the intentional grounding of ontologization.

Formal Region

As already noted, the theoretical-methodological, or termed otherwise, the quantitative-formal, are not within the domains of the contingent world, posited as transcendent. It is not found even in the directly intuited morphological composition of the lived world. It is regarded as different from these domains. Not having any other locus for the formal, the thinkers of the modern age invented a container called "mind" in which these quantitative and formal components reside. They belong to the immanence of the subject. The immanence assumes an ambiguous status: it is the container of the theoretical-methodological formal necessities, and yet it is factually contingent substance. This contingency is expressed in Cartesianism in two ways: first, the formal composition, with respect to a posited absolute being, cannot be regarded as necessary. This is to say, the absolute being can will different formal systems; this is an analogical expression of a conception which offers an initial indication as to the arbitrariness of the formal. Second, the formal is seen as capable of continuous analyses; any break in the analyses is a matter of decision. In this sense, the formal domain swings in the ambiguity between necessity and will, rules and choice. The importance of this "indecision" consists precisely in the option to either regard the formal as a priori given or as a construct of the subject. Various expressions are offered at the dawn of the modern age to indicate the shift toward the latter option. The notions of nature as created in accordance with mathematical laws comprise one expression. Coupled with the notion that even the mathematical-formal is decidable by an absolute

will, the result is obvious: the stress is on the primacy of construction of the formal systems. They too are chosen, although they cannot be regarded as contingent in the sense of the contingency of the transcendent world. Their emergence requires unique intentions that have to be regarded as capable of formal construction and of arbitrary signification. Moreover, such intentionalities must include the possibility of extending and proliferating formal compositions and divisions at will, and of disregarding the perceptual, intuitive content. The signitive symbolism of quantitative and formal compositions do not offer any intuitive counterpart in the perceptual world apart from the sounds or marks, selected arbitrarily. But these marks, while part of the morphological world, in no wise resemble the theoretical-methodological composition; they simply provide the arbitrary means for perceptual expression. While there are many complexities in the constitution of the quantitative-formal modes of theoretical-methodological “thought,” in principle this thought does not offer any possibility of correspondence between theoretical- methodological compositions and the perceptual world of shapes and structures.

The intentionality emerging here between the theoretical and the “real” swings between two possibilizing structures: the formal possibilities, operating purely with arbitrarily selected signs, reach a point of realization that the formal processes are also arbitrarily constructed and hence can be reconstructed at will, purely empty significations without any immediate fulfillments in the perceptual intuition. These formally designed possibilities are also in a position to align the transcendent reality toward intuitive fulfillment by human intervention into the processes of the lived world and, by disregarding the given perceptual morphologies of that world, to shape the presumed underlying homogeneous matter in accord with the formal designs. Both, the formally designed systems and the transcendent material nature, comprise a detachment from the lived world and allow an arbitrary correlation between them. One can treat everything from a vantage point of detached formalism and regard qualitative and essential distinctions with indifference. As already suggested, the formal indifferent and disconnected constitution lends itself to a horizontal process of increased formalization of all propositions in such a way that there emerge increased formal differentiations of formal systems. While leading to more complex formal connections, it also includes increased differentiations. In

this sense, the material reality can be increasingly differentiated and constructed along more complex and yet more distinct technical masteries and controls of the material. The increase of formal complexities and differences is coextensive with an increase in the contingency of the material processes, leading to more possible rearrangements of the indifferent material nature. Each domain is released from the concrete lived world implications, each an “expert” in its own sphere, need not relate to any other sphere; each can claim that there is no such thing as conclusive evidence precisely because the formal systems and their fulfilled material arrangements are arbitrary designs and carry no necessity; they are, insofar as they make, and with the making they assume “reality” and hence increment power and “prove” their momentary success.

It would be redundant to speak of “needs” since the latter are part and parcel of the possibilizing procedures and become at the same time needs and fulfillments. We can make it, therefore we want it, and we want it therefore we can make it. What this suggests is that the process of increased contingency and arbitrariness as sources of power comprises a self-referential domain. This means that there are no restrictions for the “search for truth.” After all, such a search has lost any boundary and any distinction between knowledge and object. Even in social understanding, the relationship between the formal and material processes is determined by “science,” i.e. the very self articulation and production. One, thus, cannot find any trans-scientific criteria to check this process. And each domain has no built in reason to stop the proliferation of its own form of knowledge and praxis. There are no physical reasons to cease making more physical experiments and refinements, no economic reasons to stop the economic “growth,” no biological reasons to stop remolding of the living processes along new combinations, etc. Any limitation would be regarded as an infringement on the autonomy of research. Any science, which would proclaim that it has become complete, would cease to be a science in the context depicted above.

Progress

Given the key intentionality which swings without any essential necessitation between the theoretical-methodological and the transcendent homogeneous domains, there emerges the attendant factor which is per-

manent: PROGRESS. It must be without regression, without death, and all formal systems and all transformations of the lived world into a calculative remade world are enhancements, maintenances of this permanent structure. What is peculiar about progress is that it has no "subject" that would progress. Its aim and its subject is itself and thus it is self-referential. Progress is its own destiny. It constitutes its own increasing formal refinements, efficiencies and "perfect abilities" without of course attaining perfection. No attained construction is left without possibilizing and hence improvement. In this sense one could say semiotically and yet on Husserlian basis, that the signifier and the signified are one.

Permanence and Flux the Living Present

The phenomenological analyses of most diverse activities of awareness and their correlate contents led to the cognizance that the living present contains two encompassing, mutually exclusive although completely interrelated facets: the standing, the fixed or permanent, and the streaming, the flux, the dynamic becoming (*stehend-stroemend*), usually exemplified by the constitution of time awareness. It is to be noted that this exemplification is one among many modalities of a more basic awareness of permanence and flux. This intimates that our discoveries of these facets in other cultures need not be tied to the questions of time. Other cultural modes of expression of permanence and flux will have to be respected. Such exemplifications or expressions are cultural modes of symbolizing the more basic presence of permanence and flux comprising morphologies of civilization awareness. It ought to be pointed out that the latter are neither completely a priori nor a posteriori; rather, they are pervasive generalities of concrete awareness that can be accessed by way of specific cultural life worlds. Thus the generalities are completely intertwined in cultural life worlds before a priori impositions and a posteriori generalizations.

While we already came to the conclusion that there are a variety of such worlds, we should ask whether they exhibit more general modes of awareness that pervade more than one life world. Care must be taken not to impose these generalities, but to show their phenomenal presence in a specific life world. Using cultural life worlds as expressive of permanence and flux, we hope to articulate what is common to the lived

worlds and what is divergent, and at what levels. It should be reiterated that phenomenology does not construct but articulates the compositions of awareness not by generalization but by variation of diverse levels of what is given in order to extricate the most concrete, even if unnoticed, lived phenomena. The discoveries of differences among life worlds already suggest that they are neither empirically nor deductively derived, but are basically expressions of direct awareness. Such expressions will be followed in these researches as traces of such awareness.

Given this context, it ought to be clear that even the most respected theoretical constructs cannot be given any preeminence, since they too belong to a specific life world and must be regarded as a culture of such a world. Phenomenological researches cannot give preeminence to a claim of representing ultimate reality by any culture of any life world. Such realities will be seen as specific expressions of possible cross-cultural generalities exemplifying the correlations of permanence and flux. They will be regarded as variants of such correlations. Thus myths, signs, facts, languages, aims, metaphysical and ontological claims, are variants that express these basic phenomena of awareness.

This opens the possibility of various correlations of permanence and flux, suggesting that these phenomena or their compositions are not precisely identical with disciplinary and cultural components of a given life world. This is to say, while the social research attempts to decipher the social structures and their causes, and the cultural scholarship yields a variety of cultural discourses, our phenomenological approach will cut across these broad areas in the hopes of deciphering civilization modes of awareness that transgress various cultural and cross-cultural domains. Cultural discourses that compose lived worlds are not iron clad rules; to the contrary, deviations and “distortions” are also notable and can be read in correlation to or within a given life world and in comparison to either different or similar cultural discourses in other life worlds. It is possible to investigate such distortions and deviations by noting the efforts to adapt a specific discourse to a specific practical context and historical exigencies, and to articulate the way such efforts comprise an introduction of some aspects of other cultural discourses. It is also relevant to note how in some cases one would not find deviations or distortions, but only partial expressions of a cultural discourse from

another life world. Although interesting and important, these issues will not be addressed in the present discussion.

Eidetically speaking, lived worlds exhibit apodictically evident, yet culturally multiple readings of the living present, the standing, permanent, and the flowing, changing aspects. The study of life worlds and their cultures, indeed the disciplines within them, reveals a constant and irrevocable presence of this living present. Although these two aspects might seem to be mutually exclusive and mutually referent – and due to their exclusivity and mutuality various metaphysics were, and continue to be built, some ascribing reality to permanence while others to change – each requires the presence of the other either for its background or foreground. Neither apart from the other can comprise a complete lived world. No socio-cultural discourses and intersubjective practices are completely structural, revealing only stasis, or totally in flux. Philosophical variations are available. Some ontologies and/or epistemologies make claims that structures are not found in the phenomena but are “imposed” by some system of categories, or by subjective interests. Such claims reveal one among many options to permanence, without abolishing its necessity. The same can be said of change. Obviously, at this transcendental level of awareness the traditional differences between subjective and objective become redundant. They become cultural aspects of a specific lived world, assigned to express either permanence or flux.

At any rate, the studies of the lived worlds manifest, at the least, that in principle, the permanent compositions are describable in their essence while flux, also in its essence, cannot be delimited without residua. A full description of flux would reduce it to a structure. Hence, it lends itself only to an approximation, and the latter depends on culturally available means of discourse and intersubjective understanding. Given this understanding, lived worlds reveal two pervasive modes of discourse, one suited for permanent factors, the other more appropriate for dynamics. The former, in the West, exhibits something Platonic-scientific, something “puritan” about it; it is bounded and circumscribed, delimiting a presumed order which can be expressed either theoretically or practically. Changes, in turn, may be understood in a sense of wild immersion in some spontaneous movement of forces whose sense requires one to “live through” the very process. This living through appears in life phi-

losophies. This does not imply a superiority of one over the other mode of expression. In some lived worlds the permanent is deemed to be the ruling factor, while in others the dynamic is more important. Thus, for example, in Bali the most significant decisions are gleaned from cryptic sayings of persons caught in a trance ², or rebirth is elicited by a catharsis of a revivalist, or national pride and destiny is invented in a flux of political rhetoric enchanted by an actors on television. This allows us to introduce one of the pervasive distinctions between the exoteric discourse, appropriate to the permanent aspect of awareness, and the esoteric, appropriate to becoming. One must be cognizant that a specific mode of discourse, regardless of its presumption of being objective, logical, and explanatory, may be inappropriate to a given cultural experience. Indeed, even within a context of a culture in a lived world the assumption of a sole mode of speaking may not be taken for granted. When an exoteric discourse is employed to describe flux (e.g. scientific psychology), then the result will be a reification of psychic dynamics, leading to an ironic treatment and regard of various scientific discourses. There will not be any conscious connection between experience and discourse. The same can be said of the structural; a use of poetry to speak of mathematics does not add to the understanding of mathematics.

Approaching the relationship and differentiation between permanence and becoming, and their major cultural articulations, we can decipher rough outlines. Becoming and permanence can be correlated in a harmonious way (e.g. Chinese Confucianism), or arranged in a succession of temporary domination of one over the other (e.g. a tendency in Hinduism), or immersed in a hierarchy of powers and controls (e.g. Medieval and early modern Europe), or even understood as a battle until one of them is completely annihilated (e.g. Marxian revolutionary theory, and some prophetic and eschatological religions). Some becomeings can be regarded as totally dominated by the permanent, wherein the only solution is a complete escape (e.g. gnosticism), or, finally, the permanent could be conceived as a mere appearance, a *Maya*, veiling a total flux, (e.g. Buddhism).

Great many of the characteristics relating permanence and becoming can be read from the discursive systems of particular traditions. In Chinese tradition, the permanence term *LI* is related to the immanent or the

inner, while becoming term CH'I designates the external. Thus becoming is not contained by the permanent, as would be the tendency in Western romanticism 3, but rather the permanent emanates change. In addition, such terms as "spontaneity" and "life" are associated with the permanence term LI, the immanent, while, surprisingly such terms as "order" and "law" are tied to CH'I, flux, the outer. It seems, then, that in the Confucian tradition structure, as a specific modification of permanence, is natural, and one must adhere to it spontaneously, and spontaneity consists of this adherence. In turn, flux, in its purity, is compelled less naturally; in this sense, fits of passion, that are outside the normal psyche, or even illness, as being either abnormal or artificial, would lend credence to the awareness of spontaneity that must adhere to permanence. Taoists even claim that evil becoming arises solely from artificial human self-assertion.

While subsequently we shall decipher the "formal rules" of the relationship between permanence and becoming, we are in a position to point out that such a relationship is deemed crucial in delimiting evaluative components. The notion of good order, or even good disorder, is regarded as an appropriate relationship between permanence and becoming, while something malign, regarded as bad order or a bad disorder would be considered as some form of "misrelationship" between permanence and becoming. This is not to suggest a necessary connection between some a priori morality and immorality, but to indicate an association between valuation terms in the composition of permanence with becoming. These terms are equally variable, and must be regarded either in a context of a particular symbolic design of a life world, or as some more general set of symbolic invariants that transgress both cultural and disciplinary limitations.

Modifications of Permanence and Becoming

It can be granted at the outset that the complexities of interpretively accessible delimitations of flux among cultures of life worlds call for exhaustive analyses and detailed descriptions. Such analyses have been done by cultural scholars if not under the rubric of change, at least in the contexts of languages, images, and practices, which make the understanding of change accessible. Our task is not to review such analyses, but to extricate more pervasive phenomena which comprise the traces

of civilizational awareness. Although it is impossible to exhaust all cultures, they manifest that becoming can be regarded within the following broad modifications:

A. Various dynamisms are regarded as life sustaining, even if they do not possess positive value in all cases. Vital drives, eros and desires which, in the case of Hinduism and Buddhism, are deemed to be the sources of suffering, while in Greek culture, specifically Eros, is seen as life infusing and elevating. The vital drives and even eros have been regarded as components of natural spontaneity, or at times as influxes from some transcendent source. Moreover, they can be wild, both in natural and super-natural senses, or cultivated in accordance with custom and socio-cultural functions.

B. Dark, disruptive, chaotic, indeed deadly, being related to Thanatos and the latter, associated with the libidinal death instinct, is at times regarded as demonic, irresistible and yet self-defeating, manifesting itself, in Durkheim's understanding, of Faustian impulses. While there may be an appearance of traces of nobility and honor, these dynamisms are associated in the main with the lower region. If they reach the higher plane, they tend to infuse it with pollution and degradation. These impulses tend to subvert the elevating eroticism.

C. The Ur-becoming, signified as a hurricane's, vast upheaval of unknown cosmic forces, appearing in revolutions, uncontrollable and spontaneous mass movements, and even in charismatic figures. Ur-becoming may appear as ambivalent and can be destructive or revitalizing, or both. This appears in Hegel's as well as Sun Tzu's conceptions of war, and in Nietzsche's depiction of life that is both destructive and creative, "the dark mysterious force desiring and denying itself." Basically, this primal becoming does not signal any warning concerning the rules of its appearance; if it posts signs, they are designed to constantly deviate toward dissolution of any fixity.

D. Constructive events, regarded as impulses striving to establish meaningful designs, both for symbolic purposes and for direct human interrelationships. Such events tend to "ignore" or bypass specific cultural discourses in any given life world and propose universals such as human nature. They also disregard their impact on life or relationships to any ultimate purpose. These impulses are exemplified in the constant effort

to establish and refine legalistic and moralistic systems, precisely coded modes of behavior – Jesuit discipline, and Confucian designs for ritualized ethics – all considered as cultivations of the human. The impulses assume a variety of designations, ranging from vital, through sensuous and emotional, all the way to spiritualities. There is also an allowance for mutual intersections among these impulses.

E. Mechanistic designs that are constructed to signify an indifferent, lifeless, and simultaneously a deterministic cosmos. Such symbolic designs range from a meaningless and purposeless clash of forces, operating by attraction or repulsion, whether in Greek atomism, and/or their conception of a battle among psychic cosmic forces, through modern physics, empiricist associational and behavioral psychology, market forces, and logico-mathematical systems, to such notions as the stern face of predestination and destiny, and their impositions on nature.

F. Tenuous and ethereal dynamisms, consisting of spontaneous ethical and aesthetic sensibilities, appearing as if from nowhere and vanishing without a trace, apart from remaining shadings of memory that spread across numerous and even typologically diverse experiences. Such experiences and memories have no chronological topos, although they provide regions of intensification, diffused attunement, and even nostalgic self-identification. In one sense, it is the Merleau-Pontean dimensional this, as an expressivity that transgresses localized objectivities, and yet does not turn out to be a region of transcendence. Such dimensionality may also assume substantive modifications, expressed in various terms, such as destiny-fate, having no localizable origin, but affecting human sensibilities, and manners. They remind us of our duty to serve the spirit, the times, and the calling, although without any clear sense of their specific origin. These ethereal dynamics seem to be ever-present and atopic.

G. While mainly masculine, and partially monastic, certain energies or dynamisms can become all pervasive preoccupations to transcend the immediate solicitations of the world, to return to the extra-worldly paternal home, so prevalent in chiliastic and eschatological movements and, in another sense, in the detachment of sciences. Such transcendentalizing is expressed usually by attitudes of non-involvement or non-participation in the states of affairs of one's world. It may be regarded as an external look with an attendant longing for something else, for the source of this tran-

scendence and detachment, regardless whether such source is known or unknown. This transcendentalizing at times assumes specific fusion either with something extra worldly, or something that is deemed to be pure and ultimate, such as pacific surrender to the impeccable laws of nature or a will of divinities. Dynamics of this type may appear in active rituals of purification that result in the shedding of terrestrial pollutions. Matriarchal, although very seldom feminist symbolic designs tend to exclude such purifying rituals, unless the matriarchal internalizes the transcendentalizing designs signified in masculine terms.

H. Vitalistic flux, usually expressed in animistic forms, shows various unattached, freely floating contractions of force, capable of entering various objects and phenomena, vivifying them and departing. This would be coextensive with magical realm and practices, articulated by Gebser at the level of vital awareness. The latter exhibits some distinct modifications. It dominates the ritualistic incantations, where the act becomes the power of the event, the word brings about storms, healing and destruction, and the mask becomes the very enacted entity. This awareness is as well prevalent in transubstantiations, where the bread becomes flesh, and the wine blood, where a chant gives rebirth such that the human becomes the enchanted word. Thus through prayers and appropriate deeds, one not only associates but becomes identical with the very powers of a demon, a divinity, a totemic animal; it is notable that this identification stretches all the way to an assumption of names of animals or figures of power. Sports teams have their vital names and parade their mascots, and populations identify themselves with the victorious teams by proclaiming “we won.” This awareness is also at the basis of theatre, where the actor becomes the enacted role, is absorbed and disappears into the portrayed character. 5

Each modification of flux can subsume and/or pervade a range of cultural variations, and can overlap with, transform, and find resonances in others. For example, both the vital as well as the erotic can be an impetus toward detachment and transcendence, or an attraction to merge into them as expressions of cosmic life and love. These modifications are also implicit criteria by which it will be decided what kind of specific flux may be regarded as dangerous, even if it is good, simply because it needs strict controls without which it might transgress symbolically

assigned limits and become decadent both by overuse and a lack of use. It might even be deemed indestructible and beyond human control.

One relevant hierarchization of flow and stasis is offered by Parsons, is the location of flow at the lower level of the cybernetic control hierarchy. Such a view leads one to understand the devitalized character of becoming in sociology. This restriction could have been circumvented by introducing a flow stressed control hierarchy, independent of the first and flowing in an opposite direction with spontaneous passions in a ruling position. Such two hierarchies would not have to be understood as facets of an established unity, but as bargaining with each other “politically” for “shares” in deciding results, where several hierarchies of each type would participate in the process, with equal rights for each to have its day.¹¹ The Parsonian sociology is more akin to the composition of the Soviet Union, rather than the Western societies. More appropriate social theory for the West, encompassing the above bargaining, would be Luhmann’s multi-layered permanence-flow, with each one having a right to have its time and to carry out its political programs. This would be, to speak with Husserl, a poly-centric sociology, and indeed poli-centric culture, and would permit the coexistence of modernism and post-modernism with an ability to cross the lines and thus to create novel permanence-becoming configurations. The latter would most likely be comprised of flux enhancing flux with only minor restrictions.

Postscript

Given the above characterizations of the major kinds of permanence-change and their interrelationships, it is possible to note some of the pervading rules of such interrelationships. What is quite obvious is that permanence-change, of whatever type and at whatever level, are always correlated. Their correlation follows all pervasive rules irrespective of culture, history, and privileged “explanations,” whether metaphysical, scientific, or mythological.

The first rule decipherable from the above cultural designs shows that becoming can function to enhance, promote, progress, and maintain permanence. Whether I work very tediously and hard to maintain the permanence of my job, whether the king fields and army of knights to maintain the permanence of his throne, whether Lucifer before the fall

scurries around to insure the supremacy of paternal edicts or whether the working class is pressed for labor power to maintain the ruling position of the owner class, all are engaged in permanence maintaining flux.

The second rule shows that flow can be disruptive of stasis. The barbarians are breaking down the edifices of the civilized world, Lucifer rebels and establishes a process of corruption of paternal edicts, over production, and resultantly, workers strikes and revolts disrupt capitalist fabric. In their stead, dissidents are disrupting the progress of the people's parties and their efforts to establish communism, while the secular devils in the West are an incipient disruption of the Islamic republics. In modern literature the primordial chaos is slowly seeping through the bourgeoisie waxed furniture and order, and the woman's revolution is disrupting the history of patriarchal supremacy.

The third rule shows that permanence can suppress becoming and disrupt its dynamics. The despotic-imperial edicts prohibit any deviations, the erotic spontaneities are defected along the paternal edicts, the passions become mortified by the salvific codes of fundamentalists, and the Confucian hierarchy suppresses the Taoist spontaneity, the "garden of freedom."

The fourth rule emerges with permanence as enhancing flow. Democratic institutions, articulated in the Promethean mythology of rebellion, but impossible in the Judeo-Christian and Islamic rebellion, are flow enhancing. The dialectics, prior to Dialectic, demands an incessant transcendence of what is, and solicits a constant revolution, leading to the possibility of post modern surrender of hierarchical, stratified, sublimated, ideologies, and alienated thought. Such surrender is made possible by a fundamental recognition that the rules of permanence-flow, and their numerous modifications, have no natural necessity and are institutionalized constructs, modifiable with the transformations of discursive practices.

There is, of course, another rule which can be deciphered even across the rules of permanence-flow, but the extrication of this rule is much more involved and has been explicated in other writings.¹⁴ Suffice it to say that such a rule must be capable of including the four rules of permanence and flow, and even the logic of negativity, so prevalent from the second part of the nineteenth to the middle of the twentieth centuries, and in some major Eastern systems of thought.

CHAPTER VII

CULTURE: LAW AND VALUE: A

Phenomenology of Desire: the Practical Domain

The concern of this paper is about the emergence of customs from valuation and of laws from custom, to the extent that these become “sedimented” in a tradition of human action and perception. The phenomenological understanding of values, customs and laws lies in the concrete domain of perception and experience. This has great significance for cross-cultural communication. In learning the values of the others, we do not learn primarily a system of values but of the way human perception is structured “selectively.” We learn how to discriminate among the things and events of the world: between what is important, worthy, how and in what way to act toward something, how to treat it; and what access and prohibitions there are in relationship to something. This process is not reducible to learning definitions. It is rather a process of perceptual discrimination, of what one concretely can and cannot do.

Conflict is a special problem: one participant in an interaction refuses to accept the choices or selections of another, and communicates this refusal. What is crucial is the employment of “negation potential” for refusing choices; the acceptance of what had been previously accepted. As a reaction, with the existence of class structure notes the functional differentiation of society is already conflicts. But they are circumstances “pregnant with conflict” – if this becomes appropriate to investigate under what additional circumstances or conditions is an outbreak of con-fact likely to occur.

Luhmannesque Principles of Conflict

The following communication Principle of Conflict is derived from the European social theory of Niklas Luhmann. According to Luhmann:

1. At the face-to-face level, a system is based on personal presence operating under a premise that a consensus exists about what subject is being discussed. At any given time, only one central topic can be handled. As soon as conflict through the very act of refusal becomes the focal theme, the whole system is restructured. The

participant reacts to this new topic to continuously limit what is possible within the system. Interaction systems cannot easily co-sign open conflicts to a marginal status within their border. They are faced with a choice: either avoid conflicts or be conflicts.

2. Advances in social evolution in modern societies presuppose a two-faceted increase in the potential for society-wide and cultural conflicts: an increase both in social potential for producing conflicts by communicating refusal and in the social potential for tolerating conflicts as continuing events that only need to be resolved in critical cases. As complexity increases, so does the differentiation of interests and perspectives as do occasions and structured opportunities for negation. Social order must assume that legal norms than will be changed as well as established truth will be doubted, i.e. someone may stay away from religious ceremonies without crowding the feelings of region or even withdrawing from the religious community.
3. The chance to consistently follow special interest also depends upon an increase in readily employable “negation potential”. The same can be said for social development: the possibility of transforming and varying the given. The structural principle of organizations presupposes social mobility and the ever-present option of breaking of entering a new social relation. In sum, differentiation, innovation and organization can be said to depend upon a normalization or routinization of conflict behavior.
4. A political systems potential for resolving conflicts must be seen as the result of several variables: (a) it depends on the extent to which oppositions and conflicts in society at large are politicized, or thought to require binding decisions, (b) it depends on whether the political system has been sufficiently differentiated from the rest of society so that, in taking over a conflict as its own behavior, it can activate new motives. Furthermore, the degree of abstraction and the scope that the structure of the political system has for defining the limits which conflicts may be permissible are equally important. Finally, and most important of all, the systems potential for conflict depends on how selective processes can be coordinated with one another.

5. The original impulse toward a thorough understanding and description of society cease in connection with the transition from archaic settlements and tribal communities to collectivities of greater magnitude. Such larger collectivities were constructed and held together politically and were thus essentially characterized by a capacity for making binding decisions. This transition to a politically achieved social order did not merely extend society's capacity for integrating group activities -- which, "primitive" communities already possessed. More significantly, it introduced (by concentrating power and authority) the possibility of resolving conflicts through binding decisions. Therefore, it made it experientially obvious that the social whole does not result from spontaneous or "natural" living together, but rather, in certain respects, presupposes contingency and refuses the deliberate overcoming of contingency. In order for us to come to understand Luhmann's system theory of conflict we must approach this special problem from the concrete experience of valuation in order for conflict at the social and cultural level to be managed.

Valuation: Selectivity of Environment

Perception is the fundamental domain of experience. For phenomenology this domain is constituted on the basis of our direct corporeal engagement with the world. The perceptual level contains two basic factors: the field background and the specific objects and events which emerge from this field. The emerging objects and events are founded upon our orientation, our interest and attendance to something specific. If we shift our interest to something else, the previous specific object "sinks" back into the field background. Valuation presupposes this perceptual experience as the process which lends preeminence to some things and neglects others. Therefore, our environment is a valuation milieu, which consists of a field of things, events and objects which assume preeminence stand out and are counted as important and relevant to us. The sum of such objects comprises the humanly relevant surroundings. They belong in a system of meaningful interrelationships. All objects are selected in terms of explicit interest from a broader background environment. These objects of interest constitute an interrelated "immediate environment" wherein objects,

events and things are treated as “tools.” The immediate environment is no longer a “natural” environment. Various objects are selected along practical and instrumental valuations and enter an ends-means interrelationship such that the various objects have value for the sake of some purpose and the achieved purpose may become means for other purposes. For instance, wood is evaluated as “material” means for the purpose of a house, and a house is for the purpose of shelter. The field is for the sake of growing crops, and the crops are for the sake of food. This means that the wood and the field are not judged merely on the basis of their perceptual qualities, but evaluated and selected for their KU value. In this sense human perception is completely intertwined with valuation. According to phenomenology, humans do not approach the objects given to perception with a “value” system existing intact within some mental region. In such a case we would simply apply our values to “indifferent” objects, whose qualities express for us no inherent attraction. Values emerge in selectivity of environmental factors. For instance, scientists do not simply respond to the objects of the environment. Rather the scientist selects the materials on the basis of their value for his/her experiment. We can extend the selectivity concept to every human interaction in the world, from religious practice to building a home. In religion certain objects are selected as valuable for a ritual, for sacrifice, for evoking the favors of divinities and for directing appropriate human behavior. The term “direction” does not mean a spatial orientation but rather the ways in which things and other humans should be treated. “Others” belong to the environment, of course not as objects of use, but more fundamentally as partners in the process of constituting an environment. This form of “value judgment” is more concrete and may be considered to be a “pre-linguistic” value judgment. Handling, surveying, testing the materials being selected is a direct perceptual and corporeal process. The hardness, the elasticity of the wood is directly judged by the hand and the eye, the appropriateness of the soil for crops is judged by the texture of the earth between our fingers. This kind of valuation is “pre-predicative,” and it comprises the basis of linguistic predication: “This tree looks good; we can use it.” Yet the pre-predicative level is what comprises valuation and selectivity.¹

¹ Husserl, E. *Experience and Judgment*. Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1973, p. 88.

The objects, events and domains which emerge as an interrelated immediate environment, become “valuable.” Therefore, our essential and relevant environment is a valued environment. The valued environment isn’t a closed one. It extends toward the “background” and points to things in the background whenever they become relevant and are selected by us. For example, a city dweller who views oneself as a “sportsman” will buy a hunting rifle, practice in a closed city room -- all these belonging to his immediate environment. Yet in the diffused background there are the forests, the mountains where he/she is going someday to hunt. But he/she will go hunting on the advice of friends, or on the suggestions of “experts” who will select for him/her the “good” places to go hunting. This selective valuation is extended from one’s immediate environment to the factors within the background environment which become relevant and interconnect with the immediate surroundings. The extension of valuation is not arbitrary. It interconnects with the immediate environment and continues it “without breaks.”²

The initial valuation and selectivity can become “sedimented” or habituated and the “valuable” objects of the environment can become a matter of course. Our engagement with them turns to a set of unnoticed or anonymous” activities.³ For example, a carpenter performs his activities without paying attention to them and without engaging him or herself in the process of evaluative selectivity. In this manner the carpenter’s milieu assumes a factual status, as his or her “reality.”

Phenomenology does not claim that all of us engage in the process of evaluative selectivity of the environment. We are born into an environment which has been established by others. Hence education partially consists in learning the ways to deal with the objects and others already there for us. But in this our learning accepts established valuations tacitly as accomplished and objective facts. The objective facts nonetheless embody the evaluative selectivity which has become institutionalized in the objective facts-the implements, the buildings, the materials and our ways of dealing with them.

² Husserl, E. *supra* note 1, p. 88.

³ Merleau-Ponty, M. *Phenomenology of Perception*. Smith, C. trans. New York: Humanities press, 1962, p. 91.

Custom

The valuative selectivity of objects and events which comprise our immediate environment at the same time constitutes our modes of activities in relationship to objects and events and to other persons. These activities become sedimented through repetition, leading to the understanding of customary behavior. “One” uses this kind of material, this kind of implement to build something or to plant something. The child is taught the “right way” to perform something with the use of the appropriately selected means and materials, with appropriate valuations. It is the accustomed “right way” that turns into a custom. In this sense customs of action with accustomed objects and events, as well as and accustomed relationships with others embody evaluative selectivity and are deemed to be of value.⁴ Customs, at this level, are sedimented valuations and can constitute a “value system” of people. The value system, extended into linguistic articulation, is a direct description of customary relationships and activities. In the simplest linguistic form such values can be expressed as “This is the way we do things around here,” or “this is the way the Chinese do things,” etc.

On the basis of the previous discussion of the perceptual foundation of selectivity, we can see how customs, or “ways of doing,” are correlated with ways of perceiving. Perception is not a secondary mode of activity consisting of sensibilities, but is completely intertwined with the activities and customary “doings.” Hence at this level to say “this is the way we do things” is equivalent to saying “this is the way we see things.” If we say that “this (x) is good for that (y),” what is it we have already done? We have presupposed the activities of Y and have at the same time indicated how we-see the functions or qualities of X in relation to Y’s activities. We also assume the correctness of our assertion (X is good for Y). For the “others” who share the relevant environment in which X and Y are customarily valued. Chicken soup, ginseng tea, mustard plaster, and Vicks Vapor Rub all are good for the common cold because congestion is reduced by the hot, pungent qualities of these substances.

Since the immediate environment is built by us through the original (originating) acts of evaluative selectivity, it is also a source of desi-

⁴ Luhmann, N. *Zweckbegrif und Systemrationalitaet*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1977, p. 24.

gnation in terms “mine” and “yours” or “ours” and “theirs.” Building an environment is a way of appropriating it and assigning to it a personal imprint. What and how one “builds” constitutes one’s sphere of influence delineated against the “building” of others. In this sense the environments of others are diffused backgrounds and cannot be intruded upon. The sedimented result is that one does not intrude into the other’s environment to appropriate objects without the other’s permission. Customs such as prohibitions against stealing have their source at this level. This same principle operates regardless of the complexity of customary practices. When a person circulates his money on a stock market, the money constitutes his inviolable domain. When a government, such as socialism, claims that the means of production belong to the society, it also proclaims tacitly that this social domain is not to be interfered with by private individuals without governmental permission. In post-revolutionary states old customs maintain their force, even if terminological changes are made to accommodate the “revolutionary ideology.”

Customs, based upon evaluative selectivity, constitute unwritten codes (see Luhmann) of human activity toward things and with one another. They carry the practical “wisdom of the ages” and their initial codification is usually symbolic or ideological. Symbolically, the customs are represented through mythological figures: goddesses and gods and their servants are the “primordial” makers and teachers of the “proper ways.”⁵ Since they are the builders of the environment, humans, in their limited wisdom, must do their level best to imitate the ways of the mythical figures. In this sense the customs are sanctioned by gods, and their transgression is tantamount to the transgression of some ultimate being. In reading mythologies we are reading human customs in a symbolic form. Ideologically the customs are represented by more mundane expressions. The customs are regarded as reflections of “inherent” human nature, of human reaction to material needs, of an initial covenant establishing rules of behavior by “rational self-interest” or of sublimated human drives.” Symbols and ideologies are a way of codifying the customary. Thus the customary evaluative selectivity of the environment and human interaction need not be observed directly. It can be deciphered from symbolic and ideological expressions.

⁵ Greimas, A. *Apie Dievus ir Žmones*. Chicago: AM & M Publications, 1979, p. 10.

Cross-cultural communication about customs intertwines these three domains: direct understanding of the selectivity process, symbolic expressions and ideological “explanations.” There is a general consensus among the scholars of culture students that mythological and ideological “languages” comprise a codified reflection of social relationships. What phenomenology adds is that these relationships have a source in the selective valuation of the environment which correlatively includes human activities and interrelationships.

Selective valuation also constitutes a “significant environment” where one thing or event interrelates with and points to other events. Trees selected as “good” for building point to the activities of building, the production of boards, logs and their relationship to buildings and their purposes. (Inner horizons or fields of implication.) The significant environment lends to events and things a priority of importance and establishes a context of what is near and what is distant. Phenomenology suggests that prior to presupposed spatial distance there is a distance and nearness of meaningful factors in the environment.⁶

The individual’s relationships are structured by the meaningful factors. For a business-person, driving down the road among majestic mountain peaks, the majestic is distant, what is near is the coal which he interrelates with his business environment. For the religious person the tavern next door is remote, while the church six blocks away is very close. The tavern is an irrelevant factor for selectivity. The significant factors correlate with typological activities, customary processes.⁷ In the meaningful interconnection of factors the business-person would deal with the required activities and investments to extract the coal from the mountains. These factors and activities would be near, despite the fact that the business-person is hundreds of miles away from his office. The meaningful interconnection of factors provides a system within which our actions make sense: they too interconnect meaningfully and thus comprise a “silent language.” This language reveals the typological interconnections and also the “customary” activities sedimented into customs: that is the way we do things around here. Hence the hermeneutic

⁶ Bardt, H. *Umwelterfahrung*. Darmstadt: W.B.G. 1979, p. 60.

⁷ *Ibid*, p. 68.

of customs can be accomplished by “reading” human activities in the context of the meaningful interconnections of the environment. Phenomenologically, this relieves us from the task of deciphering what is in the “mind” of peoples having different customs from our own.

Mythological, ideological and linguistic expressions comprise only a partial codification of customs. The reason for this limitation is the imagery of mythology and the indefiniteness of audial speech. To insure the continuation and success of the custom, mythologies “over determine” the customs by making the daily activities into super-human, world creative deeds. The details of human daily concerns are pale in comparison. Myths codify the “founding” acts of “making” the world and of building an interrelated system of meanings. In turn, language which codifies the daily activities and sedimented practices carries with it psychological attunement and disruptions which would accrue to customary codes. Customs are usually transmitted through direct spoken language. But direct spoken language is that its meaning is not univocal. Spoken language has an overlay of psychological meanings rendering it ambiguous. Moreover, unwritten codes, codes transmitted audially, do not allow a precise verbal repeatability. They assume a “system” of various expressions each one deviating from the others. One cannot return to the same precise statement. One gives a variant from it and the variant may become the “standard” which also is deviated from by subsequent expressions. This is the reason why there seem to be such a variety of linguistic expressions of customs and such a differentiation among the sayings of “folk-wisdom.” Each one is “correct” but each one is “more” than an interpretation of the earlier ones. Each one is rather another saying with a different meaning, and the difference may not be acceptable even by a people of the same region, or of the same tradition. The linguistic codification and hence extension of what is understood by “heard to be” the custom, begins to deviate from direct involvement in daily activities and to assume a life of its own.

Pure custom, as expressed in myths, is an enactment, a direct engagement in activities. Once activities are sediment and extended into linguistic edicts, sayings and commands, the customs assume a partial codification. Linguistic codification “expands” the customs through variation of stories and sayings, through instruction by exemplars. The ex-

pansion of customs is no longer followed by such statements “this is the way we do things around here” but “As the story goes” and “As the saying goes.” The complexity of codified customs, and specifically the complexity of linguistic expressions which become customary, require a more encompassing and yet more uniform codification. Thus “covenants” are made in order to unify some of the linguistically articulated customs.

Codified Constitutional Law

While customs and linguistically codified activities have no juridical force, they have a force of habit, of a sedimented tradition. Yet the codified law is regarded as having a legitimacy which can be enforced. The specific character of constitutional law is that it has two sides: emerges or evolves from customs and at the same time transcends them by becoming “applied” to them. Codified law simplifies the customs into more general rules becoming more encompassing than the specific customs. Although embodying practical and customary values, the customs are seen as facts which have to be submitted to norms.⁸ While there are well-known theorists who claim that the only sense of law is the constitutional law which is posited by an agreement and enforced by social sanctions.⁹ Hans Kelsen, for example, argues that the difference between a custom and a legal norm is the difference between moral order and order of rules. Moral order has no coercive power, is customary, but not explicitly legitimated by positing a set of rules. The order of rules is normative and has a socially organized coercive power.¹⁰ This positive theory of law claims norms emerge from the act of positing of norms which then become a justification for a legal system. Thus the constitutionally posited norms comprise a positive value judgment. Therefore, law does not have its origin or source in any custom.¹¹ To the contrary, scholars of law influenced by phenomenology argue that laws do originate in and emerge from, customs in order to manage social complexity at a higher, more encompassing level.¹²

⁸ Waldenfels, B. *Der Spielraum des Verhaltens*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1980, p. 288.

⁹ Kelsen, H. *Pure Theory of Law*. Knight, M. trans. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970, p. 173.

¹⁰ Luhmann, N. *supra* note 4, p. 155.

¹¹ Kelsen, H. *op. cit.*, p. 62.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 199.

The claim that law does not have custom as its source must be rejected on the following grounds. Customs are not simply actions. They are embedded in language, myths and sayings. Sayings and language embody the initial “selective valuation” and hence must enter into the establishment of explicit norms. The evaluative norms do not appear with a positing of a value judgment as the basis of a norm, but are pregiven in customary action and language. Moreover, if such evaluative norms were to emerge on the basis of the “pure” establishment of norms, they would have to be completely distinct, disconnected from the incomprehensible for the persons who would be establishing them and on whom they would be imposed. For instance, in the domain of cross-cultural communication, no intelligent explanation could be offered how two distinct peoples, having posited their distinct norms, could communicate them to each other. There would be no basis in experience, no world context in which one could recognize one’s possible activities. As suggested by Bernard Waldenfels, a leading scholar of Merleau-Ponty and Marx, human activity does not simply follow normative edicts. The human activity takes place in a context.¹³ Phenomenology contends that any cross-cultural communication of norms, of coded rules is primarily comprehensible on the basis of direct activity: what one can and cannot do. The “I can,” the domain of practical action is presupposed. Even if one were to extricate oneself from the active process of valuation and from a sedimented tradition of activities, one’s positing of the “rules” would have to be translated directly into action in order to be understood.

Not only do norms emerge from the customary language which has within it no distinction between “fact” and “value,” they also point toward the experiential context in two ways. First, norms are “interpreted” to suit a customary situation and, second, norms are selective of the environment which is already pregiven on the basis of customary activities.¹⁴ Additionally, the rules that are established to manage complexity, must enter into contexts in which they must be applied. In this sense, they cannot be “pure.” As Gadamer says, quoting Aristotle, “one and the same measure always proves smaller when we buy wine than when we

¹³ Waldenfels, B. *supra* note 8, p. 286.

¹⁴ Waldenfels, B. *supra* note 8, p. 299.

sell it.”¹⁵ This means normative rules do not cover the specifics of every case, nor do they cover all possible cases to which they will be applied.¹⁶ Phenomenology does not deny that norms comprise a framework, but rather shows that the “pure” framework is enacted by engaged humans with situated interests, conflicts and customs. The norms are enacted by situated and corporeal beings who do not simply confront the norms by cognitive assent. Rather, the norms are “fleshed out” and submitted to interpretation that is always context-bound. Even those who apply the rules are not “situated” and must, therefore, interpret rules in a manner which makes sense to the particular case. The ordering of behavior regulated by legal norms is itself a behavior which is acted upon by others and interconnected with a specific tradition. The tradition contains the customs which are developed prior to rule codifications and the latter are constantly interpreted in light of the customs.

Norms and laws are not derived from any presupposed human or social nature. Rather they appear on the basis of a decision; which legitimates the norms selected. The experiential condition for establishing norms is that the decisions are made not only about regulation, but also reflectively about decisions. The reflective condition functions on two levels. First, it is a reflection upon the customary practices, valuations and their linguistic and ideological expressions. Second, the reflections focus upon the rules which are being formalized and the decisions which posit these rules as legitimate for all members of a society. It could be said that the posited rules embody concretely the decisions and the reflective process which set up the rules. The rules then comprise reflexive means which not only illuminate the customs but also manage their complexity. The rules are a reflexive structure which in its generality is more encompassing and becomes a directive over the customs.

The reflexive process accomplishes the ability to constitute the possibilities for the application of a particular system upon itself. There are numerous examples in social life of this process. We not only have a tradition of education, but also of education about education; we not only use currency as means for commodity exchange, but also have reflexive

¹⁵ Gadamer, H. G., *et. al. Truth and Method*. New York: Continuum Publishing Group, 2004, p. 303.

¹⁶ Luhmann, N. *Positives Recht und Ideologie*. Archiv für Rechts und Sozial-Philosophie, Nr. 53, 1967, p. 537.

processes to “exchange the exchange means,” we not only have language developed through tradition, but we also extricate the rules of language and posit them as reflexive means to evaluate our customary uses and master them in terms of the “correct” grammatical rules. The same is also true for social rules: they are reflexive processes ranging over customary practices and apply directly to these practices. At first glance the rules may appear to be “abstract,” in actuality they provide a reflective framework for activities. Customs direct our activities implicitly, and rules established by reflective decisions direct our activities explicitly. This is not to say that the reflectively established rules cover the customs identically, point for point. Rules are more general and provide a way of acting which may not be included in the customs or they may require the establishment of future customs in accordance with the rules. The reflexive process constitutes the condition for “positivization” of laws; the laws become “positive” in this process. (Luhmann) Laws, therefore, are not derivable from “nature” or “myths” or “ideologies.” Due to positivization, “nature” or “myths” assume a specific role: they function as ideological legitimating of the rules. We shall discuss the question of ideology and value in the next section. It is sufficient to point out that the reflective process of positivization tends to abolish mythological expressions of “the ways” of acting and is translated into a systematic constitution of ideologies as “supports” mechanism for the norms.

In regard to cross-cultural understanding of law, it is inadequate to simply read the rules; these would be empty formalities unless we also read them as reflexive processes which contain the decisions to establish them and relate the rules to the customs. The decisions are not composed of factual, but of evaluative experiences, although we should not make a distinction between the two. In the process of selection among the customary activities, decisions are made on the basis of various understandings such as “better, worse, more suitable, appropriate” “more encompassing, closer to the needs of the community, providing a more uniform and equitable treatment of the membership,” etc. The interpretations are followed by immediate ideological rhetoric of “this is the human thing to do” or “this is in accordance with how we all ought to act (naturally).” The reflective process of decision making constitutes a secondary evaluative selectivity within the already established environment. Hence when we

enter the environment of customs of another peoples, we must also learn the way that the secondary selectivity functions. We must enter the reflexive process embedded in the rules which comprise indexes for the ways that one ought to function within the customary environment. One learns a process of selectivity among actions and environmental components, i.e., components which have significance. This means that entering into another culture and its value “system” is not an entrance into a completely alien world; we can understand the actions as meaningful interconnections of an environment and the ways in which reflective processes constitute norms on the basis of selective valuation within the environment which we can readily understand.

Although it is a demonstrable fact that cultures differ in terms of customs and modes of activities, the relativity does not preclude our understanding of them and our ability to communicate with them. At times it is almost amusing to read accounts of the customs of other peoples and the claims that such customs are different from ours and hence inaccessible to us. Bound as we are to our own customs and rules, we cannot liberate ourselves from them to be able to grasp those of the other peoples. Yet the persons writing such accounts tell us precisely that not only they, but we who read the accounts are in a position to understand such peoples. This means, we are already in the process of communication with them. The basis of this process is the phenomenologically understood “I can” structure. The “I can” structure means I can act and perform in the same ways that they can, even if in my own culture I don’t. I can follow the meaningful interconnections of a cultural world because these interconnections comprise the structuration of activities and perceptions, which constitutes the field of my concrete involvement.¹⁷ In this sense I do not have to learn an abstract “value” system extricated from the world and placed inside the “subjects of another culture. The valuations are embedded in the environment which is coextensive with this activity and perceptions. Therefore my understanding of their values is a direct process of perceptual engagement and corporeal activity. The complete intertwining of perception and activity with the significantly deployed environment is prior to the distinction of value, fact and meaning.

¹⁷ Merleau-Ponty, M. *supra* note 3, p. 67, 152.

Ideology and the Legitimation of Value.

Ideology functions to codify the customs; yet in contrast to myths that parallel customs, ideology enters the domain of codified rules as a factor of legitimation and stabilization. We have previously noted, the establishment of rules is a reflective process of decision. Yet the decision alone is insufficient to guarantee the acceptance of the rules, specifically when the rules must in some cases, either limit or transgress ingrained customs. As Paul Ricoeur points out, the use of violence to enforce the rules could not be maintained if any kind of cohesive society is to be obtained; hence ideology functions to legitimate, to justify the rules.¹⁸ Such notions as “the laws correspond to human nature,” or “they are expressions of the will of the autonomous members of society,” or “they enhance progress” or “the rules provide for human equality” etc., are used to stabilize the selected rules.

The peculiarity about ideologies are they not only support and legitimate the rules, but also that they embody the values of the rules. What is at work is a process which structures itself across various levels. The valuative selectivity of the environment, comprising the customs, is evaluated by a reflective process of decisions about the rules which are capable of managing a greater complexity of customary activities. This reflective process is one of valuation and selectivity among the customary values. Hence the positivised rules are embodiments of this secondary valuation. The ideological expressions which legitimate the rules have no meaning apart from the meaning of the values embedded in the rules. For example, to say ideologically that laws flow from human nature, means that the human being is of value if he/she acts in accordance with the rules or laws. The laws are expressions of human nature, and to act in accordance with the laws is to act in accordance with human nature. Or we can take, for example, the ideology of “progress.” If the reflective decision-making selects from the customary valuations and positivizes those valuation as rules as enhancing change, then to conform to such rules means to conform to progress. Therefore, the ideology of progress legitimates and embodies the reflective valuations which posit the rules establishing them as “positive law.”

¹⁸ Borchert, D., Steward, D. *Technological Age*. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1979, p. 117.

Niklas Luhmann expresses this point well. He indicates that any preference of one activity over another is valuation. These valuations are reflected upon and posited as rules. Ideologies have no other meaning apart from being the embodiment of the values of the rules. Ideologies are values which are employed to evaluate other values.¹⁹ Luhmann's point is that ideologies are symbolic expressions which provide the means to evaluate various norms as valuable for positivisation into laws. Hence an ideology of progress is a symbolic expression of values which provides a reflective access for decision-making concerning the valuations which ought to become positivised into "standard" rules. It is important to note that ideologies are not the sources of values and rules. Rather rules emerge from valuation and the reflective decision-making which selects specific valuations for positivisation. Therefore, ideology emerges as a symbolic expression which allows the evaluation of values and the selection of those which are preferred for the establishment of rules. These ideologies are reflexive mechanisms which enhance one set of activities over another, since the desired activities comprise initial evaluation and environmental constitution.

Relevance-for Cross-Cultural Communication

This has grave import for cross-cultural communication of law in that we must recognize how ideologies function as legitimating expressions embodying the reflective valuations for the selectivity of norms. By understanding ideologies, i.e., the linguistic descriptions which purport to explain human events in terms of some permanent assumptions, we are in a position to grasp the way in which reflexive decisions positivize some customs and valuations into laws. For example, if one is told that human beings are subject to the rational progress of material conditions through history, inclusive of revolutionary activity, one can also understand that such an ideology embodies valuations which select specific values for positivisation into law.

The positivized laws would sanction activities which promote material production, revolutionary activity and submission to established laws as the sole rational mode of behavior during the present historical stage of development. Or if one were presented with an ideology of

¹⁹ Luhmann, N. *supra* note 16, p. 551, 154.

the hierarchy of human levels of perfections, acquired through cycles of rebirth, one would also find that this ideology is an expression of and a reflective stance for the selection of valuations which as positive laws sanction caste differentiations. These differentiations might go so far as to forbid legally some activities of one group, while allowing the same activities in another group. The same can be said for racist ideologies, although such ideologies may assume the rhetoric of biology/natural, evolutionary or even theological expressions. What is important for cross-cultural communication either of laws or of ideology is they function correlatively. Laws and ideologies are correlative expressions of the preference for activities established reflectively.²⁰ They embody reflective decisions comprising a process of selective valuations among customs. (It is beyond the task of this paper to include the motivating factors such as interest in the making of decisions.)

As soon as the values embedded in an ideology become visible, it becomes a standard of "value valuation." Thus in this process absolute values discredit themselves. It is not possible to evaluate values in terms of "higher values," since such values will have to be positivised reflexively as one set among other sets to be compared, selected, accepted or discarded. And ideology is a summation of particular values, a summation allowing the variation among values. At the same time, ideology allows for a relative stability among values. This means that a complex society is no longer founded on a fixed set of customs and their valuations, but requires various reflective decision making processes establishing relative norms and their attendant ideologies. At first this may seem as if such a society or societies would be completely unstable. But precisely the opposite is the case. Societies which include diverse norms with diverse ideological legitimations require a variety of political groups each permitting the other to have a temporary function of reflective decision-making in order to positivize some rules resulting in establishing specific programs. Temporary functioning requires a partial sacrifice of the valuations of the other groups; yet many groups are willing to concede to the temporary supremacy of one ideology in light of the possibility that their day is also coming.

²⁰ Luhmann, N. *supra* note 16, p. 553.

Societies with one ideology and correlatively with a fixed selectivity of positivized rules, endure a complete disruption of the social fabric by the valuations and activities of a group which is continuously suppressed. After all, the opportunity to institute its valuations and programs expressed ideologically is completely forbidden. While a suppressed group recognizes its activities as valuable and constitutive of possible environment, their re-lective decisions remain without fulfillment; hence their alternative is perhaps revolutionary overthrow of the political organ which in its decisions maintains only one ideology for the selectivity of values. This means that a “suppressed” group is permitted neither intra-cultural communication of its ideology and values nor a cross cultural communication with members of other cultures holding similar ideologies. The group’s reflectively selected valuation can neither be positivized into social norms nor enacted into programs for the establishment of an environment. In a society with a monistic ideology, other possible ideologies may acquire a symbolic function; such a function does not signify real possibilities. It communicates only revolutionary activity in which the ideology as a symbol functions as a possibility to be concretized in the post-revolutionary period. In this case, if there is any cross-cultural communication concerning law by the “suppressed” group, the communication is structured along two dimensions: (i) the ideological, in which the suppressed group expresses its dissatisfaction with the socio-political system as one which violates “human nature,” “human rights,” limits “progress” etc., and (ii) the practical, in which requests are made for support of revolutionary activity, i.e., aid for concrete establishment of valuations embedded in the alternative ideology. The communication of such requests leads to international tensions, accusations and indeed an establishment of ideologically laden organizations functioning reflectively to monitor intra-cultural and cross-cultural “violations of human rights.” Such organizations employ mass media to communicate about laws on the basis of an ideology which does not embody “higher values” but alternative values which are not permitted an opportunity for programmatic realization in a particular culture. It could be surmised that such organizations opt for a culture with numerous ideologies and evaluative structurations of the environment. In this

sense they demand that each culture possess multiple reflective processes each capable of positivisation of rules for concrete realization.

While the cross-cultural communication about laws is possible both at the level of ideologies and the process of reflective positivisation of norms, we must be cognizant of a possibility which might lead to miscommunication. In societies with multi-ideological options, the process of reflective decision making may be perverted. When we communicate about the establishment of norms, we do so on the tenuous assumption that the political activity is to attain specific programmatic aims stemming from the positivisation of rules for activity. Yet in many cases political parties pervert such an aim: the proposed ideological valuations are in turn evaluated with respect to their potential for the maintenance of political power of a given party. The programs become subordinate to the ends of power which should not be an end but a means. Even in the intra-cultural communication about laws one must ask whether the norms are being positivised for the establishment of programmatic ends and their enactment through selective activity or whether they are means for the propagation of political hegemony. This also applies to cross-cultural communication concerning laws. This communication becomes quite complex, since the perversion of evaluative process from reflective positivisation of norms for their enactment introduces another reflective process: political power.

In this sense all values become extremely variable and the valuation itself extremely reflective. Here the process of "power reflectivity" subsumes under itself all customary values, all positivised norms and their correlative ideologies, and submits them to variation as means in a chess-game of political power. Within this context, the communication about laws must also become highly reflective and constantly revert to such questions as: "How will this law and its resulting programs benefit the political party?" "Is this law a rhetorical device without concrete programmatic value?" "To what extent is the new rule designed to subvert the aspirations of other political parties with their ideologies?" The task for communicative understanding, in this regard, lies in the extrication of ideologies and their correlative laws not as reflective means to establish programs but as instrumentalities to be employed either

as rhetorical devices or as weapons against other ideologies. When we enter into a cultural milieu possessing political processes whose main devices of reflective decision making is removed from the public sphere; they become interests of private political groups. In this milieu we reach a “legitimation crisis.”^{21 22}

Legitimation crisis means that the reflective processes of positivisation of values into rules and their correlative ideologies cease to function as a concrete selectivity of activities for the meaningful structuration of the environment and become means for private interests of political maintenance of power. Basically, communication about law and legitimation becomes a communication about the use of laws and legitimizing ideologies as means for political power and communication reverts to a discourse about the “effectivity” of laws and ideologies to enhance the private political aims of the political groups. Therefore, in modern mass-media communication the responsibility of the journalist is to be a critical evaluator of this process. The mass media has to function as a reflective process capable of discerning the difference between the reflective processes in the political sphere which positivise rules for the sake of propagation of private political ambitions. In an intra-cultural sense and in a cross-cultural sense, the communication about laws and ideologies has to be a critical communication. In this sense, the institutionalized mass media comprises a reflective process with the duty not only to report “facts” but more importantly to reflect on the evaluative processes which select and positivise the laws. The mass media is the major reflective process of valuation which is in a position to critically evaluate the “valuation of values” by political processes.

Summary

This essay discussed the primary emergence of valuation which is not distinct from factual activity of a meaningful construction of an environment. At this level evaluative selectivity of environmental factors and “natural” causality are not two distinct phenomena. The evaluative

²¹ McCarthy, T. *The Critical Theory of Juergen Habermas*. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1979, p. 358-386.

²² Mickunas, A., Pilotta, J. *Technology vs. Democracy*. Cresskill: Hampton Press, 1998, p. 141-154.

activity is sedimented into customary performances within the established environment as a meaningful interconnection of things and events. Yet the pressure of complexity, i.e., the emergence of various customs and their interaction requires rules which would be capable of managing such an interaction. Hence a process of reflectivity arises which functions to evaluate selectively customary values and posit some of them as rules.

The communication about customs is a direct call for the understanding of “the way we do things here;” requiring a description of the selective valuations of things and events and our interaction with them. The customary processes are legitimated by mythologies. The mythical figures perform similar evaluative activities and in turn sanction human activities. Hence mythologies communicate the customs of particular peoples. Yet the reflective processes which positivise selectively some of the values for a broader management of complex customs require reflective communication. Therefore, one must ask why some facets of a culture remain customs unaffected by legal prescripts, while others are submitted to regulations. The legitimation of reflectively established rules are expressed ideologically. Ideologies contain selected valuations which in turn justify the reflective selection of some values as positive norms for the management of complex customs. These norms are programmatic prescripts for concrete activity and structuration of the environment, justified by ideologies such as “human nature” or “historical progress” or even “free expression of individual wills.” One main characteristic of positivized rules are that their application requires interpretation within concrete situations which involves the customary activities and environment, application cannot avoid the customary.

Complex societies have two possibilities for reflective positivisation of norms: monistic and pluralistic. Monistic societies positivisation of norms is expressed by one ideology which allows the selectivity of norms at the expense and negation of other possible norms and ideologies. Such societies are in a constant danger of having unfulfillable valuations for activity and construction of environment and of revolution. The pluralistic societies are in a position of engendering support from groups with diverse norms and correlative ideologies, since all of them are in a position of “having their day.”

The task of modern mass media is to function as a reflective process. It must evaluate critically to what extent the reflective processes of various political groups positivise laws for the evaluative activities of environmental structuration, and to what extent such laws would serve as means for political maintenance of power by one group. In other words, to what extent the norms and attendant ideologies are exploited for private ends. In short, mass media communication is a reflective process whose major task is to reveal legitimation crises.

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CHAPTER VIII

TECHNICAL CENTERS AND CULTURAL MARGINS

Particularly in the last decade, scholarly debate about international technology transfer and national development has centered with growing regularity upon the disruption of social environments and the uneven transformation of national economies brought about by the introduction of modern Western technology into developing nations. Harsh criticisms of Western technology transfer policies and practices are often coupled with equally severe assessments of extra-national domination of modern mass communication and information technologies. Galtung (1979), Hamelink (1983), Mattelart (1979), Smythe (1981), Schiller (1976; 1981), and White (1982) are readily identified with this trend in modern communication political economy.

Regardless whether one is sympathetic to the conspiratorial ring of many of their arguments, the core issue is clear enough. The commodification of Western culture in combination with its massively capitalized distribution apparatus threatens to overwhelm many non-Western cultural systems. Too often in today's world, the intellectual, symbolic, moral and instrumental resources of many nations are subject to extra-territorial control and manipulation.

But this is not a recent situation. For better than 500 years, the relationship between Western and non-Western nations has been defined by one-sided economic exploitation effected through political domination and cultural marginalization. The "wretched" that Frantz Fanon (1968) so ably characterized owe their prostration to the destruction of their cultural anchorage. Nkrumah (1973: p. 207) stated the situation plainly when he said: "Europeans insist upon the denial that we are an historic people." The colonialist arrogance that history begins only with the arrival of the first Europeans is surpassed only by the post-colonial conviction that history must come to a dead stop should the last European depart.

Of course, for the generation of the microchip and the superconductor it is not intellectually respectable to assert the moral superiority of the West. On the surface at least, the Western world has given up as

ideologically quaint and geo-politically impractical its self-legitimizing formulation of land, bloodlines, and religion that so effectively worked hiatus upon the indigenous cultural and social evolution of societies around the globe. At least since the era of Oswald Spengler and the introduction of automatic weapons, the bloom has fallen from the flower of Western moral imperialism.

But this by no means suggests that relationships have improved. According to Cees Hamelink, if anything, the condition of the marginals has deteriorated. Hamelink (1983) argues that “the survival of autonomous cultural systems in many areas of the Third World is very much in question.” And, he continues, “cultural autonomy is essential for a process of independent development.” The cultural marginalization of developing nations, the pernicious denial of history, geography and choice, has its post-War formulation. The modern superiority of the West, embraced with the same exaggerated sincerity in Nsukka and Manila as it is in New York or Paris, is fabricated out of the unhappy equivalences of information-technique-power. The hierophant of the technological enlightenment is the scientist; its holy places are the academy and the corporate research division; its currency is the intellectual and moral capital resources of global society. In its post-War, post-colonial formulation, modern domination is more elegant, more efficient, and more affluent; but its effects are no less tangible, and its consequences no more humane (Angus, 1984; Mickunas, 1987).

Viewed in this broad cultural perspective, control of and access to technology become the primary attributes distinguishing the perennially “haves” from the chronically “have not’s.” Similarly, technology transfer and diffusion topics, namely, when, how, where and if, offer some of the most challenging and potentially valuable questions currently being tackled by communication scholarship. But still too often, human communication is looked upon only as a means to promote the adoption of a desired practice (Academy for Educational Development, 1985). Today, we ‘export’ cigarettes; and tomorrow, we ‘transfer’ cancer research and “wellness” social technologies. In either instance, the privileged organization of cultural-technological proprietorship remains in place.

Reflecting on the impact of technology on culture in the developing nations, Johan Galtung (1979) has asserted that Western attitudes toward technology and national development are intrinsically and

irremediably adverse for the social and cultural organization of life found in many non-Western societies. Galtung advocates profound re-orientations within the so-called ‘alpha-structure’ that predominates the advanced Western technological outlook. Everett Rogers (1983) has acknowledged that individual blame and pro-innovation bias characterize both diffusion research and diffusion practice carried on within the “traditional innovation diffusion paradigm.” Michael Todaro (1981) has observed that many societies in the developing world “suffer from serious cultural confusion when they come into contact with economically and technologically advanced societies.” Finally, Perlmutter and Sagaf-Nejad (1981) maintain that responsible technology transfer depends upon achieving genuine and effective dialogue among all the participants in a technology exchange relationship.

This discussion outlines some conceptual and methodological features of research that promote intercultural sensitive technology transfer. It argues that (1) no technology inherently makes sense for another cultural system, and therefore (2) an explicit determination of a technology’s socio-cultural “fit” needs to take place. This perspective emphasizes the utility of achieving mutual accommodation in a technology exchange relationship. It attempts to delineate a polycentric model of technology transfer by underscoring the critical role of cultural autonomy in planned technological solutions to development problems (Pilotta & Widman, 1987). Finally, it offers a preliminary framework for indexing the socio-cultural appropriateness of a particular technology within a given setting in the interest of providing a methodological basis for genuinely collaborative knowledge transfer activities.

Communication Research and Knowledge Transfer

Development and technological development have come to be viewed as virtually co-terminus. “Developed,” “advanced,” and “modern” now mean “technological.” With only the possible exception of raw dollar transfusions into developing economies, every remedy for underdevelopment involves some sort of knowledge transfer. Even political reform rests finally upon sets of prescripts, techniques, and practices dedicated to making some preferred model of government work effecti-

vely. It is possible to treat the ideological struggles being waged in many developing countries as contests between competing political technologies. Be that as it may be, technological affluence has become the accepted yardstick for development in developing and developed nations alike. The adoption of technological accomplishment as the measure of development has created a virtually universal attitude toward technological transformations as both inevitable and eagerly anticipated.

For our present purposes, technology can be defined broadly, following Dennis Goulet (1971), as the “systematic application of collective human rationality with the view to achieving greater control over nature and over human processes of all kinds.” International technology transfer can be defined broadly as (1) the spatial translation across national boundaries of (2) any of the aggregate purposively designed or evolved ways and means for (3) benefiting enhanced human manipulation of production and/or the satisfaction of human needs and desires through (4) the rational organization of human instrumental control over the material and symbolic environment.

This definition of technology includes: capital inputs and implements of all types; human resource, and especially human knowledge inputs; as well as both technical and commercial information associated with the economically and socially efficient employment of technological principles, processes, implements and products. The tremendous breadth of the technological domain reflects the high degree of social penetration, rational specialization and economic integration characteristic of advanced technological societies (Luhmann 1970 & 1982). For example, according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, “technology” comprises a vast array of items and practices which range from feasibility studies and planning, to marketing research that implements design and physical installations. It also includes training, management, administration, and financing devoted to resource exploitation and manufacture, as well as to a vast assortment of human service delivery structures. (Perlmutter, 1981).

It can be argued that technologies collectively represent simply value neutral means serviceable for the accomplishment of socially desirable ends. When looked upon only as means, technologies constitute inputs into the organization of social and economic activity that respond

to the goals, values, and priorities established by the user. In this view, goals, values, and priorities are extrinsic to the particular attributes of the technology itself.

But even from the vantage point of this instrumental definition of technology as value-neutral means-ordering techniques, there is clear *prima facie* evidence of valued options. These preferred options include presuppositions about the efficiency of technological solutions for development problems, thereby wedding technological innovation with economic and social progress (Slack, 1984; Servaes, 1986). Because this association appears eminently reasonable, it lends credence to genuine research biases that have colored both the research designs and conclusions of diffusion researchers. Diffusion research has been prejudiced in favor of adopter categories and adopter characteristics, adoption rates (dominated by the well-known S-shaped diffusion curve), the social-psychology of change agency stratagems, the identification of an assortment of diffusion patterns according to spatial proximity, access to information, relative economic advantage, and so forth.

The operative bias is twofold: (1) the technological innovation inherently merits adoption, and (2) the proper objects of diffusion research are the individuals targeted to receive the innovation, and not the innovation itself or the interaction of the innovation with its physical and human environments. As the result, a remarkable oversimplification of the knowledge transfer process has occurred. This oversimplification of the knowledge transfer process combines with the penchant for taking the technology for granted in such a way that diffusion is reduced to a matter of demonstrating the eminent advantages of the technology to prospective users. In other words, diffusion is reduced to marketing. This practice inherently marginalizes indigenous technological traditions, and insists upon the functional irrelevance of local history. Local history is demoted automatically to a collection of anthropological curiosities and assorted prehistory's. In short, recipients are "fitted" to the technology (Halloran, 1986; Golding, 1974).

Many authors have voiced their resistance to this narrowing of the technology transfer, development conceptualization: Todaro (1981), Galting (1979), Schiller (1976), Golding (1974), Mattelart (1983), White

(1982), Servaes (1986) and Goblet (1971). In fact, the list seems endless. According to authors like these, both the antecedents and consequents of development efforts driven by knowledge transfers are affected by items like: international economic relationships, recipient institutional structures, labor force dislocation, and proprietorship over material and information resources, distribution of benefits, local appropriateness of technical designs and indigenous social and psychological characteristics.

Technology and the Cultural Environment

For present purposes, it is not important to review the many structural constraints and special interests that shape the landscape upon which technology transfer runs its course: And most especially from the standpoint of the developing nations themselves, neither does a technophobic exercise merit serious consideration. What is the important point is that the transfer of implements, procedures, ideas, and information cannot be compared to the simple spatial relocation of physical objects. Instead, technology transfer introduces an entire series of complex interactions that can eventuate in unanticipated sudden and telling social cultural transformations for the recipient societies. It is neither a matter of reshaping peoples' outlooks and values by modifying their environments, nor a matter of reshaping peoples' outlooks as the condition for successfully instituting permanent changes in their environments. Instead, it is a matter of finding ways to manage responsibly multidimensional changes occurring simultaneously across multiple materials, psycho-social, and environmental levels. Technology transfer, no less than the research apparatus that administers and informs diffusion practices, is a form of social action. As such, it is embedded in cultural values. In this light, it is easy enough to see how what is in fact suspect social science becomes equated with "Western" social practice. Galtung (1979: p. 15) has formulated the situation in broad terms.

"Transfer of technology" can never be a socially or politically neutral process, despite the use of such terms as traditional/modern or developing/developed, giving the impression of a generally accepted or historically inevitable process. The nature of the transfer of technology should be seen rather in terms of Western/non-Western, since this ma-

kes the process clear . . . The transfer of technology being a very deep-rooted and complex process, discussions of the terms of transfer cannot be limited to the terms of techniques.

It is a truism for cultural anthropology that technology, namely, socially or materially embodied means-ordering structures, is integrated in the social and cultural environments of human groups. Everyday taken for granted features like common sense, social hierarchies and individual values are interwoven with the local technological milieu. Tommy Carlstein's (1982) "ecotechnological" analyses of the relationships between "cultural action shapes" and natural habitat offers an application of this principle within the framework set by a broad conceptualization of human ecology. A technology is a socio-cultural mechanism. As the result, a technology is never simply located or contained within a cultural domain. Instead, a technology represents a vehicle for an intrinsically culturally-specific system of meanings (Pilotta and Widman, 1987). A technology is an expression of the framework of meaning within which a particular human society lives. A technology, in other words, represents an extension of a particular intersubjective human understanding (Mickunas, 1987).

A technological system constitutes a configuration of means-ordering processes, of "how to's" with respect to the environment. The formal abstractness of the technology with respect to nature endows it with an instrumental capacity for purposeful manipulation and transformation of nature by selectively recombining and disposing over naturally occurring means-ordering processes (causality). But at the level of human culture, a technological system is thoroughly integrated with the cognitive and social organization of a historically and geographically local cultural form. As the consequence, the simple spatial relocation of some item from among the technical productions of one cultural form has the potential for generating disruptions within another cultural form, all the way from the societal to the individual levels. The inability, in principle, for a particular culture to anticipate or to control a technology's potential for disruptive impact upon another culture underscores the need for identifying collaboratively constructed domains for multilateral or polio-centric technological mediation between the relevant cultural groups.

No technology inherently “makes sense” within another cultural setting. That a given technology does make cultural sense represents a conclusion based upon explicit determination of its social and cultural “fit.” It is precisely this explicit determination of social and cultural fit that is almost entirely lacking in traditional innovation and diffusion models. It is also methodologically not an object of concern for many critical political economy-based analyses of technology and development. The absence of a multilateral perspective is clearly symptomized by what Todaro (1981: p. 319) has characterized as “internal” brain drain in the developing countries.

Dominated by rich-country ideas as to what represents true international and professional excellence, these highly educated and highly skilled Third World professionals do not physically migrate to the developed nations, but nevertheless migrate “intellectually” to these countries in terms of the orientation of their activities. This “internal” brain drain is much more serious than the external one.

Internal brain drain is a manifestation of the condition of discursive domination of developing countries by the developed nations (Pilotta & Widman, 1987). In other words, the ways of thinking about needs, issues, remedies, and enterprises—including, most especially, what the words “development” and “modernity” mean—are formulated in terms of an exogenously achieved conceptual vocabulary, the vocabulary of the advanced, technology-exporting nations.

Managing Technological Impacts

The traditional model of technology transfer has assumed that diffusion consists of the transmission or “communication” of a practice or body of information from a sender to a receiver, where senders and receivers can be individuals, organizations, or entire social systems. In the field of communication, knowledge diffusion research has principally taken the form of either interpersonal or mass communication studies. Throughout, a technical perspective has dominated: it has stressed the instrumental conditions and processes associated with knowledge distribution and adoption, and has conceptualized its variables primarily in terms of receptiveness to and the technical efficiency of knowledge

transfer transactions between the subjects and objects of innovation-inducing messages.

In essence, whether at the individual or aggregate levels, the history of this research has gradually disclosed indirectly the demonstration effects created by change-oriented messages. The stimulus for change and the tendency for knowledge diffusion activities to induce effects that overspill the controlled asymmetry of the sender-receiver model arise from the condition that communicative action is attention-shaping, and therefore is capable of carrying consequences for domains of human behavior that are not provided for within the explicitly circumscribed scope of the information exchange. In other words, diffusion messages, despite being focused upon a specific problem or need, nonetheless interact with a host of what are strictly speaking external factors to the technology transfer. However complex the change message, it is nevertheless simple by comparison with the much more extensive network of interactions comprised by the broader matrix of its combinations with the communication environment (e.g., the socio-cultural system of the recipient nation) in which the message must be understood and put to use. The essential quality of the demonstration effect is that the message is overdetermined or “has an excess of meaning” with respect to the larger communication milieu (Greimas, 1983).

Despite their important differences, this is the reason for the apparent validity of both the purely technical and structural (critical) vantage points upon knowledge diffusion. The technical perspective rightly makes central the state-of-affairs or problem-solving orientation of specific diffusion activities. From this standpoint, diffusion is a matter of efficient information transmission that must as far as is possible isolate the problem or activity at hand from the broader and uncontrollable domain surrounding it. It is not to be legitimately expected of the change agent that s/he be either responsible for or competent to manage and direct the sequences of interactions taking place within the social environment as part of the technology diffusion activity. These possible combinations are, with respect to the matter at hand, strictly irrelevant from the technical standpoint.

At the same time, the historical/critical/structural perspective sets these collateral interactions into relief and quite rightly demonstrates

not only the reality, but also the virtual inevitability of such impacts and constraints within the economic, social, historical, psychological and environmental dimensions of the recipient's action frame. The net result is that the issue of technology transfer has been viewed as either a narrow, isolated activity or as a far-reaching historical event. In fact, it is both.

Technology transfer exchanges will reflect the higher order differentiation of the developed source societies (Luhmann, 1970). Technology transfer exchanges purposively influence circumscribed ad hoc domains determined by the particular problem at hand. But these exchanges also simultaneously migrate into and effect repercussions systematically within (technically) amorphous social domains. Thus, while deliberately and necessarily local, knowledge diffusion is never entirely 'localized' or 'localizable' because the technology also carries with it the residue of the complexly differentiated social environment from which it originated and whose articulation of that environment it necessarily presupposes.

Stated somewhat differently, the natural habitat of modern technology is high social complexity; therefore, a transferred technology will generate interactions of a similar order of complexity in its new surroundings. Such complexity is required for the technology's functioning. It is commonly acknowledged that novel technologies within developed nations create multidimensional effects-psychological, social, political and environmental (Rice, 1984). These effects are tremendously magnified for less complex social forms. The great stresses and strains that a modern technology can bring about within a less differentiated developing environment are both manifest and well-documented by critical/structural appraisals of knowledge transfer practices.

With this much theoretical justification, we can return to the problem of managing cultural change. It has been suggested that what is required are efforts devoted to maximizing the 'fit' between the technology and its new habitat. It has been further suggested that this problem presupposes an understanding that (1) this environment is a fundamentally exotic environment, and (2) the recipient intellectual/professional/scientific dimension of this environment has a significant bearing upon (in that it is part of) the possibilities contained within the reci-

ipient socio-cultural-technological system. The attention-shaping nature of communication practice can be used to highlight the construction of a multilateral or poly-centric domain of technological mediation, much in the same way it has been used to dress the diffusion conceptualization in robes of neutrality and beneficent progress.

Socio-cultural Receptivity Index

From the standpoint of achieving the mediation of technology, the central issue is not the fact of technology's diffusion to nations around the world, but the way in which the technology is interpreted and implemented. Consequently, it is a problem of gauging and adjusting for the probable interactions between the innovation and the socio-cultural environment. This is principally a question of the communication practices associated with the technology and their way of influencing social patterns. In order to accomplish such gauging and adjusting, technical considerations and determinations need to be supplemented by a socio-cultural problem-solving orientation that is adequately sensitive to cultural/environmental differences between the technology originator and the recipient nation. Such an orientation would serve to provide guidance (in the broadest sense) with respect to the probable interactions between the particular technology and existing cultural meanings and practices. That is to say, the deliverer's sense of relevance must be coordinated and reconciled with the recipient's frame of reference (e.g., the recipient's cultural sensibilities). Only in this way will the two very different social realities achieve a measure of genuinely collaborative interaction.

The immediacy of the natural environment is so much taken for granted that we never pay attention to it, although it sustains all of our biological necessities and physical functions. This unnoted "immediacy" applies equally in the case of the cultural environment: we do not face it; rather we are embraced and engaged by it. The various elements comprising the natural environment become thematic only when they for some reason become an object of concern, especially when something fails to perform properly or somehow obstructs normal functions. Similarly, the cultural environment becomes an object of concern when

the interconnections of its symbolic design do not apply in the accustomed way. In such situations the cultural system, or rather the agents embraced by it, encounter 'novelty,' 'nonsensicality' or 'confusion.' It is therefore of particular significance that technology transfer entails the intentional and purposive introduction of novel configurations into a local cultural system.

The various symbolic designs make up a cultural eco-system which, while taken for granted in our daily activities, is never confronted directly; all activities, events and behaviors appear in its context. Even the natural environment is incorporated into this cultural framework. This framework becomes manifest and effectual through its various artifacts and institutions, ranging from the religious and mythological, to the professional and scientific, and to social roles and the daily stylization of human encounters.

Socio-cultural receptivity has two principal roles: (1) it provides a taxonomic framework of meaning that incorporates the core dimensions of cross-cultural encounters pertinent to technology and innovation diffusion activities. Therefore, it furthers the identification of the important components of the frame of reference establishing the cultural environment. (2) It serves heuristically to draw the attention of planners, designers and implementers to the possible domains of socio-cultural environmental impact. Thus it contributes to the capacity for 'sizing up' and 'reading' the situation, calling attention to the likely combinations of socio-cultural interactions that might be encountered.

The general nature of the communication relationship between technology/information transfer activities and recipient cultural characteristics can be formulated in the following way. On the one side, place characteristics are a consequence of the recipient's stage of development. On the other side, delivery strategies and implementation practices and objectives are established by the policy and program goals of the deliverer. This independence of the two parties becomes transformed into irreversible interdependence at the point of delivery. Regardless of the previous history of the recipient nation and the institutional history and orientation of the deliverer, the two become "locked" irrevocably into a reciprocal communication structure. It is this structural interdependen-

ce of communicative action that determines the possibility, the effectiveness, the timeliness, and the sustainment/durability of the technology exchange undertaking.

Socio-cultural receptivity indexing places emphasis upon locating possibilities for mutual intersection between different complex systems of cultural designs (Pilotta & Widman, 1987). The methodological assumption is that there exist no 'one way' influences. By its very nature, technology mediates and is mediated by the socio-cultural system into which it is being introduced, viz., it effects changes and is itself changed. Consequently, the objective is to raise the inevitable intercombination with a communication environment to an explicit domain of analysis in order to make possible the maximal anticipation of consequences. In this setting, the innovation and its interaction with the socio-cultural environment are the chief foci of research attention. Indeed, adopter characteristics and determinants, as well as the characteristics and determinants affecting the deliverer and the deliverer's sense of relevance are treated as elements of the interaction configuration produced "problematizing" of the innovation which establishes the basis for explicit cultural mediation of the technology.

The following roster itemizes dimensions along which the cultural mediation of the technology is to be pursued and, it should be emphasized, pursued across the symbolic designs framing both deliverer and recipient cultural sensibilities.

Social Cultural Receptivity Dimensions

Cultural Factors:

1. social organization of space and place: central place, prominent natural features; the articulation of social roles and, status relative to locally significant landscape.
2. social institutions: education or the organization of work; adaptability of the local mind-set to the technology; local aspirations and expectations.
3. value composition: prevailing beliefs and myths, cherished virtues and practices; also constructs like common sense, propriety, justice and the like.

4. ritual organization of social life: punctuality, ceremony, hierarchy and psychological adjustment.
5. cultural legitimation of social structure: the relationships between cultural outlook, heritage and values and role divisions, status, social place of different generations and genders; political forms.
6. cultural aesthetics: concepts of beauty, decoration, and appropriateness; aesthetics of the physical environment; also the perception of symbolic designs and artistic forms.

Social Factors:

1. somatic expression: bodily expressiveness, physical regimen and rhythms, tact.
2. psychological culture: emotions, manners, appropriateness, sociability, trust.
3. conceptual/credal constellations: differences between groups, unchallengeable beliefs, unmentionable topics, world-view.
4. linguistic culture: cultural face and language; verbal expression of equality, sincerity, superiority, uncertainty, disagreement and the like.
5. individual interpretive matrix: the other's likely assumptions and interpretations of statements and actions; how one's culture, history, and social position are read from the other's point of view.

In short, both general cultural factors and more apparently communication-specific factors affect the delivery and enactment of the knowledge transfer. Sometimes, it is a question of the mutual adjustment of expectations about the other that takes the form of negotiating cultural differences. For the deliverer, constant monitoring and careful evaluation are crucial to the gradual development of trust and collaboration. It is important that the recipient has a way to see that it is the recipient's own best interest that is served by the innovation, and consequently that the technology "makes sense" within the recipient's own cultural understanding.

Accessing recipient cultural sensibilities and priorities lies at the heart of this research approach. Establishing this access requires participatory research methods (White, 1984). By enacting a problem-solving, user-oriented approach, participatory research attempts to avoid the sit-

uation in which researchers gather information from a population for purposes that are either undisclosed or unintelligible to the population. Participatory research begins from the premise that the recipient population knows best its own situation and requires that the research activity be ratified as having value to the recipient's own life-situation.

Technology transfer is a form of social action. Participatory research acknowledges social action as a legitimate component in the research design. It seeks to engage the research population in the research process and assist the research population to understand the relevance of the activity of concern in light of the recipient's own social environment. Participatory research (1) helps to create a shared awareness of an existing social reality; (2) promotes indigenous recognition of possibilities for change; (3) presupposes interaction between deliverer and recipient roles; and (4) constitutes the recipient as an equal partner in the exchange process. In summary, assessment research conducted along SCRI dimensions can be integrated into a development program as a means for the gradual coordination of pertinent relevancies. In this way, the research procedure can guard against the temptation to focus irresponsibly upon the decision to adopt as an end in itself.

We have argued for the utility of a culturally sensitive approach to technology transfer. We have provided a justification for doing some additional fine tuning of technology transfer and diffusion practices by identifying some conceptual shortfalls among existing research perspectives, and by highlighting the reality of research issues that still need to be addressed. The theoretical relevance of these issues has been established by way of a qualitative approach that looks at cultural environments (including technological structures) as elaborate sign-system articulations of social habitats. This perspective calls for a problem-solving and user oriented **research procedure** hinging upon the management of cultural differences.

Our aim has been to extend, rather than to restrict, the scope of considerations meriting attention by knowledge diffusion and development communication scholars. At the same time, we have carefully avoided importing socio-philosophical predispositions into the definition of the problem. Having one's conclusions in advance remarkably foreshortens insight into the complex variability of the relevant phenomena.

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