Tomo Akviniečio valios samprata

Valią Tomas Akvinietis apibrėžia kaip protingą norą, kurį turi tik intelektinės substancijos nes intelekto prigimtis yra supratimas, todėl gėrio siekimas vyksta protingai norint. Valia priklauso norų giminei ir yra santykis tarp subjekto ir objekto. Tarpininkaudama objektui, valia pateikia jį intelektui kaip gėrį, kurio intelektas pradeda siekti. Valios dėka veikiantieji patys nusprendžia, pradėti veiksmus ar jų nepradėti, ir šitaip jie tampa savo veiksmų šeimininkais. Pažinimo dorybė tobulina valią, palaikydama teisingą intelekto darbą, siekiant tikslo.

According to Aquinas, the significance of will consists in this: it makes intellectual substances masters of their own actions. Seeking a more profound analysis of will, the author starts from the consideration of appetitus as a genus and its species: natural appetite, sensitive appetite and intellectual appetite. All appetites strive for good, but differently. Inanimate bodies and plants strive without perceiving good, animals perceive only particular goods, but intellectual substances have a knowledge of common good. This depends on the nature of these beings. Each nature is an essence of a being, as seen in action. Action is a perfection of a thing. A thing is imperfect as much as it lacks action. There are two kinds of action: those, which remain in a subject and those, which come outside, e.g. a mental project of an artisan, is realised in his product. In actions of this kind participate both intellect and will. The will follows the intellect and relates the intellect to an object of action, but action itself is related by the intellect to the common good.