
CULTURAL SECURITY, NATION-BUILDING AND THE STATE IN JORDAN

Agnieszka Syliwoniuk-Wapowska*

**Pope John Paul II State School of Higher Education in Białą Podlaską, Faculty of Economics and Technical Sciences, Chair of Economics and Management, Department of National Security
ul. Sidorska 95/97, 21-500 Białą Podlaską, Poland
Telephone (+48) 83 344 99 00
E.mail: agnieszka.syliwoniuk@wp.pl*

Annotation. The main goal of the article is to show the relationships between the policy of nation-building and cultural security in Jordan. Both the phenomena have an essential meaning for the political stability of the Hashemite Kingdom, which will be shown in the paper. The policy of nation-building is intensely promoted by the state authorities and there are many steps that are taken to create a solid national identity. In Jordan nation-building is about overcoming divisions which exist within the society and integrating people into one national community which is based on certain values and joint interests and, at the same time, accepts plurality. It should be noticed that some of the aforementioned initiatives also fall within the scope of the state's security policy in the sense that they are important from the point of view of ensuring cultural security.

Keywords: Jordan, state security, cultural security, policy of nation-building, national identity, state policy

INTRODUCTION

The history of the Jordanian statehood dates back to the first half of the XX century. The Emirate of Transjordan was established in 1921 and for over two decades it remained dependent on Britain. This relation terminated in 1946 when Transjordan was formally declared an independent constitutional monarchy. In 1949 the state changed its name to the one that is used today – the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan¹. The nation, however, did not come into existence so quickly. It began to form after the establishment of the state and there are strong arguments for the fact that that this process is still in progress. The policy of nation-building is intensely promoted by the state authorities and institutions and there are many steps that are taken to create a solid national identity. Some of these initiatives also fall within the scope of the state's security policy in the sense that they are important from the point of view of ensuring cultural security.

The main goal of the article is to show the relationships between the policy of nation-building and cultural security in Jordan. Both the phenomena have an essential meaning for

¹ See: Madeyska, D., *Historia współczesna świata arabskiego*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2008, p. 72.

political stability of the Hashemite Kingdom, which I will try to show in the paper. In order to do so I will refer to the examples which may be found in the literature as well as to the results of my own qualitative research which was carried out in Jordan in September and October 2012. The main part of the research consisted of expert interviews with professors of the University of Jordan in Amman which were conducted according to the list of issues, free-form interviews conducted with the people of Amman and my own direct and indirect observations. Some parts of the paper demanded in-depth analysis of certain documents and legal acts. I refer to the original language version of these texts, that is the Arabic one.

When it comes to the notation of the Arabic terms, I use the ISO transliteration of Arabic characters into Latin characters. However, I decided to do an exception for the names of persons and I noted them in the way they are used in scientific discourse².

THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF CULTURAL SECURITY

Security is one of the most important values for every state and society. It is a complex phenomenon and although many definitions of security can be found in the scientific literature, perhaps none of them covers all the aspects of this notion. There are, however, two approaches that generally depict its nature. According to the first of them, security is a state which may be achieved through adequate institutions and actions that are taken in the order to prevent any military or non-military threats (of both internal and external nature). Therefore, in this perspective security may be defined as lack of danger. As for the second point of view, security is a process based on certain ventures which are directed towards various threats that hinder the realization of the goals of state's policy³. What is more, security can be perceived in both subjective and objective manners. In the first case it relates to the state of mind or subjective judgements concerning existent or potential risks whereas in the second one – to the lack of real, objective threats⁴. It is essential to notice that these two attitudes do not always coincide. In the case of states such situation may be explained by the poliarchic and highly complex nature of international environment. In these circumstances security of each and every state is

² For instance, Abdullah instead of 'Abd Allāh, Hussein instead of Ḥusayn.

³ See: Wojtaszczyk, K.A., *Bezpieczeństwo państwa – konceptualizacja pojęć* [in:] Wojtaszczyk, K.A., Materska-Sosnowska, A. (eds.), *Bezpieczeństwo państwa. Wybrane problemy*, Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, 2009, p. 11–12.

⁴ Nizioł, M., *Bezpieczeństwo kulturowe (na przykładzie państw arabskich)* [in:] Ziętek, A., Stachurska, K. (eds.), *Adaptacja wartości europejskich w państwach islamu*, Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 2004, p. 46.

relative as none of them is able to predict true interests and intentions of the other international actors⁵.

The notion of security should be analysed in the context of both internal and external policy of a state as it is determined by hazards and threats which may have their sources inside and outside state. Furthermore, it is important to stress that security used to be perceived as a unidimensional phenomenon which related mainly to military hazards and their prevention. Nowadays, however, it is seen rather as a multifaceted notion which manifests itself in diverse spheres: political, social, cultural, military, economic, ideological, ecological and others. Certainly, there is an interplay between the dimensions of security listed above and it is hard to define the borderlines between them, yet such division seems to be useful for analytical purposes.

Cultural security is one of the most recently developed dimensions of security. It refers to survival and development of a nation, its culture and identity and is connected to the other dimensions of state security, especially political one. Cultural security may be defined as a capability of a society to retain and develop its own cultural identity in changing conditions. It is essential to notice that in order to be considered a subject of cultural security, a community should share cultural identity and be fully aware of it as it happens in the case of nations or ethnic communities⁶. Following this line of reasoning, it should be stressed that the notion of cultural identity is crucial for the concept of cultural security as it is the key value which may be endangered and therefore should be guarded by a community.

Each person has various layers of identity which coexist. As identity is contextual and dynamic, there is an interplay between its layers. In consequence, in certain situations one of them comes to the fore. Cultural identity is based on elements of culture understood as the whole of material and non-material products of human activity which is objectivized and shared by members of a certain community. It can be passed to other communities and next generations⁷. National identity is one of the layers of cultural identity. It can be defined as a feeling of belonging to a national community which based on history, memory, language, culture and values shared by its members.

⁵ See: Pietraś, M., *Istota i ewolucja międzynarodowych stosunków politycznych* [in:] Pietraś, M. (ed.), *Międzynarodowe stosunki polityczne*, Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 2007, p. 19.

⁶ Nizioł, M., op.cit., p. 48–49; Ziętek, A.W., *Bezpieczeństwo kulturowe w Europie*, Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 2013, p. 76–78.

⁷ Szczepański, J., *Elementarne pojęcia socjologii*, Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1970, p. 78.

The main threats for cultural security of nation and state are connected with crisis of cultural and national identity, migrations and the problem of integration of migrants, national, ethnic and religious conflicts, flow of ideas and cultural patterns and, finally, internationalization in the sphere of politics, social life and culture⁸. The countries of the Middle East have experienced all of the aforementioned phenomena.

NATIONAL IDENTITY OF THE JORDANIANS AND THE POLICY OF NATION-BUILDING IN THE CONTEXT OF CULTURAL SECURITY

With its history of almost one hundred years, Jordan is a state that has to consolidate its nation in order to provide political and social stability. Its geopolitical location can be described as difficult one as it is a relatively small country with limited natural resources and rather unfavourable climate. It is bordered by Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the West Bank and Israel and has only a small outlet to the sea – the Gulf of Aqaba. Such neighbourhood does not guarantee security as this part of the Middle East is particularly exposed to conflicts of different kind (e.g. Arab-Israeli conflict, war in Syria and Iraq, “war with terrorism”). For many people who were forced to flee their countries due to wars and military clashes Jordan turned out to be a second home. From the point of view of the Hashemite Kingdom, however, every influx of refugees posed a severe threat to its internal security. In order to ensure stability of socio-political life, the state authorities launched several initiatives aimed at providing social cohesion and, at the same time, preserving the national identity. In this light the policy of nation-building may be perceived as an essential instrument of assuring cultural security. It is important to stress that this policy has to take into account not only the interest of the nation but also cultural diversity of various social groups that inhabit the country. In order to be effective it cannot be based on intolerance or take on aggressive forms.

National identity of the Jordanians forms an important element of their complex cultural identity. Apart from this layer of cultural identity, there are several others that also should be mentioned and these are: ethnic identity, tribal identity, religious identity and Arab identity⁹. In

⁸ See: Michałowska, G., *Stosunki międzypoleczne* [in:] Haliżak, E., Kuźniar, R. (eds.), *Stosunki międzynarodowe. Geneza, struktura, dynamika*, Warszawa 2006, p. 228–230; Nizioł, M., op.cit., p. 56–61; Włodkowska, A., *Bezpieczeństwo kulturowe* [in:] Wojtaszczyk, K.A., Materska-Sosnowska, A. (eds.), *Bezpieczeństwo państwa. Wybrane problemy*, Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, 2009, p. 152–159.

⁹ Majd Adeen Khamash lists several levels of the identity of the Jordanians such as: kinship identity, community identity which should be analysed in relation to ethnic identity, national identity, Arab identity (or the Arabism), religious identity and global identity. The information is based on the expert interview conducted with Majd Adeen Khamash in Amman in October 2012.

addition, some Jordanians have a Palestinian component which is a part of their identity. This element may take on diverse forms. It is therefore worth noticing that in the case of Jordan nation-building is about overcoming divisions which exist within the society and integrating the people into one national community which is based on certain values and joint interests. It presents a serious challenge for both the state authorities and for the society as a whole.

One of the most significant divisions in the Jordanian society is the one into so-called “native” Jordanians and Palestinians or Jordanians of Palestinian origin. The matter is deeply rooted in the history of the Hashemite Kingdom and its attitude towards the Middle East conflict. It has to be stressed that the problem of Palestine has a special status within the Jordanian politics as it is both the question of internal and external policy of the state and its security.

In the result of the Arab-Israeli war of 1948 Cisjordan, which is the Arab part of Palestine known today as the West Bank, and West Jerusalem were incorporated into Transjordan. Consequently, king Abdullah I of Transjordan declared himself the king of Palestine. In 1949 Transjordan and Israel called a truce. In the same year the state changed its name into the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan which emphasized the unity of lands situated on the two banks of the Jordan river. In 1950 Jordan officially declared the incorporation of the Palestinian lands acquired in 1948. This situation led to many tensions as the decision of the Jordanian authorities met with strong opposition from the other Arab states which strived to establish a fully independent Palestinian state¹⁰.

For Jordan this political step meant not only the enlargement of its territory but also a significant increase in population. Since that time integration of the people who inhabited the two banks of the Jordan river became one of the top priorities of the Jordanian state policy. In order to involve the people of the West Bank in political life of the country the authorities decided to allot to them half of the seats in the lower chamber of the parliament. The other half of the seats fell to the people who lived in the lands of former Transjordan¹¹.

In the result of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war Jordan lost the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The defeat was a terrible shock for all the Arab countries, however, for the Hashemite Kingdom it was particularly severe as it meant not only a loss of an important part of its territory but also

¹⁰ Zdanowski, J., *Historia Bliskiego Wschodu w XX wieku*, Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich – Wydawnictwo, 2010, p. 272.

¹¹ Bartosz Wróblewski indicates that such division of the parliamentary seats aroused a feeling of frustration in the Palestinian community. It was due to the fact that the population of the West Bank was twice as big as the one of the former Transjordan. Wróblewski, B., *Jordania*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Trio, 2011, p. 113.

new wave of refugees from Palestine. The structure of population in Jordan was destabilized so seriously that it is estimated that at the time about 60% of the inhabitants of the country were of Palestinian origin¹². King Hussein and the authorities of the country did not want to resign themselves to the results of the 1967 war. In consequence, Jordan did not renounce its claims to the West Bank until 1988 when the monarch expressed his support for the First *Intifāda* which started in the West Bank and in Gaza in 1987 and announced the break-up of all the administrative and legal bonds with the West Bank¹³.

Integration of the two groups of people – the inhabitants of the former Transjordan and the refugees from Palestine – into one nation since the very beginning presented a great challenge for the authorities of the kingdom. It was a matter of internal security of the state which should be analysed not only in political dimension but also cultural one. For many reasons it was a difficult and complicated task. There were differences between the two groups of people and several of these dissimilarities were of cultural nature. In many cases the Palestinians presented higher level of education than the Jordanians, they were affluent and had a more open attitude towards life and the world. As for the “native” Jordanians, many of them were less educated¹⁴ and poorer than the Palestinian refugees¹⁵. The inhabitants of former Transjordan earned their living as farmers and shepherds. Despite the fact that the state authorities put a lot of effort into settling the nomads, a significant part of the “native” Jordanians did not abandon their nomadic lifestyle.

Apart from the actions of political nature, the king and the government launched the policy of integration of the Palestinian migrants. An important step in this scope was taken in 1960 when all the Palestinian refugees who decided to live in the Hashemite Kingdom were entitled to gain Jordanian citizenship. In order to build a strong and stable Jordanian national identity, the Palestinian identification had to be weakened. Therefore all the terms and notions that indicated the differences between the “native” Jordanians and the Palestinians who are the citizens of Jordan had to be eliminated from the public discourse. This tendency is still actual today.

¹² Madeyska, D., op.cit., p. 73.

¹³ Zdanowski, J., op.cit., p. 280.

¹⁴ The first university in the territories of former Transjordan – the University of Jordan – was established in 1962 in Amman.

¹⁵ In the 1920s and 1930s many Transjordanians migrated to Palestine in search for a better job. Wróblewski, B., op.cit., p. 70.

In his book king Abdullah II estimates that in 1999 around 43% of Jordan's population had Palestinian roots¹⁶ which is a rather significant proportion. The problem of developing social cohesion is still present in the Jordanian politics. The authorities of the kingdom spare no effort to minimize the social divisions, hoping that in the future such actions will turn out to be fruitful. All the citizens are treated equally despite their origin. Political correctness which is present in the public discourse does not allow to talk about Palestinians in Jordan but rather about Jordanians of Palestinian origin. There is also one more thing that should be mentioned: the Palestinians who were forced to leave their houses and their land were not referred to as refugees as such term might insult them. They were called *al- 'ā'idūn*, which means "those who will come back"¹⁷.

The results of this policy are not unambiguous as the Palestinians represent various attitudes towards the possibilities which are offered to them by the government¹⁸. Some of them identify themselves as not only Jordanian citizens but also members of the Jordanian nation who have a Palestinian component in their cultural identity and are involved in political and social life of the kingdom. The others accept the fact that they are Jordanian citizens, but they do not have a feeling of belonging to the Jordanian nation and their national identity is the Palestinian one. However, they are loyal to the Jordanian state. There is also a group that has the citizenship but shows no loyalty towards the Jordanian state and nation. These people pose a threat for internal stability of the state and well-being of the society. They reap the benefits of the fact of being a citizen, but they do not fulfill civic duties and sometimes they even take actions against the state. Finally, there are Palestinians who do not enjoy the citizenship of the kingdom and do not belong to its nation¹⁹.

The authorities and the people of Jordan know the importance of the policy of nation-building and the meaning of measures that are used to ensure cultural security. The events that took place in the 1960s and 1970s showed that the lack of social cohesion may turn out to be very dangerous. A phenomenon that could be observed after the defeat of 1967 war was a strong

¹⁶ King Abdullah II of Jordan, *Our Last Best Chance. The Pursuit of Peace in a Time of Peril*, London: Penguin Books, 2012, p. 153.

¹⁷ The information is based on the expert interview conducted with Saad Abudayeh in Amman in September 2012.

¹⁸ Musa Shteivi claims that the integration and socio-political conditions led to the rise of a new identity – the Jordanian-Palestinian identity. He stresses that some people identify themselves as Jordanians, the others as Jordanians-Palestinians and there are also those who define themselves as Palestinians. This variety of identifications is due to the fact that people have diverse experiences in their lives. The information is based on the expert interview conducted with Musa Shteivi in Amman in October 2012.

¹⁹ The information is based on direct observations and free-form interviews with the inhabitants of Amman conducted in September and October 2012.

mobilization of Palestinian organizations which was combined with radicalization of their members. In the face of ineffectiveness of the military actions of the Arab states the Palestinians decided to take the matter into their own hands and force Israel to accept their claims. They started to form their own armed groups and to fortify refugee camps. Furthermore, they formed illegal structures which functioned as a kind of “state inside the Jordanian state”. In addition, Palestinian leaders raised hope of independent Palestinian statehood and undermined the loyalty towards the king and the monarchy. Such a grave situation was a serious hazard to the security of Jordan. It turned out to be even more harmful when Palestinian armed groups terrorized the inhabitants of Amman and paralyzed their daily life. They also started to attack Israel from the territory of Jordan which complicated the efforts of king Hussein who strived for a compromise with the neighbouring state. The Palestinians were more and more aggressive. At first the monarch did not opt for a military solution of the internal conflict. This, however, turned out to be impossible and finally the tensions led to a civil war that started in 1970 and lasted until 1971 when the Palestinian radicals were defeated²⁰.

The civil war shattered the hopes for a successful integration. It contributed to the rise of the state authorities’ mistrust towards the citizens of Palestinian origin which manifested itself in reluctance to employ them in the army and secret services. The reason behind this attitude was that people were afraid of dramatic events like the ones that they experienced in 1970s²¹. In 1974 the Palestine Liberation Organization was internationally recognized as the only representative of the Palestinian nation. In the face of this event king Hussein decided to reorganize the structure of the kingdom which meant reduction of the number of Palestinians in the state institutions. Furthermore, the Palestinian refugees were not granted Jordanian citizenship anymore²². To some extent the aforementioned events influenced also the structure of employment. “Native” Jordanians could find work in state institutions and administration whereas Palestinians were employed mainly in the private sector²³.

²⁰ See: Ashton, N., *King Hussein of Jordan. A Political Life*, New Haven–London: Yale University Press, 2008, p.136–157; López García, B., *El mundo arabo-islámico contemporáneo. Una historia política*, Madrid: Editorial Síntesis, 2000, p. 230–232.

²¹ In revenge for the defeat in the civil war members of the Black September Organization killed Wasfi al-Tal, the prime minister of Jordan, in Cairo in 1971. Al-Tal became the prime minister in 1970 and countered Palestinian radicalism. In symbolical terms his death was perceived as a revenge taken on the Jordanian state.

²² Zdanowski, J., op.cit., p. 280.

²³ The information is based on the expert interview conducted with Musa Shteivi in Amman in October 2012 and the free-form interviews conducted with the inhabitants of Amman in September and October 2012.

In the course of time the situation of the people of Palestinian origin who live in Jordan has changed positively. The one and only condition that they have to accept is that Jordan is a sovereign state which exercises its power over everyone who decided to spend his life there and any attempt to interfere in public order will be suppressed. In other words, they have to accept that “Jordan is not Palestine” and that “Palestine is in Palestine, not in Jordan”, as many Jordanians say²⁴.

The second line of social divisions is of ethnic nature. Although the main part of the Jordanian society is formed by the Arabs, some of the Jordanian citizens have other origins. Among ethnic groups which are present in socio-political life of the country one should list the Armenians, the Cherkess and the Chechens who migrated to Jordan from the Caucasus. In the course of time the representatives of these minorities integrated successfully with the society of the kingdom and at the same time retained their own culture, customs and historical memory as the elements of their cultural identity. As the Cherkess and the Chechens are (in general) sunni Muslims, it was not difficult for them to get on better terms with the Jordanians.

All the three groups have their representatives in the parliament²⁵. According to the electoral law of 2016, the Cherkess are granted three seats in the House of Representatives and so are the Chechens. As for the Armenians, they are treated as a part of Christian minority and can compete for nine parliamentary seats which are granted for Christians²⁶. Taking into consideration that there are 150 seats in the House of Representatives, the number of fifteen seats allotted to the representatives of the aforementioned minority groups may appear relatively small. However, the quota system allows them to participate in political process and political life of the country. It also an instrument of inclusive policy which is aimed at providing peaceful coexistence of various groups within the society.

The third division which is present in the Jordanian society is the religious one. The vast majority of the citizens of Jordan are sunni Muslims. Christians form second biggest

²⁴ The information is based on direct observations and the free-form interviews conducted with the inhabitants of Amman in September and October 2012.

²⁵ Jordanian parliament – the National Assembly (*Mağlis al-Umma*) – is bicameral. Members of the lower house – the House of Representatives (*Mağlis an-Nuwwāb*) – are elected in the popular vote whereas members of the upper house – the Senate (*Mağlis al-A'yān*) – are appointed by the king.

²⁶ *Qānūn al-intiḥāb li-Mağlis an-Nuwwāb li-sanat 2016*, Mağlis an-Nuwwāb, <http://www.representatives.jo/ar/%D8%B5%D9%81%D8%AD%D8%A9/%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8>, access: October 2016 and *Niẓām ad-dawā'ir al-intiḥābiyya li-sanat 2016*, Mağlis an-Nuwwāb, <http://www.representatives.jo/ar/%D8%B5%D9%81%D8%AD%D8%A9/%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-0>, access: October 2016.

confessional group²⁷. According to the constitution, Islam enjoys the status of the state religion²⁸ but all the Jordanians are equal before the law and cannot face discrimination for confessional reasons²⁹. The constitution guarantees also the free exercise of rites of religions and creeds if these are consistent with public order and morality³⁰.

The situation of Christians in Jordan differs a lot from their functioning in the other Arab states. Christians form an integral part of the society of the kingdom and are active in its political and social life. They have lived in this land since the very beginning of Christianity and as time went by they adapted for living in a Muslim society. The factors that join Christians and Muslims together are two dimensions of their cultural identity – the national identity and the Arab identity³¹. Having this in mind, the state authorities take actions to overcome divisions that are based on religious criteria and promote the inter-faith dialogue. An institution which is particularly active in this field is the Royal Institute for Inter-Faith Studies (*Al-Ma'had al-Malakī li-ad-Dirāsāt ad-Dīniyya*), established in 1994 in Amman as a non-profit, non-governmental organization. The institute conducts research on Christian-Muslim relations and the role of Christianity in Muslim societies of the Arab world. It organizes conferences, seminars and lectures which focus on the abovementioned subject³². Such activities are very important from the point of view of social cohesion. It is worth mentioning that Christians are visible in the sphere of education as they run schools which are attended by both Christian and Muslim children. In Jordan Christians enjoy relatively wide scope of freedom of worship, they celebrate religious holidays and participate in church services.

One of the reasons behind peaceful coexistence of Muslims and Christians is that Islam in Jordan most often takes measured forms. The king and the elites of the monarchy spare no effort to promote moderate Islam which is peaceful, open to everyone and has respect for human life as well as renounces violence of any kind. Such image of Islam was sketched in the *Amman*

²⁷ It is estimated that Christians form 3% of the Jordanian society. King Abdullah II of Jordan, op.cit., p. 262.

²⁸ *The Constitution of Jordan* (1952), art. 2.

²⁹ Ibid., art. 6.

³⁰ Ibid., art. 14.

³¹ Although Islam is the dominant religion in the Jordanian society, religious tolerance is seen as an important value. According to the research on religious beliefs and the perception of democracy of the students of the University of Jordan, 85,7% of the respondents agree with the view that “Religious minorities (Christians) in Jordan must be allowed to worship freely”, 76,8% of them supports the view that “Political decisions must be made in accordance with Islamic principles” and 81,5% of the examined students think that “Jordan must apply Sharia’ law”. Al-Soudi, A., *Examining Democratic and Religious Beliefs Among University Students: A Comparative Study Between Jordan and Turkey*, *Dirasat, Human and Social Studies*, 2001,28 (Supplement): p. 891, 894–895.

³² For more information see the webpage of the Royal Institute for Inter-Faith Studies, www.riifs.org.

Message (Risālat ‘Ammān) – a text which was issued in 2004 in Amman and can be perceived as an appeal to whole the world to understand the message of Islam properly. The document is a reasonable voice in the discussion about Islam in the modern times. What is more, it rejects every type of extremism and terrorism as non-Islamic. Religion cannot be used to impose radical vision of reality³³. King Abdallah II supports the view expressed in the *Amman Message* and expresses opposition to fanatics who kill and steal in the name of Islam. He stresses that it is not the real Islam but a kind of deviation which does a lot of harm to this religion³⁴.

One has to add one more division that is deeply rooted the history of Jordan and its people: tribal division. It has to be said that until today tribal identity, values and traditions play an important role in the Jordanian society and political life of the country. Some people claim that it has a negative influence on the internal politics as it favours nepotism and clientelism, which are harmful for democratic process, and promotes tribal particularism. The others say that it is a positive phenomenon which enforces social bonds and, consequently, civil society. The opinions are divided but it is certain that tribalism is a factor that has to be taken into consideration in the analyses of the Jordanian society³⁵.

Having on mind the aforementioned divisions, it is evident that integration of the society and enforcement of the Jordanian national identity form an important challenge that has to be taken up by the king and the government. Among many actions taken in this field two initiatives are particularly worth mentioning – *Jordan First (Al-Urdunn Awwalan)* and *We Are All Jordan (Kullunā al-Urdunn)*. The first of the two ventures was launched in 2002 as a plan of reforms which were aimed at unifying all the Jordanians into one nation in order to achieve common goal – the development of the kingdom. The project was based on the assumption that the Jordanians should overcome the existent social divisions and recognize the primacy of national interests over particular ones. The initiative was also aimed at reinforcing the concept of modern, democratic state and building the culture of respect and tolerance³⁶. The second of the aforementioned initiatives was an agenda directed to consolidate the nation and to reach the

³³ The Official Website of the Amman Message, www.ammannmessage.com, access: October 2016.

³⁴ King Abdallah II of Jordan, op.cit., p. 240–243.

³⁵ See: bin Muhammad, G., *The Tribes of Jordan at the Beginning of the Twenty-first Century*, 1999; Syliwoniuk, A., Tożsamość kulturowa a postawy polityczne Jordańczyków. *Spoleczeństwo i Polityka. Pismo edukacyjne* 2013, 1 (34): p. 192–195; Syliwoniuk, A., Załęski, P., Trybalizm w społeczeństwie i polityce – analiza porównawcza Jordanii i Kirgistanu. *Spoleczeństwo i Polityka. Pismo edukacyjne*. 2014, 2(39).

³⁶ *Al-Mubādarāt al-Malakiyya: Al-Urdunn Awwalan*, Ġalālat al-Malik ‘Abd Allāh at-Ṭānī Ibn al-Ḥusayn, http://kingabdullah.jo/index.php/ar_JO/initiatives/view/id/33.html, access: October 2016.

compromise over substantial social issues that should be of use in terms of public policy-making³⁷.

Jordan is a country which experienced many waves of migration. In 1948 and in 1967 hundreds of thousands Palestinians arrived in the Hashemite Kingdom after the Arab-Israeli wars. Then, in 1991–1992, over three million of refugees crossed the borders of the kingdom after the Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. In 2003 many Iraqis fled their country after it was invaded by the US-led coalition and found refuge in Jordan. Now the largest group of refugees are Syrians. In addition, there are more than six hundred thousand of Egyptian migrant workers in the kingdom. It is estimated that refugees and migrants make up 30% of the overall population of Jordan³⁸. The percentage of people of foreign origin who live in the kingdom is significant. Furthermore, one has to have in mind that every group of migrants that came to Jordan has its own culture and national interests. It is therefore essential to reinforce Jordanian national identity in order to avoid desintegration of the society.

CONCLUSIONS

Jordanian society is characterized by a vast diversity in terms of culture and lifestyles. This, in turn, generates social division which in some cases may be dangerous for security of the state. Some of the problems which have their source in the multitude of cultural patterns can be solved by a combination of political and cultural instruments and methods. The policy of nation-building should be listed among these tools. The case of the Hashemite Kingdom shows that wise and consistent actions aimed at moderating the divisions that exist within the society can result in relatively peaceful coexistence of groups which have different characteristics.

A significant percentage of the Jordanian society is made up of people who once were immigrants. They have various ethnic origins and diverse religious beliefs. Most of them, however, has a feeling of belonging to the Jordanian nation. They are neither deprived of their culture nor banned from the country's socio-political life. The Jordanian national identity exists at a different level than other layers of cultural identity and therefore does not interfere with ethnic or religious identity. Such situation is accepted by the society and state authorities which

³⁷ See: *An-Naṣṣ al-kāmil li-waḥḍa wa-barnāmaġ 'amal "Kullunā al-Urdun"*, Ġalālat al-Malik 'Abd Allāh aṭ-Ṭānī Ibn al-Ḥusayn, http://kingabdullah.jo/uploads/wearealljor_ar.pdf, access: October 2016.

³⁸ Shteiwi, M. (ed.), *Migrants and Refugees: Impact and Future Policies. Case Studies of Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and Greece*, European Institute of Mediterranean 2016, p. 28, <http://www.jcss.org/Photos/63610661-5019394533.pdf>, access: October 2016.

manifests itself in an open attitude towards cultural diversity and relative freedom of religious rites. It is also expressed in political sphere, for instance in the form of a number of parliamentary seats reserved for representatives of ethnic and religious minorities. The case of Jordan shows that in order to assure cultural security the state authorities should use a complex combination of various political, social and cultural tools.

REFERENCES

1. The Constitution of Jordan (1952).
2. Niẓām ad-dawā'ir al- intiḥābiyya li-sanat 2016, Maġlis an-Nuwwāb, <http://www.representatives.jo/ar/%D8%B5%D9%81%D8%AD%D8%A9/%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-0>
3. Qānūn al-intiḥāb li-Maġlis an-Nuwwāb li-sanat 2016, Maġlis an-Nuwwāb, <http://www.representatives.jo/ar/%D8%B5%D9%81%D8%AD%D8%A9/%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8>
4. Al-Mubādarāt al-Malakiyya: Al-Urdunn Awwalan, Ġalālat al-Malik ‘Abd Allāh aṭ-Ṭānī Ibn al-Ḥusayn, http://kingabdullah.jo/index.php/ar_JO/initiatives/view/id/33.html
5. An-Naṣṣ al-kāmil li-waṭiqa wa-barnāmaġ ‘amal ”Kullunā al-Urdun”, Ġalālat al-Malik ‘Abd Allāh aṭ-Ṭānī Ibn al-Ḥusayn, http://kingabdullah.jo/uploads/wearealljor_ar.pdf,
7. King Abdullah II of Jordan, *Our Last Best Chance. The Pursuit of Peace in a Time of Peril*, London: Penguin Books, 2012.
8. Ashton N., *King Hussein of Jordan. A Political Life*, New Haven–London: Yale University Press, 2008.
9. bin Muhammad G., *The Tribes of Jordan at the Beginning of the Twenty-first Century*, 1999.
10. Halizak E., Kuźniar R. (eds.), *Stosunki międzynarodowe. Geneza, struktura, dynamika*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2006.
11. López García B., *El mundo arabo-islámico contemporáneo. Una historia política*, Madrid: Editorial Síntesis, 2000.
12. Madeyska D., *Historia współczesna świata arabskiego*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2008.
13. Pietraś M. (ed.), *Międzynarodowe stosunki polityczne*, Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej 2007.
14. Szczepański J., *Elementarne pojęcia socjologii*, Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1970.
15. Wojtaszczyk K.A., Materska-Sosnowska A. (eds.), *Bezpieczeństwo państwa. Wybrane problemy*, Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, 2009.
16. Wróblewski B., *Jordania*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Trio, 2011.
17. Zdanowski J., *Historia Bliskiego Wschodu w XX wieku*, Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich – Wydawnictwo, 2010.
18. Ziętek A.W., *Bezpieczeństwo kulturowe w Europie*, Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 2013.
19. Ziętek A., Stachurska K. (eds.), *Adaptacja wartości europejskich w państwach islamu*, Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 2004.

20. Michałowska G., Stosunki międzyspołeczne [in:] Halizak E., Kuźniar R. (eds.), Stosunki międzynarodowe. Geneza, struktura, dynamika, Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2006.
21. Nizioł M., Bezpieczeństwo kulturowe (na przykładzie państw arabskich) [in:] Ziętek A., Stachurska K. (eds.), Adaptacja wartości europejskich w państwach islamu, Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 2004.
22. Pietraś M., Istota i ewolucja międzynarodowych stosunków politycznych [in:] Pietraś M. (ed.), Międzynarodowe stosunki polityczne, Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej 2007.
23. Włodkowska A., Bezpieczeństwo kulturowe [in:] Wojtaszczyk K.A., Materska-Sosnowska A. (eds.), Bezpieczeństwo państwa. Wybrane problemy, Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, 2009.
24. Wojtaszczyk K.A., Bezpieczeństwo państwa – konceptualizacja pojęć [in:] Wojtaszczyk K.A., Materska-Sosnowska A. (eds.), Bezpieczeństwo państwa. Wybrane problemy, Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, 2009.
25. Al-Soudi A., Examining Democratic and Religious Beliefs Among University Students: A Comparative Study Between Jordan and Turkey. Dirasat, Human and Social Studies, 2001, 28 (Supplement).
26. Syliwoniuk A., Tożsamość kulturowa a postawy polityczne Jordańczyków. Społeczeństwo i Polityka. Pismo edukacyjne. 2013,1 (34).
27. Syliwoniuk A., Załęski P., Trybalizm w społeczeństwie i polityce – analiza porównawcza Jordanii i Kirgistanu. Społeczeństwo i Polityka. Pismo edukacyjne. 2014, 2 (39).
28. Shteivi M. (ed.), Migrants and Refugees: Impact and Future Policies. Case Studies of Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and Greece, European Institute of Mediterranean, 2016, <http://www.jcss.org/Photos/636106615019394533.pdf>
29. King Abdullah II Official Website (Ġalālat al-Malik ‘Abd Allāh at-Tānī Ibn al-Ḥusayn), www.kingabdullah.jo
30. Royal Institute for Inter-Faith Studies (Al-Ma‘had al-Malakī li-ad-Dirāsāt ad-Dīniyya), www.riifs.org
31. The House of Representatives (Maġlis an-Nuwwāb), www.representatives.jo
32. The Official Website of the Amman Message, www.ammanmessage.com

KULTŪRINIO SAUGUMO SAMPRATA, TAUTOS FORMAVIMOSI PRIELAIDOS IR VALSTYBĖS STATUSAS JORDANIJOJE

Agnieszka Syliwoniuk-Wapowska*

Biała Podlaska popiežiaus Jono Pauliaus II valstybinė aukštojo lavinimo mokykla

Santrauka

Straipsniu siekiama aktualizuoti tautos kūrimo politikos ir kultūrinio saugumo ryšį Jordanijoje. Abu reiškiniai yra svarbūs Hašemitų karalystės politiniam stabilumui. Tautos kūrimo politika intensyviai remiama šalies valdžios. Be to, išskiriami įvairūs aspektai, darantys tiesioginę įtaką tautinio identiteto kūrimui. Tautos kūrimo procesas Jordanijoje niveliuoja visuomenės skirtumus ir integruoja žmones į bendruomenę, kuri grindžiama tam tikromis vertybėmis ir interesais, kita vertus, yra atvira pliuralizmui. Minėti veiksniai neretai atitinka valstybės saugumo politikos tikslus, nes padeda užtikrinti kultūrinį saugumą.

Pagrindinės sąvokos: Jordanija, valstybės saugumas, kultūrinis saugumas, tautos kūrimo politika, tautinė identifikacija, valstybės politika.

Agnieszka Syliwoniuk-Wapowska*, Biala Podlaska popiežiaus JonoPauliaus II valstybinė aukštojo lavinimo mokykla, Ekonomikos ir technikos mokslų katedra, Ekonomikos ir vadybos skyrius, Nacionalinio saugumo fakultetas. Mokslinių tyrimų kryptys: Jordanijos visuomenės pokyčiai, kultūrinio saugumo užtikrinimas, tautinis identitetas.

Agnieszka Syliwoniuk-Wapowska*, Pope John Paul II State School of Higher Education in Biala Podlaska, Faculty of Economics and Technical Sciences, Chair of Economics and Management, Department of National Security. Research interests: alterations in Jordanian society, assurance of cultural security, national identity.