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CHAPTER I

Introduction to Phenomenology

Phenomenology is the kind of reflective thinking that probes meaning in order to discover its native roots and source of origination. It offers a method of clarifying various levels and modes of activity responsible for constituting sense. This activity is presupposed, even if not explicated, in making sense of our communicative practice. The field of communication cannot be adequately understood without the comprehension of various communicative activities and what those activities signify. No doubt, other approaches claim the capacity of analyzing such activities, yet phenomenological analyses attempt to research such activities without prejudgments and metaphysical admixtures.

However, the almost exclusive emphasis on the *results* of other methodological practices has caused the authentic contribution of the necessary activities, responsible for the outcome, to be ignored. Other methodological procedures function in a straightforward and naive way and, thus, have lost their productive capacity. They become reduced to anonymity and remain as habits for a continuous effecting of the same typological results.

One of the fundamental assumptions of the scientific community is the conception that *judgments* have an enduring identity. Although the results of a scientific study are checked for their validity, the course and process of their development are not scrutinized. In fact, the scientific community transmits results, but not the course and process of their formation. Scientific discourse is based on the presupposition that a proposition has an objective identity at all times for all people. In this way, identity becomes the basis for validity. By being handed down as a result, the resolution is severed from the source, which alone can provide the ground for their verification and reconstruction.

The logical concepts, on the one hand, produce results that are reflective of practical interest, predominantly oriented to payoff and the technical calculation of these results. On the other hand, the theoretical interest focuses on the operations of consciousness involved in the production of these results. The logician is guided by an epistemological and practical interest. Logical concepts are of a practical interest and, hence, are necessarily related to judgments. However, it is through reflection, specifically

phenomenological reflection, that the intentional mechanisms responsible for the judgments abiding validity are brought to light. The abiding validity provides the character and stability for those judgments that are the fundamental assumption of all theoretical constructs. No science can be truly scientific unless it becomes aware of the operations used in the formations of logical objectivities. Without exploring the acts of consciousness, through which objectivities are formed, logic cannot justify its goals and the method it employs for its realization. Thus, the transcendental position is the condition for logical (scientific) discourse. Through the transcendental position, one can strictly delimit and delineate the applicability of the method (procedure) employed.

The field of communication science has most recently been attracted to the theme of intersubjectivity. The theme has been developed through various orientations as a fundamental feature of sociality. Those involved in phenomenological analysis and hermeneutics have done the most extensive work in the area¹. Students of this theme have concentrated on the affirmation of intersubjectivity at a premethodical level. By doing so, they have neglected to elaborate on the necessary reflective acts that determine the conditions for the method that verifies the intersubjective dimension. The method that is in question is the method of *bracketing*. This method properly belongs to the enterprise of phenomenology and, specifically, the school of Edmund Husserl.

The science of communication generally accepts that the relationship between the sender and the receiver of a message is determined through the channel. The channel is the medium of communication. We know that the behavior of the other is a manifestation that is *communicative* even without a specific intention. In the broadest sense, the channels are communicative modalities, which include spoken word, written word and gesture. In as much as each of these modalities may be understood as speeches, the latter is communication because it is a bearer of intentional activity. If we observe the character of these channels, we can distinguish a quality of immediacy; in talking, I turn to one that listens and consider the person as a

¹ Waldenfels, B. (1971). *Zwischenreich des Dialogs* [The in-between Region of Dialog]. Den Haag Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff; Waldenfels, B. (1980). *Der Spielraum des Verhaltens* [The Scope of Behavior]. Frankfurt am Main, West Germany: Suhrkamp; Apel, K.-O. (1980). *Toward a Transformation of Philosophy* (G. Adey & D. Frisby, Trans.). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

listener. When speaking, I am not aware of my voice, its pitch, its volume, its phonetic components, but of what they mean, what they say, and what they signify².

Speech as communication is a turning-discursively-toward that is based on the twin assumptions of a saying-to-intention and paying-attention-to. The one to whom I speak and who listens to me, who pays attention to my speech, interlocks (the turning-toward, saying-to and pay-attention-to are structures). This intentional unification is the intersubjective dimensions of discourse. This intersubjective dimension articulates the meaningful characteristics of the channel, in which the empirical components, such as black marks of the written page, noises of a sonorous body, or the muscles of the hand, can function. The channel bears the meanings that constitute the transcendental aspect of phenomenology and the transcendental dimension called intersubjectivity. It is incumbent upon us to elucidate the method and clarify the terminology in order to see this dimension³.

Ontology and Science

Over the recent years, the science of communication has begun to show a guarded interest in phenomenology as a viable approach for the understanding and analysis of human communicative processes. Various articles have appeared in communication journals attempting to show the function of phenomenology within the science of communication, and even journals have been established in which various scholars are engaged in phenomenological analysis of communicative processes. The task of this work is manifold: first, it will delimit the “nature” of phenomenology as science, its aims and its basic structure; second, it will evaluate the various major communication theories prevalent in contemporary scholarship in order to assess their strengths and weaknesses and to show what phenomenology can add to the understanding of the communication process; third, it will show the function of phenomenology within the various communicative processes, such as language, social interaction, bodily expression, commu-

² Merleau-Ponty, M. (1973). *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language* (H. Silverman, Trans.). Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press; Waldenfels, B. (1980). *Der Spielraum des Verhaltens* [The Scope of Behavior].

³ Stewart, J. (1978). Foundations of Dialogic Communication. *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 64, 183–201.

nicate transmission of structures and their meaning through institutions; fourth, it will provide concrete examples of phenomenological analyses of various communicative processes at various levels and their relationships. In this sense, the work is both theoretical and practical. Although phenomenology has developed its specific terminology, unfamiliar to the uninitiated, the work will avoid unnecessary use of technical terms and will substitute them with terms or phrases that are familiar to the reader. Once the reader has a working knowledge of phenomenological method, the replacement of terminology will not be a detraction from understanding the function of phenomenology within the science of communication.

Phenomenology emerged in the late 19th century within the controversy of the foundations of science and logic. The explanatory power of the method of the physical sciences, at that time, had assumed such preeminence that they found themselves in the position to make claims of being the basis of all objective knowledge. Any endeavor, desiring to assume the name of science, was compelled to assume that the basis of all knowledge must lie in the empirical-naturalistic or physicalistic approach. Following this lead, sciences, such as psychology and even physiology, advanced the notion that because logic is fundamental to scientific work, it too should be based on empirically observable and describable facts. After all, the claim went; human beings use logic in their scientific theories and, therefore, logic should be based on the empirically observable functions of human beings. Psychology, being the empirical study of the human mind and its scientifically decipherable laws, should assume the burden of being a foundational science for logic. By implication, this also means that psychology should be the basis of all sciences, insofar as all sciences employ logical procedures in their theoretical work. Psychology should become the science of all sciences, which would provide a solid, empirical base, from which the laws of logical operations would be derived for all scientific endeavors; this, moreover, would provide all sciences with an objective base and exclude all subjective factors, such as human intentions, volitions, desires and emotions.

What such a proposed foundation means is that the laws of logic and even mathematics consist of generalizations of empirically observable psychological phenomena or facts. We know that people count, and, hence, numbers can be derived from the fact of counting; we know that people can only see one color at one time and not two, and, therefore, we can derive the

notion that one thing cannot be blue and red at the same time and in the same respect. If we generalize this notion from the various observations of our empirical experience, we can derive the principle of noncontradiction: that it is false to say that the same thing can have two opposing characteristics at the same time and in the same respect. This view can be completed by adding the concepts of association and causality. The present blue color of a thing reminds me of, or is associated with, the previous experiences of blue and not red, thereby leading to the notion that past experience is a corrective for the present and the present for the past. At the same time, this view is guaranteed by the notion of causality. The things and their properties leave or cause impressions in the human experience. Hence, the blue color causes one to see blue and not red, which allows one to correct one's experiences by rechecking the source of the impression. Hence, not only the principle of contradiction is derived from empirical observation, but any contradictory statement could be checked by showing the causes and observational procedures that would have given rise to such statement.

This view is quite reasonable and can be substantiated on the readily available evidence offered by sciences and even nonscientific observations. Phenomenology calls this view *naturalistic*. It assumes that all experience is based on natural physical and psychological processes. Taken at its face value, it claims that every psychological experience is correlated one-to-one to a physical event that causes the given experience. When one sees a specific color, one can give a cause for the vision in terms of specific light waves hitting the retina; when one feels a sharp pain, one can point to the sharp object that causes the pain. On these grounds, the claim can be made that the only valid experience of the world is one that is caused by the objects of the physical world. Any other experience is subjective and scientifically unwarranted. If there are any other experiences, they must be reduced to their causal inception in empirical experience. For example, if we have ideas, the ideas must be traced to their causal origins in the empirical world. If we have religious beliefs, the beliefs must be shown to be the products of causes in upbringing, unfulfilled empirical desires, or a wild imagination. Phenomenology calls this process of explanation of non-empirical components by empirical components *reductionism*⁴.

⁴ Spiegelberg, H. (1971). *The Phenomenological Movement*. The Hague: Nijhoff.

Plausible as reductionism may sound, specifically when it is seen as an explanatory hypothesis, phenomenology raises a number of questions based on what is called *phenomenological experience*. For example, why does one want to reduce one domain, that is, the logical, to another domain, the empirical? Is there an ontological prejudice lurking in the assumption that the only valid experience is empirical? Moreover, the reduction of one domain to another assumes the presence of both. It is quite possible to deal with each domain separately, decipher its own structure and describe it as it is given in itself. This consideration prompted Husserl, the father and major exponent of modern phenomenology, to call for the return “to the things themselves”⁵. This call means that one should take experience on its own terms, as it is given in itself, whether this experience is empirical, logical, theoretical or practical. When a logician is engaged in logical proofs, he is not dealing with empirical, but with logical components. He “sees” the components and their relationships; he “sees” the correctness or incorrectness of the logical procedures without any empirical vision. This “seeing” is an experience that deals with a domain having its own prerequisites and procedures that, even in the process of their reduction to an empirical explanation, have their own validity and are assumed by the reductionist. This suggests (for phenomenology) that reductionism, which is intent on explaining experience in terms of only one domain, the empirical—accepts an ontological prejudice concerning the nature of objective being. This prejudice is assumed, although not demonstrated. Were we to return to the things themselves, we would discover that experienced objectivity is much broader than the “naturalistic” prejudice permits. When a mathematician deals with mathematical components, such as negative numbers, he has no recourse to any empirical data for such components, even though he sees them and their function in vast mathematical constructs. The mathematician not only does not have a recourse to empirical data, but he does not even pay attention to his psychological experiences as facts within his own life; in fact, he must exclude them as irrelevant to his work. Moreover, were he to glance at his psychological facts and give a description of them, he would discover that he could derive neither the mathematical objects, with which he is concerned, nor the structure of this experience of such objects. The two domains, the mathematical and the psychological, have nothing

⁵ Husserl, E. (1962). *Ideas I* (B. Gibson, Trans.). London: Collier.

to do with each other, except when a psychologist wishes to apply mathematics, such as statistics, to deal with psychological facts. Yet, even the experience of application assumes the distinction between the two domains of objectivity and experience and constitutes a distinct process that can be understood in its own right apart from mathematics and psychology.

Such reflections led phenomenology to evaluate, very strictly, the naturalistic prejudice and the validity of reductionism. Let us take the naturalistic prejudice first. Beginning with the notion that psychology can provide the foundations of logic, Husserl (1962)⁶ pointed out that such an attempt is absurd. Psychology, in contrast to physics for example, is one of the most recent sciences that have not yet demonstrated with any rigor the laws of psychological processes. It is an uncertain science and its proposed laws are constantly challenged by divergent schools of psychology. How then could it be a foundation for logic, which is strict and certain science and on which axioms and procedures the rest of the sciences are based? It is, to say the least, nonsensical to base the strictest of all known sciences on a least strict and uncertain science. But assuming that someday psychology is to become a strict science, and certain of its laws, even then it could not be the basis of logic. The laws of psychological facts do not imply the laws and procedures of logic, although the formulation of psychological laws assumes as a basis the laws of logic. Moreover, the very notion of law, even psychological law, cannot be taken in a simplistic manner. What we call empirical laws cannot be reduced to empirical observations. We do not observe laws, we observe phenomena, which either confirm or negate the conception of a particular law. But the law is not identical with the observed phenomena. If that were the case, then the law would change with the changes of the observed phenomena; in which case science would cease. Yet, science functions on the assumption that although the phenomena change, the laws governing the phenomena remain constant. This implies that the experience of the laws of phenomena remain constant, which also implies that the experience of the laws of phenomena is in no way empirical, although it is necessary for science. In turn, laws cannot be reduced to the empirical phenomena. Nonetheless, because we are dealing with laws, we cannot assume that they are there although they are not experienced. In such an assumption, we would have some kind of mysticism, wherein we would be concerned with some-

⁶ Husserl, E. (1970). *Logical Investigations* (Findlay, Trans.). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

thing that is objective although experientially inaccessible. Phenomenology maintains that this would be a mystery only under the assumption of the naturalistic ontology and of empirical experience as the sole access to objectivity. If we broaden the notion of experience to include the experience of objectivities that are not empirically given, then the mystery dissolves. It is a very common practice for a scientist to say “Let us look at the laws” of some natural phenomena. The scientist is not just looking at the things around him, but at the laws. It can be said that he sees them directly, that he is aware of them although not at the empirical level⁷.

But phenomenology takes a further step. Even if the strict science of physics were taken as the basis of logic, it could not account, on its own grounds, for logical experience. To know in detail the mechanical laws of a typewriter and to describe how it makes empirical marks on the paper, it does not constitute an explanation of the logical formulations written on the paper. Moreover, the physical explanation, even if formulated into laws, does not imply the logical structures with which the scientist deals. It is simply the case that the two domains are distinct. Hence, even the physical-empirical phenomena and its laws do not constitute the base for logic and its experience. If we do not know logic already, no sum of physical marks made on paper would allow us to infer the logic that is expressed during the writing. This can be taken even further. The structure of the laws of physics, which presupposes logic, is not identical with the structure of this particular typewriter and the marks that it makes on the paper. The typewriter constitutes an empirical “example” of mechanical laws that can be applied to many mechanical processes. Were we to maintain a strict relationship between empirical characteristics of the physical world and our direct perception of those characteristics, we would not be able to claim that two distinct empirical processes are governed by the same physical laws; after all, in each case we would have an entirely different set of empirical impressions, which, within themselves, would not have any indication that they follow identical laws. All we could say is simply that they are different.

Even at a quite unsophisticated level, the aforementioned considerations indicate that there are distinct domains of objectivity that can be present for distinct levels of experience. Phenomenology would point out that

⁷ Farber, M. (1967). *The Foundations of Phenomenology: Edmond Husserl and the Quest for Rigorous Science of Philosophy*. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.

this distinction allows us, at least minimally, to think of scientific formulation of hypotheses that may or may not be true. Such a formulation can take place at a purely logical level and experience, whereby the empirical experience would constitute a specific case, an “example” for “visualization” of the correctness or incorrectness of the hypothesis. If this were not the case, then each hypothesis would have to be derived from the empirical data and, hence, be applicable only to such data and none other. In brief, there would be no room for variation.

But in the scientific procedures, hypotheses are formulated that direct scientific research into areas that have not yet been empirically experienced. As logically constructed laws of the phenomena, they are experienced without any empirical components. It is possible to change the empirical data without affecting the experience of the identity of the hypothesis; in turn, it is possible to vary hypotheses without changing the empirical data. The same empirical datum can be viewed under the structures of various hypotheses. This variation suggests that there is no one-to-one correlation between empirical and logical experiences; from this, it follows that the logical experience is not caused by empirical characteristics of the world of things.

Even at this level, the phenomenological implications for the science of communication are obvious. Indeed, the communicational process is concerned with things, humans and events, yet the laws of communication and their logic are not based on just the empirically given events. Although communicating about things and events, we are involved in a process that is at variance with the things and events. Here again, the things and events may vary empirically, yet the communicative process may remain constant and, in fact, repeatable. Conversely, the things and events may remain constant, whereas the communication process may change. For example, we may communicate about most diverse things in terms of their pragmatic value; the pragmatic value remains constant, so to speak, amidst the changing things. Or we may communicate about one thing in terms of its scientific, aesthetic, economic and even religious value. Although the thing remains constant, the communication process shifts from scientific to aesthetic structures and logical requirements. Indeed, there is a correlation between the communicative process and the things and events, yet the correlation is not a causal one. Things do not cause one to communicate about them scientifically, in terms of extremely complex mathematical and logical struc-

tures; yet, it is precisely such structures within the communicational process that constitute the modalities of our experience of things. Hence, things and events, including ourselves, are not given *simpliciter*, but are given in terms of experiential structures, without which things would not be given. And it is these experiential structures, within which communication takes place and which are shared in the communicational processes. Phenomenological understanding of experience explains such common communicative devices as “How do you see the situation?” Although the situation is given, what is shared is the view of the situation. Communication is not a mere reaction to a situation, but involves the way the situation is experienced.

These considerations suggest that the experiential process itself is not explainable in terms of a causal relationship of the experiencer to the experienced things. To capture the sense of the experiential process, it is necessary to offer additional distinctions between the *naturalistic* assumption of empirical reality and the way that it makes sense or has meaning for us. When we make a judgment about a sunset, a mountain range and a sea storm, and pronounce that they are magnificent, we are communicating a meaning that we attach to three distinct events or situations. This suggests that the empirical phenomena and the meaning ascribed to them in our experience are two distinct processes. This is not to be taken as if the meaning is something psychologically subjective and, hence, private. Empirical-psychological processes are distinct from the meaning ascribed to events for the following reasons:

1. When we make a statement, such as “The storm is furious,” we may vary the sounds empirically. We may say it in German, Chinese or French, without changing the meaning of the statement. We may say it slowly, rapidly, we may stutter, and yet across these variations the meaning remains constant. The meaning is distinct from the empirical modalities of its expression.

2. In the process of making the statement, we may have various changing psychological attitudes: we may be elated, afraid or indifferent; we may perform psychological associations with previously experienced storms and the way we were terrified. All these psychological variations do not change the meaning of the statement; the meaning remains constant.

3. Even if in our vocal expressions the psychological attitudes are manifest, such as when one voices the statement indifferently, exuberantly, and so on, one does not change the meaning of the statement; one merely

reveals one's psychological relationship to the storm. What one primarily communicates is the meaning, understanding of which is required for the understanding of the psychological states expressed through empirical sounds or gestures.

4. In the same manner, we can ascribe meaning to our own psychological states, when we say, for example, "My fear has no reasonable grounds" or "My psychological life is all messed up". Here, too, the psychological attitudes and empirical states are "meant" in a particular way and the meaning constitutes a particular manner, in which we experience our own psyche. This indicates that the experience of our own psyche is not identical with that psyche.

Again, we find the same kind of differentiation and correlation that we noted earlier. Various psychic and empirically changing processes may be meant in one way, may be experienced in terms of one meaning, when we, for example, judge that our love, hate, indifference, like and dislike have become "worthless" in relationship to someone; conversely, we may judge one psychological phenomenon in terms of various meanings; our indifference may be valuable, practical, aesthetically distancing and, in case of scientific work, laudable. These considerations point to one fundamental phenomenological notion: the constancy hypothesis, adduced by "naturalism," is inadequate to explain experience. The constancy hypothesis states that for every experiential component there is a one-to-one causal relationship either to an external or an internal event. Yet, as was briefly shown, such a correlation does not obtain and, in principle, is not given in experience. Although correlated to the empirical-natural world of things and events, including subjective states and processes, the experiential process is distinct from and at variance with the natural phenomena.

The preceding distinctions between the natural-empirical phenomena and the modes of experiencing these phenomena lead phenomenology to conclude that the experiential process consisting of sense-making and meaning structures has its own conditions and requirements apart from, although correlated to, the natural phenomena. Moreover, because the natural phenomena are given within the context of the experiential process, it is necessary to investigate this process in its own right. Only by understanding this process can we fully appreciate the ways, possible or actual, that nature in all of its facets can be experienced. Yet, to attain

this process, phenomenology finds it necessary to employ a specific method called *bracketing*. The term *bracketing* means that all assumptions about nature and empirical phenomena, all being, in brief, all reality, must be placed into parenthesis, must be set aside as if it were an irrelevant function in experience. This does not mean that phenomenology doubts the existence of nature or that it is skeptical about its characteristics or their accessibility to experience. Rather, the bracketing serves the purpose to direct our attention away from the naturalistic assumptions toward the experiential-process. Bracketing does not change or interfere in any way with the natural process. Everything goes on as before. The only change is that whatever belongs to the naturalistic assumption is placed out of play to open room for the investigation of the experiential dimension. The naturalistic assumption includes a vast array of phenomena: nature itself, historically transmitted theories about nature, human psycho-physical processes, cultural objects, ethical and aesthetic assumptions and even most secure scientific theories⁸. This is not to say that the validity of these theories is experience, i.e., what kind of experience would be required for their presence to the subject. The same holds for all the other mentioned domains of objectivity: phenomenology does not doubt the existence of aesthetic objects; it only wishes to decipher the experience required for the givenness of aesthetic objects. There is no objection to science and scientific procedures, no objection to arts and the modes of their operation and even no objection to psychology and its domain of investigation. All these domains are accepted as they are within their own parameters or, as phenomenology would say, within their own essential structures. What phenomenology insists upon is that the “experience of” psychological states as objects is not identical with the experiential process or that the process of experiencing of an art work is not derivable from the characteristics of the art work in a causal fashion. Moreover, phenomenology insists on taking the objective domains within their own parameters as they are given in themselves without any reduction of one domain to another for explanatory purposes. It can be shown that each domain has its own essential structural components and correlatively specific required experiential processes for their presence to the subject. For example, when dealing with a particular psychological state, we are not dealing with chemistry. We can look at the state, describe its characteristics,

⁸ Husserl, E. (1962). *Ideas I*, p. 59.

and, in turn, describe the ways that the state is experienced. When we are confronted with the domain of chemistry, we are required to undergo a different set of experiences in face of an object that belongs to chemistry and not to psychology. Phenomenology is not interested whether one domain can be reduced to the other; that question is left for ontology, which assumes a certain reality “in itself” apart from experience. This reality is not doubted by phenomenology; it is simply not made into an “object” of concern. Its main concern lies in the manner, in which the various objective domains are given in experience and what kind of experience is required for each domain to be present to the subject⁹.

Experientially speaking, the bracketing reveals an absolute domain, in relation to which the objects of the natural world are relative. Things change, they are contingent, yet the experience of them is essential. For example, the very notion that “all things are contingent” is an experiential insight into an essence of all things that belong to experience. With the notion of an “insight into an essence”, we are led to the delimitation of the first and rudimentary experiential structures in correlation to the “natural” things and events. The first level is the one between the perceptual process and the material, spatial thing. While observing a particular material-spatial object, the perceiver may perform various acts, such as closing and opening the eyes, and moving about the thing and seeing it from different sides without the loss of the identity of the object. The object remains constant through the multiplicity of perceptual acts and their disruption and, hence, is totally distinct from the perceptual process. As phenomenology would say, the object is *transcendent*, i.e., apart from and outside of the process of experiential activity. Nor does the object “cause” the perceptual process. After all, the unseen side that I am about to see does not cause me to move to the other side of the thing, because it is not yet causally present to my vision.

Without the structure of identical and continuous “transcendent” object and the variation of perceptual activities, no experience would be possible. At this level, something must remain identical and continuous, to which the various perceptual acts are correlated; otherwise, with each act the object would be different and no continuity between the acts would be given. All such acts assume a continuity and a synthesis because they are related to the same thing, they are perceptual acts of the same object. I see the object; I

⁹ Husserl, E. (1962). *Ideas I*, p. 82.

walk around it; I touch it. Through all these activities, the object is the same. This means that the object is not derived from the perceptual acts or from experiential activity in general. That is to say, perception does not project, in some mysterious way, its own objects. It accepts the object as it is present through the perceptual activity.

It is to be noted that the perceptual process of any spatial thing involves an approach to the object from various sides and perspectives, through which the object appears to the experiencer. Yet, a strict distinction must be made between the side of the things and a perspective, from which the thing is seen. The side of the thing belongs to the thing. But a perspective is taken to the thing by the experiencer in such a way that the experiencer must assume a spatial position to the thing and even to the side of the thing. Hence, a perspective constitutes a spatial modality of perception, in terms of which the experiencer presents the thing, its sides and various characteristics of the thing to himself or herself. The process of perspective constitution requires that the perceiver be in a position to move, i.e., have a kinesthetic capacity. In order to see something from various sides, the experiencing subject must be able to move oneself. Although the thing and its sides are absolutely correlated to the perspectives of the experiencer, neither is derivable from the other. The thing is spatial, whereas the perspectives we take to the thing are not given in space; they are experienced directly in such a way that it is impossible, strictly speaking, to take a perspective to a perspective. We can only assume a perspective to a spatial thing.

This process could be extended to include not only the thing given in perception, but also its sides and, indeed, its various characteristics. Even a color of a side of the thing is given from various angles of observation.

Although there is no ultimate perspective, there is, of necessity, perceptivity in the perception of spatial things. Regardless of who would wish to experience a spatial thing, the experiencer must regard the thing from various perspectives. This suggests one fundamental facet of phenomenology: it seeks to discover the essential characteristics of experience and of experiential process, which are essential for the experience of objects, regardless of who the experiencer may be. This means that phenomenology's aim is to get away from subjective skepticism and relativism and to discover universal and necessary structures that would be valid for all experiencing subjects at all times and everywhere. Hence, it can claim that at the percep-

tual level the requirements are such that there must be a spatial object with sides given in and through the variation of perceptual acts and perspectives. Under any other conditions, perceptual experience could not occur. At the same time, this experience involves an object, essence of which lies in its “indefinite explorability” through continuous perceptual perspective variations. These perspective variations could be performed by anyone, anytime and anywhere and the perspectives could be described and communicated to anyone. Hence, communication is possible not only because we have a world of common objects, but primarily because we can have the same experience, which can be directly, communicated. Once again, it must be stressed that phenomenology, dealing with experience, has nothing to do with subjectivism or with some private or inaccessible experiences belonging to the internal process of some mysterious subject. Suffice it to say, as Husserl pointed out, that even a God, in order to experience a spatial object, would have to submit his experiential process to perspective variation and a series of perceptual-kinesthetic movements¹⁰.

Within the context of phenomenological experience, the communicative process assumes the following shape. It is to be noted that although dealing with spatial things we do not pay attention to our experiential process; we are directed to the things. Yet, the experiential process is the background, in terms of which the things are given to us. We do not usually look at the perspectives we take or the movements we perform, but rather at the things, their sides and characteristics. The same can be said of the communicative process. When we are communicating, we are directed to the object of our communication; we communicate about things, humans, events and so forth. Yet, for those things to be present in various modalities in communication, the communicative process is assumed as a “silent background”.

This silent communicative background is identical with, or is at least an expression of, the experiential process that is also a background, in terms of which things are experienced. What the communicative process depicts are things as they are given to us in experience, it moves with the experiential process. When we say “seen from this angle, the blue of the object is brighter”, we have the following process: we are in the presence of an object possessing a specific characteristic. In communicational process, the characteristic is an object of communication and, indeed, of experience.

¹⁰ Husserl, E. (1962). *Ideas I*, p. 90.

Yet, at the same time, the communication includes a position, a perspective, from which the object is seen. Without this perspective, which can be assumed by the communicative partner, the communicative process would not be complete. Basically, what is being communicated is what is being experienced. Without the experiential process given within communication, the thing would not be given or seen as it is, nor would it be transmitted to the communicative partner.

We are now in a position to take another step toward the broadening of the experiential process and toward a further distinction between the natural objects and the experiential dimension. As it was noted, the process of perception may vary, whereas the object of perception remains constant. But what is the constant object, given in experience that can remain? In terms of a common and even scientific understanding of nature, the spatial thing, although relatively constant, is nonetheless in a process of slow self-transformation. Hence, it cannot yield the condition of being constant in all respects. It is common to say that the table I saw yesterday is the same table I see today. But what can be the sense of “sameness” here? At least temporally, the table is different and cannot be transposed back to yesterday. Moreover, the very notion of perceptual experience of a spatial object does not permit us to say that we see the object; strictly speaking, we can only see one side of the object from a particular perspective. Perceptually, the object is never given as such. One could perhaps say that the object becomes a sum of sides and characteristics. But the problem is what unifies those sides and characteristics into an identical object? Obviously, it is not something given in perception. Hence, phenomenology points out that even perceptual process requires another level of experience that is not perceptual, but essential.

Modern philosophy has many arguments for and against the “existence” of essences; in fact, these arguments divide entire philosophical schools into idealism, empiricism, naturalism, realism and even subjectivism. But if we recall the phenomenological procedure that brackets all questions and assumptions of existence and deals only with the question of experience, then we can dispense with these arguments and simply pay attention to the requirements of experience itself. If experience requires essential components, then such components must be accepted experientially without any regard to the ontological question of their existence or non-existence. And precisely such components are discovered in experience. What phenom-

enology points to is that experience is always involved in essential *insights*, even when such insights remain a mere possibility and may never have a perceptual correlate. At the same time, the perceptual process itself is ruled by essential insight, without which such a process would not have a synthesis. Even when we say that there are no experienced essences, we are communicating an essential insight, which is understandable by anyone, even when it is contested. Or once again, when one says that all experience is contingent, one is involved in communicating an essential insight. This suggests that experience is always involved in something essential accessible to all. Take another example: when we teach children basic arithmetic, we use all kinds of objects to exemplify the arithmetic relationships. Our teaching process is not involved in showing the children a set of perceptual objects, but by means of them evoking an essential insight into mathematical procedures that are not perceptual. Yet, precisely this essential, nonperceptual insight is what allows the children to make sense of the objects used to communicate the mathematical structures and relationships. The essential insight is not derived from the various objects used to exemplify and reveal the insight. The real, natural objects are here bracketed, for the sake of the experience that is essential and not dependent upon these particular perceptual objects. The perceptual facts may constitute an occasion for, or an example of, an essential insight, but they are not the cause of the insight. The facts are contingent, the experiential insight into their contingency is essential¹¹.

The notion of essentiality can be applied to the perceptual experience of the spatial object. While perceiving a spatial object here and now; we are led by an insight into the spatiality of any natural object, into its structure, and with respect to this individual object, into the type of an object that it is. This essential insight into the object is not identical with the individual object, because we can change the individual objects within the parameters of their typology without discarding the identity of our insight. The insight into the essential structure in experience allows us to unify the various sides and perspectives and to continue the exploration of the object indefinitely. Hence, the question whether the essence exists or not is irrelevant, what is relevant is an essential insight into or a generalization of the perceived objects. As suggested earlier, we do not perceive the identity of that an essential insight into a typology is a condition for the experience of a spatial object and that the

¹¹ Husserl, E. (1962). *Ideas I*, p. 99.

perceived object may be changed within the limits of the typology without destroying the experience of all of them being of the identical kind, this is not to say that the typology is derived from a generalization of the perceived objects, as suggested earlier, we do not perceive the identity of the object: we only perceive sides and facets of the object. Yet, a necessary condition of experience is the presence of an insight into an essence, a typology of an object, to which we can return irrespective of space and time and the spatio-temporal changes, to which the empirical object may be submitted.

The insight into essence in experience is one of the conditions for communication. In most communication processes, we do not have the perceptual objects before us. If this were necessary, we would never be able to communicate about anything except what was given in immediate perception. Moreover, even when we communicate about things, which are present or which we have experienced perceptually, we find that in the first case the communicating parties never have the perceptual thing in full view or perceive it from the same perspective; after all, the two perceivers can never occupy the same spatial location at the same time and see the object from precisely the same perspective. In the second case, although the communicating parties might have seen spatial objects, these objects perceptually were somewhat distinct. Yet, in communicational process, they agree of having seen a table or a box. What allows the communicability is the phenomenological fact of having an insight into an essence of what a table or a box is as a typology. Without this insight, the communicating parties would be required to go and see perceptually all the sides of the particular table or a box in order to understand what is being communicated. But as already noted, even in this case all one would see are sides and facets, but not the object as such. Even in this case, one would require an insight into a typology for the understanding of what the other person is saying. In case we were tempted to use the hypothesis of memory and association of previous experiences with the present, the requirement of essential insight would remain. First of all, if the communicative parties were to associate their previous experiences of things with the present experience, the experiences would not yield a common ground for communication. After all, perceptually the objects were not alike. Secondly, if in the present experience the communicating parties have only perceptual experience of the sides and facets of the thing, to add previous experiences of sides and facets of other things

does not account for the fact that they are communicating about the thing as a unity of sides and facets. This suggests that communicability assumes an insight into a typology as a condition of mutual understanding. In this phenomenological view, any object of a particular typology could be used as a perceptual example of an insight, which one has in one's experience.

Against subjectivism of experience, phenomenology points out that the essence of typology is nothing "intrinsic" to the experiencing subject, but is an object of experience. It is an experiential given. We can assign attributes to it, we can judge the propriety or impropriety of such attributes, and we can correct our views or be corrected by others in the process of communication. In fact, this process of judging, communicating and attributing is not time or space bound, nor is the typology an object of our experience. We can come back to the process, check our own and other judgments and look again at the typology and what properties belong to it. This release from spatio-temporality is precisely a basic requirement for communication. Although the means of communication may be temporal, sounds, marks on paper, the structure of the communicative process, and the object, about which the communicative process is engaged, are not temporal and, hence, they are accessible to anyone any time. When we read a story or a theoretical treatise from the past, written by persons we have never met, we have no empirical evidence of those persons, nor any way to check the manner, in which they received their empirical impressions and the surroundings that have "caused" such impressions. Yet, when we read the printed pages, we know what is communicated to us, even when we do not know when the pages were written. Were we to see the case otherwise, it would be impossible to repeat, in principle, the same question or to recheck the correctness of our attributions with respect to a particular typology; after all, we would, at least temporally, be in a different circumstance, with different empirical input, causing us to react differently. Yet experientially, we can look back to our previous logic, correct it, reevaluate it, regardless of the differences in our natural causal situation.

These considerations lead phenomenology to yet another conclusion. In the process of communication, it is possible to change the natural means of communication, the empirical modes of sending messages without changing the object of communication, nor the message that is being transmitted about the object. This means that the natural means are bearers of,

but are not the message. That is to say, the causal relationship between the natural means of transmitting the message and the natural person, who is being affected by such means, do not constitute the communicative process, even if they are a necessary condition for such a process. The conditions for the expression of something do not constitute the expression. The hand, as a condition for writing, not only does not imply the shape of the alphabet (after all, there are so many distinct alphabets), but, above all, does not imply the grammar of a particular language. Rather, the structure of grammar can be exemplified by handwriting, by speaking, by computerized process and by other means of codification. Hence, communicative experience is at a level of typological and repeatable structures, accessible to all, and exhibited by most divergent natural-empirical phenomena. This is not to deny the value of the latter phenomena; it is to show that these phenomena in themselves do not present a complete view of communication.

Although the experienced essences and the activities, in which they appear, are the domain of phenomenological concerns, they are always correlated to their naturalistic-empirical content. Yet phenomenology, concern of which is direct experience, maintains a strict distinction between them in order to show the process of experience devoid of ontological impediments. An example, at the perceptual level, would make this experiential process more vivid. While observing a spatial object, such as a desk, we see it from one of its sides. The side is a limited appearance of the table. At the same time, we must assume a perspective to the table. The perspective belongs to the perceptual process of the experience as a necessary modality for the table to be given from one side. By moving about the table, we change our perspective and a different side of the “same” table appears. In order for the two sides to be the sides of the “same” table, and for the two perspectives to be the perspectives of the same subject, two conditions must be met: (a) the maintenance of the object as “same” throughout the variations of the sides, and (b) the continuity of an identical perceiver throughout the changing perceptual perspectives and activities. Without these conditions, all we would have on the object side is a succession of sides and aspects instead of being sides of ... and, indeed, it would not even make sense to speak of sides; on the subject side, there would be a mere succession of perspectives that would not have a synthesis as perspective positions of the same subject related to an identical object.

But the required identity and continuity of the perceiver and the object are experiential, requiring no presuppositions of existence or non-existence of nature. Despite the perceived sameness of the table, all that we actually perceive are its various sides and facets; yet, in none of them do we perceive anything as an identity. The identity is an experienced typology of a kind of object it is; although the typology is required and is correlated to the perceived table, the experience of the typology as identical and continuous is not given merely at the empirical level. Hence, if we bracket the question of existence or non-existence of the natural table and deal with it as it is given in experience, we shall find that the experience of the table has a structure and a process that is distinct from the table, even if the particular table can be used as an example of an insight into a type of an object that it is. Because the process of perspective variations does not belong to the perceived particular spatial object, it is the way that the object is present to the subject. This requirement for typology does not belong to just this table, but to a multitude of spatial objects that could function as a table.

The question whether the typologies exist or not is an ontological-speculative question that is irrelevant for phenomenology. What is relevant is that such typologies and essential structures, given in direct experience, constitute the conditions for our perceptual experience. As “timeless”, in the sense that we can return to them in experience, even when the specific object is abolished, they are given as objects of our direct insight. Hence, when we said that a spatial object is experience able indefinitely, that one perspective leads to another, that one side points to another and that exterior aspects lead to interior aspects, we were concerned with the essence of any spatial object and the requirements that one would have to submit to in order to experience such an object. Moreover, when we communicate about the spatial object, we are involved in the essential aspects given in experience for communicability about the individual object given in perception. Even when we communicate about individuals, we are involved with an essential insight into what individuality is, what distinctness and uniqueness are. Were communication limited to empirical process alone, we would never communicate, because we would be locked to the succession of the given sides and the perspectives by virtue of which of the sides are present to us, without the sides being sides of a unitary and identical object.

The requirement of essential experience is extended in phenomenology into every facet of perceptual as well as theoretical experience. For example, perception of a quality, such as color, requires an essential insight into what a quality is and what are the essential differences between types of qualities, such as color and sound. The particular, perceptual colors and sounds become instantiations or examples of the essential experience. The experience of red is not red; rather, it is a process of perspective variations and changes in illumination, distance, paying attention, focusing and contrasting. Through all this process, the essential insight into the color red remains constant, whereas the particular perceptual red constitutes an example of the essence. Here again, the ontological question of the perceived red is bracketed; what is attended to is the experiential process and its constitutive elements that allow this particular color to be present to the subject. The particular red is transcendent to, and outside of the process of, experience, although experience refers to it. What allows communication is not the sharing of some subjective impressions, but the transmission of the experience of the quality accessible to all. That is to say, the experiential process is subjectively indifferent.

By bracketing the question of the existence or non-existence of the perceptual object, phenomenology also brackets the question of the existence or non-existence of essential structures. It is only concerned with the manner, in which they function in experience. At the same time, phenomenology shows that the experience of essences is distinct from perceptual experience and is not caused by or reducible to the perceptual experience or natural process. We may take totally divergent natural objects and judge them to be a group. The group is not identical with the given objects not only because they comprise a set of distinct causal influences and are generically distinct, but because we can replace the objects indefinitely without altering the experience that they still comprise a group. When we communicate our experience, we are communicating about the group, about the ways of collecting most divergent objects into a group despite the fact that the communicating parties have never experienced the same empirical objects.

When a science of communication constructs explanatory theories about communicational processes and communicates them to other members of the scientific community, such a science does not require that the “receivers” of the theory must have had the same objective-perceptual experi-

ence or the same subjective internal states in order to understand the theory. The theoretical components, their validity and internal consistency, are judged in terms of their own logic. Indeed, the theory may be incorrect, but this does not abolish its comprehensibility and communicability. After all, to say that the theory is void of perceptual support assumes that the one who makes such a charge has nevertheless experienced the theoretical structure in its own right. Otherwise, such a charge would not make any viable sense.

The presence of the theoretical components, which may not have any perceptual correlate, is accepted by scientists in the communicative process. At the same time, the process of experiencing such components, the making of judgments, the formulation of propositions, the process of analysis and synthesis, are accepted by scientists without any regard to the subjective states of the proposition makers or analyzers. In fact, such states are at that time bracketed as irrelevant and not belonging to the domain of discussion. This means that the experiential process and the theoretical components, with which it deals, a process and components that are repeatable at will, are not derivable from the subjective states or some presumed naturalistic position of the scientists. If this condition were not met, then any causal variation of the external or internal environment during the scientist's presentation and communication of the theory would change the components of the theory and the analytic process and construction of propositions related to the theoretical components. But in this case, no scientific communication would be possible. Experiential evidence shows that the variation of the natural-causal relationships does not affect the communication of scientific experience. Any scientific-theoretical process, if it were based on a naturalistic explanation, would be reduced to constant skepticism and anthropocentrism. The theory would be comprehensible and communicable only under invariant conditions not only of the person, who would be communicating this theory, but also of the persons, who would be listening to the communication. Moreover, the listeners would have to somehow decipher every psychophysiological state of the communicator and assume precisely the same state for the understanding of what is being communicated. In addition, the listeners would have to have precisely the same impressions that the communicator has, otherwise they would not be dealing in principle with the same object or from the same side and perspective. To complicate things further, the theory could not be communicated in

another environment, because its validity would be coextensive with the conditions, under which it was communicated the first time. There would be an entirely different theory. But obviously, even scientists, who maintain the naturalistic base of explanation of all experience, do not operate that way and, in fact, they assume that their theory is valid irrespective of the causal conditions, under which the scientists are operating.

The preceding discussion opened a level of objective experience that, although correlated to subjective states and perceptual phenomena, has an objectivity of its own. That is to say that despite their nonperceptual character, the typologies, the theoretical components and the experiential process dealing with them can be investigated objectively irrespective of their spatio-temporal location and, thus, communicated, and to such an extent that they constitute the ground for the process of communication. Yet, such a process involves some fundamental aspects not yet discussed. These aspects consist of the sense and meaning required for the comprehension of experience and of the perceptual phenomena, to which experienced is related.

It is quite common in the communication process to ask what a word or a something, such as a perceptual component or a theoretical factor, means. In fact, there is an entire philosophical movement dealing with the clarification and analysis of the meaning of linguistic terms. This suggests for phenomenology that meaning plays a fundamental role in experience and communication and that without it neither experience nor communication would make much sense. Because the experiential and communicative process is involved in sense-making, phenomenology assumes the task of deciphering at what level of experience the process of meaning is given.

It hardly needs to be repeated that the meaning of a sentence is not identical with the marks made on a paper or with the sounds emitted by the speaker. The marks and sounds may vary as perceived components without changing the meaning they transmit. At the same time, there is a variation between the meaning of a sentence and the object referred to in the sentence. For example, “The Victor at Jenna” and “The defeated of Waterloo” are two statements with different meanings; yet, the meanings refer to one and the same person, namely Napoleon. The converse also holds: one statement can refer to two distinct objects. This suggests that meaning is not derived from the empirical-naturalistic phenomena, such as sounds, marks or things and events of nature. Yet in turn, our experience of things,

events, marks and so forth, is fundamentally involved in meaning. One would have to say, perhaps, that we, the subjects, attach meaning to the things, events and marks. But such a view is problematic to say the least. First of all, our own subjective experience may vary without inducing any variation in the meaning attached to such an experience. Different subjective processes and psychological states may have the same meaning. For example, when someone says that “My body and my psyche are sick”, the variation of psychophysiological functions does not affect the meaning that is attributed to these functions, although we could not experience the functions without the meaning. This suggests that meaning cannot be treated as a subjective experience that is somehow added to objective events. This is the reason why phenomenology, in order to extricate meaning from an enmeshment in subjective-naturalistic states and objective-naturalistic phenomena, brackets both. Once again, this is not to imply that the subject ceases to be; rather, the subject with its internal states and processes is understood in terms of a more fundamental level of experience based on meaning. Phenomenology does not ask whether meaning exists; it takes it as a given function in experience¹².

¹² Husserl, E. (1962). *Ideas I*, p. 48.

CHAPTER II

Methodological Critique

Having touched upon the method of phenomenology and the manner, in which it evaluates the *naturalistic* position, in the following section we briefly evaluate the various theoretical positions from positivism through structuralism and semiology. The evaluation is not designed to show that such positions are wrong, but mainly to show what phenomenology adds to the understanding of the communication process. In addition, the critique is designed to identify unjustified presuppositions and unquestioned ontologies not for the sake of rejection, but in order to place them in an experiential context and to note the range of their validity. It must be stressed that it is not the rightness or wrongness of such positions, but merely the limits of such positions that will be evaluated and critiqued. At the same time, each theoretical stance will be “asked” to adhere to its own principles and not to introduce something, so to speak, through the back door. The latter task is perhaps the most difficult, because in this short survey it is impossible to present all the possible answers and objections that could stem from phenomenological critique. Nonetheless, an effort will be made to maintain as fair an evaluation as possible.

One of the major theoretical-methodological trends, stemming from the success of physical sciences, is positivism. Its first assumption is that the final or ultimate reality is physical, that is, spatiotemporal. Its second assumption is that we are part of that reality and are completely bound to its causal laws. If at times we can create the illusion that there is something outside of or apart from physical reality, such notions must be shown to be ultimately based on and explainable by physical laws. Hence, although we may imagine that there is a consciousness having a specific function, such a function and the language used to express it must be reduced to, and translated into, physical explanation and physicalistic language. The third assumption of positivism is that it states that all experience is empirical, and all science must rest on such an experience. The experience is comprised of a causal impact on our physical organism by the environment. One could say that experience is a reaction to stimuli. This leads to the claim by positivistic science that human behavior is a reaction to stimuli. If we can de-

cipher the stimuli, we can predict human behavior in advance, that is, we can deal with human behavior scientifically. The fourth assumption of positivism states that any scientifically tenable proposition would have to be a generalization from individual experienced cases. Any other proposition would be either a tautology or a poetic saying having no scientific import.

Although we have already dealt with various components of positivism, without naming them, a closer scrutiny of its principles will reveal what phenomenology adds to the understanding of experience beyond positivism. First of all, the notion that reality is ultimately physical is not a product of direct empirical experience. When we observe objects, what we directly perceive are colors, sounds and the touch of smooth or rough surfaces, which do not imply anything physical. Even if we assume the direct perception of objects, such as tables, trees, humans and so forth, what would allow us to say that all these divergent things are physical? One could answer that they are in space and time, that we can weight them, measure them and calculate their movements. But neither space and time, nor the measures of speed and location are something that we perceive empirically. Assuming that space and time are relations among physical objects, it is still the case that we do not have physical impressions of relations. Even at this level, positivism imports something into its ontology, which is not of physical nature. At the same time, it imports measures and numerical systems that have no spatiotemporal locations. Unless, of course, we are prepared to maintain the absurd proposition that numbers are in our physical brain or are identical with the marks made on our measuring implements, we have to admit of experience that is not necessarily within the ken of positivistic metaphysics. Yet, when we analyze the brain, we do not find numbers, but a multitude of physiological processes. At the same time, if our measuring standards were identical with the marks on the implements, then the only criterion we could have for the accurateness of our implements would be precisely the implement. It would be impossible to correct our implements. Each implement would “speak for itself” and a comparison of two implements would simply lead us to conclude that one is longer than the other, but not that one is more accurate than the other. Yet, when we take a

Mathematician, who is concerned with numbers and their relationships, one is not dealing with his brain or the marks on the implements, he is facing a mathematical reality. To reduce such a reality to physical states, it re-

quires (a) that we already have such a reality and its relationships and (b) that the components of such a reality are derivable from another domain. Yet, in order to derive the first from the second, one must assume the first; otherwise the whole process of reduction would make no sense. Phenomenology, by bracketing the assumption of *being*, one is free to survey the experience of these domains as they are present to the subject. In fact, Husserl claimed that positivism is insufficiently positive, because it does not accept what is given in direct and positive experience¹³. By accepting each domain, be it empirical, logical, theoretical, valuative or aesthetic, as it is directly present to the experiencer, Husserl claimed that he is the true positivist without any ontological assumptions. Phenomenology does not deny that there is a physical reality; it simply suspends the assumption of such a reality in order to investigate the kind of experience required of the positivist to maintain the thesis of such a reality and the limits that are placed on such an experience. Yet, at the same time, it extends the concept of what is given to the experiencer in order to deal with other domains, as they are given in themselves. It is only on the basis of such an extension, that any subsequent ontology could function when it purports to reduce one domain to the other or to explain one in terms of the other. Phenomenology does not object to such an attempt at explanation, but it leaves this task to metaphysicians. Of course, the problem with the latter is its speculative character and fruitless argumentation.

The second principle is also problematic. To claim that there is no such reality as consciousness is, on the one hand, to assume it, and on the other, it is to use it in the process of its denial and theory construction in order to explain it away. The notion that everything real must be within the context of causality is belied by the direct observation of various human functions. First of all, causality requires a spatial nexus. Yet, even our psychological processes, such as a succession of ideas, have no spatial location, although they may have a temporal succession in the form of “one after the other”. Or take psychological events, such as love or hate: the spatially observable changes in our physiology, such as blood pressure, heart rate, perspiration and so forth, may be identical in both cases and, indeed, may be produced by running, even though our experience of love is completely different from hate and running. Reductionism would have to claim that anytime one runs and increases one’s blood pressure, heart rate and perspiration, one

¹³ Husserl, E. (1962). *Ideas I*, p. 84.

could be judged to be in love. Second, maintaining the principle of causality and behavior, it is possible to describe human behavior in terms of direct empirical and measurable evidence. Yet, if we maintain that principle, we would have to say that when a person is shaking the Coke machine, he is simply moving his arms and his body in a particular way and that the machine is caused to move accordingly; but we could not say that the person is angry with the machine. Such a notion would be an inference from the empirically observed behavior; yet, such an inference is no longer given at an empirical level. After all, perhaps the person is dancing with the machine. What is required is an understanding of the intent of the actor and not just his empirical behavior. Third, consciousness must be assumed as an active process that can survey mental and physical states and the relationship between them. The behavioral positivist, although showing the causal relationships between the mental states and physical reality, must be outside of that relationship in order to carefully select the related factors and to exclude the irrelevant factors and, indeed, to impartially survey them. If the scientist cannot be a nonparticipating observer, he cannot give us an objective view. But it is precisely consciousness that can experience processes without being a component within those processes. The scientist, in fact, assumes that consciousness is a detached and external observer if his findings and observations are to gain scientific objectivity. Consciousness is an irreducible process, without which scientific work makes no sense. Because this requirement is unavoidable, phenomenology accepts consciousness as it is given and not as it is conceived by some ontology. Fourth, without experience and its constant components, which are not submitted to spatiotemporal changes, scientific work would be exposed to constant causal transformations; the scientist could not detachedly survey the field, but would have to react to every causal influence in his environment. Moreover, he could never repeat the “same” experiment, because from day to day the causal conditions would change and the components of his experiment, at least the physical, would be different. What allows the repetition of a scientific experiment is the experience of the identical and repeatable typology of the experiment, a typology that the scientist experiences and uses to reconstruct the physical elements. The scientist does not construct the physical components of his experiment as a reaction to physical stimuli. Rather, he is directed by the experienced, although perceptually not given, essence of

the experiment, within context of which there is a range of variations of the physical components. Hence, the very scientific methodology presupposes phenomenological experience for the essential theoretical and hypothetical components as identical throughout a multitude of physical and causal processes. Such an experience is the ground for scientific communication. When a scientist reads a paper about his experiments, the listeners (a) have not been submitted to the same causal environment as the reader; (b) the listeners are not observing and measuring the reader's behavior, but are attending to the structure and logic of the presentation, a presentation that although being expressed physically is not identical with the expressions. Phenomenology submits that although the speaker deals with the experiments, his ability to communicate his experiment is the consequence of the experience that he shares with the listeners and not his behavior that his audience can observe. If his audience were to attend to his behavior, it would miss what he is saying. The experience is shared, clarifiable and repeatable by both the speaker and the listeners. Clarification is possible only if the speaker and the listeners are attending to the same essential composition of the experiment and the ways, in which the experiment is meant.

The third principle was partially considered in our discussion of phenomenology's conception of experience. Yet, some issues must be touched upon in order to show the problems when experience is causally interpreted. Taking causal explanation of experience scientifically, it would have to be maintained that perception depends on a one-to-one correlation between the physical input and the experience that this input evokes. Hence, in the case of vision, it would have to be maintained that light waves hit your retina, move through various chemical media and then locate themselves in a particular area of the brain. This constitutes our vision. If this were the case, we would never see the object; what would be present to us would be the light waves in our brain, and all our experience would be closed within the brain; we would never know the "outside" world. Moreover, we would not even be able to claim that we have a brain, because we have never seen it. The objection could be that we have seen the brains of others; yet, strictly speaking, even in this case the only experience we have are the light waves emitted by the supposed brain of the other. The only avenue that is left is to "infer" the presence of external objects. Yet, in this case, we are importing a function that is not empirical and causal, but logical, a function that can

not only observe the process of light waves and their causal function in our brain, but can also be capable of correlating such light waves to proper external objects. Yet, this indicates that there must be an experiential process that can signify the external world and its objects. It is in turn capable of deciphering the function of causal processes as *means* or a *medium* of vision, but not as vision. This suggests that a causal explanation of experience confuses the means of experience with the actual process of experience. Another causal explanation rests on the notion that the physical objects are basically spatiotemporal entities composed of extension, size, weight and location; their qualitative properties, such as color, sound, touch and so forth, are the impressions that are subjective. In brief, the color green does not belong to the object, but to the subject. The experience of the green is green. Once again, direct experience belies such an assumption on the following grounds: (a) when we observe a quality of an object, we see the quality “on” the object and not in our subjective impressions. We see the green from various perspectives, under various conditions of illumination and so forth, constituting our experiential process of the green. The green is not within the experiential process; rather, it is an objective property of a thing. (b) If the qualitative aspects were in us, and because our senses present us only with qualitative properties, then we could never get beyond them to the “physical thing”. The physical thing could only be inferred. Yet, in this case we once again assume a power of inference that is not derivable from the qualitative impressions. (c) The correlation of the qualitative impressions to a particular object assumes an access to that object in our experience. Were this not the case, then we would be at a loss as to which quality belongs to which object within the temporal succession of qualitative impressions. Such a theory, which is intent on excluding consciousness and of reducing it to a sum of qualitative impressions, introduces, through a back door, a function of inference, a function of consciousness that must be directly aware of the object. Moreover, such a function must be capable of correlating the succession of qualitative impressions to an identical object. Yet, direct experience testifies that we need not infer from an impression the presence of an object; we see the object as having qualities. Again, such a theory would preclude any communication. The subjective impressions of one subject are private and cannot be transmitted to anyone else. Even if this were possible in some mysterious way, no two subjects could have the same

qualitative impressions; hence, the communication of one subject's impressions to another would not lead to understanding, because the receiver does not have such impressions, that is, he/she has never been in the precise situation of the other subject. For communication to occur, the "sender" of the message would have to take the receiver to the precise situation, in which the impressions occurred. But because events are constantly changing, no such transportation would solve the problem. Two subjects, closed within their own impressions, have no theoretical access to communication. Yet, as phenomenology suggests, we communicate at a meaningful and essential level and with precise experiential requirements. When speaking about the green quality of a thing, the subject not only sees the color green, but also transmits a typology that is experienced by all and that can be exemplified by anyone's empirical experience by a variety of impressions and perspectival variations. Finally, it can be shown that there is no constant correlation between the physical characteristics of an object and the psychophysiological process of the subject and how the characteristics are experienced. If we were to take precise visual stimuli and trace them through our physiological processes, we would find that our direct perception does not correspond to the so-called objective conditions, both internal and external. Although in accordance with such conditions we should see blue, green and yellow, we actually see grey¹⁴. But not only grey as an individual stimulus; we see grey in a context of other chromatic components, against which the color grey is delimited. This suggests that (a) our perception is not expressible by the constancy hypothesis, that is, a one-to-one correlation between stimulus and response and (b) that there is no individuated impressions given in perception; rather, each qualitative experience is given in a context of other qualities and our perception of it depends on the context. For example, the color yellow may be dull among greens and greys, but very bright among blacks and reds. A particular chromatic impression is a function of an entire perceptual field¹⁵. What positivism would want to call atomistic stimuli or impressions are not experiential, but ideal theoretical constructs. Even in this sense, positivism transcends direct experience toward components that are not empirically given.

¹⁴ Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962). *Phenomenology of Perception* (C. Smith, Trans.). New York: Humanities Press.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

The fourth principle, the principle of generalization, is rooted in the entire history of philosophy. Yet, it assumes greatest preeminence in empiricism and positivism with their intent to exclude anything that would suggest some a priori knowledge or experience. As already noted, consciousness is denied as a valid objective function. If experience is to be limited to the empirical components, then, indeed, the scientific methodology cannot extend its range beyond such components. This can be granted to a scientific procedure that would wish to remain on a most primitive level. Yet, even at this level, certain problems appear that are difficult to explain within the positivistic context. Assuming that there is no consciousness, the only experience that is available is one of individual or atomistic components. How would such components yield general propositions? They do not generalize themselves, and because there is no such function as consciousness, then no generalization can occur. If it does, then positivism is guilty of introducing a function that is excluded in principle by its theoretical stance. Generalization requires an experiencer, who can survey the particulars and find something common among them; the commonality cannot be a property of any of the particulars, because in this case we would still possess a particular. How can a particular encompass all other particulars or be subsumed under it? The usual answer that is offered is that generalization is a summation in the sense of enumeration; in other words, the general proposition states nothing more than the sum of the observed individuals. But summation is a function that is not identical with the succession of atomistic impressions and our reaction to them. Moreover, summation assumes a function of counting, a conscious and active process of surveying the individual cases and not a simple reaction to a momentary impression. In fact, it is a very deliberate and selective function that excludes irrelevant stimuli instead of simply reacting to them. At the same time, this function—called by phenomenology consciousness—is not only concerned with the individual cases, but already employs mathematical generalities, such as sum, all, some, unit and so forth. These requirements cannot be accounted for on the basis of empirical impressions as the sole source of experience. It should be pointed out that the process of generalization from the individual cases to universal propositions must submit to the phenomenological condition of an insight into an essence, an essential structure, toward which the generalization is oriented. Without such a structure, we would not know what

we are generalizing toward. Generalization and the construction of general propositions require the phenomenological experience of essential structures that are not bound to any specific empirical impression. It is precisely this condition that allows scientific communication. It can transmit not the private individual impressions locked within themselves, but structures that can be exemplified by a variety of individual cases.

Other problems, arising within the positivistic-behavioral context, consist of the claim that the only meaningful propositions are those that can be empirically verified. In fact, verification should be the meaning of such propositions. However, when we formulate hypotheses that are to be verified, we do not yet have the empirical content of such hypotheses. All we have are a set of general propositions that, according to such a theory, cannot have any meaning. Yet, it is experientially obvious that when such hypotheses are communicated, their meaning is understood and shared by all parties prior to verification. Moreover, such hypotheses direct the perceptual process toward the selection of proper empirical data. What directs such a process? Obviously, they are directed not by the empirical impressions, because we do not yet have them. It must be, phenomenology claims, our consciousness that formulates these hypotheses using essential insights into structures and the meanings that it ascribes to these structures¹⁶. Without it, the scientific enterprise as a deliberate search for the “right” data would make no sense. This, in fact, accounts for our possibility to speak of scientific predictability. To predict means to anticipate events, for which we have no current empirical impressions. Hence, prediction is a conscious function that is not based merely on empirical experience. By extending the notion of experience to include the experience of structures and meaning, phenomenology can readily show that the empirical-perceptual process is directed by deliberate conscious constructions, indeed, active and not merely reactive constructions, which allow science to function and communicate.

The phenomenological critique should not lead to the conclusion that phenomenology rejects positive empirical facts. It accepts evidence as it is given, without introducing any theoretical components, such as atomistic impressions into the perceptual process. It accepts the atomistic impressions not as perceptual, but as theoretically constituted experience and a

¹⁶ Husserl, E. (1970). *Logische Untersuchungen* [Logical Investigations]. Tuebingen West Germany: Max Niemeyer Verlag, p. 50.

particular structuration of that experience, namely, temporal succession of theoretically constructed units. Phenomenology does not claim that such an experience is invalid; it simply points out that its validity is not at the empirical level of experience. It accepts atomistic conceptions, yet, it points out that the experience of such facts contains structural components capable of arranging facts atomistically. Indeed, it points out that every fact is correlatable to an essential mode of experience and every essential mode of experience is correlatable to an exemplifying fact. Although they do not cause one another, they are consciously “directed” to one another. Hence, in the communicative process, while attending to essential structures, we are at the same time directed to the factual, although for each individual distinct, datum. In this manner, there is no loss of individual perception and no immersion at the same time into individual and inexpressible experience. In addition, phenomenology offers the ability to experience insights into possibilities, into hypothetical structures that may not have an empirical content, although they may have an extremely high significance for social life. Hence, it can deal with values, religious questions, political dogmas and fiction, inclusive of the arts. Each has an experiential access although no empirical content can be offered for such experience; the content remains symbolic, on the basis of which much of human cultural and communicative process rests. Construction of symbolic systems is hardly tenable on the positivistic-behavioral model, yet, many factors of our lives flow with the process of symbolic communication.

Following the positivistic-behavioral model, a communication theory would have to claim that communication occurs between two separate entities, whereby the one, who emits a signal, is a sender of a message, and the other is the recipient of the message. What does it mean to say that someone sends a message? On the basis of positivistic-behaviorism it is hard to comprehend how one could send a message. First, all behavior is a reaction to external stimuli. This means that the person does not send a message, but reacts to a disturbance. In order for the receiver to grasp the message, he would have to experience the disturbance that the other is experiencing; otherwise, the message would say nothing. Yet, if it is assumed that the sender initiates the message, then the sender acts deliberately and with conscious intent; the action is not merely a reaction, but an initiation, a spontaneous process of consciousness. In this case, the notion of purely empirical

behavior as a mere reaction must be surrendered as a basic explanation of communicative process.

What constitutes a message? If the claim is to be made that the message is identical with the empirical impulses, transmitted from a sender to the receiver, then one would have to adhere to the principle that for a precise set of impulses as causal, there should be a precise reaction: the causal constancy hypothesis. Yet, experience testifies that there can be a wide variation of empirical impulses without the requisite variation of a message. One can say something rapidly, slowly, excitedly or even write it down – all constituting different causal patterns without affecting the message. Is it not the case, rather, that message in experience is a transmission of a meaning? The analysis of the empirical input gives us only a bearer of the message and not the substance. Moreover, because the meaning signifies something, points to something, is attached to some object, then the message implicates, points to, delimits an object in the two senses just outlined: (a) it carries an essential structure, to which the meanings are attached, and (b) it points to a specific factual datum of the essential structure experienced or to be experienced variously by different individuals. In addition, it can carry a meaning of pure possibility. Yet, the meaning and the structures, indeed the very arrangement of the message, are not identical although correlated to the empirical bearer of the message. If this were not the case, then the only criterion for the understanding of the message would be the observation of the receiver's response to the dictates of the empirical impulses. Yet, it is obvious that many messages are understood; the intent of the other is noted, but the response does not follow. This in no way implies that the message was not understood; the receiver knows what the sender meant, yet, he did not behave as the sender of the message expected. This means that although the message's meaning is understood, the meaning is not a cause of behavior even when it suggests the direction that the behavior should take. The receiver, in brief, can decide whether to enact the meaning that he understood or to reject it. Thus, he is not a mere reactor to the stimuli, but an initiator of action. On direct behavioral terms, the non-reaction of the receiver would simply mean miscommunication; the message was not understood. However, the message can obviously be understood although not acted on. Here, the causal-behavioral method breaks down because it does not entail the experience of factors that are not causal. Such factors are precisely the

message that can be evaluated, accepted, rejected, responded to and even changed¹⁷. Phenomenology extends our experience to include such factors and accepts them precisely as they function in communication. In this sense, phenomenology prefers to talk of a field of meaning implications that can be followed and not a field of causalities. The meaning implications, constituting a field of orientations, may be enacted or refused empirically-behaviorally, or they may be pursued purely logically, that is, discussed linguistically in a dialogue without any attendant behavioral enactment. And both cases assume the experience of the meaning of the message.

In order to conclude the phenomenological critique of positivistic behaviorism, it is essential to note that phenomenology does not reject the positivistic achievements; it simply extends the field of investigation into factors, such as meaning, essence, typology and even logic, as viable areas for the science of communication. These areas comprise the basis for communicative understanding in all of its facets. These facets constitute a field, within which empirical components assume relevance and function, meaning and direction, and obtain sense and structurally detached comprehensibility. Even human behavior opens a system of meaning implications that interconnect with other behaviors and their meaning implications. Indeed, messages must be transmitted by causal means and behaviors; yet, the essence of the messages consists of the shared meaning and the objects they delimit. Without the sharing of these “extra spatiotemporal” components, communication would at best be an immediate reaction to stimuli, implying nothing further than such a reaction. To restrict our focus to this kind of reaction is obviously inadequate if we are to understand the vast theoretical constructs, the hypothetical questions and their drawn implications and conclusions, which are so prevalent in the scientific and communicative process.

Another major theoretical position, purporting to deal with communication, specifically in its linguistic form, is structuralism. Structuralism has various proponents, beginning with the Prague school, moving through the linguistic field theorists and entering France as structural semantics. It is well known that Husserl, the father of contemporary phenomenology, had an impact on the Prague school of structural linguistics. Instrumental in this was Husserl’s first major work entitled “Logical Investigations”¹⁸. The

¹⁷ Waldenfels, B. (1971). *Zwischenreich des Dialogs* [The in-between Region of Dialogue].

¹⁸ Husserl, E. (1970). *Logical Investigations*, p. 10, 56.

investigation of this influence would take us too far afield from our topic. Suffice it to say, that Husserl's "Logical Investigations" was merely an initial step toward phenomenology; hence, anyone, whose exposure to this approach was restricted to this work, would have stopped short of the vast developments of phenomenology in the later works of Husserl and other phenomenologists¹⁹.

In our preceding discussion, we have used the term structure within the phenomenological context. Yet, the meaning of the term is not exactly the same as it is in structuralism. The difference emerges from a difference in theoretical positions and in the range, to which the term can be applied. Phenomenology claims that structuralism leaves out various important, indeed fundamental, aspects of experience that would be required for the understanding of structures. Our investigation of structuralism will reveal the gap that phenomenology can fill. As was the case with positivism, phenomenology does not reject structuralism, but only extends it by showing additional components that are necessary for the understanding of human communication and interaction. Because one of the major claims of phenomenology is that human life takes its course within the context of experience, the analysis of experience may constitute an extension of communicative understanding beyond structuralism.

Structuralism by definition means a manner, in which a building, an organism or any other complex and complete whole is constituted. This does not refer to the materials or stuff, of which it is composed, but the manner, in which these materials are arranged, that is, their relationships that form a coherent whole. Of course, the materials play a role, yet, they are selected to fit the requirements of the structure. Obviously, the converse is also partially true: If certain materials are lacking, particular structures could not be constructed. This structuralist viewpoint implies a functionalism; buildings are constructed to serve a purpose and language is devised to serve the purpose of communication. Even if the building has adornments that express no functional value or even if language has components serving no expressive ends, still at base the buildings are for shelter and the language is for communication. In this sense, the purpose determines the structure. In language, the purpose of communication determines its structure.

¹⁹ Holenstein, E. (1974). *Linguistik, Semiotic, Hermeneutik* [Linguistics, Semiotics, Hermeneutics]. Frankfurt am Main, West Germany: Suhrkamp.

Although structuralists engage in arguments, concerning the “location” of the structures, that is, whether they are models constructed by the scientist or where they are found in the real object, the most prevalent trend is that they are decipherable in the object by excluding the irrelevant physical features. The object is the physical reality and the mind discovers its structure in this reality. The structure is, thus, derivable from the observed factual states, although in itself it is not observable. Some structures, for example, in the social sciences, may not be directly manifest; they are, thus, called latent and must be analyzed out of the social reality. They are discoverable by a scientist, who aims beyond superficial behaviors, feelings, habits and attitudes and deciphers the deep relationships that rule the surface phenomena. Hence, the structure is always in the object and must be distinguished from a model constructed by a scientist. The model can represent a structure, but only when the components of the model correspond to the components of the structure of a given reality.

When dealing with language, structuralists have not reached consensus. Some simply deal with language as an object consisting of a sum of linearly distributed linguistic units, such as phonemes or terms; some include the speaker’s choices of terms for a particular purpose and some take language as an object of study under the assumption that the structure of the object can be discovered. Hence, they discard the speaker and the acts of speech, be they conscious or unconscious. This attempt is to see language “as it is in itself”, unrelated to any functions of the social subjects²⁰.

Some structuralists claim that structures, comprising the “logic of communication” and the rules of behavior, are unconsciously structured and, hence, strictly speaking, are not “known” by the subjects employing them. Through the exchange of linguistic signs and their meanings, the members of a society produce and maintain conceptual schemes that delimit social transactions. These transactions “express” the structures, although no particular expression yields the total structure. The study of these structures is possible because they are expressions of the human psyche that supposedly possesses universal characteristics. In other words, these individual psyches share the same structure. Given that these structures exist within the mind, they cannot be physically observed. They must be inferred from empirical

²⁰ Helbig, G. (1983). *Geschichte der Neueren Sprachwissenschaft [History of the New Science of Language]*. Opladen, West Germany: Westdeutscher Verlag.

observations, and the best place to look for these empirically observable structures is in language. However, it must be pointed out that the structure of language needs not be an expression of psychological structures, but can be partially based on social interaction. To study the structures of interaction would consist of the investigation of relationships of communication. Such relationships assume priority and the rules of such relationships, that is, their logic, would comprise the structures that are valid for all members of a communicative group. Because there are various levels of communication, social roles, family relationships, economic exchange and so forth, the rules and structures of each need not be reduced one to the other, although they can be conceived as variant expressions of one another. This form of structuralism goes so far as to claim that rules could be established for the transformation of one set of structural components into another. Thus, structuralism aims at a fundamental structure, within which all others are variants. In this way, a code for the deciphering of all languages and communication could be developed. Such a code is suggested by Jakobson and seems to be accepted by Levi-Strauss, that is, the binary code or the dichotomous scale²¹. It is even claimed that this code is the primal psychological fact in that the recognition of a pair by a child precedes the recognition of individual objects. This view is based primarily on the notion that phonemic structures are binary, and this structure reflects the structure of the psyche. By extension, this structuralist trend claims that not just the human mind, but the entire reality is ordered by binary relationships. Regardless of the complexity of the structure, its components can be analyzed in terms of a dichotomous scale; the latter subsumes not only linguistic and other forms of communication, but even natural events. Although some structuralists do not accept the binary set and argue for a trinary set, the basic assumption remains: there are primordial structures that rule all communicative processes at all levels of human interaction²².

There are various points of affinity between phenomenology and structuralism. Structuralism does tend to accept an area of objectivity within its own context. In terms of language, for example, structuralism accepts the

²¹ Jakobson, R. (1968). *Child Language, Aphasia, and General Sound Laws*. The Hague, Netherlands: Mouton; Levi-Strauss, C. (1963). *Structural Anthropology* (C. Jakobson & B. Schoepf, Trans.). New York: Basic Books.

²² Geckeler, H. (1971). *Strukturelle Semantik und Wortfeldtheorie* [Structural Semantics and Word Field Theory]. Munchen, West Germany: Wilhelm Fink Verlag.

“essential” components of language and attempts to discover such components across a vast diversity of expressions. Moreover, structuralism admits that there is no necessity to derive one structure from another or explain one in terms of the other. This is, indeed, a form of non-reductionism, which is also accepted by phenomenology. Yet, phenomenology, without rejecting the achievements of structuralism, would like to add various contributions not touched on by structuralism and to “bracket” various ontological presuppositions that belong to the speculative and not experiential dimension. Not that speculation is an uninteresting domain of investigation; it belongs rather to the question of how possibilities, without experiential content, are constituted.

The first problem facing structuralism, according to phenomenology, is the degree of abstraction involved in the basic structures. They seem to fit just about anything, and in this sense, they can accommodate the most diverse phenomena, irrespective of their generic differences. Due to such abstractedness, the dichotomous scale, for example, does not tell the experiencer whether he is dealing with humans or atoms. Yet, if specifications are introduced, then relevant experiential variations must also be introduced and their limits respected. The difference in the experiential meaning present in the binary relationship of positive-negative electric charges is in no way comparable to the relationship of male-female. Our experience of the electric charges, given, for example, in mathematical formulations, is radically different from our experience of male-female relationships. The latter is *intersubjective* and consists of various and highly complex levels of interaction, including play, eroticism, work, cultural means of communication, institutional settings, moral values and even religious meanings. The simple male-female dichotomy depends very much on the meaning context that may allow us to experience male and female without the characteristics of such a dichotomy. In a work situation, the gender characteristics may be disregarded completely and the person may be seen in terms of the meaning of the performed or required tasks; a politician, a cab driver, a student, a child and so forth. Hence, the meaning of the gender characteristics may be limited to a specific biological difference that does not enter into the experience of that person in a work situation or in a multitude of other situations. Phenomenologically speaking, there is no justification for the notion that the basic structure should be one of dichotomy, or for that

matter, one of triad. This is not to say that we cannot impute such structures in a very rarified atmosphere; yet, in the lived experiential solution, in which direct communication takes place, such structures differentiate into a variety of meanings, having no necessary connection with each other. Hence, communication, conceived phenomenologically, takes each level on its own terms and deciphers the experiential and communicative meanings appropriate to each. Of course, structuralism could object and point out that even communication is dichotomous, because it takes place between two persons or between a person and a group; yet, experientially communication includes more: the persons, the objects, the linguistic tradition and even the social positions of the communicating parties. All of these factors cannot be reduced to a dichotomous structure. While communicating, we are involved in a language of our tradition, although at that time we do not face language as a dichotomous opposite to our speaking, even if we are not completely identical with the linguistic process. As phenomenologists, such as Husserl, have suggested, in the direct experience of communication there is no sharp separation between the communicating parties; it is one process, in which the “I” and the “you” are not opposites. Only when communication breaks down are the communicating parties thrown back upon themselves and assume separation. The direct and immediate process of communication is prior to any dichotomous structure²³.

Phenomenology also questions structuralism’s two ontological assumptions: (a) the presence of structures in the unconscious or their unconscious use and (b) all reality is ordered by specific structures. With regard to both assumptions, phenomenology takes an ontologically neutral stance because the only way that we can talk about any kind of reality is in terms of experience. Hence, the main question would be: what kind and level of experience are required for the presence of such ontological structures?

Briefly, it can be pointed out that the level of experience is theoretical, requiring a complex process of selection, differentiation, exclusion and judgment. Yet, this process implies or is correlated to the experienced theoretical components, but not to their existence. In brief, it implies a modality of experiencing reality, but not the reality itself. In regard to the second assumption, phenomenology points out, that structuralism borrows the objects of experience and the essential aspects present in experience

²³ Husserl, E. (1966). *Analysen Sur Passiven Synthesis*.

and translates them into ontological reality. This is an unwarranted leap from experiential components to the posited reality. In reference to the first assumption, phenomenology suggests a distinction that abolishes the theoretical need for an assumed unconscious process. While experiencing things about us, events that come and go, we are directly aware of such things and events in a particular way. Yet, we are not directly aware of the manner, in which we structure our experiences of those things and events. Although we are directly living within the experiential process, we hardly pay attention to such a process; rather, we attend to objects and events. Hence, this process is anonymous. Yet, the anonymity does not mean that it is unconscious. All we need to do is reflect on the modalities of our experience in order to discover why the thing was present in a particular way: as useful, as remote, as taller than and so forth. The problem with structuralism is that, on the one hand, having discovered the immediate components of experience, such as dichotomy, it assumes that this dichotomy was, in some way, unconscious, and on the other hand, it posits these experiential components as reality. Phenomenology does not deny that dichotomy is a mode of experience and can become an object of reflection; it simply points out that an object of experience is ontologically indifferent.

Indeed, structuralism can communicate its theses not because of its ontology, but because of the experiential dimension accessible to all. It presents an experiential system of essential structures, in terms of which we too can view reality; yet, such a view does not imply any existential claims. The object of experience, as was already stressed, is not the ontological object called reality, although the latter can be employed as an example of the experienced essence. What is transmitted in the process of communication is the experienced and not the ontological object. In addition, the experienced object is transmitted in communication within the context of an experiential process, capable of ascribing a multitude of meanings constituted by selectivity, judgment, synthesizing, evaluating, rejecting, accepting and so on, a process, that structures, but that cannot be subsumed in all cases under a particular structure. This process is discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters.

Phenomenology is capable of adding to structuralism various fundamental experiential processes and essential components without any ontological assumptions and without simplification of experience to a highly se-

lect and abstract structure. For example, structuralism can deal with language and its dominating rules, yet, it leaves out the language that is used in the communication process at the time that the rules are discussed. This process, the experiential and immediate observation of the linguistic rules, although fundamental, is at the same time not included in the rules being discussed. Yet, this process is precisely what attributes various meanings, values and judgments to the rules. Without it, the rules would be neither experienced, nor communicated. For communication, this phenomenological dimension is unavoidable and must be investigated in its own right. Although dealing with structures as identity, structuralism forgets the experiential variations, across which identities are constituted and communicated²⁴.

Two additional, although closely related, factors of structuralism must be briefly discussed: (a) structures, that is, linguistic, can be discovered in their purity by an objective observation, that is, empirical investigation of a given language, and (b) the structures of language can be analyzed apart from speakers and users of a language.

The first assumes that empirical observation can, in its own right, reveal the structures present in language. Yet, the experience of language is much broader than a mere observation of its empirical components. To investigate something is to be led by an insight into the experienced essence of that something. Such an experience directs empirical observation and selectivity. The linguist does not blindly plunge into the empirical components; rather, he is looking for something among such components. If he did not know in his experience what he is looking for, he would be unable to arrange the empirical data properly and would be unable to select the “appropriate” empirical components. In brief, the linguist has an experiential insight that allows an attribution of certain meanings that are proper to typology under investigation and exclusion of meanings that do not fit. Hence, the empirical work presupposes a structure that one seeks and meanings that one can attribute to the structure. Both of these experiential components are not empirically given, although they are presupposed in the empirical investigation and in the communication of the results. This is not to deny that the empirical components of language are present to the experiencer; yet, such components are transcendent and are outside of the

²⁴ Held, K. (1966). *Lebendige Gegenwart* [Living Presence]. The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff.

process of experiencing. The empirical components are organized and arranged in terms of the experiential process with its typologies, meanings, judgments and selectivities. This process is a necessary ground for understanding the sense and structure of language²⁵.

The second aspect accepts language without the speakers or the communicating parties. This assumes that the speakers are completely dominated by the linguistic structures and have no impact on language and communication. If this were the case, language would remain constant and, once learned, it would contain no ambiguities. Yet, experience testifies that in the living linguistic engagement, there are no precise univocal meanings; the meaning of each term is contextual and situational and has a horizon of implications that would be absent in another context. Indeed, the communicating parties also play a significant role in revealing the meanings of a term; not infrequently we hear such questions: “What do you really mean by this term?” From such a question can emerge a novel meaning of a given term that, in fact, can become a part of general vocabulary. Hence, the participants in the communicative process have a great deal to do with the meaning of terms; they mean something by them. It is, therefore, inadequate to analyze the “dead letter” and to expect a resultant understanding of language and communication in their lived engagement. This is not to say that such an engagement cannot be understood and analyzed; rather, the pure observation of language and its structures is inadequate for understanding all linguistic and communicative processes. Phenomenology, in this sense, is not a negation of the accomplishments of structuralism, but an addition that is essential for the comprehension of lived communication. Within this context, it could be said that although language structures our experience, the experiencer also structures language, contextualizes it and ascribes specifications to it that have unique and situational implications. This accounts for ambiguities of expression and for the possibility of overcoming such ambiguities.

Finally, the givenness of structures of experienced objects and states of affairs for phenomenology signifies neither an inherence of these structures in some objective or subjective reality, nor a supervening natural or social necessity; rather, it is a relationship between the experiencer and the world. One could say that structuralism ontologizes and, thus, misplaces struc-

²⁵ Husserl, E. (1968). *Logische Untersuchungen* [Logical Investigations]. Vol. I, p. 30.

tures, whereas phenomenology regards them experientially as relational systems of meanings and their significations of experienced essences.

Semiology

Semiology requires that we survey its basic tenets, concerns and principles in order to note how phenomenology would complement it in terms of concrete experience. Semiologists are concerned with the sign systems in the broadest sense of the term: from language to the modes in clothing and the varieties of human behavior, from ethical systems through entire cultural systems. It uses the language of computers, codes, models, binary oppositions, metaphoric shifts, etc. Culture is seen as a sign system of information exchange, accessible to the communication and information theory. Semiology talks of a secondary modeling system as a tripartite relationship among the sign systems, the reality that it continuously models, and the sign user. Central to this is the notion of a system and the relationship among systems. Akin to structuralism, semiologists are interested in the concept of binary opposition, that is, strictly defined and logically exclusive relationship. This constitutes a principle of all formation. In meaning formation, for example, a concept is understandable only in relation to its opposite: “masters” make sense only where there are “slaves”; “selves” where there are “others.” It is the source of definitions and the analytical tool in the study of culture that is defined in opposition to that which escapes cultural regulations. Oppositional pairs are the primary principles organizing human life and thought and have led the way to comparative theorizing²⁶.

One of the basic oppositional principles is the difference and relationship between primary and secondary systems, such as natural language and its various specific formulations, such as literary, aesthetic, scientific and so forth. This leads to the concept of models that consist of a finite number of elements and relations among these elements. Models provide a way of forming a world. Modeling of the world is carried out in human society due to the presence of a number of semiotic systems that are mutually complementary. Various semiotic modeling systems form complex hierarchical series of levels, in which the system on the lowest level-natural language-serves to codify the signs that enter the system at a higher level-literary

²⁶ Hawkes, T. (1977). *Structuralism and Semiotics*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

language. The most fully developed semiotic methods pertain to relationships among different levels in natural languages (between structural and mathematical linguistics).

In any semiotic system, the sign (the unity of the signifier and the signified), interrelating with other signs, forms a text. The signs are linked by syntagmatic rules. Semiology extends linguistic terminology to make it applicable to all sign systems. For example, Saussure's distinction between *Langue* and *parole* became understood as samples of the theoretical apparatus of any sign system – *Langue* – and of the realization or employment of individual signs in specific contexts – *parole*. Although Saussure had limited his understanding of semiology to a linguistic science employing the methods of verbal research, the contemporary semioticians recognize semiotics as a study, for example, of an artistic text in its complex interweaving of many linguistic codes, thus, necessitating a methodology apart from linguistics. The text has to be tied to various cultural systems and their hierarchical arrangement. In these procedures, a sign is seen as an intersection of two linguistic codes (language here is no longer just the spoken language), whereby there is a transfer of meaning or information. This transfer constitutes the very ways that any text could be understood because the text is part of a cultural whole; it must be understood in its relationship to the modes of life, literary norms, traditions, ideas and its relationship to extra-textual reality. Hence, the text is only one of the cultural models; other models, while interacting with the text, constitute the nature of the signs, precisely because of the opposition to the codes of the text²⁷.

Culture, as a whole, is also seen as a system of signs and is opposed to non-culture. Culture is, thus, seen as human made and conventional. This leads semioticians to the question of the relationship between natural language and culture. There is a tendency to accept natural language as the basic sign system, whereas cultural phenomena are seen as secondary modeling systems. In this sense, natural languages can fulfill a metalinguistic function. This leads semiology to stress functionalism against anything called essence. The functioning of natural language is seen as providing the members of a social group with an intuitive sense of structuredness, which transforms the “open” world into a “closed” world of names²⁸.

²⁷ Eco, U. (1979). *A Theory of Semiotics*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, p.23.

²⁸ Hawkes, T. (1977). *Structuralism and Semiotics*, p. 32.

Obviously, semiology extends the realm of investigation into the human world to include not only spoken or written linguistic phenomena, but also the non-spoken, the ritualized and the cultural phenomena. Yet, it does so at such an abstract methodological level and in a language of cybernetics that it seems to become an exercise in formalisms without any roots in experience. If there are roots in experience, semiology must assume that experience is totally shaped by the semiologic sign systems. Hence, the first problem facing semiology lies in the direction of the ability of a semiotician to survey with detached objectivity the various cultural phenomena, their levels of modeling and even the natural language as the basis of all culture. If natural language were the meta-basic sign system of all understanding, then it would be impossible to survey this language objectively and relate it to higher models of a culture, without circularity, that is, we would be defining natural language by itself. Such a definition is not a definition; it would be like saying a hand is a hand. However, experience testifies that we can survey the natural language, see its relationships to aesthetic language and to other cultural codes, and do so without any apparent impediment or constraint by the closed structuration of the natural language. This process, called by phenomenology the transcendental, constitutes an experiential background, from which the investigation of any sign system and its relationships to other systems is visibly experienced. It constitutes an experiential condition, without which semioticians could not proceed with their work. At the same time, it is the level of experience, at which essential and typological distinctions are made. Although semiology denies any requirement for essence, phenomenology points out that the essences, as given in experience, are presupposed by semiology, which makes distinctions among various sign systems. To delimit what belongs to one system and what to another, and specifically when they can be seen in terms of logical exclusivity, requires essential delimitations of such systems. For example, when semiology makes a distinction and constitutes a binary opposition between cultural and extra-cultural phenomena, it assumes an essential distinction²⁹. Of course, semioticians could point out that what is extra-cultural in one culture may be intra-cultural in another and, hence, the distinction is functional within a particular social-linguistic fabric. Yet, despite the question concerning which factors are seen as cultural and which as extra-cultural

²⁹ Eco, U. (1979). *A Theory of Semiotics*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, p.28.

during a particular historical period or distinct geographic location, the experiential fact remains that the selectivity of such factors assumes an essential insight into their difference and into what constitutes culture and what does not. In brief, the historical variations assume an insight into a constancy that appears throughout such variations. Without such constancy, the variations would not provide us with any principle or even a nominal definition as to differences between culture and non-culture.

Taking semiology on its own terms, the distinction between what is culture and what lies outside of its parameters is cultural and, hence, dependent on the natural language of that culture. But in this sense, there is nothing extra-cultural, because a simple designation of what constitutes non-culture lies within the framework of a sign system. Being locked in such a system, we cannot specifically look at what lies outside it, when the entire semiotic process is based on a sign-system and the modes of its communication. This means that the experiential process that differentiates between natural language as the fundamental sign system of a culture and the higher models must lie either in the natural language or outside of it. If it lies in the natural language, then it is difficult to see any reason why there should be any higher models, to which the natural language would have to be related. If such a language is to function as meta-language, all the higher models should be given within the distinctions of such a language. Yet, if there is an either/or distinction indicating the differences and relationships between the natural language and the higher models, then the distinction must come from another level, capable of objectively surveying the natural language and the higher models. In itself, there is nothing to indicate that one language is natural and others are not. We speak, we poetize and we formulate scientific theories very “naturally”. When we introduce distinctions between these languages, we do so by ascribing to them an experiential meaning from a domain of essential insight constituting criteria that allow us to make the distinctions. Although it may be possible to see language in functional terms and, hence, to exclude anything called essential, it is not possible to reject experiential essences used to constitute typologies of languages and their relationships. Once again, phenomenology does not make a claim that essences exist; it claims that they are required for the experience dealing with distinctions and attributions.

Semiotics assumes a unity between the sign and the signified and at the same time introduces a signifier. First, we must question whether the sign and the signified have such a unity. In phenomenological terms, a sign indeed signifies, but in a way that the signified need not be exhausted by a particular sign: the sign is never adequate and, hence, never in complete unity with the signified. The term red indeed signifies the color red, yet, the phenomenon that is experienced as red has more significance: it has a depth horizon and an expansive horizon. The red is dull, attractive and blazing; it is a red color of a table, a table in a room in the house, and so forth. It is not the sign alone that leads to continuous exploration, but the experienced phenomena themselves. They suggest the appropriateness and the interrelationships of signs. Moreover, in the process of signifying, the experiencing subject, the signifier, does not so much attend to the signs and their relationships, but to the phenomena themselves, and then selects the signs to signify the phenomena. Knowing the sign system, knowing the relationship among signs, is an abstraction that does not necessarily follow the structure of the experienced phenomena. In many cases, the signs may be deconstructed away from the analytically appropriate functioning of the sign system to accommodate the phenomena. The condition for this is, of course, the subject, who experiences the phenomena and who can assign meanings to the signs that are not in accord with the ones required by the strict adherence to the sign system. Thus, the user of signs may intend the sign to mean something other than what the sign usually signifies. This experiential process may lend a meaning and, indeed, by doing so, restructure the meaning of other signs to correspond to the phenomena and to their horizons of implications. Hence, the communicative process requires an inclusion of the communicator capable of assigning meanings to terms required by the experienced phenomena, to which the communicating parties are directed.

Matter of Fact

What is a “fact”? A fact is a state of affairs, the public description of which is not solely dependent upon the unique circumstances of a single individual. The occurrence and the subject-matter of this description may be so dependent, the description itself as an act performed may be dependent, thus, the description as an object, however, must be public and, as representative of the described, must focus primarily, if not outright exclusively,

on these aspects of the described deemed exemplary, i.e., independent from the historical and psychological uniqueness of the circumstances described. This independence may seem ambiguous in that it involves not only 1) the independence of the description itself, as a new public “object”, but also 2) the independence and transmission of some of the features described, chosen because of this transmission. Any “description” may be public in the way mentioned by virtue of 1) even when what is described is itself not amenable to independence in sense 2). To establish a matter of fact, however, we would maintain that independence 1) and 2) have to be achieved in one and the same description. The case mentioned above, where 1) is achieved but not 2) is the case characterized as that of “proper sense”. More obvious examples can be used to show the way a field or subject matter is delimited and matters of fact are established. An example from a legal system ought to suffice.

To arrive at a required description is the role lawyers and investigative officers assume as they compile and compare the accounts of diverse witnesses to a particular event. All factors indicating that some element in the description attaches solely to the unique circumstances of a single individual (drunkenness, psychological disturbances either pathological and prolonged or momentary, etc.) are sifted and their bearing on anyone description evaluated. Critical questions of essence are answered on the basis of these evaluations and eventually lawyers, judge and jury come to the final confrontation with the “evidence” and decide whether or not the event in its public description essentially fits as an example of “premeditated murder”, “accidental homicide” or whatever, as the case may be. First, the testimony is sifted, then the final picture is tested to see if, on the basis of the “facts”, what looked like premeditated murder still fits the essential features of such or whether, in the sorting process some essential features have disappeared, the lack of which transforms the “matter of fact” into a case of (an example of) accidental homicide.

“Selective description” is the process, according to which an event occurring in the stream of lived experiences of a subject is made inter-subjectively validated by the process outlined. This means that the subject matter is accessible to anyone capable of performing the activities described so far. It is one mark of educational process to see who can perform such activities in correlation to a given field. Although the example chosen is the

cooperative effort of a criminal trial toward “matters of fact”, the example should not stand in the way of understanding other fields. Obviously, errors of justice, as in any other field, are made often enough for disquiet concerning the genuine independence of the matters of fact from the unique circumstances of some single individual. All too often what is taken as such is not really such in the actual case. But this only reinforces the point made by giving an example of a failure to fulfill the requirements specified: miscarriages of justice occur, when (unknown to judge and jury (one would hope!)) some single individual succeeds in presenting as independent from his volition a description intimately subservient to it. Nor should the illustration given suggest that only in this kind of cooperative effort are “matters of fact” properly described. A closer look at the procedures of such a trial reveal that each individual participant (witnesses, lawyers, jury, judge and defendant alike) are asked by the situation to test for themselves each individually the descriptions they hear against previous descriptions and, for the witness and possibly the defendant too, against their rememorated lived-experience of the event.

Hence, everyone must sift, test and attempt to fulfill the overall aim of making the description itself independent of private circumstances. Eventually, each juror will have to pit unaided his own “model description” against those of his jurors not (ideally) on the basis of pride of authorship, but on the basis of its independence from himself. That is why prospective jurors, whose beliefs would render them unable to fulfill this ideal, are sorted out and disqualified or should be. A better analysis of this example shows each individual singly, in the privacy of his own subjectivity, performing for himself the “selective description”.

A further comment to be made here concerns the next step to be taken by each juror in exclusive communion with himself: “exemplary generality”. Once the “matters of fact” have been established to his satisfaction, the juror must look upon the individual and particular case, thus, pinpointed as a member of a well-defined, open group comprising all lived-events, which differ from one another only in the specificity of the circumstances of their occurrence and not at all in some basic features deemed essential. The case is tested for such basic features and is looked upon as a purported example of “premeditated murder” or “accidental homicide” and as such it resents itself as fulfilling or not fulfilling in whole or in parts the require-

ments prescribed by such a role. “Taking something as an example” and “selecting essential features” are synonymous expressions, describing the act of “selective generalization” or “exemplary generalization”, two nearly synonymous expressions. “Selective generalization” points to the removal of the unique and private circumstances or features from the matter of fact; thus, described as the representative of a complete group. It is to be noted that a particular juridical system also lurks in the background and can be investigated in its own right.

At this point, some may feel tempted to reinforce the “objectivity” of exemplary generalization by some sort of statistical corroboration or some other form of quantitative inductive generalization. The problem is that there can be no quantitative inductive generalization, except on the basis of all three moves described above. One has first to achieve the public description of a state of affairs in order to have the latter of fact with which to begin a collection of instances. Before one can collect any kind of sample grouping, or even specify the conditions ruling such a collection as well as the recognition of control groups, all three techniques – selective description, abstractive generalization and exemplary generalization – will have to have been performed. They will confer on the statistical sampling and the quantitative induction, the frame of which gives them continuity.

The “object” obtained by public or independent description, generalization and exemplary generalization “transcends” by essence the concrete individual circumstances, within which it is presented. The lived occurrence: a car almost ran over me becomes the sentence “a car almost ran over me”, which fits but does not belong to the particular event it describes, since this event and the sentence could serve as well for your event as for anyone else’s, exhibiting the same essential features. Hence, the sentence “a car almost ran over me” has a presence other than (1) that of the event it describes, (2) that of the instance of its being uttered, or written, I or read, or heard, (3) its local occurrence in any of those forms or streams of lived experiences – by being independent from anyone stream of lived experiences.

This realm may indeed have traces in specific stream of lived experiences (in this case, the actual marks on paper or sound waves), but it is not in them; rather, they point to it as other than they. This realm transcends its traces. It is ideal rather than real: it is the transcendental level, the level properly reached by formal generalization. To reach this level is the *Sin qua*

non for a field and although fields may differ in subject matter, principles and heuristic methods, they all have at least this in common, that the matters of fact, on which they base their findings, have all undergone at least the full formal generalizations detected here.

Specific fields, such as Classical Physics, require that all its “facts” be described in terms of magnitude alone. This requirement is over and above the more fundamental one requiring only an independent description. There is no essential move from the initial fundamental requirement to the more specific one, limiting the tools of description to “magnitude” only. The descriptions given here did not involve magnitude, yet, they did involve “matters of facts” as well as generality. We were able to arrive at descriptions independent of any single individual, ranging generally and unequivocally, over all possible similar instances, and providing as well the definite conditions, under which they would not apply in any single case. These are the basic requirements of any field. These requirements are fulfilled by the limitation to magnitude, but it is wrong to assert that only the description of magnitude can guarantee their fulfillment. Hence, there can be science, when the fundamental demand for independent description and formal generalization is met, whether or not it is met by the description of magnitudes.

Phenomenology, in this sense, is an attempt to establish just such a fundamental conception, in some cases called transcendental – this holds even when the subject-matter of the description is not itself eidetic or transcendental in nature. Take, for example, the above discussion on the sentence “a car almost ran over me”: there is nothing transcendental about being “almost run over”, yet, this sentence is generally representative for any and all specific such instances, no matter what the actual circumstances might be. The lived event the sentence denotes furnishes the essential features the sentence expresses; these essential features are lifted out of the particular experience by a selective generalization. An independent, but not selective description would include many particular details, which would prevent the paragraphs expressing them from being representative of anything, but this one uniquely lived instance. This would not be a transcendental phenomenological description in the sense used here. On the other hand, a far richer description than the one obtained with the sentence “a car almost ran over me” could be given, involving as many of the essential features, such an experience possesses “for anyone”: such a description, although its

“lived” subject-matter would be neither “eidetic”, nor “transcendental”, does not prevent us from raising “questions concerning its essence” and, hence, would place itself and the object it expresses – the essence sought – at the eidetic or transcendental level. Such a description would be the eidetic description of the essence or *eidos* of a non-eidetic object.

If we take up again the example of the use of the sentence “a car almost ran over me” given above, we find that there are very many situations, in which it could conceivably be properly applied. We find also that each of these situations could be described in itself in such a manner, that it would be exemplary (i.e., define an open group of such possible instances). That is to say, the factors closing the group have nothing to do with the particular structure of the group itself, but depend rather upon essential laws governing the group, in which this group may fit. The group “I was almost run over by a Cadillac” will appear as a closed group on the empirical basis of what we know about Cadillacs and Cadillac-making. This has nothing to do about the actual structure of the example, which says nothing concerning empirical limitations. ‘I’ can be almost run over by countless imaginary Cadillacs countless times: the group defined, thus, is open solely because its essential structure says nothing as to number.

If I were to talk about the fingers on the hand of a five-fingered animal, although the number of such animals is left open, the number of fingers per hand is not (adjective is missing) and any hand could produce only five exemplars of such a group member, the group of which would then close itself. That is why six fingered animals belong to either a different species or are construed as “monsters”, which odd hand-configuration has to be “explained” by an appeal to a different grouping: the group of genetically damaged five-fingered animals, i.e. group so-defined that the number of fingers it might exhibit ideally is unlimited in the structure of the group either in less or in more. Or, to put this in a different way, we have removed from the example an essential feature, without which the example is no longer an example of what it was supposed to represent. Other respects have remained equal, obviously, add so we still want to talk about five-fingered animals, but we have to do so in a negative or a limited way. The “monster” is a five-fingered animal, which does not fit the example in the one specific instance, in which he is meant to fit, i.e. five fingeredness, but which should, according to other indices. And I know that he should on the basis of the

closed-group of fingers deemed exemplary. Hence, the exemplary group of fingers is limited as to number in its essential structure, although this in no way limits the group of five-fingered animals, the structure of which contains no specification as to number at all.

The distinction between groups, the essential structure of which is limiting as to number and groups the essential structure of which has no such explicit limit, is fundamental to all we have to say here. The distinction between the eidetic level and the empirical, formal generalization and quantitative generalization, is based on it. Quantitative generalization goes beyond the finite group of samples quantified only by statistical projection. It is, therefore, at the mercy of the specific state of affairs in any single case not yet collected, or any wider group of cases not yet collected, which may cause the statistical projection to be revised. This is both its defect and its strength: quantitative generalization presents itself as tentative and open to revisions according to specific empirical procedures usually grouped under the heading “scientific” or “empirical” methods.

Yet, the essential delimitation is different, as noted in the example with a car. Most people would take it for granted that all I wanted to do here was to recount one particular incident of my personal history, according to the fact that I might accent my tale, my account might take on different meanings, when located in different horizons of awareness available to me from others. It might be an instance of carelessness. It might be an example of independent lines of causation relevant to another, e.g., scientific or theological. If all I am asked is what is needed for a police report, mentions of “the Lord” or of “determinism” will not be retained by the traffic cop. The incident itself may have, for example, the philosophic use I am making of it right now.

Any “matter of fact” can be the objective referent of any number of radiating intentions, each offering a different perspective upon the particular matter of fact, each with meaning in its own different way (here, one is reminded of the old “Winner at Jena and Vanquished at Waterloo” textbook examples), therefore, each presenting its own aspect of that matter of fact, each doing so more or less felicitously on its own terms. Between the signification, the meaning and the objective referent or matter of fact, which “fulfills” or “supports” it, a distinction, which is different from the distinction between the actual state of affairs and the essential features of the matter of fact, has to be made,. Here, there are four terms: the intention of

signification, that signification, the actual state of affairs, and the essential features of that state of affairs publicly described or as a matter of fact. The essential features of the “matter of fact” are the “reason” of the series of possible significations the matter of fact supports: they “appear” through every member of the series and this is how a member of the series is recognized but, they are not anyone particular series-member – if they were this one member, there would be no series because what binds the series together is the ghostly presence of its ratio of the series itself; its specific differences from every other purported member would become essential (exemplary or defining) distinctions, which would prevent us from assimilating them with the others. The imaginary variations, which enable us to recognize similitude among purported series-members, do so because they aim at an ideal identity of essential structures apprehensible, when specific features of each series-member are imaginatively removed though in reality they remain untouched and by their removal lead from one member to the next.

Thus, the convert, the policeman, the indeterminist and the philosopher may all agree that they are talking about a traffic incident when each is willing to remove from his view of the event those features, which the others do not share; this does not make this particular view privileged over others: it is only what they have in common, i.e. what is visible through each, but belongs exclusively to none in particular (bear in mind that for the policeman or the insurance man, a traffic incident comprises features, to which neither the convert, nor the indeterminist, nor the philosopher needs to be sensitive: it is apprehended through each, embodied in none). The ratio is not itself a series-member and requires a particular view (formal generalization) of a series-member for its apprehension: a particular view, i.e., a particular intention, one, whose object is an essence, an eidetic intuition. The series-member then appear as one possibility among many; some of its features appear removable not simply because they are mired in particularity, but because they are dependent upon an intention of signification other than the one intuiting essences. The ordinary intention of signification fulfilled (or answered) by a particular series-member must be replaced by another intention, which tests both the previous intention of signification and the object fulfilling it, together for features dependent upon the previous intention specifically and not transposable to the object of any other intention.

From what has been said it is clear that the presumed “empirical person” cannot be posted as a standard, by which to decide the human question. What was noted with regard to the self and ego, leading to polio-centric field and history, the self is always more than an ego. This more is a constantly lived and assumed set of phenomena, pertaining to this subject matter: the human is more than what is given at present. Various terms have been used to express this “more”, ranging from potentiality to possibility, impossibility and even infinity. This suggests a common recognition that this “more” has to be disclosed, revealed, actualized or realized. It can be claimed that even philosophical anthropologies belong in this framework, when they proclaim the human as an “unfinished” being, or when the globalizers on various continents demand for all sorts of technologies, assistances and expertise to help “develop” the indigenous populations. All such notions suggest that there is a human dimension that has to be brought out, educed, educated and, thus, fully actualized. Even all the furious revolutions to abolish alienation perhaps rest on this phenomenon of “more.”

CHAPTER III

Phenomenology and Language

Perhaps there is no other question that could equal the preoccupation of the 20th century's thought than language. If we survey the major trends of philosophy, we find that despite the vast diversities in orientation, ontological principles and theoretical postulates, they all converge in the claim that language is the mode of being human, without which at least our human world would be incomprehensible. From positivistic search of universal calculus through ordinary language philosophy, hermeneutics, semiology, structuralism, to phenomenology and field linguistics, the assumption is that a proper understanding of language is a key to the secret of demystification of the world and even the revelation of the ultimate being. Of course, phenomenology is no exception to this preoccupation. It is quite remarkable that although Husserl was still remote from the question of language, even if his "Logical Investigations" comprise an excellent treatise on the analysis of a multitude of linguistic forms and their distinctions, later phenomenologists, beginning with Heidegger and going through Merleau-Ponty, take language to be as the *sine qua none* of all thought and being. This chapter will give a summary exposition of language in phenomenological thought and show its direct functioning in the dialogical process and experience. The phenomenological discussion of language can be subsumed under three major phases: (a) the Husserlian phase that is preoccupied with language as an expression of the phenomena of consciousness; it is an external garment of thought, (b) the Heideggerian notion of language as a house of learning, and (c) the orientation of Merleau-Ponty toward language as the basis for the structuration of experience and the phenomena.

The Husserlian Phase

Although Husserl has not written an explicit work on language, on the nature of speaking his opus is replete with references to language and specifically its relationship to logic and science. In this sense, language is to be determined by thought and logic. Husserl's first concern with language is its capacity to express meaning. Because the basic experiential dimension is concerned with meaning that stems from conscious intentionality, then

language is a means to express the intentionality. This basic process of expression and meaning appears in the dialogical process with the question “What do you mean by this term?” This question suggests that the term does not have an independent meaning, but must acquire its meaning from the speaker, who “means” the term in a particular way. This led Husserl to the notion that speaking is definitory and predicative. By giving meaning, we define terms and use them in a predicative sense. Furthermore, Husserl’s linguistic understanding follows his basic conception of consciousness as an intentional process of meaning something other than itself of being related to something. The ego thinks, perceives and wonders about something: *Ego-cogito-cogitatum*. Language follows this outline in the form of *ego-dictodictum*. Hence, in the analysis of intentional experience, there is a correlative analysis of language; the explication of language is, in turn, the explication of experience. From what has been said in Chapter 1, it should be clear that experience does not point and is not bound to the world of things. Things for us are as they are meant. Things may vary without any change in the meaning attributed to them and meanings may vary without any change in the things. Thus, things are given within the web of conscious experience of meaning. If language is the vehicle of meaning and the way it intends things, then language, as an expression of intended meaning, is also the web, within which things make sense and appear in experience. Whenever we speak, we intend the terms to function with the meaning that we give them. In this sense, we cannot find meaningless terms because any terms, whenever chosen for communication, are already intended to mean something. An analysis of language in Husserlian phenomenology is an analysis of experience that the terms embody. There is no “language in itself”. It is only language because it traces and articulates experience. Meaning that stems from intentional experience is completely intertwined with language, even if different terms can be used to express the same meaning or one term can carry various meanings. In either case, language is inhabited by the intended meaning.

But the meaning is directed, it means something. Intentional orientation, which constitutes a meaning, is directed toward something and means that something. Hence, I speak words about something. Through intentional meaning expressed by words, I am open to the world and to others, who hear me. Language is generated in the expressed meaning that is oriented toward the world and addressed to others. Language is, in this sense,

a mediation between the subject's intentions and the world, and between subject and subject. It could be said that the intentional consciousness deploys itself into a concrete experiential, audible and visible field through spoken or written language. But for Husserl, language has another specific characteristic. Although language is pre-given, found in our natural world and the culture, in which we are born, it is at the same time set into movement from its habitual meaning toward a critical meaning, precision. Although a habitual word may have many associations and related meanings in the process of speaking, we sharpen the word and move it toward critical precision. We consciously extricate it from its moras, so to speak, and lend it clarity and univocity. This movement from natural ambiguity, naive usage of terms toward their clarity is a movement from what Husserl called the natural attitude of language toward its use as a medium of an expression of univocal meaning and the univocal way of meaning and expressing something. In this sense, Husserl dynamizes language, sets it into motion by lending it precision and univocal direction. It could be said that for Husserl, in the process of communication, language is this transition from everydayness, from naive position to critical meaning. In speaking and communicating, this transition is ceaseless. We take the pre-given words and constantly move them toward an articulated expression of meaning and designation³⁰. In the dialogical encounter, we always shift among the pre-given terms, combine them and recombine them in various ways and sweep them up toward an appropriate expression of a meaning and the meant states of affairs. Language in dialogue is this constant movement from naive to reflectively purified and critical meaning. Due to the dialogical encounter, language is sharpened and clarified. One's expression is always silently contested by the other, interrogated and moved toward precision. As Heintel suggested, for Husserl, language becomes processual and not a sum of pre-given terms of natural and naive speaking. In this movement, language becomes the mediating domain, trans-significative, such that the dialogical partners encounter in it each other and the world. Of course, for Husserl, the experiential consciousness, the consciousness that intends something in a particular meaning, is broader than language³¹.

³⁰ Waldenfels, B. (1980). *Der Spielraum des Verhaltens* [The Scope of Behavior], p. 133.

³¹ Heintel, E. (1972). *Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie* [Introduction to the Philosophy of Language]. Darmstadt, West Germany: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, p. 40.

In case of a novel insight words may fail and we cannot express what we mean. Yet, even in these situations, the meaning is not absolutely alien and can be slowly explicated in terms of other meanings and their verbal expressions until finally the novel meaning comes to the fore. This suggests that language and its meaning can be restructured in terms of the intended meaning and the states of affairs. What keeps language open and pliable, according to Husserl, is our ability to mean something in novel, although not in alien ways. Although we have finite empirical means of expression, such means, in their movement toward spoken articulation of meaning, are indefinitely pliable.

Although the movement of language toward selectivity and articulation allows us to employ it with full awareness of its meaning, a language of a tradition has an ontological dimension that is never questioned.

Heidegger called this dimension “hermeneutics”, which is an interpretation of the meaning of being. The Western tradition, expressed in language, interprets being as substantive, consisting of a permanent and stable structure possessing specific attributes, some of which are essential and some accidental. According to Heidegger, such an interpretation leads to a static language. Linguistic terms refer to permanent substances and, hence, have a permanence of their own. Substantives are characterized by attributes and verbs that reveal the qualifications and movements of the permanent entities. The language is, in this sense, “significative”. It points to things, their characteristics and their actions.

Western thought is completely imbedded in this ontology expressed in language. In this sense, our thought cannot escape the constraints of language. Our thinking is coextensive with our language, and we think solely in words. But this does not mean that the speaker is in charge of language, that he has language objectively. Any kind of objective analysis of language is inadequate. If being is given to experience in terms of hermeneutics and in terms of interpretation that is linguistic, then all being claiming objectivity must be present within the context of language. The linguistic context is the milieu, in which being plays out its destiny in our experience.

In light of this, Heidegger was compelled to abandon any kind of objective and analytical approach to language. One reason that Heidegger rejected the objective stance toward language and, indeed, metalanguage, is because apart from having ontological prejudgments, it is metaphysical. It is correlative with the Western metaphysical conceptuality that is founded on the logic

of identity, of A is A. The notion of identity underlies both the Western metaphysics and the Western logic as a foundation of language. One of its shortcomings is its exclusion of time as a fundamental aspect of the experienced world. Although our languages may possess temporal terms, they do not change the basic identity or the substantiality of the basic terms, that is, the nominative significations. The temporal terms merely transpose the identical entity into a different time slot, which is accidental, inessential or fortuitous.

The movement toward metalinguistics is a movement toward the technologized metaphysics. It is the metaphysics of technologization of language into a functional instrument of information. This metalanguage becomes the new metaphysical world that supposedly dominates all human interaction. Yet, this metalinguistic movement obfuscates the language that we speak, namely, the language, in which we say something about the metalanguage, the language that is not subsumable into any kind of metalanguage. If language fails in this sense, this failure belongs to language itself. It is ultimately impossible to make language into an object, because in doing so, we still remain in speaking, which is not an object of our linguistic reflection. This creates the hermeneutical circle: in order to speak about language, we must be in language that encompasses more than the language being spoken about. This leads us to the point in which the last interpreter must be sought. Is the last interpreter the speaker, as would be the case with Husserl, or is it the language, into which we are born and which is more than any speaker could encompass? Phenomenological understanding of language is a resolution between these two dimensions. Is language based on “timeless” conceptual structures, or is it historically transmitted embodying the interpretation of being, an interpretation from which we cannot escape? After all, any time we wish to make language into an object, we maintain a more fundamental language of our tradition, within which the objectified language functions.

These problems shall re-emerge in our discussion of the concrete role of language in communication. What is essential at present is the manner, in which language functions directly in experience. It is hoped that our exposition of language will not attempt to make the linguistic process into a “metalanguage” or into an objectified system of analytic components of some would-be logic, constructed a priori, to validate our speaking. Rather, we shall attempt to capture the linguistic process as it takes place without prejudice.

Although thinking of language as a mode of being-in-the-world, Heidegger was keenly aware of language as “anonymity”. In speaking we do not have language facing us as a system of grammar or semiotic signs: what we confront in speaking is the other and the things, the implements, their characteristics and relationships. We do not pay attention to the words, but to the world. It could be said that language is “intentional” insofar as to speak means to speak about something with someone. In exhausting itself by deploying the world, language is the very manner, in which the world is present to us. It is the very articulation without which the world would be mute. This is not to say that language is “creative” of the world; rather, it is a way that the world is manifest through language, a way that it is present to the variety of linguistic expression and modes of articulating does not mean that speaking is an attempt to express a subjective mode of relating to the world; as if a different modality of speaking were a different modality of subjective projection of the world. On the contrary, it is an indication that the world is not a one-dimensional sum of things; it is neither monistic nor pluralistic; it is a multidimensional articulation of things and events, a multidimensional unfolding and interacting process, and language catches the various aspects of the world in speaking. Above all, the variety of experiences of the world is what language manifests. But in this sense, language does not manifest itself; it is always other oriented.

This is not to say that the “other orientation” is a “copy” of things or events. All phenomenologists are in agreement that there is no paradisaical state, in which God told the names of all things. Although pointing away from itself, language at the same time establishes relationships and a context for our experience of things and events. At the same time, language reveals our own positions, attitudes and perspectives to the world. This is not a revelation of mere subjective states, but of modalities, in which humans relate to events and each other. In brief, the modalities are relational, through which there is a mutual structuring of the world and the subject. It is an in-between-region. In this relationship, language is an event, where truth happens, not in a formalistic and absolute sense, but in a finite and always provisional sense. By revealing events and ourselves in one way, we hide them in another way, by dealing with things in one possible way, we neglect and forego other possible ways. The concept of possibility is crucial for the understanding of language. While revealing the modalities of

experience of things, language also provides a horizon of possibilities that constitute the temporal context for such an experience. It is by virtue of language that we transcend the immediacy of the situation and open up a horizon, within which events and things assume their experienced temporal orientations. When we say that “this is a rain cloud” before the rain, we open the possibility of the cloud toward rain. Without this linguistic transcendence, we would be closed to the immediacy of things and function only as a mechanical reaction to them. Language is projective and transcends the immediately given toward the possible and the temporal. In this sense, language reveals the temporal being of things as they unfold toward their future, and it also includes their past. It is precisely because of the temporality of language, and not its formal eternity, that truth is finite. Being temporal, language can reveal only partial modalities of the ways that things are, were or will be manifested.

The temporal transcendence of language constitutes a meaningful context, as well: hence, our experienced world is a system of meaningful interrelationships that are not only expressed through language, but are articulated linguistically. Each event speaks to the extent that it belongs within a linguistic context of a particular tradition. When a policeman’s flashing signal appears in your rear view mirror, it is not a stimulus, to which we react, but it primarily “speaks” of the system of rules, laws, lawyers, judges, fines and authority. It has a horizon of interconnected meanings that allow us to make sense of the flashing light. Because language in its anonymity is identical with the meaningful interrelationships of the world and its temporal horizons, then it can be said that the world we live in is a medium of dialogical communication with others. The problem of intersubjectivity is solved by the fact that we are born into a linguistic tradition that is not created by us; in this sense, we are already in a human-intersubjective world established by language and not only language. The world of equipment has the same communicative and intersubjective structure. The hammer I use points to the nail, the nail to the board, the board to the wall, the wall to the house, to new homes, to families and the entire system of establishing a situation for living. The hammer is present with the hammer maker, who fashioned the hammer for your hand; the maker is present to you in the service he provided. If the hammer does not have the balance required, you get angry at the makers of the hammer, you are intersubjective. The

hammer has a meaning in a context of interrelated meanings. It belongs to the meaningful world of interconnections. Once again, the world is communicative, it is linguistic at all levels; or to speak in terms of our theme, it is dialogical, because it involves the others and the world, in which we and the others find themselves. At the same time, the communicative dimension of the world is temporal in its fundamental outline. The hammer does not only point to the nail and the nail to the board, but also to the total house to be completed and to the future as part and context of the meaning of the present functioning of the implements. The same can be said of language. The terms draw their meaning not only from the present functioning in the propositions, but also and primarily from the temporal context that the words deploy and by which the words are deployed.

The dialogical understanding of language that includes the tacit presence of the others of our tradition and the practical and cultural world of implements and customs is a system of meaning implications, in medium of which we live. This medium is prior to the distinctions of the world into subjective and objective, into inner and outer. Such distinctions are established linguistically as our modality of being in the world and of having the world. In terms of this linguistic understanding of the world, the subject encounter is dialogical in the sense that during the process of dialogue the subjects do not see themselves as separated individuals, but as participants in one process. As mentioned earlier, the specific emergence of individuals as being distinct appears when the dialogue breaks down; with the breakdown of dialogue, there is a momentary break-down of the world. The system of meaningful interconnections collapse and the dialogical partners and the things of the world appear disconnected and individuate.

Take, for example, the case of instrumental interconnection. As long as the hammer holds, it points to an entire system of interconnections. If the hammer breaks, the system collapses, and the user of the hammer is thrown back upon himself, while the other materials stand there disconnected from the system. As soon as we reestablish our orientation and subsume the hammer under the process of fixing it, the world resumes its interconnective system, although now in a different context. The previous system may remain latent or may be subsumed under the new meaningful interconnections.

All communication, all intentionality that means something or other must appear in a physical medium, in sound or mark of some kind. For

communication, such media are language, institutions and implements that mediate the subject to the other and the world. In dialogue, they concretize and situate the dialogical partners and the objectivities of discourse. In this sense, the concrete world in which we live is always meaningfully articulated. In all that we do we are bound on the commonality of this world and its sense articulation.

In the objective sense, language, for example, is a realization of the objective intentions, without becoming an object of intention. In the dialogical function, language appears in its triadic structure: something is mediated to the other in linguistic announcement and receptivity of the announcement, although the fundamental moment is the “objective function” of language. It changes a mere sound into a meaningful sign, through which someone means something or signifies a state of affairs. By using words, we do not ask what they are, but what they mean to point to. Through the sense that the words carry, a communicative community is founded. To speak of something in conversation implies also the expression of oneself in objective function of meaning that also retains the subjective function of expression. This does not mean that language reveals an act of decision to speak, but shows that the act is articulated in speaking. We understand ourselves better when we articulate ourselves linguistically; and a non-prefabricated conversation may hold surprises for the speakers. Through articulation, the meaning acquires a transitory, yet enduring “documentation”, a lasting existence in the world that becomes accessible to all. Each expression becomes a possible expression for everyone, as a possible communication within a community. The communication of states of affairs is also communication of oneself; the self-communication is not a contingent aspect of language, but belongs to language in its essence. Even when I attempt to speak of myself, I split myself into the object of communication and the communicating subject. This sets limits to solipsistic idiosyncrasy. The linguistic function of announcement is also essential because the full structure of language as dialogical consists of the unity of addressing, self-expression and signification related to the addressee, requiring a linguistic announcement and acceptance of the announcement. The latter two moments can be designated as essential aspects of communicative function. An intersubjective mediation requires the linguistic unity of meaning and physical means. Language belongs to the comprehensive unity of meaning

and bodily expressivity of the expressed and the expression. It is possible to logically differentiate this unity by showing that the word is not the thing or states of affairs; yet, in direct speaking, language is the way that things are present, the way that they are “adumbrated”. Moreover, the separation is possible only through subsequent reflection. While speaking and listening, we live “in” language as we live in intentionality, and not toward them. Obviously, when we read, we do not thematize the marks on the paper; the marks appear, yet, we “live” in the enactment of their meaning. The marks, or the sounds, function properly only when the communicative act does not aim at them, but goes through them. The unity between the meaning and the verbal sound or mark comprises an insoluble unity that is prior to their separation. This unity appears prior to any analysis: it is not a reality that synthesizes two elements, but a complete intermixture of the elements. As Waldenfels pointed out, the intertwining is very specific; the meaning “tends” toward expression and is not given without it. Yet, this tendency needs not be expressed through a precisely specified means; after all, we say that “I chose the wrong words for what I wanted to say”, or when we translate we select and reselect terminology for a closer approximation to the original meaning of the language that we are translating³². This is not to say that language is completely transcended; rather, there appears an experience of linguisticity as such, which is a condition for translatability. This experience is of a unique kind; it recognizes that the two languages that are given are sense materials carrying meaning and that the shift from one to the other leads to comparisons that have a range of options within the two languages. It is an experience that is premised on the recognition of universal linguisticity of the human experience and communication. What aids in this experience is the fact that linguistic process is intentional and that it is oriented toward things, objects and states of affairs that have a moment of sense experience. Yet, there is no guarantee that the translation will be completely successful, because there is a constant unification of meaning and sensibility and a constant intertwining that is in constant transformation and is always exposed to hazard, to dialogical shifts in face of the changing perspectives, and to adumbrations of the partners. This suggests that the expressive unity is a living unification.

³² Waldenfels, B. (1980). *Der Spielraum des Verhaltens* [The Scope of Behavior].

In direct dialogue, we seldom pay attention to terms. We live in a linguistic unconsciousness, as Gadamer had argued from a hermeneutical standpoint³³. Of course, as with all corporeal activity, there is a pre-reflective process occurring anonymously. Difficulties in understanding, blurred speech or marred writing direct our attention to the sense medium. In this case, the question is not “what one is saying”, but “how it is being said”. Finally, what are the rules and laws of this language that either enhance or limit expressibility? Yet, all such questions presuppose, but do not encompass the living process of language in dialogue. And in this case, the linguistic intentions are not individual, but belong to a common theme. Yet, the commonality is “occasional”, consisting of situated expressions and statements. We share the situation only in language, a situation, sense of which is not pre-given, but is built up through speaking. The situation appears in language as meaning, a laden phonetic event, which sense is not found in one or the other or in both partners, but in the expressive interplay occurring between them.

Language is not a closed system of rules and logic; it remains open and flexible. Although language has structural moments worthy of analysis, we shall limit ourselves to the dialogical openness of linguistic process. Seen structurally, the various linguistic components are related in a whole, in a way that allows transformations and substitutions of terms. These are not necessarily dependent on external influences, but are regulated originally within a language. The notion of structure subtends any kind of dualism into subjective-objective or internal-external; it is rather between them and is founded on ambiguity. This ambiguity is one of the conditions for the ability of language not to be locked into the present; it can have projects that transcend the present.

Structure and meaning are not external to each other as if one was an objective constellation, while the other was a subjective orientation. What is being structured is precisely human activity and experience in their meaning; at the same time, meaning is not a detached ideality, but is a structurally articulated field of activity and experience. In this sense, what is experienced, i.e., the experience and activity, cannot be submitted to external structural regulations. Structures that are neither a thing nor an idea do not

³³ Gadamer, H. G. (1975). *Truth and Method*. (G. Barden & J. Cumming, Trans.). New York: Seaberg Press.

correspond to activity that is merely a bodily mechanism or a consciousness activity. Being bound to a sense-oriented activity and experience, the structures must remain dynamic, because they include both significations and the essences to which meanings point. Without signifying, without being meant in some way, the essential structures would not be apparent.

Such an intimate connection between structure and meaning is not dependent on one-to-one correlation to individual acts or whether they are arranged combinatorially or comprise a temporal succession; rather, they too function as variables in a system of significations. This is to say, as performances, they have a meaning and the latter depends on a system of meanings transmitted in language and institutions. The essential moments for the understanding of language experientially comprise a careful balance between the individual and the linguistic systems of a tradition.

First, the individual activities have a meaning only in a system of interrelated meanings, wherein each act is submitted to the structures of language and the cultural norms. Some pointed examples would be a Christian making a sign of the cross, or a Muslim suddenly prostrating toward Mecca. These activities internally communicate articulated systems. Language ceases to be a substantive process, with positive components having their own function and meaning. The latter appears in the differential articulation. Hence, no particular sound and no specific mark mean anything by themselves; their meaning is constituted by their differences. In principle, this differential process allows language to be open.

Second, the experiencing subject, with open temporal horizons, lives in the language and institutions of the present and interprets historical development in terms of contemporary understanding. If there is a difference between the present and other historical periods, the difference appears on the basis of a domain, the transcendental, which, at least for a moment, must be able to encompass the present and the historical dimensions in order to shift between them. This is the moment of the subject, the individual revealing the impossibility of a complete domination of the individual by contemporary linguistic and institutional systems. In essence, this moment reveals the limits of contemporaneity and allows the interrogative mood to appear in the dialogue between the present and the past.

Third, language is not a naturalistic-mundane event, as if it were some sort of empirical data, but it is a way of designating mundane events and

objects in order to make sense of them. It parallels the previously discussed transcendental domain, comprising a tension between the individual consciousness and a tradition of dialogical rules and linguistic norms. It is significant for dialogical understanding that the transcendental domain should be noted. It is “language” from “elsewhere”. While the dialogical partners are engaged in active-passive phases, each partner takes a tacit position in both phases in a moment of reflexivity that is unnoticed, although constantly in force. It is a moment that intertwines the sense of and the difference between question and answer, and ranges across selectivities of linguistic options of both dialogical partners. Although we are calling this moment the “individual”, it must be clear that it is not a substantive concept of individuality, but is active, dynamic, transformative and a field. In this sense, the very meaning of being determined by the institutionalized language and a tradition cannot be equated with a causal conception. Rather, the very activity is the initiating of the meaning and at the same time decentered toward the linguistic requirements. Yet, the latter are vectors suggestive of meaningful options and verbal arrangements, even if such options might create an appearance that the individual is a function in a system of significations³⁴.

The “I speak” and the “I speak with others” cannot be reduced to factual linguistic processes or to consciousness processes. Words have a sense and we think and understand ourselves and others through them. Words are not objects of conception, but are at the disposition of a corporeal subject, who is engaged in a linguistic world. Language requires an inner organization that is basically a differentiation and not a conglomerate of phonematic, lexical and syntactic forms that cannot be traced arbitrarily. At the same time, there is the moment of language, the perceptual moment. It is similar to the individuating, transcendental moment that provides a shift between language and the perceived mundane objects. There is a basic affinity between perception and language; both belong in the “in-between domain”. In one sense, the belonging constitutes a complete intertwining, such that the perceptual is the spoken, and the spoken is the perceptual. Yet, in another sense, the perceived provides a tacit depth that differentiates between what is spoken and what is more and what calls the speaking to extend its formative power. The perceptual field is a linguistic field and more. This more is precisely expressed in the diacritical characteristic of language. When we

³⁴ Waldentels, B. (1980). *Der Spielraum des Verhaltens* [The Scope of Behavior], p. 148.

say that language is different from anything natural and even perceptual, we institute a perceptual domain that reveals the difference. Thus, at the perceptual level, there appears a condition for dialogical extension outside the given linguistic parameters, although the latter are immediately called upon to articulate the perceptual moment. This condition is a perceptual figure that is not detachable from its background and cannot be extricated from its context, because it is the differentiation of the field, revealing a possible linguistic meaning. Although the latter cannot be extricated from the sign system, because it is a differentiation of the linguistic field, it marks a novel difference in the field. A sign means something in differentiation from other signs, and the perceptual moment offers an extension and a re-combination of linguistic terms. Hence, the meaning lies not only between words, but also between words and perceptions, and between perceptions that extend the meanings of words. If a sign means something only in relationship to other signs, then meaning is bound to a particular language. A particular speech is an extrication from the total language, which in turn allows the sense making of the particular speech. This abolishes the innocence that particular meanings of words can be coordinated to particular facts, or as if one could use indifferent signs to coordinate pre-linguistic or supra-linguistic facts or meanings. The affirmation of the diacritical understanding of language and perception abolishes the need for ontological explanations and metaphysical postulates as sources of meaning.

There are other advantages in the phenomenological analysis of language and experience. The presumption of pure thought that somehow rationally organizes empirical data and then clothes such an organization in language becomes redundant. If experience is intentional, and if the latter is interrelated in a system of linguistic significations, then intentions are coextensive with linguistic meanings. Any so-called pure thought or formal matrix is derailed in its meaning toward linguistic complexities and assumes a role in a field of concrete perceptions and verbal expressions. What allows us to think that language is a mere clothing of intention or thought is the phenomenon of linguistic self-effacement. A successful speaking effaces itself in the presence of what it signifies; and this is what had led some to conceive of thought and intention as being prior to language. For example, if I try to recall a story, I tend to recall it as a totality and not as a group of signs or words. I tend to recall it as a whole, even if not too clearly. Lan-

guage tends to direct us to things it signifies and effaces itself precisely to the extent that its meaning comes across in communication. It hides itself at the moment of its success and makes us feel that we meet another person or our intentions, in themselves, wordlessly, when actually we meet them through the background of linguistic articulation. But, in this case, a successful thought is also a successful linguistic articulation.

It could be objected that algorithmic symbolisms are univocal and give us direct access to the symbolized. Such a symbolic access is possible at a very primitive pictorial level. We can draw a triangle, a square or a house as direct images of experienced structures; yet, when we place such images into perceptual-linguistic field, we discover systems of meaningful interconnections, sweeping up styles of life of particular peoples, their instrumental capacities, their logical acuity, their architecturally constituted social space and time. The simplicity and inadequacy of the immediate representative images as modes of speaking and experiencing have been adequately demonstrated by the work of Elisabeth Straker. Her work also exposes the inadequacies of algorithmic languages³⁵. In their assumed ideality and all encompassment, they are dead, without contexts, and have no concrete significance for dialogue and communication. We are also aware by now that even pure geometries are not free from the broader contexts of their production and their problematic and possible ways of interpreting them. One can justifiably say that although language is anonymous and that it effaces itself before the meaning, it is a background structuring of the experienced world. Although it moves from the signifier to the signified, it structures the signified indefinitely and in novel ways. Hence, besides the four aspects we just discussed, language can be refined in terms of the following points: language is situated because it is produced and used by situated-corporeal humans and is intertwined with perception. The situatedness already appears at the level of phonemes, which are diacritical elements of terms and provides stresses and nuances within terms; hence, they do not have a direct significative aspect, although they shade the manner in which the meaning will be understood, at least in its effective dimension. They are the sonorous elements that have the dimension of expressivity. One of the most fundamental roles of phonemes is diacritical, aiding in the discrimination

³⁵ Stroker, E. (1987). *Investigations in Philosophy of Space*. (A. Mickunas, Trans.). Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, p. 296.

among words and similar terms. The same is valid of words; they are marks of difference from other words. They present signification only in relationship to other words, through a situation, as unities cohering and differing from other unities. In the act of speech, the words suggest each other and arouse other words. This leads to a certain spontaneity of language that accounts for the way that language can have us, instead of being a mere possession as a tool for expression. At the same time, the linguistic involvement allows for transcendence of the here and now insofar, as meaning is not pre-given, but is born in speaking “between words”³⁶. Hence, it is a movement, surpassing of signs toward signification and the total linguistic field, suggesting what has been said and what is to come. This spontaneity of language accounts for the conquering of new perceptions, of expressing novelties and teaching the subject about his/her own thought. In this sense, risk and ambiguity are essential aspects of language as a “conquering” process capable of intertwining with and opening experiences and perceptions that once were foreign to us. Hence, 20th century writers, such as Claudel, and the surrealists were capable of freeing language from obvious control of facts and trusted it to invent new relationships of meaning, while dwelling in it, using it, but never becoming sole masters of it. The spontaneity of language also means that language is never completely acquired and it always remains a possibility and an institution, or that it is a living institution. This life is also the reason why language is never completely transparent in its meaning. Although we tend to capture it, it offers more than we expected and implies options that we can never fully pursue.

Although language makes ideal meaning possible, it does not reveal it in its totality. It never delivers things or meanings in their purity, without experiential contexts, against which background and depth it profiles figures. Because it is never totally objective and because it always functions against this background of perception and the multitude of processes of signifying, language remains open. To be precise, language can never be pure because it always exists in a situation and in time. This is important for the understanding of language as a finite, situated, and yet transcending signifying. Language does not move to signify something in one-to-one correlation, but does so laterally by articulating differences in perceptual and linguistic fields. It crystalizes significative intentions in the spread between

³⁶ Waldenfels, B. (1980). *Spielraum des Verhaltens* [The Scope of Behavior], p. 163.

words. Hence, things are not meant directly, but in terms of differentiation of their meanings. Thus, language is not a pure representation, but an expressive communication and signifying of the perceptual context of things at the same time. It is equally an appeal to others. In this sense, language is a will to understand and to be understood by others. Language, at this level, is a factual intersubjectivity.

The fluidity of language also depends on our activity. This means that we do not take things and meanings as being complete apart from our speaking. What we mean in language can be grasped only as a process of structuration. Once again, this relationship between language and linguistic performance can be seen as lateral meaning. We do not go simply to things; rather, our access is disrupted by language so that through speech we fill out and flush out things in terms of linguistic differentiations. The speaking breaks up the latency of language into a structuration without being able to encompass total language.

The linguistic act and language are not opposed; yet, speaking is not a pure activity of an individual, but is immersed into a socially formed history. In this sense, speaking is a mediation between the present and the past; it is constituting and a constituting process. In this sense, language is a sedimented pool and we reach toward it in our speech acts when we wish to say something new. Here, the synchronic and diachronic dimensions of language are completely interrelated. Moreover, the language of the past is not a sum of designated facts, but an articulated system and the contingencies of this language emerge in the present speaking, and the latter does not crystalize itself into a completed system of pure actuality and transparency. It is rather an incarnated logic, in which contingency, reason and fortuities comprise a moving equilibrium. What maintains it in motion are the requirements of communication, in which the aim at novelty combines with a certain compulsion with the old. The new is diacritical and is understood only in terms of the old comprising a coherent transformation.

The regularity and lawfulness of language is more than a habit, but depends on social communication, convention and sanction. There is a “dialogue” between individuality and society. The social, imprinted in linguistic rules, is not a massive, substantial reality, but a system of symbolizations that pervades, but does not suppress the individual. Structured language leads to the circularity between the individual and the sociohistorical

world; the individual is eccentric and the social world finds its center in the individual. The line between the individual and the social has no precision, because the individual in his corporeity and linguisticity belongs to a domain of anonymity, which he can never completely surpass. Yet, the individual is not completely closed by precise prescripts; he always finds latent meanings that he can explore.

The relationship between linguistic acts and a given language is variable. There is always a possibility for creative speech that elicits something novel from the given language. Here, the new meaning is not given, but achieved and the author creates a public and the communicative language reaches here its limit, a limit that is in constant flux. But a question can be raised whether, even in common practice, there might not be a creative aspect. This is precisely the case because language is diacritical; any shift of linguistic relationships is also a shift of meaning that appears in the relationships. This notion can be expanded in another way: linguistic surpass of itself. This question could not be raised if we could step outside of language into mere facts or into precise and univocal meaning that would subsequently be designated by language. This question could not arise, also, if language were a closed system. It only appears when we concern ourselves with language as it functions in mutual communication. Here, we introduce in language something that transcends the language. This occurs not merely because in its eminence language contains the difference of the signified and the signifier constitutive of a sign, but because of a language-transcending difference constitutive of the use of signs, the designated surpasses the designation. The intention of meaning is not pure meaning and confronting us with pure meaning, but it is a will to speak, inherent in language itself. It is the superfluity of what I want to say and experience in contrast to what is to be said and is already said. And here, the world of "silent things" announces itself, because they too want to say something by confronting our initiatives. This transcendence of the meant in contrast to the said does not delimit a boundary of language, but corresponds to its organization. Precisely because meaning appears only among signs, I am never definitely beyond language and never definitely closed in language. Deviation and inner differentiation of a sign system are interrelated. What permits the understanding of dialogical novelties is the conjunction of language and experience. Although being addressed in a novel mode, we are

opened to the possibilities of experience that become our own and at the same time we are opened to linguistic shifts that are comprehensible on the basis of the poli-centrally acquired linguistic meanings that have options unexplored by our own habitual uses of languages. In this sense, there is a comprehensibility of novelty, a novelty that is never absolutely radical because it is expressed within a language, horizons of which are our own.

Although there may be languages constituted for theoretical purposes, they are comprehensible in two ways: (a) the scientific community, accustomed with the structuration of this language, communicates within this language and (b) the communication of theoretical understanding outside of the scientific community shifts to the everyday language and translates the theoretical terms into the language of the lived world. In this sense, the language of the lived world may be “rearranged” for the purpose of eliciting appropriate meanings; yet, being in the language of the lived world, such meanings are accessible to the uninitiated in the theoretical structuration of a language. As Gadamer would say, theoretical-scientific language requires a journalism that would “interpret” the theoretical-scientific language in terms of the historically transmitted language of the lived world³⁷. For example, a psychiatrist has a scientific-theoretical language, yet he/she translates the language to the patient into a daily language. Although the doctor knows the scientific terms, such as repression, syndrome formation, etc., he addresses the patient in a directly comprehensible speaking about the relationship of the patient to his/her parents and their behavior toward the patient in his/her lived situation. The doctor may indeed bring out the novel meaning of the relationship; yet, the novelty is expressed in the language of the lived world, assumed both by the patient and the doctor. After all, prior to being a scientist, the doctor already lives in the medium of a poli-central language. In dialogue, the linguistic process plays a complex role. The first presupposition is the communicative community described in the first chapter in terms of poli-centrally oriented field and historically institutionalized meaning. This institutionalization includes language. The second requirement is that the dialogical partners belong to the same linguistic community or the same linguistic modality, such as scientific or theoretical. The third requirement is that the exchange of experiences in the dialogical process is now complicated by language that shapes the percep-

³⁷ Gadamer, H. G. (1975). *Truth and Method*, p. 311.

tions of both speakers in a way that what is said by one embodies the perceptions and thoughts that are relevant to the situation. Yet, in his speaking, there is a residuum of unexpressed perceptions that imply more than the present speaking can encompass. At the same time, he says more than he intends to due to the fact that language is also an embodiment of perceptions of generations past. The recipient of the address follows the outlines of the language and incorporates them into his/her own perceptions, which are more than the address can encompass; at the same time, the address carries more than the recipient can master due to the superfluity of meaning embodied in language. The conjunction of his/her perceptions and the language that he/she hears opens a field of options for an answer that is never complete and that can and does shift with the continuation of the dialogue. Dialogue as linguistic is open.

Communication is more than a transmission and exchange of conceptions, information, views and feelings, and it is oriented toward a constitution of a common sense and meaning. Husserl had pointed out that linguistic communication participates in the constitution of an experiential sense of the world and the act of communication is constitutive of community and in community. Communication plays a fundamental role only when it is constitutive for the sense of experience and activity and not a mere mediation of what is already pre-given and complete, because in that sense communication would become redundant.

Common constitution of sense is possible when singular acts of communication not only go through signs, but, above all, when communication is a conjunction of acts that reside in the contingent materiality of signs and unfold their productivity among the signs. This view is broader than Husserl's and Schutz's conceptions. They locate communication at a mediating level inserted between constituting consciousness and the constituted society. Here, the medium appears as a mere transition of a one-sided constitutive process. Communication would be like either an inescapable society or a conjunction of singular consciousnesses. This preeminence of consciousness is just as one-sided as the preeminence of society. In the first case, the signs would be constituted by individual intentionality and in the second one by a supra-individual system of rules. In the first case, communication would be a transmission of meaning and in the second one an application of rules. In either case, no productivity of sign system is per-

mitted. The task of phenomenological theory of communicative language is to surpass these alternatives.

Although the problems of communication based on the individual intentions expressed in signs are obvious, the problems with the opposite view must be briefly mentioned. This view claims that communication is possible when we possess a common system of signs that is structured by linguistic rules. Our intentions coincide, because they are submitted to the modes of expression directed by rules of a sign system. The constitution of common meaning means an application of common rules. The linguistic signs that are constructed in terms of common rules have a primordial relationship to objects and states of affairs to the speaker and the hearer, and by virtue of this three-fold relationship, the sign is a symbol, signification and a sign; it serves for the presentation of expression and appellation to others. A specification of linguistic acts occurs through the irreducible functions of hierarchically differentiated order.

In communication, the hearer deciphers the intentions of the speaker in terms of common rules that he/she applies to the expressions of the other. The retort to other's appellation does not go through the perception of alien expressions. Hence, the activity of the individual is always social; there is always a common fund that cannot be completely appropriated by the individual, because the individual owes all that he/she is to this sphere, in which communication takes place. Yet, in this thesis, the accentuation of rules reduces speech acts to application of rules and to combinatorial variables. If we were to speak of a building of meaning, then we can only conceive of a mere applicative building of meaning, in which the differences between the speaker and the hearer are abolished, and if not, then one of the speakers has not yet learned the application of the rules. Yet, ultimately, there is the fundamental assumption of the propriety of the rules and acts of their application. This is Wittgensteinian and, in a way, de Saussurean³⁸.

The one-sidedness of the two positions appears to be inadequate for the understanding of communication. If we take the rules of language, we find that they apply to sentence units; yet, there are no rules that state how sentences are to be connected. This suggests that we do not select sentences on a basis of fixed rules, but build a communication from sentences. The sentences are connected by an actor situated in a field. For example, such a

³⁸ Gadamer, H. G. (1975). *Truth and Method*, p. 174.

string of sentences as “How are you? It is a fine day. Are you playing tennis today?” has no pre-established rule. Moreover, one sentence does not imply another. And it is even hard to say whether the sentence “It is a fine day” is a question or a statement of fact, or whether another question is to follow. And even to claim that practical rules would combine such sentences fails because the just mentioned sentence does not imply any practical question that would follow from the sentence. What of the communicative partners, the speaker and the listener? If the dialogue were to be understood on the basis of agreed, effective and established expressions, then it would be sufficient to analyze the rules, in terms of which such expressions are produced and understood, where response, agreement or rejection would be experienced. In this sense, the succession of sentences would be understood as an extension of sentences. The address and the response would be merely a change of roles, wherein no new structural relationships would be brought to the fore.

The attempts to found communication on these grounds escape the possibility of common activity; the activity remains incapsulated in individual sentences, and the commonality is reducible to the relationship of production and reproduction, without reaching coproduction. In this connection, it is no accident that various authors, such as Buhler and even Jakobson, replace the addressor and the hearer to a sender and a receiver of messages and, thus, speak of encoding and decoding, leading to a model of communicative³⁹. Yet, here the question of the continuation of communicative process cannot be answered: how information is to be continuously transmitted in a mutual process. We could also suggest that Habermas establishes a communicative ethics and reduces language to individual acts of speech that are called elementary units of speech⁴⁰. He deliberately refuses to note that speech acts appear as a rule in pairs. This, for him, is related to communicative activity; the communicative activity takes place in accustomed and normatively guaranteed linguistic games. Here, one exchanges information and the validity of signification interconnections is assumed. The constitution of the world is located in a pre-communicative activity based on instrumental praxis. In this sense, communication is not produc-

³⁹ Buhler, K. (1976). *Die Axiomatik der Sprachwissenschaft [Axiomatics of Linguistic Science]*. Frankfurt, West Germany: Vittorio Klostermann; Jakobson, R. (1968). *Child Language, Aphasia, and General Sound Laws*.

⁴⁰ Habermas, J. (1984). *The Theory of Communicative Action*. Vol. I. (T. McCarthy, Trans.). Boston: Beacon Press.

tive; it only exchanges products. This occurs in terms of universal rules that prescribe a principle exchangeability of dialogical roles.

The question that must be raised is: what is communication if not merely a transitional process of individually founded transmission of meaning, or of a socially regulated exchange, that is, a locus of social productivity and productive sociality? If communication plays a role within a system of signs, then the commonality must be read directly from the signs in a way that various activities do not only come in contact through them, but are completely intertwined with them. To grasp this, it is essential to discuss the concept of context. The constitution of meaning is more than a lending of meaning or an application of rules, but also a progressive constitution of a context.

Context is a field of meaningful acts of relating, whether such acts are one's own or those of the other, whether they are successive or simultaneous; these acts relate to the field and organize it in a particular way. This requires the notion that language consists of two strata; the syntagmatic axis, which obeys the principle of succession and simultaneity, and the paradigmatic axis dominated by the principle of exchangeability. In this sense, every linguistic activity unifies an operation of combinations that builds the context and an operation of selection that allows substitutions. This is valid for the domains of phonetics for word-building, that is, construction of sentences and their continuation by other sentences. From plane to plane, the possibilities of combination increase and the freedom of selectivity grows to the final step of succession of sentences, where the obligatory syntactical rules forfeit their power. Let us look at the last step. A question opens a play-space. An answer emerges that is selected within the opened play-space. Generally speaking, relationship is attached to a real relationship insofar, as it selects modes of relationship within the possibilities of the context. Combination and selection are strictly related here; if one is weakened, linguistic and communicative process is disturbed and finally abolished. Combination without selection leads to a compulsive relationship (closed context), selection without combination leads to an arbitrary and disconnected relationship. In all normal cases, the context is open, but limited.

With regard to the connection among sentences, we have here open rules that exclude certain possibilities of contextual constitution without prescribing determined possibilities. The answer "fits" the question and continues among coherent options. Yet, we must take a further step, which

would take us away from a mere linear succession of the dialogical process. For this, we must distinguish between three expressive dimensions: linguistic expressions, corporeal expressions and activities; these are related to each other in various ways. They intertwine in a successive interconnection: I can react to an expression of pain with a question or with an act of help. Yet, the different modes of expression intertwine simultaneously. I comment on my action, and I promise something with my expression and intonation. Hence, the context is constituted not only temporally, but it also assumes an “environmental” thickness, a depth⁴¹.

This may seem to be trivial. Yet, this triviality appears only because one sees the transition from one form of expression to the other as occurring in a heterogeneous sphere, for example, as a transition from conventional linguistic activity to real consequences; and the simultaneous intersection of linguistic activity with other expressive forms are all too hastily explained in terms of real accompanying phenomena, as a background in which speaking is imbedded. Yet, this notion contradicts the possible coherence and incoherence between the representatives of different expressive classes. Mere factual consequences and accompanying phenomena can cohere in certain regularity or fail to cohere and can correspond to what is being said or contradict the speech, empower it or disempower it. Here, any theory of language that regards linguistic signs as a mere representation of autonomous thought and intentions of feelings break down. The various forms of expression are similar to corporeal synaesthesia and synergy; they constitute a structural interconnection containing interferences, substitutions, separations, interferences and dominant strands, where one can speak of primary spoken, expressive or active relationship, but not purely of linguistic, expressive or active.

All this has clear consequences only for a theory of communication that interlocks and fuses the dialogical partners, where the constitution of common meaning takes place in a mutual context. Here, the schema of speaking and hearing is no longer adequate. A retort consists not only in that one speaks because one has heard something and, thus, initiates a new speak, but rather one corresponds, answers and attaches oneself to a pre-given expression and, thus, continues it. The exchange of roles is a figure of change, where an exchange of foreground and background takes place; this means more than a repetition under another sign, that is, a transformation

⁴¹ Waldenfels, B. (1980). *Spielraum des Verhaltens* [The Scope of Behavior], p. 179.

subsumed under rules. That the continuation of a theme is the constitution of meaning is neither a production nor reproduction, but a co-production that cannot incorporate its presuppositions. It is a “transitional-phenomenon”, which subtends the differentiation of the dialogical partners. Between them a common ground, a unitary plot, is constituted, and this is the condition for novelty in communication and not a mere transmission of what is already complete and given. The commonality does not merely depend on a common meaning or a transmission of similar experiences, but, in addition, it depends on a multifarious process of coherent or discordant constitution of sense. After all, discrepancies and even antagonisms are forms of commonality. We must add a brief discussion of the simultaneous intermixing of various forms of expression in the relationships between the dialogical partners. Although we cannot both speak simultaneously, we can express ourselves simultaneously. The speaker is not a pure speaker, who is productive of effects; he maintains all-sided control and modulates his speaking in terms of the actions and expressions of the other. And the hearer is not a pure recipient of sounds, but modulates his hearing by being inquisitive, by nodding his head, etc.⁴² There is a peculiar inspiration for the speaker appearing in the face of the dialogical partner, who expresses that he has already grasped our half-finished articulation; the other is, thus, half of my own speaking. In this sense, communication includes all the forms of expression, from language through corporeal expression and activity, even if one or the other may predominate in a particular context. In this sense, we can no longer speak of the “first word” in communication, because such a word is always in a context, and the context is a limited openness that can never be closed, unless one considers pathological cases.

The system of signs and their rules is in a context of activities and it encounters corporeal expressions that intertwine and reveal more in communicative process than just words. The meaning that emerges appears only between these forms and between the partners in dialogue. In this sense, semiotics is beginning to think in terms of multi-dimensional process of symbolization and both in terms of singular terms and the rules of their relationship. Thus, a system of linguistic signs can be seen diacritically as marking the difference between itself and other forms of expression and between the dialogical partners.

⁴² Waldenfels, B. (1980). *Spielraum des Verhaltens* [The Scope of Behavior], p. 181.

CHAPTER IV

The Dialogical Domain

Although institutions and the modes of communication transmitted through them play a basic role in our understanding of human interaction and mutual influence, they are nonetheless founded on a direct human interaction that is basically dialogical. Phenomenologically speaking, dialogue is a process, in which the individuals not only participate, but also structure their perceptions, conceptions, values and, indeed, their very self-understanding. During the dialogical process, the individuals do not see themselves as separated egos attempting to project external signs about internal psychological and mental states, concepts or experiences. As already shown, the experiences are not subjective states, closed upon themselves in the internal process. They are accessible to all, specifically when there is no human behavior, no movement, posture or gesture that does not signify or mean something. During the late hours, when one sinks into the couch and begins to nod, he signifies that he is no longer interested in conversing; he is tired or bored. All the participants can directly read this gesture without first wondering what this gesture signifies. As already noted and as will be subsequently developed in greater detail, expression is read directly, immediately and without any intervention by the “readers” of the expression. Interpretation takes for granted direct experience of expression.

The discussion of dialogue is inseparable from the question of *intersubjectivity*. In early phenomenological literature, the term *intersubjectivity* meant a capacity to (a) experience the other person directly as having consciousness “like one’s own” and (b) to be able to have common experience. Husserl’s work *Cartesian Meditations* is concerned with the question of “how the other, the alter-ego, is given in experience”. One point of this work was to show that all experience is intersubjective; the world is given primarily to a community of subjects, and the alter-ego is implicitly involved in all experiences of each individual⁴³. Subsequent developments in phenomenology have demonstrated that intersubjectivity is always presupposed in the understanding of objectivity. With Heidegger’s work *Being and Time*, we are moved into a historical world into which we are born, with ready-made

⁴³ Husserl, E. (1970). *Cartesian Meditations* (D. Cairns, Trans.). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

implements, language, institutions and traditions, embodying the contributions and the presence of others. Even if the other is not personally or physically present, the presence is always there in all the signs of our world, in the morality we follow, in the gods we worship, in the language we use and in the implements we employ⁴⁴. And with Merleau-Ponty's work *Phenomenology of Perception*, we are "intercorporeal"⁴⁵. The meaning of the latter term has various aspects. It is a silent, anonymous background, on which our individual corporeal gestures emerge and, hence, transmit a common signification; it is a historically accumulated process of sedimentations of acting, behaving and, thus, suggesting that each corporeal gesture has a depth of meanings that at the same time lend openness and ambiguity to each gesture. It is also a basis for transcendence, which, although going beyond the present field of perception, does not extricate itself from its immediate environment. In general, it is a perceptual dimension constituting a ground for direct communication of meaning that is never complete and requires continuous articulation; it is always open. At this level, the dialogue is preverbal; meaning is read silently, and each corporeal gesture, although exhausting itself in its signifying power of a situation, carries more meaning than the present situation requires. Hence, two persons could read the gesture differently, depending on their situations. For example, a gesture of impatience in a dangerous situation means one thing, whereas in a loving situation it means something else. This is the reason why a gesture, while being in a situation, transcends the situation and can have more meanings than one.

Individual and Community

The question concerning the priority either of the individual or of the community (the social) is as old as philosophy. The Greeks in general, and Aristotle in particular, lent priority to the polis, the whole of society; in order to be human, one must be a member of a human society. The society has its own nature and the individuals are parts of such a nature. At the other end of Western tradition, there are theories, such as utilitarianism, which claim that the individual is the only reality and society consists of a sum of individuals. In the first case, the problem is how do individuals become individuals if they are subsumed under the compelling power of society; in

⁴⁴ Heidegger, M. (1962). *Being and Time* (J. Macquarrie, Trans.). New York: Harper.

⁴⁵ Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962). *Phenomenology of Perception*.

the second case, the question is how do individuals, separated and unique, manage to form a society?

Phenomenology attempts to resolve this problem by avoiding social holism and social atomism. This means that phenomenology must show, on the one hand, that society is not merely an atomistic plurality of externally related subjects without any internal impact on each other and, on the other, that society is not a holistic unity, under the guise of a universal spirit, social conditions, historical necessity, and so forth, lacking any basis in the particular individuals, who comprise it. The social person may be distinguished from the individual person, who is composed of individual acts, aims, and directions. In this activity, the individual person finds his social behavior constituting a relationship to others. This relationship is an activity of higher order and establishes a social personality; the latter may be characterized in various ways: its personality is higher than that of the individual because its experiences are built not only of one individual's activities, but also of the activities of others. Thus, when two individuals communicate, they mediate each other's views and experiences and together they comprise a basis for a communication to an indefinite number of individuals. The social personality is of a higher order because it embraces not just the activity of an individual, but also the activities of various individuals, whereby the interrelationship of the activities constitute something more than the sum of the individual acts; they influence and change one another. In the process of communicative interaction, the individual persons influence and change one another, thus, yielding a more encompassing awareness that belongs to more individuals. The relationship between the founding individual and the social, higher order individual can be depicted through an analogy with musical notes and melody. The sounds are the foundation of melody; but in forming the melody, the sounds create a higher order that is not identical with the sum of sounds. This is not to suggest that the sounds lose their individuality; the contribution of each is recognizable. Yet, their internal communication forming a melody creates an order that can be perpetuated even if the individual notes are changed. Analogously this constitutes a continuity of the social order, yet, in such a way that the individual and his contributions are always presupposed. The individual and the social are in the founding-founded relationship. The founded, the social-communal, comprises the "we" consisting of the accumulated relationships and mutual influences of activities

sedimented through history, where the very names of the actors have been forgotten. And yet, the bearers of the names were the founders of the social dimension; in turn, the contemporaries are also founders and at the same time carriers of that dimension. Here, the function of carrier is not identical to a mere transmission of a tradition; rather, it adds an experiential perspective or a shift of meaning to the whole fabric of society. The reason for this addition lies in the experience of the fact that while being in society we are also capable of facing society. While being influenced by, we, in turn, influence society. We not only accept and follow what is socially common, we also question and interrogate the communal spirit and we either accept it or reject it. In brief, there is an interaction not only among individuals, who form the foundation for society, but also between the individual and the society⁴⁶.

The solution to the problem of individual-community is also offered by phenomenology at another level. While being engaged in the world as individuals, aware of our individuality and its various attitudes, habits and conceptions about the world, we at the same time confront the world, which is humanized. Every institution, implement, street sign, utterance and book has a presence pervaded by human experience; not our own, and yet accessible to us, because as was already shown, experience purified from all explanatory impositions is accessible to all. The constitution of society and the accessibility of any experience to everyone comprise the foundation of human communication, and communication, in its stead, enhances the development of the individual as a social being.

The World of Dialogue

Our age has been designated in various ways: the age of alienation, the age of schizophrenia, the technological age, the postindustrial age, etc. It seems that another designation could be added to this list: the age of encounter and dialogue.

We shall attempt to extricate the dialogical notion from other notions and present the conception that “being with” others is one of the most basic and fundamental philosophical and perhaps scientific questions of our tradition. Moreover, the question of dialogue and its foundation is not only

⁴⁶ Landgrebe, L. (1968). *Phaenomenologie und Geschichte [Phenomenology and History]*. Darmstadt, West Germany: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.

of philosophical-theoretical interest, but also includes the most concrete encounters ranging from play to medicine and the highest theoretical sciences.

As already mentioned, the Greeks considered human life to be political. The *polis*, having a nature of its own, provides the foundation of dialogue. Moreover, the humans participate in the all-encompassing *logos*, a universal reason that rules heaven and earth. This assumed commonality guarantees the dialogical correctness among individuals. The Greeks did not maintain the concept of a private consciousness in the sense of individual self-sufficiency. The self-realization of the human is always through the others and through divinity. Even in Plato's *Symposium* we find that a man or a woman are not singular, separated entities; rather, they are parts of a higher unity and both are driven by eros to achieve this unity. The singular, that is, the separated being, cannot be addressed as human; only in an erotic relationship to the other does the human become complete. That eros pervades not only the body, but also the soul and the spirit is almost a self-evident truth for the Greeks. The completion of one through the other is a condition, a dialogical ground, for being human⁴⁷.

This is valid even for the Stoics. It is reflected in the notions of *Oikeiosis*, meaning a turning to oneself, to one's own essence, as a way of relating to others. The very rational nature of being human requires that this turning to oneself is not to be understood purely individualistically; rather, the turning must discover the very structure of reason in all events, a reason, to which the very individual is bound. In Hellenic times, of course, it is no longer the polis that is all-encompassing, but the world and humanity. Thus, the *Stoa* extends the notion of *zoon politikon* to the notion of *zoon choinikon*, where the human is ecumenical. Hence, the dialogical dimension is extended beyond one's human environment toward the entire human kind.

Even in Christianity, "being-with" is essential to the concept of philosophical anthropology. The simple demand of neighborly love is a condition for being human. Obedience to the divine can only be expressed in relationship to the other. As Bultmann pointed out, the Christian demand to love the neighbor, which is primarily discovered in love and, thus, not understood before, is the transformation of the direction of life of the natural human order, because the latter is exposed to the danger of subjugation

⁴⁷ Krueger, G. (1978). *Eros und Mythos bei Plato* [Eros and Mythos in Plato]. Frankfurt am Main, West Germany: Vittorio Klostermann.

of the other through the self⁴⁸. Dialogical thought would be hindered without this dimension.

The fulfillment of self through the other, or the co-humanity, allowing the other to be through the self, are the two alternatives, one offered by Greek thought, the other by Christianity. Augustine attempts to unite the two, the Greek Eros-motif and the Christian Agape-motif in the notion of *Caritas* and interprets loving the other as oneself as an equilibrium of both notions of love. Dialogue can occur only when neighbor love takes its measure from self-love, where both become not exclusive, but assume a justifiable form of human interaction.

Of course, this dialogical move, based on *Caritas*, has some dire consequences in medieval mysticism; the human person wanted to have a direct experience of divine love and, hence, began to neglect the neighbor. The modern rationalism has intensified this direction insofar, as the essence of being human was transferred to reason as a self-sufficient process, requiring no complementarity of the other. This is the radical move of Cartesianism with the notions of innate ideas. This anthropological theory, in its epistemological formulation, claims that the human is at the outset “by itself” requiring no experience and encounter of the other.

In empiricism, we discover a different base for dialogue. In Hobbes, for example, the human relations are based on power driven by selfishness, related, of course, to reason as a base of social contract. We agree in brief to have a dialogue for our own selfish interests, but not for our encounter of one another in a free space without external infringements. Locke deviates from this stance by positing a nature of freedom, wherein convention and dialogue is there to maintain that freedom. Hence, the very essence of state is to maintain an open dialogical dimension. Indeed, self-love here plays a fundamental role, yet such a love is mediated by reason, by rational self-interest. Still, another way that the ground of dialogue was conceived is given in the writings of various theorists, such as Hume and Shaftesbury, who posited sympathy as a common bond among humans. It is another question whether sympathy is adequate for dialogue. Others, such as Rousseau, would claim that dialogues impossible in the state of modern society. Originally, the human is dominated by self-love (*amour propre*), which is a

⁴⁸ Schrey, H. H. (1970). *Dialogisches Denken* [Dialogical Thinking]. Darmstadt, West Germany: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, p. 3.

socially innocent relationship to things; this relationship is transformed in modern society to exclusive love of oneself and to self-seeking (*amour de soi*), which intensifies the already existing inequality. Master and slave, poor and rich, and inequality are the results. In German idealism, there is a conception of the human as an autocrat, designated as reason, consciousness or an ego, requiring no other for its realization. The only way that dialogue is possible is that this rationality is the inner conformity of all humanity. This is culturally and historically untenable, specifically when Kant designates this rationality in purely Euclidean terms. At any rate, even here, to account for the human dialogue, Kant would have to introduce a common element, an identity that ranges across the entire humanity. And even Hegel, the master dialectician, could find no other recourse to yield the grand synthesis of subject-subject than an overarching love. In love, he says, the singular is still present but no longer as separated; as a singular, the living feels the living in love. It could be said that the entire Hegelian system, the synthesis of the opposites, the divine movement across historical phases is based on this unity in love. As Schrey pointed out, Hegel's later logical system can only be understood in this context⁴⁹.

One could characterize the entire Goethe-period as a search for this unity, this "communality" as a criterion of humanity. The community is required for the completion of the individual. The individual consciousness is inadequate and the individual must be seen as an organic member of a greater whole. As Korff points out, totality is impossible in the individual; it cannot be the all. Yet, with others it can unite itself into a totality, where all can constitute a commonality, wherein the idea of humanity is to be realized⁵⁰. This led to the notion that their condition of self-realization and all culture is the community that has the right to demand universal education, indeed to insist that it is the duty to be educated. Only with the transition through community and its forms can the human achieve a true selfhood, real and concrete content of which can only unfold in a concrete activity. The natural unity between duty and inclination, law and freedom, and society and individual belongs to the beautiful spirit.

⁴⁹ Schrey, H. H. (1970). *Dialogisches Denken [Dialogical Thinking]*. Darmstadt, West Germany: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, p. 8.

⁵⁰ Korff. (1927). *Geist der Goethezeit ["Spirit" during the Time of Goethe]* Vol. II. Leipzig, Germany: Verlagsbuchhandlung, p. 332.

In Romanticism, the same unity is sought through the longing for fulfillment in the other, another, who is distant and, as such, unreachable. In the dialogue of the romantics, one senses the painful path of earthly unfulfillment. In a personal self-consciousness, one feels here the consciousness of the species, allowing for the communicability of the inner self with the others. With Humboldt, there emerges another dimension, subtending our dialogical encounter with the other; it is language⁵¹. Language as an objectivation of thought mediates a unique world view to the speaker, a speaker, who is neither the creator of thought nor of language. Language has indefiniteness, in process of which we experience only a brief duration of the past and a brief expectation from the future, although in its essence it encompasses all humanity. The individual experiences the greatest vitality in language to the extent that he is an emergence from the entire human kind. This is the field, wherein individuality, totality and universality are conjoined. It is only in language that the individual confronts the universality of spirit and culture and concretizes them to a specific meaning.

The notion that language is primordial, that it precedes thought and reason, is maintained by J. G. Hamann⁵². The word is not merely a designation of an object, a way of conceiving things, but rather a revelation and a veiling. This leads to the claim that the essence of dialogue must not only include language, but also history. Revelation and veiling are historical categories, and history, at the same time, makes possible human linguisticity. This linguisticity is the first move to the concrete dialogical dimension, to the historical actors engaged in time. This development is further enhanced by Herder, who locates language between the extremes of rationalism, expounded by Leibniz, and the irrationalism of Hamann⁵³. Language is not just the highest achievement of the analytical power of thought (Leibniz), nor completely remote from understanding; rather, it is the basic power of human spirit. Thus, language is a product of immediate sense-experience as well as the work of reflection. Language is a means, through which the sensed world is transformed into a world of perception. It becomes, therefore, a hermeneutical key to the problem of philosophical anthropology as such. It means that language is not only a work, a system, an *ergon*, but also

⁵¹ Schrey, H. H. (1970). *Dialogisches Denken [Dialogical Thinking]*, p. 10-12.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 12-13.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

an activity, *energeia*, able to constitute a perceptual and experiential world. Here, the human is no longer defined as a substance, but as an activity. Language is, therefore, understandable only if it is traced all the way to the spiritual activity, from which it originates, yielding the result that internal and external are completely intertwined. The subject-object dichotomy is beginning to break down, and this breakdown is required for a true dialogical process, where the other is no longer seen as an object or as a third person, whose signs we are attempting to decipher, but as a first person speaker, whose speech is the very interiority of the speaker directly accessible to anyone. Jacobi took this notion one step further by showing that the entities of the world and the experience of such entities are given only on the basis of the concrete dialogical process manifest in language⁵⁴.

Language constituted the bridge between the philosophies of “self-consciousness”, ranging from Descartes through Kant and even Kierkegaard, to the philosophy of dialogue, where the direct encounter of the other through language assumed supremacy. This led to the notion in Feuerbach, for example, that even the Kantian universal rationality is not recognizable without its mediation through the dialogical partner⁵⁵. A mediation of the self through the other is required for the recognition of the identity of reason, or the recognition that a rational thought is not just an idiosyncrasy of the self, but is rationality valid for all. Only this dialogical process can guarantee rationality for me as well as for the other. This is another indication of the attempts to surpass the philosophy of “I-It” toward the philosophy of “I-Thou”. Thus, Feuerbach’s thought is positing the dialogical principle as its foundation.

Structure of Dialogical Thought in the Contemporary Tradition

Throughout the traditional search for the dialogical region, we have encountered a specific phenomenon that attempted to account for the possibility of human interaction and human identity among the various singular differences. Thus, we found sociopolitical life in Aristotle functioning as the “medium”, through which encounter may take place, providing a means

⁵⁴ Schrey, H. H. (1970). *Dialogisches Denken* [Dialogical Thinking], p. 14.

⁵⁵ Feuerbach, L. (1966). *Principles of the Philosophy of the Future* (V. Manfred, Trans.). Indianapolis, IN: Robb & Merrill.

to dialogue. At the same time, the sociopolitical life is “more” than the sum of individuals. This “more” seems to signify something that transcends the individual because it is required for (a) our ability to communicate and understand one another and (b) our humanity, that is, our very essence as humans. This “more” appeared in Augustine, in the form of *Caritas*, constituting a dimension that transcended the individuals and their uniqueness and constituted a common bond. And it also appeared in rationalism as the common reason, transcending individual idiosyncracics, and in Romanticism, in the form of longing, of inadequacy, requiring the fulfillment of the self through the unattainable other. And the “more” finally emerged as language, which, although a product of the spiritual activity, plays a role in the constitution of the very spirituality, of the very activity in dialogical encounter. It also appeared very briefly in the notion of history as the “more” that is revealed and concealed in language. What is suggested here is that the dialogical process must account for the “more” in terms of (a) the first person speaker engaged with another first person, (b) language, which no two first person speakers engaged in dialogue can exhaust, and (c) history and tradition, with their institutions, within which dialogue takes place.

The notion of the first person speaker may be obvious at first: a human being speaking to another human being. Nevertheless, the positing of dialogue as a first principle of all human and world encounter requires a reevaluation of the constitution of the first person speaker. To begin with, if the first person speaker is, in principle, the foundation of dialogue and if dialogue is the basis of all human world encounter (world experience), then the first person can never become an object of any specific science, regardless of how inclusive the science may be and how well its theories may explain the individual in third person terms. Scientific theory, due to its assumed objectivity, views the first person in terms of a third person, as an object of a theory. Yet, this view requires a first person, who constructs the theory and correlates it to a set of selected phenomena. Thus, theoretical thought cannot abolish the first person; rather, it presupposes it as a condition for theoretical thought. This means that the theorizing first person, who constructs the theory, is much broader and encompasses more than the constructed theory, because the first person can construct other objectively valid theories. At the same time, although the theory attempts to explain human life, human behavior, human capacity to use language, and

influences the very object of its explanation. In terms of a dialogical encounter of person-to-person engagement, the theory that takes the person as an object (a third person) influences, by this very encounter, the investigated person. If language is the meaningful activity that directly transmits to the other the sense or the meaning of this activity, then the very structure of the linguistically constituted theory changes the “object” of investigation, that is, the dialogical partner. In this sense, objectivity is not attainable. For example, in a psychiatric situation, when the psychiatrist uses a particular theory to “explain” the patient, the patient is changed in terms of the language of the theory and begins to think of herself/himself as a sum of erotic drives, father and mother hang-ups and psychotic syndromes. In brief, the dialogical principle, claiming the priority of first person encounters, does not permit and, indeed, undercuts the notion that the humans can be treated as objects or that human encounters can be explained by an objective scientific theory. This suggests, moreover, that the first person speaker is “more” than any particular theory could encompass. The first person, in this sense, is the encompassing background comprising the basis of all theories and objectivities.

This leads us to another notion of the first person speaker, the primordial communicator. The attempt to explain human communication by a constructed theory requires an underlying process, which, in applying the theory to phenomena, selects the phenomena from a particular point of interest. Hence, the correlation of a theory to phenomena is performed by the first person communicator, who involves his/her interests in the application of the theory. The interests could range from religion to “pure objectivity”. Nevertheless, a first person interest is always involved. Hence, the first person communicator, the dialogical being, is always presupposed, although not accounted for by the theory or the selected phenomena. In this sense, again the first person is “more” than the theoretical explanation or the selected phenomena correlated to the explanation.

The dialogical base, starting from the person-to-person encounter in the first person singular, requires a shift in the very concept of what a theory is. In the dialogical process, theories cannot be seen to have an extra-temporal, extra-mundane stance, capable of indifferently surveying their field of explication. In the dialogical process, the theory influences the speaking subject, who in turn influences the theory. The theory no longer

provides an explanation, but a horizon, a temporal movement of possible modalities of articulating the subject matter of discussion. The very horizons are inconstant and change in correlation to the shifting views of the subject matter of concern of the dialogical partners. Indeed, this dialogical process may jell into a semi-permanent theory, yet (a) the speakers and their dialogical process will constitute a broader and more encompassing background unencompassed by the theory and (b) the very subject matter of their discussion, for example, the communicative process, will be affected by the theory.

It must then be maintained that the dialogical process, which, for example, attempts to deal with a theory of communication or with a socio-historical approach to human events at the time that it takes place, cannot be an object of any science or any objective description, because it is precisely this process that primordially deals with any theoretical structure and objective phenomena and correlates the structure to the selected phenomena, while itself is not included either in the theory or in the phenomena selected. This suggests that neither the theoretical exposition, nor objective observation can yield this underlying process; although always presupposed, the dialogical process seems to be anonymous.

Although the dialogical process appeared to be broader than any objective explanation of it, nevertheless, it takes place in a language with its own requirements, its own selectivity of events and its own interpretation of the world, which cannot be encompassed either by the dialogical partners or by an objective explanation. For example, although dealing with language, the dialogical partners cannot make the total language as such into an object of their concern, because the language as an object would be explicated by a language used by the dialogical partners, and this language would be much broader than the one that is being discussed. The language, into which we are born, the language that we use to talk about language and about communication, seems to be much broader and much more encompassing than the particular purposes, for which we employ it. At the same time, this broader language already offers a set of interpretations of the very dialogical partners and the process of dialogical encounter. It is, as Heidegger said, the very house of being wherein we exist⁵⁶.

⁵⁶ Heidegger, M. (1962). *Being and Time*. (Macquarrie & E. Robinson, Trans.). New York: Harper.

But what comprises language? Taking language in terms of experience, it can be defined as a structuration of consciousness into a world. This is to say that the experiencing process and the things of experience are deployed by linguistic articulation, ranging from a direct corporeal gesture to the most sophisticated mathematical systems. Every experience and every experienced thing belong in a world always and already inhabited by linguisticity; and precisely the deployment of things and experiences and the articulation of phenomena comprise the kind and the manner of the world that we inhabit. In turn, the way that the things are deployed constitutes a system of vectors, where one thing, one event, points to others inscribing spatio-temporal horizons, wherein the things, events and experiences have their loci, relationships and orientations. Linguistic process, in this sense, can inhabit anything, from a bodily gesture through spoken and written articulations, all the way to the conventional street signs and everyday implements. It also inhabits our institutions with their silent directives, requirements, requests and even imperatives. The laws speak not only from the mouths of judges, but also from institutionalized symbols, such as police, and from musty volumes stuffed in some forgotten corner of a library. And each of these institutions, although deploying the parameters of our actions and the modalities of our dialogue, in the silence of its linguisticity, implicates other institutions and, as Heidegger would have it, gathers them and reveals their silent speaking. Language, in this broad sense, is *Logos*, a power, and reveals not only things, events and their interrelationships, but also us, the communicators. In speaking, the *Logos* erects a world, establishes a context and lends our dialogical process an intimacy through vast distances. The implement we employ, made by someone, communicates to us the other's presence, the one, who designed, the one, who made, and the one, who transported this implement to us, are all gathered in the implement, and the implement transmits the presence of the others. The shape of the handle of a hammer, carved and polished by the hand of the other, points to, indicates and speaks of the other, creating a silent dialogical process. And the hammer, in turn, is not just an object; as to a board and the board to a wall and the wall to a house and the house to a family, a town or a region that one inhabits. In its deployment of the world, the hammer gathers it and signifies it. This hammer already radiates various possibilities and uses and, thus, constitutes an entire communicative sys-

tem, a communicative world of dialogue. As Theunissen once suggested, the very world of objects, events, things and characteristics is the dialogical medium, the communicative carrier⁵⁷. This medium, therefore, performs two essential functions: on the one hand, it presents the others even in their absence and it institutes a dialogical connection; on the other hand, it erects a world of interconnections that open a region of spatio-temporal deployment of things and their continuous horizons. Were we to explicate the meaning of language as *Logos*, we would be well advised to look toward the communicative capacity, that is, the dialogical process of art. The work of art cannot be taken out of its context, cannot hang on walls for courses in art appreciation, cannot primarily become a property, a monetary value like so much coal, potatoes, lumber, or what have you. The art-work as a *Logos* belongs in a region that the work itself opens up. Let us take a pair of shoes by Van Gogh. Indeed, the shoes are seen as being made of certain material and having a certain form and, thus, serviceability. Yet, it is also a gathered world that the shoes reveal. A peasant world of a maid, who wears these shoes, is inextricably intertwined. The shoes signify the world of the maid, as she plods tenaciously through the autumn furloughs of the field, raw wind at her face. To her shoes clings the rich damp loam, and beneath her feet she experiences the loneliness of the solitary evening path. In those shoes, she senses the silent call of the earth, whether in its abundant giving of grain or in its withholding in the bareness of winter. In these shoes speak the worry over her daily bread, the wordless triumph over need, the gladness at the announcement of birth and the silent tremble at the shadow of death. The shoes as *Logos* gather the world of the farm-maid and reveal the very concrete essence of a unique life. To make this perhaps more vivid, let us select some art-work that is not “representational”, such as a Greek temple. A temple represents nothing, as compared to what a picture might be said to do. The temple rather represents itself, it is present. But in this presence, the deity is also present and the region of holiness of sanctioning is opened up. And in it, the destiny of the human is shaped, whether it be birth or death, victory or defeat, or curse or blessing. And on account of the temple, the strength of the rock, on which the temple rests, appears for the first time with its strength, with its endurance; and so also the storm’s

⁵⁷ Theunissen, M. (1984). *The Other: Studies in the Social Ontology of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Buber*. (C. Macann, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

violence is withstood by the temple. And the sheen of the marble, polished to perfection, comes to be manifest in the temple, as it reflects the rays of the sun and the shadows of the evening, where light and shadow, sun-ray and crevice communicate and point one to the other. The temple gathers all, gods and mortals, the ways of living and dying, the ethos of a people and the desperation of sinning against the gods. As *Logos*, the art-work gathers and deploys the world; it speaks to all who are of the world.

At the same time, this art-work, this world that speaks, even in its nocturnal silence, is a product. It is erected, established by the human hand and human effort. Hence, the *Logos* as an artwork, as a communicative deployment and gathering of a world, also reveals the presence of the other, the dialogical partner, whoever he/she might have been, across temporal distances, bridging abysses of death, of generations and of centuries. We find the other, the dialogical partner, present in the visage of all artworks, of all institutions, from the edicts of gods to the poetic rhythm of a verse. The other emerges as a dialogical partner with the very presence of the artwork, verse institution, the other, who has instituted some modality of living, while himself/herself being instituted by the very world of communicative linguisticality. And precisely this instituting process, which, although erecting the world and itself, lends the dynamism to the dialogical encounter. In language, and in all other communicative institutions, indeed, in the world, it is not the form or the shape that lends dynamism, but the presence of the dialogical partner as the shaper, as the establisher that constantly derails any attempts to asphyxiate human speaking and human deployment of a world in linguistic practice.

But this linguisticality, this dimension that is identical with the very world of human residence, appears to be broader and more expansive, and the “more” in our experience that seems to be inexhaustible, to be the very dimension that dominates the dialogical partners and the dialogical encounter. It would seem that the dialogical partners and the anonymous background of all theoretical and mundane experience are merely brief moments in the process of world-linguisticality, of a world of communicative interactions among all events and humans. These partners seem to be encompassed rather than encompassing. It seems that this linguistically deployed world, transmitted through traditions and institutions, can never be surveyed by any singular speaker, without this speaker becoming sub-

merged and transformed along the lines required by the institutionalized linguisticality as the world of human habitat. Indeed, the very notion of a dialogue, even if it were to happen “face to face”, would be derailed, transformed along the institutionalized, that is, the pre-given communicative world that escapes our control. It would seem that the communicative, the dialogical partners are lost and all that is left is the overpowering world of linguisticality. A resolution between these two all-encompassing dimensions (the anonymous first persons and the world linguisticality) must be found. And it is found, it seems to us, in the following way.

Although the linguistic world, deployed across institutions and inter-relationships, may seem to be independent of the first person speakers, it is, nevertheless, constantly founded by them. The relationship of the first person speakers and language, the *logos*, can be explicated as follows. To maintain the dialogical base, it is essential that neither the individual dialogical partners, nor the linguistic process be given supremacy. In brief, in the organismic linguisticality, the individual should not be lost, but at the same time the individuals should not have such an extreme priority, where their relationships would be merely external. The dialogical process constitutes a commonality based on immanent relationships of independent personalities. This commonality is actualized in dialogue, where the consciousness of the dialogical partners is deployed toward the world. And this deployment constitutes a founded unity. A founded unity consists of parts that cannot be one without the others. This unity must be distinguished from the unity of pervasion, where dependent parts are founded one in the other (tone quality and intensity in music) and deal with a unity, where independent parts found a new content, for example, individual notes or tones build a melody. This is also valid for the linguisticality of the world, where the individual dialogical partners found a higher unity and, in turn, are founded by it as dialogical partners. This founded-founding relationship is such that the seemingly independent linguisticality, the *logos*, is a polycentrically articulated whole, a total movement. Hence, the linguistic world is not some supra-consciousness, but is constituted in the dialogical process that is polycentrically articulated. In this sense, the individual never leaves the dialogical region, because all of his/her linguisticality already means a communication with someone, somewhere and sometime⁵⁸.

⁵⁸ Husserl, E. *Gemeingeist* I. A V 24 - A VIII 31.

Phenomenological Principles of Dialogue

The question of dialogue and its communicative function has been discussed by various phenomenologists, among whom the most notable are S. Strasser, H. Schrey, C. A. Va Peursen, B. Waldenfels and E. Minkowski. Using their works and those of the major phenomenologists, such as Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, it is possible to extricate the following principles governing the experience of dialogue:

1. The upper limit of dialogue would be transgressed, when a common core of meaning of a state of affairs or of things would be interpreted as a property of an inexpressible state of a subject capable of constituting meaning that is completely private. In this case, the origin of meaning would be a subject, capable of understanding the other only in terms of its own private meaning, but never the meaning of the other. The understanding of what the other communicates would be always mediated through a grid of subjective meanings and states, precluding the possibility of direct comprehension of the other.

2. The lowest limit of dialogue would be surpassed if the communicative process were interpreted in terms of causality subtended by a fundamental assumption that communication occurs when certain physical, psychological or physiological registers are disturbed. It is a thesis that is based on the concepts of the constancy hypothesis and of the stimulus-response syndrome. The constancy hypothesis claims that given certain external causal situations, that situation must elicit one response. Stated in causal terms, given a specific cause, one, and only one, specific effect will follow. The same can be maintained for the stimulus-response syndrome. Given a stimulus of a particular kind, a particular type of response is to be expected. But in this interpretation of the communicative process, the dialogical partners are reduced to a system of natural signs, where one phenomenon can manifest only a specific other phenomenon: smoke is a sign of fire – a causal relationship. Each sign is closed in its function within the causal range of possibilities. Yet, as we noted, the meaning-giving function and the experienced object are at variance with the natural-causal process, even when such a process is employed as a means of communicative transmission. When we listen, we do not react to the momentary sound-impressions in a one-to-one correlation, but to the meaning of the total sentence, paragraph, story or even a treatise. Moreover, each causal carrier is capable of con-

taining an aura of meanings, among which we constantly select the proper ones in terms of their function in the total sense-making process. Another lower limit interpretation that would hinder the communicative process is the common dualism between the external and the internal states, between mind and body, where the body is a sign of internal or mental processes. At best, the relationship here is external and there is no guarantee that the visible signs correctly indicate the invisible mental states. Phenomenology suggests that in signifying, the subject is involved as a whole process. Every intention is completely intertwined with every function of our being. It is not the case that we are angry about something with one part, while the rest of our functions remain passive; our entire being is angry and the anger is present in and through our gestures. While looking at an angry person, we do not decipher signs and then infer that the person has a psychic state called anger that he attempts to express externally. We see anger directly. The first pounding the table is not a sign of anger; it is anger present to direct experience. What we directly experience is what is being communicated and not the sign. Sign is only a means, and to deal with a system of signs is not to deal with communication, but with the means of communication.

3. Even if the upper and lower limits of dialogue are not transgressed and a common-public world is assumed, the dialogical process would be disrupted if the events and objects in the common world possessed different meanings to the dialogical partners. Only an engagement in an identical signification, a recognizable core, that is, an experience of an identically meant object or event, guarantees the continuity of the dialogical process across the variances of the states of objectivity and subjectivity, external and internal. The meaning dimension in the dialogical process is fundamental. Meanings point to an essential core as an identifiable object and constitute the “repeatable”, the “atemporal” aspect that remains constant throughout the changes of objective events and subjective states. It is the common factor, the enduring experiential component, constituting the bonds of a dialogue. Although we may have an object in our common world, communication is possible if the object is meant in an identical way. While discussing a tree, an artist may mean it as an object of beauty, a businessman may signify it as so many feet of running board, and a botanist may see it as an example of a rare species. How the object is meant, intended, and the sharing of the meaning is presupposed by communication, by the dialogical process.

Although being distinct from, yet always related to the natural events, the significative dimension in dialogue constitutes a common historical matrix accessible to all dialogical partners.

In this context, the term *signification* means a process that designates something other than itself, such that the designated meaning of the object or the thing meant is disassociable from the meant object or event. For example, an experiential act of judging means, signifies the object judged, but the meaning of the judgment (a) specifies the manner, in which the object is experienced, and (b) is applicable to other objects and events. The artist means the tree as an aesthetic object, but the meaning of aesthetic is not exhausted by the tree; it can also mean a sunset or a stormy sea. In brief, signification specifies the meaning of the given object and at the same time is detached, that is, not identical with the given object; it can apply to other objects as well. The “same things” are signified differently, and different things may be signified by an identical meaning. Yet, the signification is what constitutes the dialogical domain and allows communicability. The same or different things constitute a perceptual exemplification of the meaning that is being communicated. Hence, the aim at a common object and event in the process of communication presupposes a common core of meaning of that something. If one person sees and signifies a table as a “dancing space” for his Spanish dancer, whereas another signifies it as an expensive antique, the divergence in meaning may lead to “bad blood”.

Within the aforementioned context, we must avoid the theoretical positions that would lead to the reduction of the dialogical domain to an objective sum of things or to a set of psychosomatic states, closed in a monological isolation. Because the dialogical process embodies experience and because phenomenology contends that the only world we have is the experienced one, then the dialogical process must be seen as encompassing both objectivity and subjectivity. The dialogical process is the locus for the constitution of all commonality, where various significations are accepted, rejected, modified, abstracted or concretized in direct human speaking⁵⁹.

The commonality is constituted on the basis of the co-presence of the dialogical partners, where the individual is constantly de-centered from his/her own modes of perception and experience not by his/her own self-

⁵⁹ Waldenfels, B. (1971). *Zwischenreich des Dialogs* [The in-between Region of Dialogue], p. 224.

projection, wishes or desires, but by another individual engaged in a dialogue. It could be argued that without dialogue our views and experiences would be locked within a narrow range. We discover our own limits only when our views are contested in a dialogical encounter. The dialogical partner decenters us from our own egocentricity and opens us up to experiences that not only contest our own, but also expand our horizons. This process is prior to any reflective self-reference of the individual to itself. In the dialogical domain, we are always oriented toward the other and the field of objectivity. The others are inescapably there, and we find ourselves in a dialogical domain that is oriented “poly-centrally”, or by various individuals. The others are always co-present and co-engaged in a way that neither the self, nor the others are constituted one through the other’s internal projections or inner representations, but rather emerge in a dialogue structured poly-centrally. Each self constitutes a unique addition, a specific point of reference to a common field of significations, implicating the meanings of objects and subjective states.

The “Essential” Structure of Dialogue

A basic understanding of the dialogical domain requires an extrication of its “pure” structure in the sense that all dialogical processes presuppose such a structure. The following components comprise the “pure” structure:

1. A significative orientation of the subject to a state of affairs, events or things, that is, an orientation, which, as an activity, “means” something other than itself in a specific way.

2. By signifying, by meaning the states of affairs, things and events, the subject orients himself/herself to the other subject, who is not an object in the field, but someone, who is being addressed about something.

3. By addressing the other, the subject orients the other to the meant state of affairs and also to himself/herself as the initiator of the address.

4. By orienting himself/herself to the other, the subject is oriented in turn to himself/herself and recognizes his/her own uniqueness and contribution to the dialogue.

In short, I turn myself to someone for the sake of something, speak to the other about something and work with the other on something. This essential structure remains constant across various interpretations and must be maintained if the dialogical domain is to remain dialogical.

The uniqueness of the dialogical relationship lies in that it abolishes the binary relationship of the self and the world or the self and other as an object in a field of perceptions, purposes, aims and reactions. The other self in a dialogue is also decentered toward the world in terms of the meaning given to objects and events by the dialogical partner. The question of intersubjectivity here is quite different from the traditional question concerning our relationship to and knowledge of the other. In the dialogical context, the other is experienced not as an object, given to the subject to be deciphered, but as a dialogical partner, engaged in a signification of things and events, as a process oriented toward the world and is understandable in terms of the intentional directions and the manner, in which these directions “mean” the things and events of the world. The subjects come to recognize their own positions, similarities and differences only in relationship to the signified events and objects and in relationship to each other.

The other, the “alter ego”, assumes a particular position in the dialogue; speaking spatially, it has a locus not facing someone or being an all-encompassing process that either attempts to decipher the external signs of the other or projects a meaning onto such signs, but is “next to the dialogical partner”. Originally present, the other is not yet seen either as an object of specific intentional orientations or a subject with his/her own orientations, but as a co-presence in all orientations and intentionalities in the dialogical domain. It is not the other, who is thematic, but what the other says, speaks about, acts upon and perceives and, thus, is present in all such activities. As Husserl pointed out, “It is not the other that is thematic but what the other says when I am in a position to understand and incorporate what he says. The co-presence of the other is for me a co-presence and we are at something in a unity of function”⁶⁰.

The acts of turning toward the other cannot be the same as those of dealing with the objects and events. The object motivates the self in terms of its significance. One does something with it, without its taking any initiative to the actor, the speaker. The relationship to an object is not a cooperation, a co-intentionality and co-orientation. If an object were to become such, it would be a fetish. The other is an addressee of the subject’s comportment, a receiver or a lender of signification of something. The mode of turning to

⁶⁰ Waldenfels, B. (1971). *Zwischenreich des Dialogs* [The in-between Region of Dialogue], p. 136, note 3.

the other is one of addressing, contesting and evoking. As Waldenfels suggested, the vocative sense comes here to the fore. The encounter of the other in a dialogue is not a confrontation between two subjectivities attempting to read external signs produced by each in order to decipher what the other is communicating, but a primordial presence before any reading of signs, a presence found in the very events and objects signified by the dialogical process. This can be exemplified by a dialogue in which the participants assume an interrogative mood⁶¹.

Keeping in mind the triadic dialogical structure, it is possible to analyze the dialogical domain as speaking and counter-speaking where one dissolves the other and incorporates it. Although the initiative may shift from one speaker to the other, lending one or the other a more pronounced active role, there is no sharp distinction between activity and passivity. Speaking and listening and speaking and answering are one event with various phases. A question and answer are unified in a contrary double movement, a movement initiated by the questioner and reaching its aim in the counter-movement of a reception of an answer and a counter-movement coming from the listener fulfilling itself in the communication of an answer. The movement and counter-movement are delimited from the very inception by the dialogical aim involving the partners. When one addresses the other about something, he/she assumes an active initiation; but what does it mean here to say “active”? While addressing someone or while asking a question “actively”, one is already “passively” expecting an answer that fulfills the question and at the same time contains an aura of possibilities of accepting, rejecting or correcting the answer and indeed of rephrasing the question. All this is contained in the dialogical region at the outset. The activity and passivity are completely intertwined in this domain, where every initiation is already an expectation and every expectation has a co-presence of re-initiation. The speaker gives to the listener something to understand, the signified state of affairs, allowing him/her to hear, to immerse him/herself in the question and, while becoming a co-listener, to lend the initiative to the other in order to hear, accept, reject or re-ask. The very receptivity of the answer to the question fulfills the question and is constitutive of it. Question and answer, activity and passivity, are constantly shifting and in-

⁶¹ Waldenfels, B. (1971). *Zwischenreich des Dialogs* [The in-between Region of Dialogue], p. 143.

tertwine aspects of one dialogical process, where both speakers are simultaneously active and passive⁶².

The same requirements are present in the process of listening to a question. The passivity of listening is not a precursory step for a subsequent activity of responding, but is already an initiation. When the other opens a dialogue, the recipient is already participating; his/her eagerness or ability to accept the address enhances or hinders the inception. In receptivity, he/she already knows to be propelled toward an expected answer or a response, toward a co-presence of a field of events and objects, containing future possibilities, wherein the answer is accepted, rejected, understood or questioned. Hence, he/she is already participating in the dialogical domain of open vectors of signification and resignification. While passively listening to a question and formulating an answer, the just asked question continues to be co-present in the formulation of the answer and the acceptance or rejection of the answer is already traced in the initial question and the passive formulation of the answer. While listening and at the same time formulating an answer, the listener intermixes passivity and activity in such a way that they constitute one process involving the addresser and the field of events and objects. Although such a process has analytical-logical distinctions, such distinctions do not imply the separation of functions. Actively asking and passively expecting an answer, passively listening and actively formulating an answer at the same time, are one process that, in each of its phases, concentrates and implies all other possible phases. The concept of concentration is analogous to our previously discussed phases of perception. The meaning of one perspective is a phase of all perspectives and contains them in a concentrated form by implying all of them.

It should be stressed that the dialogical process does not create the commonality of signification of events, but unfolds it. This requirement is necessary to avoid reductionism of signification and of meaning, to some personal or interpersonal process. A mutual engagement in dialogue already assumes the meant objects and events and the possibility of signifying them in various ways. What this suggests is that signification is not a subjective process or a process of an agreement among various subjects. It is always world-oriented, and in meaning the things and events of the

⁶² Husserl, E. (1966). *Analysen zur Passiven Synthesis* [Analysis of Passive Synthesis], section 15.

world, it itself becomes meaningful and signifying. This world-orientation is a condition for a dialogue.

In dialogue, there is presupposed an “identical meaning” that can be experienced by the dialogical partners. It is a “unitary core” that is the theme of the dialogue and through which the things and events of the world are present to the speaker and the listener. The unitary core is present through the various modifications of addressing, listening, formulating, rejecting, accepting and understanding. This core of meaning lends stability and continuity to the various co-present phases of the dialogical process. Although the factual objects and events are intended in the dialogue, what is ultimately given in the dialogical process is the manner, in which the objects and events are meant and their meaning unfolded. The dialogical partners assume what each means and realize the meaning in perception and corporeal behavior, each in accordance with his/her capacities, perceptual habits and open possibilities.

It is to be noted that this is the juncture, in which the factual-perceptual and significative motivations intersect. The significative process is always oriented toward perceptual and factual exemplification or “filling”, suggesting further possibilities of meaning and, hence, constituting the extension of the dialogical domain. Thus, the factual events and objects of the world are always intertwined in the dialogical process of sharing of meaning. As we shall subsequently see, this intertwining allows the extension of the dialogical process across historical periods and dialogical partners, who are not corporeally presents⁶³.

Temporalization and Unity of the Dialogical Domain

Husserl suggested that the dialogical unity of the communicating members is pre-given in human experience. In mutual understanding, my experiences and acquisitions encounter those of the other as components of my own series within my experiential life. Yet, such a unity requires the role of temporality. Question and answer and speaking and response appear not only in relationship to the signified states of affairs, but also within a temporal interrelationship occurring passively in a common process. While signifying the states of affairs in one’s speaking at the present, one means

⁶³ Husserl, E. *Gemeingeist I*.

them precisely as the listener receives them. The present speaking is nonetheless but one phase in the dialogical process comprised of a continuation of someone's address, initiation and inception and of someone's response. In speaking, we have the co-presence of previous moments and phases to come; this constitutes a field of significative interconnections relating the states of affairs as well as the activities of the speakers. This process expands into a common temporal field with its indeterminate-determinable horizons. This is not to say that one enters a field of experience of the other as a temporal object; nor is it to say that in this temporalization there is a constitution of a "we" subject. Rather, in our constitution of the meaning of the states of affairs, there is a constant opening and maintenance of temporal horizons comprising a scheme of possibilities for variations of meanings, among which our dialogical activity ranges in selectivity, that is, acceptance or rejection. The dialogical process and its temporal horizons do not guarantee that the horizon of the dialogical partners cover the horizon of the dialogical partners cover one another point for point, possibility for possibility and meaning for meaning. There is a partial covering that leaves room for continuation and unification of understanding; yet, the dialogical process is also exposed to disruptions and fragmentations. For example, an unnoticed possibility from a temporal horizon may enter the field of dialogue and change the meanings constituting the current phases of discourse. Thus, unification means, for dialogical and experiential life, that in the changes of opinions, articulations, and modes of appearance through the temporal phases there emerges a core of meaning. The core of meaning allows for partial covering of the implications experienced by the dialogical partners, leading at the same time to a partial fulfillment of meanings in perceptual life. This is to say, the perceptual fulfillment of the meanings emergent in the dialogue consists of either imagined objectivities or objectivities that had been experienced before. Because the dialogical partners had experienced such objectivities in different contexts, their perceptual filling of what is discussed in dialogue can never be completely identical for the dialogical partners. Although the kind of required filling from past experience, from recollection, is suggested by the dialogical partner in a schematic way, each individual brings his/her own experiences to lend a concrete factual or perceptual filling for the schematized suggestions. Such suggestions could, of course, extend to a direct experience of enti-

ties. Hence, it could be said that although the activities dealing with the continuous unification of a common core of meaning comprise a unified relationship between the dialogical partners and poly-centrally articulated movement, the phases within that movement intersect and mutually change, leading to a partial covering of meaning and schematized perceptual implications. This process is precisely the temporality of the dialogical domain. The temporality reveals, in turn, a passive aspect of “transitional experiences”, consisting of “background” intentionalities and silent implications that play at the fringes, at the surface and in the depth of dialogue. They constitute a context of expanded and encompassing common consciousness, which seems to lack any temporal direction. On the fringes of the temporal structuration of the poly-centric field, there appears, as Husserl said, a “supra-personal” consciousness⁶⁴.

The “supra-personal” consciousness is not some over-reaching entity, but emerges in the dialogical process and is sedimented in the individual experiences. This consciousness could be exemplified in the following way: in order to maintain the unity and continuity of the dialogical domain, it is in principle impossible to begin with an organismic society or with a radical ecology. In organismic society, the individual is completely subsumed under the social system, whereas in egological conception the relationships are external and at best are either objective or subjective. Only in the dialogical domain do we encounter a locus of commonality emerging from an immanence of the dialogical domain as a relationship between independent personalities. This commonality is actualized in communication, where we confront a common core of meaning of objects and states of affairs. The emergent meaning is a “higher unity”, a founded whole. A founded whole consists of parts that cannot be one without the other. Here, we must distinguish between a unity of pervasion, where dependent parts are founded one in the other (tone quality and intensity), and where independent parts found a new content, for example, the tones build a melody. The latter is valid for the dialogical domain making up a “supra-consciousness”. Using the metaphor of melody and individual notes, we can express this relationship in the following manner: the notes are required as individual contributions to found the melody; yet, once the melody emerges from the notes, it in turn founds the notes as notes of a melody and lends them a function

⁶⁴ Husserl, E. *Gemeingeist I*, A VIII 31.

and meaning in the whole. In this sense, the melody founds the individual notes. Yet, it is no longer identical with such notes, because the notes can vary to a degree without changing the essence of the melody. This is not to say that the notes will not institute interesting variations of the melody; indeed, each variation will be a novel contribution; hence, the individual note is crucial for the continuity and, yet, variation of the melody. Each individual note adds horizons of implications and suggestions within the melody, horizons that could be pursued and explored. This explorability, in relationship to other notes, comprises more than the individual notes would warrant; they establish a founded whole and, in turn, become founded by it.

This metaphor is applicable to the dialogical domain. In the process of signifying, the individuals found a unity, a core of shared meaning, a meaning that has a horizon of implications and a marginal region of options not explored by the individual contributors. It is more than the current possession of the individuals. Hence, it binds the individuals as dialogical partners and engages them in the whole process of meaning unification. At the same time, the unique individual opinions, articulations, positions and sedimented experiences add a novelty, a shift to the dialogical domain and implicate unnoticed variations and horizons. Thus, the complex formation of significations and meaning, emerging in the dialogical process, includes and requires the dialogical partners and their mutual participation. The significations of the one are immediately significations of the other, comprising for the partners a complex dialogical domain that can be sedimented in them or institutionalized in language, art, corporeal habits, religion, morality, etc. Here, the individual, without the loss of individuality, can become a carrier and transmitter of a tradition or institution without the loss of the ability to add to the “supra-consciousness” a unique meaning, which horizon of implications may change the tradition and institutions.

The domain of the dialogue and the melody constituted by the individual signifiers allow the individual to assume an encompassing role, consisting of an extension of experiences borrowed from others, an encompassment that can shift from one dialogical partner to others, to all possible partners, who, in their turn, can extend their dialogical domain toward greater encompassment. This implies that in one’s experiences and sensibilities, one discovers the presence and intermingling of the experiences and sensibilities of the others, not merely those, who are actually present, but of

generations past and generations to come. As Waldenfels suggested, each individual has his own sensibilities, apperceptions and enduring unities of meaning, whereas the communicating community (the poly-centered field) has in its own right a sensibility, a continuous apperception and a correlative world with indeterminate horizons. I see and hear not only with my senses, but also with those of others and the others with mine. And this is not merely an objective proposition, but a fact of consciousness for me and for all who are effective in my own activities and even in the sphere of my passivity. Hence, each can orient himself/herself not only to his/her own, but also to “our” sense experience⁶⁵.

The founded dialogical domain serves all as an index of manifold meanings and possible perceptual appearances of objects and states of affairs. What is experienced in communication by the one at the present is seen as having been experienced or just about to be experienced by the other and conversely. In this mutual transition of experiences, one’s own reality is grasped as the realization of the meant objects of the other and the perceived reality of the other as the fulfillment of one’s own intended meaning. Thus, prior to any expressed understanding, there is already a pre-given unity in the dialogical domain, occurring silently and unnoticed. What is present to others is also present to one in the process of distinguishing one’s own perspective from that of the others, where one borrows the vision or perception of the others to see the same thing “from there” and “from then”. Such sensibilities include the entire historical and institutional framework, entire traditions that comprise the “supra-individual consciousness”. It is, nevertheless, constantly maintained through, and by, the individual participants, who carry and orient the entire history and a tradition as a poly-centric dialogical domain.

The founded dialogical domain serves all individuals as an index of the manifold ways of signifying objects and events and the possible ways in the communicative process seen by one. It is seen as having been experienced or just about to be experienced by another and conversely. In this transition, one experiences one’s own perceptions as the realization and fulfillment of the ways that the other means objects and events and the perceptions of the other as one’s own intended meaning and its correlation to objects and

⁶⁵ Waldenfels, B. (1971). *Zwischenreich des Dialogs* [The in-between Region of Dialogue], p. 162.

events. Thus, prior to any explicit understanding, there is already a pre-given unity in the dialogical domain, occurring silently and unnoticeably. What is present to one is also present to the others in the process of distinguishing one's own perspective from that of others in terms of the meaning unit related to an object or event. The others provide points of reference, with perspectives both spatial and temporal, which are not mine and, yet, which I assume and include in the continuity of my perspectives and perceptual possibilities. The senses of the others are co-continuous with mine and provide me with an extended perceptibility.

These ways are institutionalizable, for example in education. During the process of education, one is engaged not only with one's teachers, but also with the great figures of the past sedimented in books. The reader assumes the meanings and perceptions of the past figures and then argues, agrees, disagrees or rejects their views. Human institutions, in this sense, are not a sum of empirical facts, but a system of interrelated meanings that signify the world in diverse ways and from various perspectives. This suggests that meaning is not necessarily embodied in the human subject, but can be carried by various means, such as books, buildings, street arrangements, art works, rituals, etc. In this sense, the sociocultural and historical world, in which the human dwells, is a world of communication, a world comprised of significant interconnections. Empirical objects and events in this world play a role of signs pointing to other signs and ultimately to the entire sociocultural system of meanings indicating the manners, in which objects and events are to be experienced. Thus, this world is basically a process of communication, and our engagement in it is basically a dialogical process. While being in dialogue with others, we are at the same time in a dialogue with the sociocultural and historical world embodied in institutions that carry the experiences, conceptions, sensibilities and ultimately the significations of the anonymous dialogical partners.

While noting the function of the "supra-consciousness" and the institutions, it is essential to note another dialogical aspect, in which the individual appears as the "other" in the communicative process. In dialogue, the other appears other by revealing perceptions, ideas and meanings that I had never thought of, perceived or meant. The other can reveal a difference to me and in this difference can reveal my own individuality, my own unique position and sense limitation. The other may reveal ways of understand-

ing that are surprising, irritating, puzzling, disturbing and even delightful. At the same time, the other can assert his/her difference by contesting my perceptions of the other's meaning, thus, exposing me to my own failures⁶⁶.

In this contestation, the other creates a distance and opens an interval between our understanding of each other without breaking the dialogical process. Here, negativity appears: "I don't understand, I don't see; am I wrong?" The partners have a power of withdrawal into separation. The other can always emerge beyond what I have thought of him/her to contest my understanding, and, in turn, I can withdraw behind my own perceptions and meanings, compare them with the other's perceptions and meanings, contest myself in terms of the other and contest the other. In this dialogical process, the other does not evoke unity with me, but a difference; it is a summons to be at my limit and to mark the difference between us and others. The presence of the other disturbs my own unity and authority and the sense of things. This suggests that our dialogue is not only indicative or interrogative, but it is also imperative, appellative and evocative. Whether I submit or not, a demand is placed on me. Even if I remain indifferent, my indifference is in the face of a call that I resist or refuse you.

The emergence of the difference in the dialogical encounter is founded on the concrete uninterchangeability of positions. The encounter is the primordial way that marks out my own position in a concrete situation. I am here facing the other, who is there and who indeed can become remote from me and his own position; a possibility of continuous absence. Yet, the other defined my position. Still, another way that the individual appears as different from the dialogical partners lies in the disruption of dialogue. While speaking, we are constantly engaged in the world that our speaking articulates; and while hearing or listening I am engaged in the articulations of the other; yet, when the dialogue breaks, the individuals are thrown back upon themselves and recognize their differences. It is analogous to Heidegger's notion of a field of communication and activity, in which things and events point to one another. The hammer points to the nail, the nail to the board to be nailed, the board to the wall to be built, the wall to the house, and so on. The hammer does not appear as an entity in space, but as a communicative process in a system of relationships. It

⁶⁶ Levinas, E. (1970). *Totality and Infinity*. (A. Lingis, Trans.). Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.

is only when the hammer breaks that it appears in its individuality and separation; then the nails and the boards also appear in their separation. In the communicative process, the other draws me into a system that places demands on me to respond, even if the response is an attempt to escape the demand. This dialogical encounter could also be called vocative; in its informative process it does not only inform, but also delimits fields of experience and divergence of perspectives that can converge or diverge. In this sense, the convergence forms a common world, a cosmos, always exposed to disruption, contestation and divergence. The cosmos does not appear in the sole perceptual experience of data and perspectives, but is articulated in a speech that questions, delimits and responds, placing the individual speakers at the limits of their contributions for the understanding of the meaning of things and events.

But the difference of the other needs not appear only in face of the other; it can also appear in the institutionally and historically transmitted sense; when I read a book or participate in a ritual of different origin than mine, I am contested, my views, my understanding is silently challenged, and my sense of the order of the cosmos is disrupted and delimited; I am thrown back to grasp my own stance. In this sense, the dialogical process leads to individuation and the recognition of the individual differences. Alone, the individual's perspective appears all-encompassing; it is only in interrogation or contestation that the individual is compelled to recognize the individuality of himself/herself and the individuality of the other. The dialogical process comprises the two major orientations: the constitution of the "supra-consciousness" that lends founded unity in human interaction and the achievement of individuation, of limitation, in which the individuals attain their experience of their own positions, perspectives and idiosyncratic meanings. The two aspects are not separate in the dialogical process; it is a continuous unification and separation, affinity and distance. In this sense, the dialogical domain is not an absolute encroachment on the individual, and the individual is not an absolute sovereign of his views and limitations.

Concretization of the Dialogical Domain

The delimitation of the structure of the dialogical domain is a necessary, but an insufficient condition for the understanding of the communicative process. It requires mediation by a specific, concrete linguistic tradition

and corporeal expression. A linguistic tradition is an interpretation of the dialogical domain in particular terms that limit the domain to a concrete historical milieu and corporeal comportment. The latter have their modes of activity and passivity, pliability and rigidity, stressing some and excluding other meanings. The linguistic modalities are, so to speak, ahead of the activity and passivity of the dialogical partners. Their pliability, in fact, modulates, suggests and pre-figures the receptivities and obstructions in our own sensibilities.

The dialogical process, although retaining the universality of its structure and meaning, is subsumed under the specificity of a situation, historical requirements and the expressive abilities of the dialogical partners. The word, the concrete linguistic gesture, delimits the pure meanings of the dialogical domain in terms of a situation that has its own field requirements. This field is constantly shaped and reshaped by the modulation of the voice, expanded or contracted by the wave of the hand, the questioning eyebrow or the shrug of the shoulders. This leads us to the consideration of the concrete gesture, of dialogical process as incarnate and historical. This is not to say that the dialogical process is understood here in terms of historicism. As we shall subsequently see, phenomenology allows a reflection on history that places historically transmitted modes of communication in their proper limits. Historicism must itself be seen as a moment of phenomenological reflection on history.

Phenomenological understanding of body, or corporeity, comprises a commitment to a situation, to a concrete world of action, an anchorage in a milieu, an immersion in an environment, in which language, gesture and bodily movements assume concrete meaning. Corporeity, as Merleau-Ponty's work has shown, is a "being-toward-the-world"; it is a pre-objective and pre-subjective experience that can be designated as "practognosis", where the world is experienced as a field of action⁶⁷. The notion of signifying and the signified assumes here a corporeal base, resulting in a process of signification such that although signifying the things and events in the field, the corporeal gestures and concrete expressions are, in turn, signified by objective terms and events. The function of corporeal processes, the gestures and the linguistic vocalizations efface themselves before the signified, the pointed to. Their meaning is not read by observing the body, but by ob-

⁶⁷ Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962). *Phenomenology of Perception*, p. 45.

serving the phenomena, toward which the body is oriented. The meaning of the gestures is read from the total context; hence, the corporeal gestures reveal the field and their meaning is the field. The function of signifying and the signified is so intertwined, that the distinction between what does the signifying and what is the signified has not yet emerged. Moreover, the terms (the objects and events in the field) signify and point to each other by way of location of our bodies. While orienting myself toward a particular object, I find that the objects surrounding it are also oriented toward it and point to it, comprising a setting, in which the object and I assume a location. While observing, pointing to the house from this side, I find that the tree behind the house points to the other side of the house, and the houses surrounding it point to the sides of the house. In brief, the objects and events co-constitute a field of significations with my bodily gestures, a system of pointers and a mutual communicative system. In this sense, my body is never completely extricable from the field, but is always engaged in a concrete communication with it⁶⁸.

Language also plays a fundamental role here; yet, it must be understood in the concrete form of a “speaking subject”. It is to be noted that to speak with others is not reducible to empirical linguistic process or to conscious acts of speech. Empiricism and rationalism fail to note that words have their sense and that we think and come to understanding in them. The terms are not objects of representations, but, deployable by corporeal capacities, engaged in an environment, in which language is completely intertwined. Yet, the linguistic world is not an arbitrary process; it requires organization. It is not a conglomeration of phonematic, lexical and syntactical forms, among which we may seek out components in an arbitrary way.

Linguistic structures are part of the perceptual structures. This does not mean that linguistic structures are somehow correlated to the perceptual structures. In our constant perceptual and corporeal movement toward the world, we elicit formations that are not conglomerates of preexisting facts, but contexts, in which objects and events are located; language is the process of the extrication of the formations in the total environment. The perceptual process, in which the field is articulated, is completely involved in the language as a field of terms, phrases, statements, articulations and modes of behavior. Linguistic fields are not a summation of terms; rather, each term

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

makes sense only in relation to and distinction from other terms. The meaning is not so much in terms as in their differentiation from each other.

This is analogous to the perceptual experience. The perceived yellow is a function of the total chromatic field; among greens, the yellow is dull, among blacks, it is bright. Homogeneous color is not given to perception. Hence, every perception, as well as every linguistic term, is contextualized. There are no salient, permanent points of “reality” without a context, and there are no linguistic terms that do not emerge from the background of the entire perceptual and linguistic field. The particular term or phrase constitutes a relief, a formation, a “figure in use”. Because the meaning of a term appears only in distinction from other terms, no word is comprehensible without the language, in which it is imbedded.

The close interrelationship between perceptual field and language concretizes the dialogical requirements into a situational and historical process. The poly-centrally oriented field is carried linguistically through historical development and the linguistic practice differentiates the perceptual fields from others through the structuration of linguistic processes employed by the others. This is not to say that the field of the current dialogical partners will cover those of the past without residua and ambiguities. As already noted, even the contemporaneous dialogical partners cannot achieve complete identity of meaning. The terms in a context also imply more meaning than the context can exhaust. The term yellow, in a chromatic field, may be concretized to carry indefinite implications: bright, dull, rich, cowardly, passive, holy, etc. But this, in principle, does not preclude the possibility of partial covering with the experiences of others, whether contemporaneous or from a different historical time.

Due to the inextricable interrelationship between the perceptual and linguistic fields, the words are not separable from the things and their qualities; the term yellow inheres in the very perceived phenomenon. Initially, we do not distinguish between the phenomenon and the term, precisely because the terms are oriented and signifying; they mean something other than themselves. Hence, in the concrete dialogical process, the dialogical partners are always oriented toward something other than themselves or the words that they use. Even when a language becomes a theme of discourse, the words used to describe language are not given as objects or subjective functions, but as a process or articulation, providing a field for the

thematized language. In brief, concrete speaking draws its meaning from the perceptual field.

The perceptual field, in turn, is articulated corporeally. Although being a principle of limitation, situatedness and localization, corporeal process and gestures transcend the limitations, go beyond the given position. Thus, while pointing to something and tracing its path, the gesture tends to say more, that is, to extend the movement. While pointing toward the shooting star across the horizon, the gesture can extend the path of the shooting star beyond our visibility. Yet, there is another way of transcending the situation; all bodily functions and gestures have a meaning that always leads to more meaning. When I signify a bright yellow, the brightness is contextual; yet, the yellow suggests other possible contexts, it transcends the limitations of this context at the very time, when it is signified in concrete speaking. This is why body is not just a limitation, but a positive initiation, an openness of the field beyond the given situation. Without the situatedness and, at the same time, transcendence of the situation, no dialogue could be possible, because it would be exhausted by the direct pointing to things that would not lead any further. The very meaning of the signified things and events reveals the facts and the concrete data and at the same time says more than the current data would exhaust; in its generality, it includes other things and events, other data already perceived or to be perceived. The mutual implication between facts, data and their meaning allows any gesture to signify them and to transcend them in terms of more meanings, which are tacitly “waiting” to be articulated.

Corporeal rootedness is what accounts for situations, for concrete engagement in a dialogue, and, at the same time, for transcendence of the situations. Although corporeally limited to a perspective, one transcends toward all perspectives and all times assumed by others and by things deployed around the perceptual datum or object. Corporeal gesture, in this sense, is a medium of articulation of the tacit meanings in the field. But because no gesture exhausts all meanings, the field of action implies and, in fact, solicits other gestures that continue to trace meanings that comprise a system of interconnected context. This means that no gesture is closed, univocal; each gesture communicates with other gestures, is prolonged and transfigured by them and the meanings that it and they explicate. In the gestural communicative process with the world the perceptual field contains

more in meaning than the present gesture, makes each gesture ambiguous not in the sense that its communication is not understood, but in the sense that each gesture promises more and leaves us with the requirement to pursue the dialogue further or at least with an interrogative mood. This leading on in the very perceptual field, in every gesture as the movement toward the world, allows for their transgression of limitations not toward something unlimited, but toward other contexts, extension and complication of meanings, a depth that always forebodes with more. Yet, in this movement toward depth, the signifying gesture is there for all to see and read and to trace further in a communicative process. In the process of speaking and gesturing toward something, the gesture reveals that something, to which the other's glance is directed and at the same time located, that something in the perceptual field containing various significative possibilities and vectors to be traced by the dialogical partners, leading immediately to a more in expression and to a beyond of what was just signified.

This process is founded on the notion of corporeity as the locus of limitation and transcendence comprising perspectives and temporal localizations. Although corporeally we assume a perspective and a temporal location, our gestures constantly break the limits of the spatio-temporal perspectives by adding those surrounding the experienced thing and of other times, in which the thing was experienced. The breaking of the limits is enhanced by direct speaking. Speaking extends and adds pliability to corporeal gestures. In speaking, the gestures assume an extension that they themselves are in no position to accomplish. This is not to say that speaking is discontinuous with gestures; rather, speaking introduces variations toward spatio-temporal depths of signification that gestures alone could not accomplish. Although my gesture, direct corporeal movement of the hand, cannot point to the African continent and make it visible in silence, the extension of the gesture into the word "Africa" makes the African continent present in a linguistic sense. This is not to detract from the contributions of the corporeal gesture, because it is the primary force of organization of the perceptual field into meaning units in such a way that sensations possess a depth instead of being flat and disjointed impressions; in gesture, sensations are transcended toward their communicative dimension. Sensations "speak" of tables, the tables of rooms and rooms of houses; where the sensation of green is a green of a carpet, the carpet announces extension and

extension space. This process of communication among sensations that are constantly transcended toward the meaning units and the field, in which such units function, is traced by the corporeal gesture constituting an expression of the very sensations and their transcendence toward contextualized things as meaning units. In this sense, corporeity is the basic communicative power: corporeity is the power that reveals the meaning of the perceptual field and the unified clusters in such a field and the manner, in which the clusters point to one another and implicate each other's presence, comprising each for the other a context.

In the communicating process, corporeity must be seen as “intercorporeity” in the process of articulating a common field of action and perception. In this sense, the other is directly decipherable in terms of the gestures that he/she performs, gestures that are elicited by the field as a play-space of the dialogical partners, wherein the meaning units are deployed and their vectors traced before any question of subjectivity or objectivity. This is the pre-theoretical domain of direct engagement in tasks, the dialogue in handling of things, a praxiological domain, where gestures not only signify things, but also handle them, balance them, reach them toward the other, where speaking is a continuation, a refinement of the handling as the fundamental form of communication. This handling, this praxiology, is the basic inter-corporeal process.

The inter-corporeal communicative dimension constitutes itself pre-personally; it is anonymous. A reflection on this anonymity discovers a particular *cogito*, a corporeal sedimentation of concrete experiences that are always centered about one's own corporeity; yet, such a centering is constantly decentered by a field of concrete perceptions and actions that are borrowed from others. This “borrowing” is mutual. One's own corporeity possesses a sedimented style taken up and propagated by the corporeity of the other in the emergence and intersection of gestures, be such gestures a fleeting expression of sadness captured in the upraised brow of the other or an entire literary work. The other's gestures are suggested modalities of one's own ability to be toward the world in a communicative engagement. Whereas the corporeal gestures of one's own body constitute an interconnected system of meaning implications with open horizons, intermingled with the corporeal gestures of the other, it comprises a unitary process. There are deformations in this process, but they are not divisive. Rather, the

deformations are experienced across the receptivity of the other's corporeity and are signified by various expressive gestures: being surprised, taken aback, disappointed, etc., may disrupt the homogeneous process and, yet, these expressions make sense within the constant structuration of communication in the inter-corporeal domain. This inter-corporeal communicative process is a phenomenon that traces itself across two corporeities that reveal not only their own interrelationships, but also the phenomenal field, to which they are primordially geared.

History

History has been understood in various ways: a cyclical process of advance and decline, a linear process progressing toward perfection, growth, establishment of conditions for democracy and freedom and even utopian state. We shall not quarrel with any of the conceptions of history. They are at base metaphysical. Our task is to understand history within experience and its communicative process. The establishment of the communicative fields through the others, through our poly-centric interrelationships, leads us to experience the generations that have gone before us. In this sense, our own experience is interlaced with those of the persons, who have gone before us. Their experiences are embodied in the language we use, in the writings we read, in the institutions we live in and in the rituals we perform. Our perceptions and meanings are partially their perceptions and meanings; while trying to understand what they said, we also add and subtract from what they said, because we cannot cover their horizon point for point as they cannot cover ours. Our communication is not just a constitution of poly-centric field, but also of a historical field.

What should be obvious is that the historical field is not a repetition or progression. Repetition and progression are comprehensible within the experiential field of communication, a field that although inclusive of the presence of the persons in the past has not yet assumed any temporal direction. To trace one event from the past to the present in a serial progression is to assume the field of presence that includes more of the past than the historically traced line would encompass. The same is valid with respect to the cyclical repetition: to repeat something is possible on the differentiations. Hence, the differentiated field must be given as a condition for the understanding of history as cyclical repetition.

The historical field of action is fundamentally concrete intercorporeal interaction. All historically transmitted sense and perceptions appear only when they are concretely expressed either in institutions, or in human expressions. Such expressions are sedimented in language, ritual, art and education. They are also sedimented in human corporeal expression and gesture. When a child pronounces the first word, he/she is already swept up into a linguistic style already present, although historical. By picking up a spoon, the child is immersed in a way of eating that belongs to a particular people and their history. The habits are sedimented in concrete implements and linguistic procedures and by employing them the child is already in a historical, experiential dimension. The spoon communicates a way of handling food and the way the other has shaped the spoon. The communication with the other is already present in the implement. The other's perceptions and relations to the world inhabit the instrument and offer the child, or for that matter the grown-up, similar ways of perceiving and handling. Hence, the world is not perceptible as a "pure nature", but as a world that is intermingled with the field of significations that also include the past as "depth" of the significations and depth of perceptions. The implements are both intercorporeally communicative and at the same time have a communication about the world. The handle of the hammer communicates the other's grip, process of polishing, but also communicates the world of interrelationships; it points to a nail, the nail to a board, the board to a wall, the wall to a house and, finally, to the entire neighborhood, its zoning laws, labor unions, etc., and these contain the presence of the history of laws, labor unions, strikes and social classes and their ideologies. Intercorporeity is here also related to the world as a field of action, containing within itself a historical depth, not as a past, but as an effective presence in every corporeal gesture and action.

Although we find ourselves in the historically given dialogical fluidum, we must not ascribe some extra-experiential dimension to this fluidum, having a causal force, and capable of determining human actions and thoughts. First of all, the historical dimension, sedimented and present in institutions and incorporated in our everyday interactions, is primarily shaped by meaning and signification, comprising a system of interconnected "signs". Any kind of strict determinism requires causality: given one set of material conditions, a definite result will follow. The result is predictable from the conditions. But meaning is not a cause, even if it is expressed

within and through the empirical-material dimension. Although the material carrier of meaning may be a cause, and although we may react to it as a cause, in its function as carrier of meaning it effaces itself and points away from itself. While reading a text, we are facing certain material conditions, such as letters on a paper, yet we are not looking at the letters, but rather through the letters we “see” what they point to, what they mean and what they signify. Not being a spatial thing, meaning cannot be a cause. Hence, in a fundamental sense, the institutions do not cause our behavior; rather, they have a horizon of meanings, within which we orient ourselves, but which are also pliable. The same building that is a school can also mean a warehouse, an architectural design, an obstruction or a sore sight. In this sense, the building as a thing to which we may react causally has no horizons and, hence, no history; only as an institution with meaning horizons that it has a history. Secondly, although the institutions have a horizon of meanings, the meanings are only comprehensible to the individuals in their communication. Hence, the individuals are never left out of sight. “In themselves” the institutions would be empirical things, such as buildings, marks on paper or natural things. They become institutions only for someone by becoming carriers of meaning. Hence, the meaning horizons, incorporated in institutions, are the meanings that previous generations, and specifically individuals in communication, have embodied in the institutions. The latter carry the systems of significative interconnections and perceptions of the individuals in communicative process. What the institutions as buildings that is communicated through the institutions. They are transmissions of intersubjective dialogue and its poly-centrally deployed field of the previous generations, but in such a way that the meaning is present to us as our own horizon, as a part of our own intersubjective poly-centric field. Hence, institutions are not causes, but aspects of our dialogical encounter and an extension of our own poly-centric field of meaning and perceptions. In this sense, our field of experience and its horizons are historical; through institutions we borrow and incorporate the perceptions of our own and of previous generations; our perceptions contain a historical depth. As already mentioned, this historical depth is interlaced with our own perceptions and meaning horizons and, thus, it is prior to and a ground of any theory of history, whether cyclically or linearly conceived.

Regarded in light of the preceding discussion, institutions can also be understood communicatively. As a system of meanings and embodied perceptions, they communicate with the “voice” of others, whose meaning is embodied in them. Although in our pre-reflective life the institutions seem to be an anonymous and all-encompassing “power”, upon reflection they reveal our “extended body” carrying the meanings of others, the perceptions and expressions of our dialogical partners, and revealing to us aspects of the world from “then and there”. The anonymous institutions and their overwhelming presence are the “we-consciousness” that is ultimately a poly-centric field of communication, a field that founds us, but also a field that is founded by the individuals: like melody and notes.

Concluding Remarks

The dialogical domain is the fundamental dimension, within which the humans dwell. It allows community, institutions and the individual to function in their proper modes without losing sight of their relationships. Although the dialogical institutions are all-encompassing, it is to be remembered that the individual, as carrier and origin of dialogue, is also in a position to confront the institutions and shift their meaning horizons in ways, in which they have not been given before. As Merleau-Ponty noted, although the institutionalized language creates the author, the author also creates the language and the audience; the audience, in turn, creates the author by finding more than the author intended⁶⁹.

Phenomenological understanding of dialogue is not a theory imposed from above by some autocratic reason, but rather it is an exposition of the communicative process as it takes place in experience. Historically speaking, the autocratic reason has also emerged in the dialogical process and has become an institutionalized mode of signifying and perceiving. Hence, at the phenomenological level, it too belongs in a dialogical domain and not above it. Its autocracy also shifts from situation to situation, where rationality is signified and re-signified in terms of the world that it attempts to deploy and in terms of the dialogical engagement of the partners. In any other view, it would become a metaphysical position disconnected from any concrete human interaction and experience.

⁶⁹ Merleau-Ponty, M. (1973). *The Specter of a Pure Language*. In J. O’Neill (Trans.), *The Prose of the World* (p. 11- 13). Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.

Admittedly, this brief exposition of the dialogical process is incomplete; it merely shows the basic outlines of communicative process without any pretense of detailed analyses of specific situations. Yet, any specific situation will have to assume the dialogical domain outlined here; specific cases would be a way of focusing the dialogical process although not abandoning it. Our subsequent discussions will focus on more concrete dialogical processes concerned with expression, bodily abilities and concrete constitution of both individuality and community, and various levels of communicative engagement.

CHAPTER V

Concretization of Language

It is remarkable that language has the power to move us to action to transfigure our views, to spread an imaginary panorama across books, institutions and daily events, to express the presence of demonic or divine powers and send a shiver up and down our backs; it has the capacity to signify and to serialize things of our surroundings and to signify them with detached designations; finally, it is able to integrate dispersed events that are remote in space and time into a transparent unified whole. All these comprise the domains of communication. The difficulty in the explication of such domains inheres in the fact that our attempts to delimit them place us in a different domain. To experience a particular domain in its own function we have to be in it, move with it and be encapsulated by it. Once we make an object of it, we transgress its limits and disrupt its process. It is like dealing with an expression: while expressing joy, we are “in it”, we are captured by it, and we do not notice its force. Yet, when we attempt to analyze it, when we try to look at the mirror to decipher the expression, we find ourselves facing a face that is not joy, but an effort to decipher joy. It is no longer joyous expression, but a curious one. Any attempt to reconstruct joy in this manner would be a failure.

We are faced then with two tasks: (a) to reveal these domains in their “deficient mode” insofar as their manifestation will have to be through another mode of communication, and (b) to show how all the domains are co-present in the explication of one through the other. This means that we are operating in all domains of communication and no longer have the privileged access to only one. Hence, we admit at the outset that the explication of one, although being distinct from the others, must become transparent through the domain that we use to explicate the first one. This is why the concepts of intertwining and transparency are unavoidable.

The effective domain of communication is the power of transformation, the capacity to “make” events occur, to make them present. To grasp this domain it is necessary to expand the notion of communication. As many writers have suggested, there are modes of communicating’ that do not involve oral speaking; there is body language, sign language in natural

settings, such as smoke being a sign of fire, darkening skies and flashing lightning being signs of a coming storm and the bending tree in the wind being a sign of the resiliency of the tree and the force of the wind. They all “speak” in their silence. Yet, in an effective communicating “without words”, the sign is inextricably interwoven with what it is a sign of. The “of” here does not have any distance. Take for example a ritual evoking the “pride of the nation” and the “great sacrifices” of the honorable forefathers in a remote past, calling for an identification of the individual with the evocation, with the slogans, and the “grand party”. The power of the ritualistic performance by the speaker, performing a ritualistic incantation, does not comprise a communication of a message, but of an affectivity that has the power to transform the person and to make him into a “follower” of some would-be leader, star, cause or purpose. Indeed, the individual becomes the very embodiment of the cause and is willing to sacrifice all for its fulfillment. Before imitation, symbolization or signification, there is the identity of one process with the other, of one event with another. The ritualistic incantation “inhabits” the audience, makes it the very force that will dedicate itself to the “vital tasks” of the party, the church, or the organization.

But the notion of affective domain of communication extends further.

In order to affect the public or the audience, the speaker “becomes” the very embodiment of the destiny of the cause, becomes its power and *purpose*. All the gestures, expressions and the specifically designed surroundings are, without any distance, the very powers with which the audience identifies. The proud body posture, the trembling voice and the pounding fist are coextensive and of equal value with the flags, the emblems of the organization, and the signs of the cult. Thus, one event or object can assume with equal affect the place of the other. This suggests that there is no “individualism” in the sense of fixed units that would remain constant. It is not the individual, who speaks, but the vital powers of the nation, the church, of the founder. One does not speak in one’s own name, but in the name of an all pervading power to transform, to make the audience into the very pride of the flag, demise of the enemies and conquest of the future. This complete enmeshment in the vital reveals the fact that human awareness in this domain of communication is not yet individuated and functions in, what we could call theatrical identification. Every event speaks the vital interest and can be transformed into any event having equal vital interest. This does not

mean that at this level the human was a subject with private interests; rather, his vital powers could be incorporated and transfigured into anything, and the vital powers of anything could be assumed by him; he could become those vital powers. Thus, the preacher becomes the word of a divinity and speaks with the power of the divinity; the reborn is, indeed, a “new” person, inhabited by the “word” that made him “whole”. It is a theatrical enactment in earnest. One does not “believe” in being a new person, one *is* the new person. If we extend this to theatric performance and what it communicates, we could say that the actor does not play the role, but becomes the very embodiment of the role. This is obvious not only from a theatrical performance, where a good actor disappears in order to become most affective, but also to all audio-visual media. Such media are essentially the means of communication for affect. It is not so much what is being said, but the ways, in which the sayings and performances, inclusive of the designed staging of the environment on the media, become affective or can transform the audience. This suggests that prior to symbolic function, where one event symbolizes another, there is an identity of the symbol and the symbolized. This communicative identity is the origin of symbol once the identity is rent asunder into two distinct functions. Yet, this separation would take us out of the vital domain of speaking. It is to be noted that in this domain words of the speaker are only one facet of communication.

If this domain of communication, this affective power, were to be transposed to the spoken language alone, if it were to extend its domain into vocal articulation, this vital notion of communication would acquire greater articulation, greater flexibility and yet would retain the power of transformation. The linguistic origins of this communicative mode rest in the practices of magic and ritual. The linguistic term “magic” stems from the Indo-European root “mag(h)”. It is a part of a linguistic field that contains our words *make*, *machine* and *mechanism* and the Germanic words *Macht*, *Moegen* and *Vermoegen* (power, desire and capacity). But the power of the word in magic is transformative and at the same time capable of being the very power of the events. This is found in the magical power of names. When a warrior assumes a name “mad bear”, it does not mean that he has acquired a label; rather, he has become the mad bear. The very name is pervaded with the powers of a raging, powerful and vital bear. The name does not label the warrior and does not associate the warrior with the bear:

it is the bear. As Merleau-Ponty would say, the name inhabits the thing and the thing pervades the name. There is no symbolic distance.

The power of the word to do and to make is very obvious in early ritual.

It is well documented that when gods create, they do so with the power of speaking with a word. By speaking, the gods can bring order out of chaos. But the origin of this power of the word is found in the ritual, where the power, the vital capacity of the word, was identical with the event. Only by having this identity that the word was also empowered to transform “as if by magic”. In the early sun ritual, “The Zaotar must bring about a high (loud) speaking”. His speaking announces the coming of the dawn. The announcement is not symbolic of the dawning sun; it is the very power of the dawning sun, which spreads the fields and forests into visibility and into holy light. The world is born. What this suggests is that the Zaotar, the priest in his speaking, has the right word that is the power of the dawn to upsurge. This is the power of the word not to create, but to transfigure the darkness into light. Magic is not creation: it is transfiguration. This essential structure subtends various manifestations of transformative speaking.

Although the “magical”, the transformative power of speaking, is one of the original modes of linguistic use, it cannot be relegated to the dark ages, to the unsophisticated and pre-rational consciousness. The magical dimension of speaking – in a broad sense of speaking – is just as present in the modern age. First of all, it has appeared in modern institutions, such as technology. Technology has a mode of communicating its power of transformation of “raw materials” into desired commodities. In this sense, the various modern movements, such as capitalism, pragmatism and Marxism, are at base magical. They promise to transform the “stuff” of the world into humanly desired results. As Marx had noted, the task is not to interpret reality, but to change it. With this change he also meant the change of the human itself. This magical conception, in fact, subtends the entire set of assumptions claiming with the establishment of “material, social and political conditions” that the human will be changed. This states that the power of the conditions is identical with and communicates the very transformation of human beings. Curiously, the governments of the two opposing super-powers are engaged in the same attempt to establish all sorts of conditions through technocratic-bureaucratic means with the assumption that such means will *eo ipso* transform the human into a desired entity. The third

world leaders make the same assumption: dictators are justified and, indeed, justify themselves by the claim that they are establishing conditions for “radical” change. They are the Zaotars, the shamans of modern age. This shamanism extends all the way to human-behavioral sciences, proclaiming, for example, that if crime is to be eliminated, then conditions must be established to yield a different human entity. It is remarkable that the conditions and the desired results function within the magical understanding of time. In magical incantation, the spatiotemporal distances are abolished. If one performs a ritual, the ritual has, indeed is, the power that is identical with events happening elsewhere and at another time: the rain

Dance and the incantation means that tomorrow’s rain is present in the ritual. The same is true of modern concept of conditions. What one does today in the form of establishment of conditions is assumed to establish the presence of the transformed “reality” tomorrow. There is the primordial identity of the event called conditions and the result that is expected. G. H. Mead, in fact, suggested that the modern science in its technological guise is magical, because it allows us to avoid undesirable results and to obtain desirable results. It is capable of transforming events⁷⁰.

What follows from this domain of communication are the various constructions of slogans, political incantations and even advertisement. Here, the individual is “compelled” to identify with the slogan and its message, to become one with the political movement, one with the advertised automobile and its erotic attraction of the opposite sex, its virility, power and feline grace. Through incantation the sum of gears, wheels, plastic and tin are swallowed up by the word and are transformed into a secret potion, into an object of neighborhoods adoration and envy into an elevated being, elevating with it the proud owner, who is identified with it. As Merleau-Ponty would point out, the power of the word, its magic, inhabits the thing and transforms it into depths otherwise unattainable⁷¹. How else are we to understand the individual’s identification with a mere thing, the individual’s submergence into a political movement, under the banner of slogans? How else are we to understand of a shrunken figure with little moustache, who combed his hair in a wrong way? In direct vocal presence, as opposed to mass mediation, vital exhortations-incantation and repetition of slogans-

⁷⁰ Mead, G. H. (1970). *Mind, Self and Society*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

⁷¹ Merleau-Ponty, M. (1973). *The Specter of a Pure Language*. In *The Prose of the World*.

flood over the mass of participants moving them to lose their individuality and to identify with the vital, encompassing, protective “we-consciousness” characteristic of the cult, clan, organization. The language of slogans and advertisements, the silent language of technology and the bureaucratized governmental procedures are magical. We seek “governmental solutions” to our problems, which means we expect the governments to transform events in our favor. Through advertisement incantation we become enchanted by the product, we become identical with the powers of the product, and we become the athletes of Wheaties and the superstars of Mercedes.

There is another preoccupation of our age that has its roots in the magical incantation, magical ritual: it is what Poggeler called *mantic hermeneutics*⁷². It is the preoccupation with forecasting, with reading the entrails to decipher the events to come. Although our forecasters are too modest to read entrails, they, nonetheless, read all sorts of portents: so many farmers have planted so many acres; the predicted expectation, if everything else remains equal, will be so many tons of grain. This forecasting is not innocent. People identify themselves with the autumn’s great crop yield in spring and buy stock, sell houses to invest, send the market into frenzy and get into a violent argument with their spouses. This simply indicates the original presence of the magical domain of communication. The terms “great crop, booming yield” are identical with the future in such a way that the future is already present: Indeed, it is identical with the presently spoken words, which send the economists, and the buyers, and sellers of stock into frenzy of activity, into dreams of riches and nightmares of loss. The same is valid for the weather forecasting.

Merleau-Ponty, for example, revealed another aspect of speaking, which is “magically transformative”⁷³. Speaking transforms perception and institutes an experience that is different from anything previously encountered. When a person works at a job, he perceives the surroundings, others and himself in terms of accustomed characteristics. His boss is a nice guy, who gives him a job, a periodical raise and an occasional pat on the back. Yet, if the worker would happen to be passing by a place, where a revolution-

⁷² Poggeler, O. (1983). *Heidegger und die Herrneneutische Philosophie*. [Heidegger and Hermeneutical Philosophy]. Freiburg, West Germany: Alber.

⁷³ Merleau-Ponty, M. (1973). Science and the Experience of Expression. In *The Prose of the World*.

ary is making a speech pointing out that the boss (the owner of the means of production) is really an exploiter, a person to squeeze the last ounce of labor power out of the worker, for the least amount of capital expenditure, the worker's perception of the boss may be radically transformed: he may begin to see his boss's niceness as a sly way to enhance exploitation, to keep the worker passive and submissive. The perceptual transformation is linguistically incantated. One does not simply change one's mind; rather, the entire being is transformed: The boss is now hateful, the entire emotional tonality is changed and the worker is no longer happy at his task.

Examples could be added from every domain of life. For the purpose of this presentation suffice it to say that the process of transformation requires an identification with an event, which is incantated in communication. Through the power of the spoken word, the person is brought to the identity of what is being advertised or incantated, and in this identity he is transformed. This identity, this identification with others, this becoming the other, is still powerfully present in the theatrical performances. The actor becomes the hero, and, as the saying goes, the person in the audience may identify himself with the hero, indeed, may for a moment become the hero. Thus, our fascination with acting, with heroes and with Saturday night cowboys: for a moment we become such heroes. For a moment we are in the power of what is being communicated.

When dealing with the expressive domain, we already encountered the psychic domain of communication. It is the locus and origin of symbols, imagery and creativity. Symbolization is not to be confused with the magical process of an identification of one event with another. Such a process is an origin of association. In the context of language, symbolization is founded on the expressive domain of communicating. Once again it is to be noted that communicating here has a broader sense than direct verbal articulation, although the verbal articulation is most predominant as the psychic domain of communication. The psychic, the expressive domain, constitutes a depth of imagery, of symbolisms, ranging from poetic sayings to divine and demonic figures. It has been said that the modern trend in linguistic understanding toward representation and away from expressivity has led to the impoverishment of language, the loss of imagination and, indeed, the loss of human psychic depth. As existentialism would have it, such a movement comprises the death, the collapse of interiority. Representative,

propositional speaking lacks the psychological charge, the depth of experience. To love, in this mode of speaking, means simply to propose to someone on a street corner for a one-night-stand of physiological stimulation.

What then is this psychic, expressive domain of communicating? Expressivity, as we saw, is a modality of speaking in its broader sense, comprises a mood, a physiognomy of events, yet in a way, that the events and their factual characteristics are not identical with the mood or physiognomy. The trees seem droopy, the lover gives a passionate look from the folds of the overcoat to the entire bodily stance. The person down the street is tired, the mother approaching the child looks inviting, all expressive aspect irreducible to the sum of factual descriptions of parts of the objects that bear the expressions. A peculiar characteristic of the expressive domain is that it can be transmitted across various media. The expression of hope in the human gaze can be transmitted to, and communicated by, various institutionalized means: it can appear in the plastic art, poetry and political institutions. Expressivity is not bound to any specific medium for its manifestation. Expressivity is one of the fundamental ways that we communicate with the world and the world communicates with us. What is being suggested is that the psychic dimension of speaking is not a characteristic of humans; it is rather the expressive dimension of things and humans, their mood, their atmosphere, in which things and we participate. It is the lonely and oppressive night, under weight of which we sit, and the loneliness is written across our face and our entire posture. It is not a specific thing that is lonely; rather, the things are means, by which the loneliness is revealed. The psychic-expressive dimension of communication is, therefore, prior to what we call subject-object dichotomy, prior to the dichotomy of psyche and body. The child looking at the inviting posture of the mother does not read external signs of internal states, in order then to decipher and interpret the external signs and deduce from them the mother's internal states. The expression is direct, immediate, the child is carried away into the mother's arms by the inviting posture. The returning soldier catches a sight of his sweetheart in the crowd, who gives him a passionate look. The look is spread across her face and her entire being. It is a direct communication not about things or facts, but of psychic expressivity.

Direct verbal linguistic speaking contains this dimension most remarkably in the voiced expression. The sound, in general, has the capacity to be shaded by expressive phenomena perhaps more than by any other mode of

communication. While listening to a symphony, we not only hear a succession of sounds, but also the shades of moods, of tensilities of excitement, sadness, grandeur, frivolity, irony, pride, eeriness and tenderness. Indeed, the instruments may vary and the factual components of the environment may change, yet, the expressive mood may remain constant; at the same time, the instruments and the factual situation may remain constant, and yet they may capture a variety of psychic-expressive aspects. It is not the case that the audience must assume some internal state, such as sadness, nor that the musician must somehow become internally sad to infuse the strings and tubes with sadness; the very sound is shaded by sad expression and spreads the sadness, communicates its expressivity across the audience and the orchestra.

In human speaking, the voice captures the expressive domain, although this domain is manifest across the entire human physiognomy. When we speak about something, our speaking also reveals the expressive characteristics of that something. The described event is a sad one and our voice reveals the sadness; it is an exciting event, and our voice is shaded with excitement, which spreads across our entire physiognomy and across the brightened face. Indeed, the proposition “And Brutus is an honorable man” refers to Brutus, yet the way an actor voices such a proposition with irony reveals something else. While listening, we not only hear propositional statements, but we also capture the expressive shadings that carry the mood, the mood of the situation, of the things and of our own being. What is called the psychic domain, comprised of various feelings, attitudes, attractions, indifferences, desperations, fears, horrors, loves and joys, is fundamentally the expressive domain of our communication with the world and with each other. It is prior to the characterization of factual qualities of objects and of the internal states of the subject. Rather, the psychic-expressive domain is manifest across and through various objects without becoming identical with them. While appearing on a face, an expression of horror tends to spread, to generalize and to intensify the entire atmosphere with horror. This spread of the psychic-expressive phenomena is captured by various means of communication: the voice in speaking, the physiognomy of a corporeal gesture, the tensility of a situation or a demonic grimace of a mask.

The spread, the movement of psychic-expressive domain across and through various “carriers”, points to a peculiar structure appropriate to expressivity: a polar structure. What this means is that the expressive domain

tends to intensify itself by spreading and polarizing itself. The joy expressed in a voice tends to prolong itself in the voices of others and, in turn, the voice of others tends to intensify the joy initially expressed. It is akin to the Sartrean description of erotic passion. A woman starts to talk to a man and her voice begins to express passion; captured by the movement of the expression, his voice too turns toward eroticism and toward an expression of desire; her voice is intensified, her passion is fed by his sonorous desire, and his desire is fed by her expressed sounded passion. The expressive, psychic domain in its movement is polarized and feeds on itself, it intensifies through itself. An expression of horror spreads to others and polarizes in their expression of the same horror; expression of horror encounters expression of horror and intensifies itself. Here, horror feeds on horror. As the sayings go, horror gripped the whole community and appeared on the faces of all of its members, or fear spread like a fire. Our corporeal gestures, configurations and our linguistic expressions capture this psychic-expressive domain and communicate it and propagate it through the simplest means, such as a voice, a story telling, an art work or a ritualistic mask.

The polarity of expressivity may appear in most unique and diverse ways. The gripping silence of the night can be intensified by its polar aspect, a lonely sound, and the lonely sound can be intensified by all pervasive stillness. The depth of darkness can be intensified by a flash of light, and the expressed, voiced desperation can be manifest in its depth by an expression of frivolity. The joy expressed by the voice of the other reveals the depth of my desperation, communicates my expressed state more intensely. The movement of the psychic-expressive domain is captured, polarized and intensified. In the process of speaking, we respond, at least at one strata, to the expressive domain that captures us directly prior to any reading of signs or interpretation. The communication at this level is direct and captures the communicating partners in a domain of expressivity that the partners polarize and intensify.

The psychic-expressive domain is also the source of imagination and creativity in linguistic process. The description of a face in terms of its factual and physiological components does not inflame the imagination. Yet, the description of its expressive domain, of its capturing the multitude of psychic shadings, leads into an indefinite variety of possibilities. The loving, the passionate, the painful, the hateful, the adoring, the proud and the desperate, all open up imagination and linguistic expression toward rich-

ness inaccessible for factual delimitation of physical or physiological characteristics. The same is valid of sound and other means of expression. A description of the factual process of sound transmission would give us a proposition of what sound is, but this proposition would miss the multi-dimensional expressivity of sound. The sad, the joyous, the despising tone, the distant, the peaceful and the tumultuous, the soft and harsh, the goose-step and the sway, all are capable of imaginary continuation and of inspiring creativity to continue in the capturing a variety of expressive possibilities. This is what lends our speaking its flexibility, its expressive variability and its open creativity. At the same time, it is the source of ambivalence, because the voice, while capturing an expressive modality, may be shaded at the same time by other, although less pronounced, expressive modalities. This leads to the possibility of intersection of various expressive modalities, which would intensify and shade one another. Another aspect, revealing creativity and imagery in communicative speaking, is the process of manifestation of the same expressive modality across the most varied means. The anger may appear in the visage of gods, in figures in animistic ritual, in poetic expressions, in the reprimanding voice of authority and even in the angry look of the storm. Here, creativity and imagination are variations of the medium to capture the expressive domain, to arrest their fleeting force, in order to make it visible, audible and communicated in dialogical interaction. This variability of media is what allows us to experience the various expressions communicated through various experiential fields. Because the anger, expressed in the mask, can also be expressed in sound and in an angry movement, then the visual experience of an angry expression is *eo ipso* an audial experience of anger. There is a direct communicability among various fields of experience in terms of the modality of expression that may pervade all of them. At the level of psychic-expressive communication, the entire range of experiential registers, so to speak, are synthesized and unified by the expressive aspect. At the same time, the expressive aspect can explode in most fascinating images in terms of most diverse media, from visual through audial, tactile and kinesthetic not only across various media, but also across a combination of media, such as sound and picture in film, music and dance in theatre, and their indefinite imaginary combinations. The psychic-expressive domain is the source of creativity and proliferation of imagination. Obviously, what is meant here by imagination is not an im-

age in a visual sense, it is rather an expressive sense capable of varying and transforming expressions, combining and recombining media with expressive aspects; it is a total experiential process involving all experiential domains and media of expression.

Although being manifest across various media, and specifically across human speaking and expressive capacity, the psychic-expressive domain is not identical with any media and, hence, transcends spatial sum of factual characteristics. The transcendence does not mean that the expressive domain is extra-worldly. That is why it can inhabit and be expressed in terms of the highest human aspirations; in fact, it is the driving force of such aspirations. Nothing great is done without a great passion. Just like the Platonic aspiration toward the highest; the perfect is inspired by eros, an eros, which pervades all Platonic expressions and pervades the very perfect ideas. His expressions are fed by the erotic enticement of the perfect, unending ideas, ideas, which are ultimately charged with erotic attraction.

The “transcendence”, and yet worldliness of the psychic-expressive domain, is also the source of symbol. At this level of language, symbol can be found everywhere without the required conception of cultural influence or historical development. The same symbolic configurations can be found everywhere without any necessary connections with geographic or historical nature. What this means is that the psychic-expressive domain can be manifest at different times and in different places; captured and frozen in a particular medium and transferable to other media without the loss of the expressive value. What this means is that a symbol is an expressive structure, which can appear in most diverse and individuated images and media. Yet, all such images and media indicate a primordial unity, a source of which all of the images are manifestations. At the communicative-linguistic level, the expression of pride may appear across various guises, through diverse media, and evolve a multitude of images; yet, all of them are swayed by the expression. Here, the most diverse communicative processes reveal one expressive domain. Yet, at another communicative level the expression of pride is only one function of a more fundamental structure of symbol: As was noted, the expressive domain in its movement polarizes itself and intensifies itself. This movement of polarization, yielding light and dark, love and hate, pride and degradation, joy and sadness, divine benevolence and demonic malevolence, father sky and mother earth – the entire cosmic tension

between good and evil – is a movement that constitutes a basic psychic-expressive symbol that cannot be exhausted by any image, by any concretization, although all images, all media of expressive transmission and all specific polarizations reveal this basic symbolic configuration. In this sense, the symbol is a source of creativity, imagination and expressivity. It is like the Chinese Tai-Chi, containing the polarizing movement of light and dark, but at the same time expressing the yin-yang and leading to the sky-earth, male-female polarization; and these are deviated across a multitude of created expressive forms of good and evil, love and hate, pride and degradation, high and low; and in Africa, among the Yorubas, it is expressed in the relationship of god and woman, the structure of granaries, and so forth. The psychic-expressive domain as a source of symbolic understanding reveals the inexhaustible depth of symbol and, hence, the proliferation of expressive images and media of expression. Language, in its turn, at the level of expressivity, is one of the major aspects, in which the symbolic structure inheres. At the same time, the symbolic structure of language as an expressive power is what gives language its indefinite pliability. The expressive domain and its symbolic structure appear in all linguistic institutions and modes of communication. Without this expressive domain and its basic symbolic configuration, communication would be reduced to a linguistic process that would exclude most of the cultural institutions, and specifically the institution of language, in which we live and understand one another.

The psychic expressive domain could be called the “soul” of language. It has its use and effectivity in every walk of our lives. In the promoting of either political figures or of some more noble commodities, the expressive domain plays a key role. The commodity is embellished with psychic attractiveness and in many cases with joyous audial-musical accompaniment. The car is not just presented with its magical power of transformation of a 110-pound backpacked bookkeeper into a virile demon of sexuality, but also as having expressive, psychically attractive characteristics: it is sleek, silent, winged like a spirited steed, and it is proud and swift like an eagle aiming at the shimmering glory of the high-noon sun – aye, the magnificent creature on four wheels. And the soaring tune sends our spirits to the heights of freedom, to unfolding images, and to the local car dealer, where we become proud owners, only to inspire envy, jealousy and erotic solicitation of our neighbor and his wife.

And it is functional in daily conversation when one, for example, attempts to convince a friend to go to the movies, to hear a lecture or to join a club. The film received “fantastic” reviews, the actors were “dynamic” and captured well the “characters” of the story. The club has some “exciting” events and some really “cool” people and for new members some “attractive” opportunities. The speaker is really inspiring and has captured the “pulse” of our times; he has some “deep” insights and “provokes” a “heated” debate. And the friend is enticed, inspired and convinced; he is swept up in the mood, in the attunement to the expressive domain of the words.

And even scientists, attempting to convince the public that the leak in the nuclear reactor poses no danger, are very adept at using expressive language: The situation is not “desperate” and the community should remain “calm”, and the experts have been sent to “defuse” the “tension”. Although “apprehensive”, the members of the community remain in their “cozy” homes.

And in the religious ritual, the announced divine beings are not just entities in the sky, but are “glorious, wrathful, kind, and inspiring”. No one prays to the Aristotelian logical prime move unless it is transformed into and revealed by expressive language. Without such expressivity, it remains remote and uninspiring. It does not lend itself to the proliferation of images and symbolic expressions. Greeks did not worship it: and only when Christianity incorporated it into an expressive language that it became proliferated across a multitude of psychically charged images and expressions, only then that it became alive and moved its people to unfold expressive images across all sensorial registers, from music to poetry, and to depictions of hell and heaven in gothic and baroque cathedrals.

Without the expressive domain, language remains dead. And because, as already mentioned, the audial field adds the immediate attunement to expressivity, the modern person uses sound to embellish all of his products, all of his ceremonies by audial expressivity. The audial expressivity brings things and events into our immediacy in an encompassing way. While watching a movie, we are drawn into it through the expressivity of sound. If the sound breaks and the film continues to role, the figures appear remote, lifeless caricatures; when sound reappears, the figures resume a life, acquire a depth and draw the audience into the wind of their actions. As E. Straus has shown, the audial field carries a direct psychic expressivity, which lends body closeness of things and calls for our participation, moves

us to inspiration⁷⁴. Although the visual panorama and visually given language does not lack expressivity, it, nevertheless, is enhanced by audiality and its expressive force. A story well told is more alive than a story read in solitary silence. This accounts for the attraction to theatrical performance. Although theatre originates in the magical domain of communication and its transformative power, its attraction consists of the audial expressive domain that sets the moods and images of the scenery. In this sense, the magical power and the expressive domain are mutually enhancing. Expressivity is the very soul of the play.

An expressivity of language is the very soul of our encounters in a dialogical process. The failure of our communicative theories of our speech education and our education of children in reading classes is that we tend to abolish the expressive aspects of language not only by stripping expressive terms from vocabulary, but more dangerously by demanding silent reading and learning. The audial imagery and the vocally articulated expressivity is the place, where the soul of the language is learned and communicated. In this silence, not only the soul of language, but the psyche of the person and its imaginatory power begin to diminish. We know only too well that an unused function tends to shrink and vanish. Speaking phenomenologically, expressive language, gesture, expressive characteristics of the world are not mirrors of psyche: they are psyche. Diminish one and the other is equally diminished.

The logical, the propositional, the rational and the mental domains of communication comprise the world of experience deployed in a serial manner. The world is a sum of objects and their characteristics having determinate spatiotemporal locations and relationships. This communicative domain has its genesis in an awareness of the following aspects of the world:

1. Lineal-horizontal orientation and directionality: it is an awareness of movement, which has an aim, a distance to be covered from here to there, from now to then. In accordance with the lineal orientation, things, objects can be serially arrayed next to each other and one after the other.

2. The awareness of horizontal-lineal direction leads to the awareness of permanent localization. The permanence is one of spatiotemporal loci and the loci can be occupied by permanent objects. The condition for permanence is reiteration of location. We know from the work of Eugene

⁷⁴ Straus, E. (1963). *The Primary World of Senses* (G. Needleman, Trans.) New York: The Free Press.

Fink that even Platonic ideality is founded on the establishment of absolute immutability of spatiotemporal loci⁷⁵. We recall that Zeno, following Parmenides, has shown that permanence and immutability depend on the condition of an infinite divisibility of any spatiotemporal location. This infinite divisibility leads to an absolute immutability. Hence, Plato's ideas, the perfect never-changing entities are an expression of this condition. They are infinite because they are at the end of all divisibility and this "end" at infinity is absolutely permanent. The result is that anything can be repeated and reiterated by the return to the same immutable spatiotemporal locus. Permanent location lends permanence to things.

3. The linguistic term assumes in this context a character of permanent definitory referentiality. Words signify, point, or direct. Words are permanent not because there is permanence in the noises we make, but because their directionality, their signification is locked into permanent loci. At the same time, words must be aligned in permanent syntactical locations. Words must assume a proper location and a grammatical correctness (directionality) in a sentence. The awareness of lineal orientation and localization is also the condition for writing and for deployment of the "grammata" of the letters in spatiotemporal loci.

4. The awareness of directionality as a basis of signification and the consciousness of permanent loci permit the disattachment of terms from singular reference to objects and their transposition to other objects. The terms assume permanence and syntactical location and can refer to a multitude of permanent loci inhabited by "permanent" objects. It is to be noted that the relationship of things and words and words with words must be understood in terms of spatiotemporal arrangement. This suggests that the propositional dimension of language is dominated by spatial metaphor of awareness. Indeed, temporal concepts owe much of their sensibility to spatial elements sedimented in them. Temporal concepts derive from the Indo-Germanic root "ti", meaning to divide, cut up and stretch. Thus, time is a segment or a stretch and is founded in this dimension of language on spatial directions and localizations. Even the qualifying terms of time are usually spatial: long or short period, great expanses of time, etc. Even notions, such as "soon, present,

⁷⁵ Fink, E. (1957). *Zur Ontologische Friihgeschichte von Raum-Zeit-Bewegung*. [Concerning Ontological Early History of Space-Time-Movement]. The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff.

past, and future” are not temporal, but derivative from spatial metaphors. Before and after share the same fate: in front and aft.

5. The preceding suggestions indicate that the propositional language is not only arrayed serially in a horizontal fashion, but that it also has a function of spatial depth. Terms refer to things before us as “objects”, as Germanic “Gegenstände”, as standing against us and as having a location there in contrast to here. This mode of linguistic referentiality, directed toward permanent objects, assumes a spatially localized relationship between the object and the subject. This relationship is known as that of *perspectivity*. Although referring to things by proper nouns, we qualify the noun and, thus, give a perspective to the object. It is possible to change our perspective by moving spatially. to a different location, while retaining the identical position of the object: we assume a different position to the object and have a different qualifying perspective. The notion of spatial positionality and propositional reference appears in most diverse guises in our propositional dimension of language: a politician takes a position with respect to the issues; the supreme court takes a “stand” concerning the ERA; religion or science provide different perspectives to the world; the debater is defending his position against his/her opponent. As is well known, Leibniz built his entire metaphysics on the interrelationship of monadological perspectives⁷⁶. Propositional language as referential is co-equal with localization, direction and variation of spatial locations of the subject and spatial distance in depth.

6. Lineal orientation and the possibility of localization also inhabits the propositional language in terms of “why, because, and, if-then” modalities. Why did something happen? Because something before it caused it to happen. “If I move from here to there, then I shall see the other side”. “If John will buy flowers, then Mary will like him”. These are successions of events, one resulting from the other. “If I make this proposition, then certain conclusions will follow”. Propositional language is, thus, logical and at the same time it is connected with lineal causality. To use propositional language is also to implicitly assume the world of spatiotemporally interconnected causality. When we ask the question “Why?”, implicitly we are asking a causal question.

7. At the beginning of the discussion of this linguistic dimension, it was suggested that localization and its divisibility were the sources of per-

⁷⁶ Leibniz, G. W. (1898). *The Monadology and Other Philosophical Writings* CR. Latta, Trans.). Oxford: Clarendon Press.

fect, stable and infinite ideas. The awareness of localization and, thus, spatiality as a succession and deployment of localizations comprise the sources of what is known as logical analysis of concepts and of reification and atomization. Awareness of localization allows us to divide and subdivide something into smaller and smaller units into atoms. This possibility is correlative to the possibility of an analysis of linguistic terms, of their splitting into analytic components and “locating” as such components within the “framework” of a logistic system, possessing “constant places” for “variables”. As it is well known, this dimension of language had resulted in theories of linguistic atomism. It sought for the “smallest” linguistic component, from which language could be additively constructed in a serial process. The much bemoaned “reification” of the experienced world has its roots here. The propositional dimension of language has the power of reification. The notion of analysis is the notion of spatial atomization and, hence, differentiation of localities and their directional interrelationships.

8. The propositional domain of communication could be called logical, rational and mental. The reason for this is that the term *mind* has its origins in an oriented, directed and linear experience. And the notion of rationality, which in the west is synonymous with logical, stems from *logos*, original meaning of which was not as Heidegger thought, gathering, but goal oriented calculation. Mind directs experience and the understanding of the world in terms of lineally calculative progression toward something. Hence, propositional language is rational-logical language, a language of localization, orientation, and ultimately of spatiotemporal analysis of locations and their lineal interrelationships. Although it could be objected that mind and logic are not spatiotemporal objects, upon closer investigation what we call mind and logic are pure spatiotemporal structures of localities devoid of things that would occupy such localities. The mental orientations from here to there, from now to then and from high to low are pure spatiotemporal locations remaining constant. After all, in this modality of spatiotemporal awareness, possessing points of fixity and localizability, the things may change as spatiotemporal objects, but the locations remain constant: anything can fill them. Hence, they have the characteristic of changelessness. The same is valid for logic. Its seeming “extra-spatiality and temporality” is nothing else than an arrangement and manipulation of static spatiotemporal loci arranged in serial successions, capable of being split up analytically

into smaller loci. Hence, the loci of propositional logic can be “instantiated” by objects that fill the pure and static spatiotemporal loci. Conceptuality and logic of the propositional language is a purification of linear space-time structure from the changing things. After all, in this structure, things change their locations in space and time, but the spatiotemporal locations remain constant. The Platonic world of ideas and the rational logicism are but two variants of linear space-time awareness.

9. The propositional language in its logistic stage correlates to the modern world of technology. If the process of spatialization and linearity is pushed to the extreme, the world is experienced as a sum of “material facts” having specific spatiotemporal loci and directions. Such loci, their relationships and directions can be calculated and the results of the change of loci can be predicted. If the process is inverted and the result is calculated, it is possible to reconstruct the spatiotemporal structure and the relationship of the loci, which gave rise to the result. This places us in a peculiar position: we can calculate, be rational about the required arrangement of spatiotemporally located events or objects and get desired results. We can set up, according to the modern parlance, the proper “material” conditions and derive the “projected results”. The latter are the differently arranged spatiotemporal components following from the arrangement of the conditions. What we call logic, scientific reason and even experimentation is the pure arrangement, pure variation of spatiotemporal static locations and their relationships and directions and the calculation as to what such variations would yield as a result. The variation can be done at will and objects can resultantly be instantiated to yield the calculated results. Technology is precisely this process: we establish results by calculating the spatiotemporally required conditions and get the projected results in linear time. The result is a different, although logically calculated, arrangement of spatiotemporal components. This, of course, involves the logic of “if-then” because we are in a position to make such propositions as “If we establish these conditions, then the results will be as follows”. The propositional language couched in this modality is a language of modern logistics, technocracy and scientific procedures. The educators proclaim that if we establish “better” schools, then the children will be better educated; the liberals proclaim that if we provide full employment, then the crime rate will drop; the Marxists proclaim that if we establish a socialistic economy, then we get a new kind of

human. What is remarkable is that this language and its technocratic mode of understanding is a language that, at its own strata, integrates magic. It is a language of transformation: change the conditions and the results are read in the conditions, like the coming rain is read in the entrails or the rain dance. The propositional language sweeps up all the other linguistic dimensions and arranges them in terms of its own world of awareness.

As in the previous communicative domains, the propositional language also functions in everyday discourse. It could be called the language of facts and practical affairs. We ask questions of each other in terms of “why” and give answers with words such as “because”. We say “If you want to have fun, you ought to go to the street scene”, and so forth. We talk about moving children from one grade up to the next, progressing them from one year to the following. We speak of aesthetic, economic and religious perspectives; we speak of language in terms of reference, signification and the logical connectors of terms. While using the magical and the expressive linguistic dimensions in our political or business proclamations, we also employ the propositional language as an integral part of our total speaking. While embellishing the car with sleekness and winged power, while enchanting it with a melody, we also intertwine propositional, that is, spatial vocabulary, such as “It will get you there in the shortest time and provide you with the highest mileage”. We say that it can devour distances and that you will just love the convenient location of the stick shift, the ashtray and the high beam. Not even religion lags behind. The god is the most distant, although his glory is near; he is the highest and we, in our sinful degradation, are the lowest. The Brahman is beyond all paths, although all paths lead to Brahman. Expressive and propositional language is integrated.

But magic, the transformative dimension of language, is also integrated.

The propositional language in advertising, for example, is not designed just to give us facts, but to “change our minds” about buying another car and getting over to the dealer and buying this car, or at least to convince us to change cars. The Skinnerian factual propositions – purely spatial metaphors – carry the magical weight of exhortation of enchantment to change our society into Walden II and to allow technocrats to deal with us “factually”. Having decided to go to a theatre, we consult our friend, who proclaims that if you go to see this play, you will be disappointed because the cast is not up to par and lacks the charm to perform the roles; thus, we change

our minds, we are transformed by the language that includes the magical transformative power, the expressive power in terminology used and the propositional, spatial deployment of factual events. We are changed, disappointed and relocated.

This leads to the *integral* domain of communication. It is nonlinear and resultantly cannot be understood in terms of the spatial loci. In this sense, the integral time dimension is also free from seriality and succession and could be called *atemporal*, that is, time free. This is not to say that atemporal is eternal; the notion of eternity is bound with lineal temporality and is derived from the ever present now and its infinite divisibility. Gebser gives us analogy by using the terms immoral, moral and amoral⁷⁷. The latter is free from morality, but is in no way some eternal law of action.

The question of time is the question of our age. Bergson, Whitehead, Husserl, Heidegger, Einstein, Heisenberg, Freud, Jung, Rilke, Nietzsche and a multitude of other important thinkers of our age struggled with the question of time. This is an eruption of time into our “propositional” space consciousness. Because every field of endeavor stresses time, how is language related to the question of time and, specifically, atemporality? The breadth of the question includes every mode of speaking from poetry through literature and science. Although these areas offer interesting examples, the basic linguistic transposition from spatial metaphor to atemporal mode of speaking lies at a more fundamental level. Such a level will have to be deciphered along various strata.

1. There is a movement in language that is abolishing the spatial metaphor in various ways. The poets and writers, from Hoelderlin through Kafka, Valery and Rilke have abandoned the propositional language and have instituted a mode of writing that is not identical with the expressive writing. They have, in main, abandoned “if-then” structures; they have dropped “why-because” configurations and comparatives, they have redefined the function of adjectives and adverbs and substantiated the inflective while verbalizing the substantive. It is known that in propositional language the adjective qualifies the substantive, even when the propositional structure would include expressive dimension: “the angry sword” or the “inviting meadow”. The 20th century writers have exploded this “perspectival”

⁷⁷ Gebser, J. (1985). *The Ever-Present Origin*. (N. Barstad & A. Mickunas, Trans.). Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, p. 2.

function of the adjective: Kafka uses expressions, such as “and he entered greetingly the siding grass”. Here, an all sided relationship is established; the adjective becomes relational. After all, Kafka does not say that “he entered sideways in grass”, but allows the mutual activity of the subject and the grass. What was once simply spatially located and viewed from the perspective of the subject is now dynamized, enacted and, hence, temporalized. The adjectival relationality leads to “adjectival ambivalence”. The dynamization is also pronounced in the verbalization of the substantive. The substantive being the static and the verb being the active elements of language, in propositional speaking they were separated; yet, with our age, they are conjoined and quite persistently. Nietzsche was one of the first to note the drastic importance and consequence of such a conjunction. In *Zarathustra*, the term Sphinx is exploded by verbalization and, hence, the substantive is integrated with the temporal, the dynamic. He speaks of “ensphinxed” by the cat girls and immediately adds, “may god forgive me the linguistic sin”. In propositional speaking, the term “god” was the most substantive of all substantives, the symbol of all fixity and changelessness. With the verbalization of the substantive, any spatial fixity, any permanent locus is abolished; space is temporalized. What these modes of linguistic employment suggest is an awareness of the concrete function of time in space. Time is no longer a mere succession of spatial loci and the events that occupy them; rather, the spatial loci and their occupants are temporalized. This is the integration of space and time manifest from physics through lyric poetry.

2. The dynamization of the substantive and the “adjectival ambivalence” leading to the primacy of mutual interrelationships and not one-sided static perspectivity abolish the notion of fixed spatiotemporal loci and require an awareness of the world as a field of mutual interactions and implications. Any localization is temporary and is possible only within the mutual interrelationships in a field. The spatiotemporal field is prior to any locus and any locus is possible within the transformations of the field. Any permanence is given only in terms of the flux of the field. Hence, any staticity is relative and is identifiable only through the differentiation of it from other functions in the field. Integral language is correlative to the notion of the field, and various linguists of this century have elaborated a field conception of language. From de Saussure through Trier, Weisgerber, Husserl, Levy Straus, Prague school of linguistics, Tartu school of semiology, Grei-

mas and his structural semantics, Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, and Derrida's *Grammatology*, there is a common thread: language is a field and not a sum of terms that signify fixed objects and are related by logical connectors and copula. In the field of linguistics, the terms are clustered along similarities and differences. Hence, the meaning of a term is only possible in its relationship to other terms and in its difference from dissimilar terms. The similarities and dissimilarities must be present as a total field in order for a term to have a meaning. What this suggests is that the meaning of a term is not in its unitary power of signifying of some pre-given entity, but in its relationship to other terms. The shift in the relationship among some of the terms in the field is also a shift of the meaning of all of the terms. As Merleau-Ponty had noted, the meaning of the term is not so much in the terms as "between" the terms⁷⁸. The term "cousin" does not have a meaning because it signifies a particular person, but it is meaningful in the field of terms of family relationships. Each term is integral to the field.

3. The integral domain of communication is also "open". Although the tendency of propositional-spatial language is to analyze and, thus, close terms by refined definitions, the integral language shows that every term is open and involves an aura, a spread prior to any spatiotemporal localization. Thus, the mode of writing that begins with "and" indicates dissolution of a temporal beginning "now" point: it is no longer a copula of terms, but opens the entire field, which is implicitly present in the continuity that the statement beginning with "and" indicates. The openness is specifically manifest in the field function of any term. The term "cousin", or for that matter "brother", is understandable in the field of family terms; yet, the family terms are themselves open. The father of the brother is the "provider" and opens up into the economic process and relationships of the community and its linguistic field. What this means is that any attempted definition of a particular term is exploded into the total field, within which these terms are understood and make sense. Propositional language is only an abstractive moment in the open field; the function of such a language is ultimately comprehensible within the integral field. In this sense, a proposition does not imply a set of conclusions or subsequent results, but primarily implies

⁷⁸ Merleau-Ponty, M. (1973). *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*. (R Silverman, Trans.). Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, p. 90-93.

the entire field, it opens up toward the totality of language. The field is prior to succession and localization.

4. The integral language is also diacritical. A language is less a sum of signs, such as words and grammatical and syntactical forms and series, than a differentiation of signs from one another comprising a linguistic universe, a field. This accounts for the fact that while possessing a finite set of terms, language is an indefinitely open process. As Merleau-Ponty argued, terms do not signify anything, and each one does not express a meaning, but marks a divergence of meaning between itself and other terms⁷⁹. The terms of language are engendered only by the differences that appear among them. Hence, terms are not loci in a logistic or grammatical seriality: rather, they abolish themselves by being exploded not by their own meaning, but by the difference in meaning from other terms. But this diacritical aspect of integral language has its base in the awareness of time that has no successive moments, but a contemporaneity of an emergent, upsurgent field. In the awareness of past and future, the terms “past and future” do not make sense without their relationship such that each term marks a difference of the other term; the past is past because it is conversely different from the future. Yet, the movement of awareness that establishes their difference is neither past nor future. As a matter of fact, it could not be said to be the present, because the present too makes sense only on the basis of its difference between the present and the past or the present and the future. This movement, establishing temporal loci and their differences, is atemporal. Not an eternal atemporality, but a dynamic upsurgence that, although establishing any term, explodes the term, derails it toward its difference. The movement to establish any term is a movement that establishes the difference of the term to other terms; it is a movement that establishes a field and not a series of terms. This atemporal movement of awareness is precisely the erupting temporality that, although disrupting the spatiotemporal fixity of any location, is itself unlocalizable. This movement of awareness subtends and is a condition of localization. And any localization is possible only as a difference of other localizations, and the latter are not absolute points of reference, but are exploded into differences of other than themselves. The atemporal movement of consciousness, as Gebser called it, is precisely the

⁷⁹ Merleau-Ponty, M. (1973). *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language*. (R Silverman, Trans.). Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.

time-consciousness that is not identical with any spatiotemporal location⁸⁰. In this sense, it marks a difference between itself and any other term. It is now somewhat clear why at the outset of our discussion we claimed that any linguistic dimension is possible on the basis of a difference between it and something more fundamental. This something is the movement of the atemporal-integrative consciousness that sets the differences and, in doing so, is different from any posited terms. Any attempt to eradicate this atemporal movement of the difference will have to presuppose it. The difference is integrative because by marking the terms as different, it also holds them together as unified, as not given one without the other.

5. The integral dimension of language respects the claim that the emergent atemporal consciousness is transparent. Although the arguments concerning the transparency of consciousness were centered mainly in phenomenology, the question of transparency appears in various domains of scientific and aesthetic research. Our discussion of the diacritical aspect of integral domain of language and its foundation in the movement of the atemporal awareness comprises the configuration for the transparency of integral language. The emergence of a linguistic term, such as a *sfuture*, meaning of which is its difference from the present and the past, requires that all three terms remain present in the field and be seen one through the other. The term *future*, in order to have a meaning, must be transparent with its difference, such as the terms *present* or *past*. This suggests that the present, past and future are not serial, but comprise a field, in which each term is transparent with the difference of the other terms. Another example would be terms, such as *high tone*. In propositional language, the terms *high tone* would refer to, would signify a tonal quality; in integral linguistics, these terms are exploded into their difference from the terms *low tone*. Their meaning would be possible on the basis of this difference. Hence, they would be field terms and not terms of signification. In its difference from *low tone*, the meaning of the phrase *high tone* is transparent with the *low tone*. Both phrases are co-present as a field and are transparent one through the other. They are not successive, but each is transparent with and articulates the other in their differentiation. The transparency of integral linguistics suggests that this linguistic domain is prior to signification, that is, prior to pointing; before pointing to each other, the terms are transpar-

⁸⁰ Gebser, J. (1985). *The Ever-Present Origin*, p. 374.

ent with each other as a total field. Moreover, this dimension is also prior to association and any metaphor. In order to associate two terms, they must be co-present and in their differentiation they must be given one through the other. This is not to say that the two terms cannot be associated or that propositional signification language loses its import. Indeed, the term *yesterday* signifies yesterday and can be associated with the term *today*. Yet, the association and signification are now aspects of a self-articulating linguistic field, terms of which are transparent through each other in their co-presence and differentiation. The integral linguistics are very much part and parcel of our everyday commerce and communication. When someone says “I am looking for a book which I left here yesterday”, he/she has a field that is articulated in terms of the co-presence of the temporal differentiations. He/she is looking for a book at the present, which involves the co-presence of yesterday and the immediate future, in which the book will be found. The person functions in the linguistic field, in which various components are co-present in their differentiation and transparency. The soon-to-be-found book is differentiated in its temporal aspect from the book that was here yesterday.

6. The integral linguistics, as an atemporal movement of the difference and its establishment of a field, is also apsychic and arational. It is free from imagery and free from spatiotemporal localizations, precisely because it is a condition of imagery and all localizations. Take, for example, modern geometry: although initially geometry was bound to spatially represented figures, requiring either visual-perceptual symbolization or their visualization in imagination, modern geometry is elevated to a system of articulated signs, requiring no perceptual or imaginary content. Indeed, such content is a hindrance. In this sense, there is no pre-given geometry derivable from a pre-given three-dimensional space. As E. Stroker suggested, modern geometries are not at first pre-given in some spatial intuition or imagination, but emerge in the process of articulation of a sign system; they have their “being” in nothing else than in their process of articulation, because they cannot appeal to anything pre-given that they would signify⁸¹. It is an emergence of a differentiation of a pure field. As she says, the presence of modern geometry is not an attempt to elucidate something given more precisely, but that such a geometry is in its process of pure construction and, thus, is

⁸¹ Stroker, E. (1987). *Investigations in Philosophy of Space*, p. 211-221.

an achievement requiring no spatiality. It is pure articulation and differentiation of the atemporal field. This is why there are no pre-given prescripts how such an articulation should occur. Such an articulation is free and can assume most varied ways. In this sense, the integral linguistics is completely open to indefinite possibilities. If rationality depends on the spatial metaphor and the serial articulation of something pre-given as an entity, a spatiotemporal fact, then the new sciences, such as geometry, are arational. If the old geometry and its ratio depended on the axioms that were spatially pre-given or imaginatively symbolized, then the new geometry has no such spatially pre-given axioms and no such rational base; in the process of construction, the new geometry, as a mode of speaking, emerges with its own axioms that are not tied to any spatiotemporal requirements.

This is a rational language that has no causal connections, nor does it imply causal succession. We cannot imagine what Einstein's system says: any visualized model is simply that, visualized help, an auxiliary tool, but not a representation of the language of physics. This is not to say that imagery vanishes; rather, it is integrated and assumes its function without being predominant.

7. The last aspect of the pure linguisticality integrates the notion of "world without opposite". The world of opposites belongs in the context of propositional, rationalistic domain of language. It is a dualistic world of language as representation, of subject and object and of subjective expressions and objective statements; yet, the integral dimension of language surpasses dualisms. For example, subject and object are not opposites: they comprise a field and emerge as co-present not as independent terms, but as a mark of the difference they have from each other. In this sense, they do not point to and signify each other; rather, they are transparent through each other as functions of a differentiated field. Hence, terms do not signify, point to or represent something opposite facing them. Before they can point either to objects in a field or to each other, they already contain the difference to the other within themselves transparently. In this sense, each term is already a field having no opposites. The integral linguistic domain has no opposite yet in another sense: it does not "face" and signify pre-given objects, but emerges with a field of differentiated unifications, within which objects can be signified and located and within which spatiotemporal loci and orientations can be established. Indeed, it is a "world without opposite" because in

its pure speaking, such as in the case of geometrical emergence of an articulated and differentiated “sign” system, there appears a world to be inhabited by various empirical ideal and metaphysical entities. What this suggests is that this dimension of language is not some kind of mystical microcosmos alight with the macrocosmos. It is not some absolute working through, and appearing in, us. In brief, in our language we do not express a pre-given sum of things or some absolute development by becoming an expression of such pre-given realities. The basic modality of the understanding of language is, indeed, different from the propositional language; hence, this modality is relevant for the understanding of the 20th century consciousness.

The integral domain of communication includes all other domains, but in its own way; the magical domain, the transformative power, is present in the process of articulation, when one term, in its difference to other terms, is also the other term in its meaning; it has the expressive domain insofar, as the expressive terms are not only tensed or deployed polarly – love-hate, joy-sadness – but are seen one through the other in their co-presence in the field; and it has the propositional rational domain of signifying and of arraying terms and objects in spatiotemporal seriality. From the discussion of the integral domain of communication, it is obvious that the future is immanent in the present. The understanding of the present is, indeed, possible only on the basis of the differentiation and co-presence of the temporal, concrete field, in which present, past and future play a role. This is also the reason why we can claim that the integral consciousness cannot be understood in terms of progress, evolution or unfolding. All these notions suggest lineality and already presuppose an atemporal awareness and the emergent field of experience, within which progress and so forth can find their orientations and temporal articulations. And this is also why we can claim that every term is an intensified field containing the world; after all, every term is a mark of difference of all other terms and their fields, comprising a dimension of awareness and linguisticity as a concrete and immediate domain, within which we live and find our way among things, objects, systems and common chores. Indeed, we live in a world without opposite because our facing the integral world dimension is a marker of the difference of our being from other beings is a difference of those beings from us within the same field.

CHAPTER VI

Intercultural Communication Reflected through Doxa, Argumentation and Semio-Discursive Analysis

Introduction

Language is a device of communication. An argument becomes opinion, when the speaker communicates it to his/her interlocutor and the interlocutor is convinced. As Philippe Breton remarks, “To Convince is one of the essential modalities of communication” (Breton, 1996:3). To communicate is to convince, i.e., “to propose to an audience good reasons to adhere to an opinion” (Breton, 1996: 3). Such an opinion is known as *doxa*. Ruth Amossy shows that “the rhetoric as art of persuading emphasizes the essential function of the doxa or common opinion in the verbal communication” (Amossy, 1991: 89).

Rolands Barthes defined doxa as “Public Opinion, *Majoritaire* Spirit, the petit bourgeois Consensus, the Voice of the Nature, the Violence of the Prejudice” (Barthes, 1995: 52), based on his famous structuralist practices to reconstruct sign systems statically without social, ideological or other consideration. His negative vision of the dominant opinion associated with the notion of ideologies and structuralism presupposes that content could be received as a code model. This assumption has been overcome by several theoreticians, who tried to incorporate the outside that the structuralists ignored. Barthes himself had no use for this outside, focusing on psychoanalysis, the notion of text, the pleasure of the text and “the death of the author” (Barthes, 1968). Cultural studies invoke the semiological model, audience studies and media affect theories to develop an encoding-decoding model. See Sperber and Wilson’s work on relevance and the implicit inferences model versus the code model and the discourse analysis of the French School, particularly Michel Foucault.

This paper works with this background of communication studies from semiology to discourse analysis. Intercultural communication and argumentation work together to construct doxa: “the whole of beliefs and shared opinions which are used as the base of communication and permit

verbal interaction”⁸². I examine this process through stereotype, a form of doxa, the entirety of beliefs and shared opinions, which serve as a basis for communication and permit verbal interaction⁸³.

How does doxa/opinion, Barthes’ “Voice of the Nature”, form through structuration, communication and persuasion of an opinion through traditional rhetorical functions, such as ethos, logos and pathos? Would the doxa relating to the others, constructed by the usage of stereotype, help or impair understanding? As Walter Lippman said, without stereotype, it would be difficult to contact an unknown person. Stereotypes sometimes help us prepare for a first meeting with an unknown person. But at the same time, stereotypical images risk leading to misunderstanding (Lippman, 1997: 59-60). Using some case studies of intercultural communication between Japan and the West as examples, I will address these questions and suggest some possibilities of intercultural communication in the global communication age.

Historical overview on studies of doxa in communication is presented next: from the Saussurean semiology developed by Roland Barthes to communication studies.

Communication has been studied from interdisciplinary points of view. The study of the construction of doxa was one of the most fundamental questions of mass media communication studies of the 20th century (Yoshimi, 2004: 44). Critically based on Gustave Le Bon’s notion of the Crowd, the character of which is impulsiveness, mobility and irritability⁸⁴, Gabriel Tarde shows in his book “Opinion and Crowd” that newspapers and magazines are one of the factors promoting the reflection of opinions and the public, a purely psychological group of which each individual is physically separated, but is connected through their feeling, in which state

⁸² Cf. Amossy, R. *Les idées reçues*. Paris: Nathan, 1991. English translations from French and Japanese are by the author of this text.

⁸³ Cf. Amossy, R. *Les idées reçues*. Paris, Nathan, 1991.

⁸⁴ “1. *Impulsiveness, Mobility and Irritability of Crowds*. The crowd is at the mercy of all exterior exciting causes, and reflects their incessant variations—The impulses which the crowd obeys are so imperious as to annihilate the feeling of personal interest—Premeditation is absent from crowds—Racial influence. “The Sentiments and Morality of Crowds”. Chapter 2 in *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind*. (Second edition). Dunwoody, Georgia: Norman S. Berg, 15-44. <http://www.brocku.ca/MeadProject/Lebon/LeBon_1895/LeBon_1895_03.html>. [accessed on 13-08-2013].

they share a certain contemporary idea that is born through the media⁸⁵. Jürgen Habermas indicates that although public space, in which opinion was born, was limited space, such as the coffee house of the 18th century, and later in the 19th and 20th centuries the commercial public media when that was born, public space has moved from being a space of cultural discussion to one of consumption⁸⁶. Thus, the importance of the role of the media in the construction of doxa is emphasised. In the USA, since the 1920s, mass communication research has been particularly active through the areas of the psychological and sociological study of media influence, in measuring political propaganda (Yoshimi, 2004: 55). In these circumstances, communication was suspected of symbolic violence and is understood as a device of dominant power. After criticism of the cultural industry⁸⁷ by the Frankfurt School, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Structuralism, born in France, found ideology in opinion construction.

Roland Barthes, on remarking in *Communication n°4* that structuralism spreads the hypothesis from linguistic school to other disciplines of the Human Sciences (anthropology, history, literature, psychoanalyse), developed Saussurean semiological theory. In 1956, Barthes based his book “Mythologies” on Ferdinand de Saussure’s courses in general linguistics, carrying out a semiological analysis of several ‘myths’ then found in French society. For Barthes, myth was a parole (speech in English) and a system of communication. Myth is a device of ideology, which realises the beliefs – of which the doxa (opinion) is the system – in discourse. The myth is a sign, its *signified* is an ideologem, its *signifier* could be anything: each object of the world could pass from a closed silent existence to oral situation, open to the appropriation of the society (Barthes, 1957: 216, 221).

⁸⁵ Tarde (1989), p.31.

⁸⁶ Habermas (1986), p.183.

⁸⁷ Cultural industries refer to “commercially and state-owned organisations in the arts and media, committed to the direct production, sponsorship, display and distribution of cultural goods and services”, a term, which was first coined by Adorno. “The forms and effects of mass culture are seen to serve the ends of commodification and to duplicate the social relations of capitalism in the realm of ideology. The cultural industries are seen as manipulative and their audiences as passive consumers. They are then contrasted in both respects with the non-commercial forms of authentic art, thought of as a product of the lone artist of integrity.” (Brooker: 60-61)

Language	{	1. signifiant	2. signifié
		3. sign	
MYTH	{	I. SIGNIFIANT	II. SIGNIFIE
		III. SIGN	

In this work, on emphasising the importance of the development of the publicity, of the mass media, which make more urgent than before the constitution of a semiological science, Barthes aimed to analyse how the communication media generates symbolic power (Barthes, 1982: 167).

Within the framework of structural semiology, Barthes also analysed media discourses on fashion, in “The Fashion System”, in order to “reconstitute a formal system, without social, ideological, aesthetic difference considerations” (Barthes, 1967: 21). After publication, Barthes himself considered this volume to be one to be overcome as a practice of structural semiology (Barthes, 1985: 11-12)⁸⁸. Sperber and Wilson, who proposed the inference model⁸⁹, including the presentation and interpretation of evidence, rather than Shannon’s code model⁹⁰, equally criticised the structural semiology proposed by Lévi-Strauss and Barthes: “Structural semiology could not find a system combining sign and message which could explain (...) how works of myth or literature could be successfully communicated” (Sperber and Wilson: 9, 11).

Thus, after this period, communication studies emphasised not static structural analysis, which aims only to expose symbolic violence, but rather the ‘inter-subjective movement’, of which the linguistic turn (such as Austin (America), Benvenist (France), Bakhtin (Russia), Jakobson (USA)) questions the addressees (for example, reader’s theory, as proposed by Eco,

⁸⁸ After this period, Barthes aimed to analyse the signifier of the text, for example, with his work “The Empire of Signs” in an effort to construct paradoxa rather than to analyse the signified of the sign in order to reinforce endoxa (Shinoda, 1989: 236, 246).

⁸⁹ “The inferential model, (is) a communicator provides evidence of her intention to convey a certain meaning, which is inferred by the audience on the basis of the evidence provided.” (Sperber and Wilson, 2005: 249)

⁹⁰ “The code model, (is) a communicator encodes her intended message into a signal, which is decoded by the audience using an identical copy of the code.” (Sperber and Wilson, 2005: 249)


Barthes, and audience studies, such as Cultural Studies). Concerning the linguistic turn, in the preface to Patrick Charaudeau's "Langage et discours-éléments de sémiolinguistique (Théorie et pratique)", it is written that:

The need for research renewal goes in two opposite directions: on the one hand, generative grammar and syntax belonging to the scientific movement (...) of a logical nature, independent of the contexts. The 'sentence' is the privileged level of the study, the *sentence of language*, cleared from the liberty of discourse. On the other hand, it is open to what could explain the effects of discourses, extroversion tending to integrate the maximum number of elements able to explain the textual communication mechanism through its contexts, its situations, its implications, of which the importance is attached to the pragmatics, to the interlocutor's knowledge, to the detectable intentions and possible interpretation. (Charaudeau, 1983:3)

Thus, within the framework of French discourse analysis, the system, by which doxa is successfully constructed and communicated, can be explained from the semio-discursive (Bonnafoous and Charaudeau, 1996: 39) point of view: semio is constructed through categories of form (words, sequences of words and their layout), which signify as they are and which are not only the transparent traces of certain content; discursive signifies as categories of form-sense are ones of usage, from which to regulate the combination, the contextualisation and the inter-textualisation according to the condition of production (op. cit.). That is, the doxa could be said to be constructed and communicated through the "process of enunciation (construction of receptor's register)", "procedure of structuralisation (construction of representation of Public Space)", etc. (ibid., 41-42). And these procedures could be examined from the rhetorical point of view (Mainguenu and Charaudeau, 2002: 44).

Communication, according to Breton, is composed of three modalities: to express, to inform, to convince in order to manipulate and to argue (Breton, 2004: 3). The communication of doxa/opinion, which "is a point of view which, in a debate for example, opposes others" (ibid., 28), and "the entirety of beliefs, values, representations of the world, trust in others which an individual forms to be oneself" (ibid., 24) belong to the 'convince' modality. To convince is composed of two further modalities: manipula-

tion, as a procedure of symbolic power, such as the analysis object of Barthesian semiology, and argumentation⁹¹, which, as opinion construction, is considered part of the receptor's register. Breton proposes a scheme of argumentative communication:



Philippe Breton's schema of argumentative communication (Breton, 1996:20)

According to this model, proposed by Breton, the opinion of the orator/writer, who proposes the argument, belongs to the domain of plausibility, which is to say opinion, point of view. The opinion is shaped as argument by the orator in order to convince the audience. The audience is that person/group, which the orator wants to convince to adhere to the opinion that he/she proposes. The argument, conditioned by the context of reception, is the whole of the opinions, values and judgements that an audience shares, which precedes to argumentation act and which plays a role in the reception of the argument, in its acceptance, or reject (ibid., 18-19). The argument designs its content and its packaging, its argumentative mould and can be divided into 4 families: the analogic (analogy, example, metaphor) (op. cit., 32, 40-41), authority (competence, experience, evidence) and frame (definition, association, dissociation) (op. cit., 40-41).

⁹¹ After the discredit of the rhetoric since the end of 19th century, Chaim Perelman redefines in his book "The New Rhetoric", published in 1970, the argumentation as "the study of the discursive techniques permitting one to provoke or to increase the adherence of the spirits to a thesis which is presented for their agreement" (quoted by Breton, 1996: 11). In contrast to the rhetorical figure as ornament, Perelman also defines a "rhetorical figure as argumentative if, carrying a change to perspective, its usage appears normal in relation with the new suggested situation" (Perelman: 14).

The Intercultural Stereotype: Doxa as an Argumentative Device

Based on the above-mentioned reflexion on construction of doxa in communication, doxa on others in the intercultural communication is examined next.

Stereotype can be defined as the construction of Doxa relating to others within intercultural communication in order to convince audience/readers, who do not belong to the society of represented others, that is, those with limited information on others in the audience's society. Stereotype is defined by Walter Lippman in his famous work "Public Opinion"⁹² published in 1922. He shows it as a consensual image that helps us mediate our relationship with reality. Stereotype is a ready-made representation, an existing cultural scheme. According to Lippman, stereotypes are essential to social life. Without them, it would not be possible for individuals to understand reality, to categorise it or to react on it. When two individuals do not know each other personally, each notes a feature about the other that distinguishes a well-known type and fills the rest with the help of the stereotypes, which they have in their mind. These images are "raised from fiction (...) because they present a social imaginary" (quoted by Amossy, 1991: 26).

Lippman continues: "We imagine most things before we experience them. And those preconceptions, unless education has made us acutely aware, govern deeply the whole process of perception. They mark out certain objects as familiar or strange, emphasizing the difference, so that the slightly familiar is seen as very familiar, and the somewhat as sharply alien. They are aroused by small signs, which may vary from a true index to a vague analogy." (Lippmann, 1997: 59) Thus, in consideration with the receiver's register, opinion should be constructed by argument by way of stereotypes of the other, which the receiver can understand through linguistic competence and encyclopaedic knowledge shared within society. The media should presuppose the "model reader", using Eco's term developed by Maingueneau, which is "one which the text implicates by its characteristics" (Maingueneau and Charaudeau, 2002: 338). Based on their ideas, it could be considered that in speech, cooperative essential activity, and in the media,

⁹² Lippmann, W. *Public Opinion*, New York: Free Press Paperbacks, 1997, (1st edition 1992), p. 53-100 (part 3 Stereotypes).

the model reader (or audience as addressee) is an imaginary addressee, to which the addresser (speaker/writer) should presuppose certain linguistic or encyclopaedic competences to interpret a particular discourse.

For Ruth Amossy, the stereotype as fixed collective representation is a construction of reading (Amossy, 1991: 21) in the sense that it emerges just when the addressee focuses on the discourse's scattered and often lacunary elements in order to reconstruct something according to a pre-existing cultural model (Amossy, 1991: 33). It could be said that stereotypes lean on the interpretation that the addressee carries out, thanks to his encyclopaedic knowledge. The stereotype rises from the doxa, that is, the whole of the beliefs and shared opinions that are used on the basis of communication permitting verbal interaction.

Ruth Amossy distinguished the stereotype from the cliché in the following way:

“The cliché is as a group of the words which it is possible to bring out materially from the text, though the stereotype constitutes a variable scheme in its formulation, which the addressee must reconstruct: “as sparing as a Jew” is a recognisable cliché to everyone.... The stereotype does not formulate any opinion: it consist of a scheme, or an image, which attributes a west of features (miserliness, cupidity) to the categories of the Jew without the general reality on which its repose would be enounced under the form of explicit idea.” (Amossy, 1991: 33)

From the point of view of the rhetoric, she defines the stereotype as a form of doxa, permitting the construction of argumentation.

“The argumentative interaction is founded on the shared knowledge which confers plausibility on the statement. Its premises and the points of accord on which it leans, are loaned to an accredited doxa by the audience. More than structured totality, this doxa is a blurred whole and a fluctuating opinion admitted in a given socio-cultural space, in the centre of which opposite doctrines and points of view coexist. It had better speak on the ‘elements of doxa’ than doxa. These elements constitute a topic which is exchanged in diverse discursive forms: rhetoric topos, idée reçue, pragmatic topos, maxim, stereotype.” (Amossy, 2000: 114)


The stereotype could be considered a form of doxa that consist of a scheme or an image that attributes a whole set of features permitting con-

struction of the foundation of the argumentative communication and abstract scheme, “known in advance, rooted in the cultural memory, which generates in the texts of lexical or argumentative formation (metaphor, enthymeme, anecdote...) materially isolable and pointed out by their repetitive features” (Honoré, 1994: 9). Stereotypes, which are not presented directly, permit the addressee to mobilise a shared knowledge to complete what it is not said and the sender to escape from the responsibility of the sender’s discourse⁹³. Stereotypes are also a kind of device to make argumentation incontestable. The stereotype could be an analogical argumentation device (analogy, example, metaphor), a framing device (definition, association, near-logic, dissociation) or a community device (common opinion, value, platitude), as Breton proposes.

What is the function of the stereotype in argumentation? Aristotle defines rhetoric as “the faculty to discover speculatively what might be proper way to persuade in each case.” (*Rhétorique*, Livre I t.) Rhetoric as the art of persuasion emphasises the important role of doxa, or the shared opinion, in verbal communication. Aristotle also poses three argumentational paths within Rhetoric: logos, pathos and ethos. The first stems from rational order, while the second and the third are affective. Ethos expresses the character of the orator, the image, which he presents to the public; pathos is the full set of emotions, which the orator tries to provoke in the audience; and finally, logos is the logic and more objective argumentation that provides the way to proof in the modern sense. The three concepts can apply to the stereotypes, which find credible argumentation and which make an opinion plausible. That is, the stereotype as a form of doxa that permits construction on the basis of all argumentation is able to correspond to pathetic, logical and ethical functions used in argumentation.

As for the Breton argumentation model, logic is used to make an argument publically credible/logical to construct an opinion that convinces an audience. The pathetic and ethical functions are used to directly mobilise audience’s feeling.

⁹³ According to Ducrot, “The general question of the implicit (...) is to know how something could be said without accepting the responsibility of having said it, which amounts to a benefit for, at the same time, the efficiency of speech and of the innocence of silence.” (Ducrot quoted by Amossy, 2000: 151-152)



The schema of argumentative communication based on the argumentation of Philippe Breton (Breton, 1996: 34)

Construction of Doxa Relating to Others in the Intercultural Context

Japanese fashion, as represented in French newspapers in the 1980s, is used here as an example to explain the intercultural stereotype of argumentation as a communication modality. Through the bias of intercultural stereotypes, a journalist wanted to persuade his readers of the validity of his approach on the creators of Japanese fashion, who had invented a new line of clothes that ignored the body and the form, which disrupt the conventional notion on European clothes (Baudot, 1999: 313). The French media presented the Japanese fashion of the 1980s, a period that corresponds to what was called the ‘Japanese economic offensive in the Occident, consciously or unconsciously through intercultural stereotypes relating to Japan, in particular that of violence’⁹⁴. As an example, in order to illustrate the arrival of the Japanese fashion creators in Paris, metaphors relating to war were used: “a battalion of Japanese” and “the yellow peril”⁹⁵,

⁹⁴ Jean-Paul Honoré questions the representation of Japan in contemporary French written media between 1980 and 1994, in which two lexical positive and negative groups of stereotypes are used: on the one hand, energy, harmony, spirituality, honour, suppleness, aesthetics, tradition and innovation; on the other, violence, conformism, esotericism, alienation, duplicity, vapidity, archaism and loss of cultural identity (Honoré, 1994: 9).

⁹⁵ «un bataillon de Japonais» et «[le] péril jaune», *Le Figaro*, 18/03/1983.

or “the Japanese landed in force at *Carré du Louvre* to present us their collection”⁹⁶.

For what function could these stereotypes be used? In order to persuade logically the addressee, the sender/enunciator exploits the logic function of the stereotype. In particular, reasons why the agents do one thing or another are exploited in order to explain the reason relevantly and reductively. In another example, (“pallid and gloomy models (of Japanese creator designer, *Comme des Garçons*) pace up and down the podium in the Prussian style (has it not been said before that the Japanese are the Prussians of Asia?”⁹⁷), not only Japanese creators, as we saw, but also their models are implicitly interpreted by way of “Prussian style”. The expression “in the Prussian style” refers to the strict discipline of Prussian soldiers, and “the Prussians” designates the soldiers of Germany, while it was under the hegemony of Prussia. These expressions are used to represent indistinctly the model wearing clothes by Japanese fashion designers as military style, according to a generalising expression “the Japanese”.

The pathetic function is used to arouse an emotive reaction in the addressee that facilitates persuasion, for example, sentiments, such as curiosity, laughter, surprise, as well as a moral reaction. The above-mentioned clichés, such as “a battalion of Japanese”, “the yellow peril”, “the Japanese landed in force”, have a pathetic function: even if these expressions are used to identify just three Japanese designers, clichés evoking a large number of enemies are chosen by the sender/enunciator. These clichés tend to raise a feeling of indignation toward Japanese designers in the addressee during the period, when Japan companies “invaded” European markets.

The ethical function is equally used to construct the guarantor ethos of the sender⁹⁸.

“The ethos recovers not only the vocal dimension properly, but also the whole of the physical and psychic determinations attached by the collective representation to the enunciator’s character. Accord-

⁹⁶ Original text: «les Japonais ont débarqué en force au Carré du Louvre pour nous présenter leur collection», *Le Figaro*, 20/10/1989.

⁹⁷ Original text: «des mannequins blafards et mornes, arpentant le podium à la prussienne (ne disait-on pas autrefois que «les Japonais sont les Prussiens de l’Asie»?)», *Libération*, 20/03/1983.

⁹⁸ Dominique Maingueneau defines the notion of ethos in the written as well as in the oral, as the personality that the enunciator reveals through enunciation (Maingueneau, 2000: 79-81).

ing to Mainguenuau the guarantor's representation of the body of the enunciator – the figure of which the addressee should construct from textual indices of diverse orders – is affected by a 'character' and a 'corporality', of which the level of precision is varied according the text (...). The ethos involves a discipline of body grasped through a global behaviour. The character and corporality of the guarantor comes from the whole, diffused from a socially privileged or underprivileged representation, on which the enunciation bases that which it contributes in return to reinforce or transform. These cultural stereotypes circulate in the most diver domains." (Mainguenuau, 2000: 79-81)

The ethos of the guarantor, assumed by the journalist of the above-mentioned examples, and who lent on the ethical function of the stereotype, has two parts: the ethos of authority and the ethos of morality. The enunciator intervenes as an expert, who interprets the Japanese fashion through the pre-established prism of an interiorised cultural illusion. This ethical function of authority often works in coordination with the logic function, which is articulated from precedent in order to convince readers better. The ethos of morality often works by implicit opposition. In this case, the stereotype has two simultaneous functions: the ethical and the pathetic. In other words, in order to provoke a particular feeling in the addressee, the enunciator constructs an ethos of the guarantor that is sensible to the same feeling in his addressee. Thus, to clarify his position in the discourse, the guarantor outlines his or her ethos by way of a stereotype that works in the mainly implicit opposition.

The above-mentioned clichés, such as "a battalion of Japanese", "the yellow peril", "the Japanese landed in force", also have an ethical function. By provoking indignation in the reader, these clichés construct the ethos of the guarantor as Japanophobic journalist and represent the negative aspect of Japanese designers. This allows the construction of the ethos of morality, which is that of the Occidental fighting against the Japanese expansion of that period.

The above-mentioned cliché, which follows "(has it not been said before that the Japanese are the Prussians of Asia?)"⁹⁹, outlines an ethical

⁹⁹ The original text: «des mannequins blafards et mornes, arpentant le podium à la prussienne (ne disait-on pas autrefois que «les Japonais sont les Prussiens de l'Asie»?)».

function that is used to construct the journalist's guarantor, knowing Japanese history well in order to be confirmed as a specialist authority on Japan.

By Way of Conclusion: Identity Construction through Intercultural Communication

The doxa, relating to others, constructed and communicated from a semio-discursive point of view, could often be considered directly as the identities of these others.

Identity can be defined using three points, such as the following ones: first, it can be defined as a constructed representation. Olivier explains:

“The identities are representations, images, and not realities. The identity is constructed. The identities are the object of permanent interpretations and reinterpretations (...) It is the system of representation of the self and the other for individual identities, and of our and others' collective identity.” (Olivier, 2009: 8)

The second point is that the other can be necessary to construct the identity of the self: identity is a “product of the relation to others” (Benichou, 2006: 13). As the third point, I indicate that the other is not a reality, but a representation. According to J Berting, “the observation of the other is to be governed by collective representations or stereotypes as soon as the distinction is done: a person is the other because a person has one or several features which distinguish them from us” (Berting, 2009: 58).

Identity could be defined as a representation produced in relation to the representation of the other by stereotypes, where the other has some features distinguishing them from us. The collective representation of the other formed by stereotypes is used to construct the self-identity.

It could be said that doxa/opinion relating to others represented/constructed/communicated through the intercultural stereotypes could be considered as identity. This type of representation/identity constructed at the crossing point of the view of the self and the other is the plausible, although the reality is not. However, as mentioned above, these types of representation/identity permit solicitation of mutual understanding between the self and the other, and at the same time risk some misunderstanding. In any case, this type of representation/identity, constructed through the other's gaze, could also be said to be one of identity of the self, even if it was

further from the 'real' self than before. Currently, in the 21st century, when transnational information systems, such as the Internet, are more developed than we imagined, the eyes of diverse others possessing various cultural backgrounds construct representation/identity on the self with eyes, according to which various representations/identities of the self might be constructed and communicated.

In this sense, in a period, when social and personal identity can be multiple and changing, and "no centre of our interior exists", as Jean-Claude Kaufmann remarks (Kaufmann, 2008), identity in the intercultural communication context of the transnational information age could be more varied than before. It is true that intercultural communication has already aimed to understand different cultures; however, today it could be said to be one of the first steps to know these "inter" identities/representations of the self-constructed and communicated through intercultural communication in order to promote mutual understanding in the intercultural context.

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CHAPTER VII

Communicating Bodies

The following discussion is concerned with the question of expression, specifically the meaning of corporeal expression. The examples of expression are numerous: love, joy, hate, sadness, indifference, pride, submission, etc. Phenomenologists, from Sartre through Merleau-Ponty, Landgrebe to Seebohm, argued that corporeal expressions and our perception of them have a primacy over interpretation and intellectual projections¹⁰⁰. The arguments that will demonstrate the primacy of expression are designed to show the inadequacies of various theoretical positions founded in modern dualisms of interior-exterior, mind-body and senses-intellect. The other task is to show the “essence” of expression by using the well-known method of variation and the transpositionality of one event into various contexts without the loss of the “familiarity” of the event. What is meant by the term “essence” was delimited earlier and will appear in the discussion of expression.

Explanatory Frameworks of Expression

One of the major theoretical principles used in the explanation of expression is dualism between the “outer” and the “inner”. The outer is interpreted in various ways: as a bodily process, as sense impressions and even as a mechanism. The inner is understood to be a mind, a reason, a psyche or a spirit. In this sense, it is claimed that the outer is experienced by the outer – the physical senses – and conceived as located sense organs. The sense organs experience the bodily presence, the actions of another. In brief, they offer to the experiencer the “outer” functions of another human subject. It follows then that the inner functions of the other are perceived as so many external actions, corporeal shapes and mechanical processes. If there is interiority, a consciousness or a psyche, then it is inaccessible directly to the perceiver’s external organs, because the latter perceive only the external bodily processes. Both the perceived body and its activities and the perceiv-

¹⁰⁰ Seebohm, T. (1985). Die Begründung der Hermeneutik Diltheys in Husserls Transzendentaler Phaenomenologie [The Foundation of Dilthey’s Hermeneutics in Husserl’s Transcendental Phenomenology]. In E. W. Orth (Ed.), Dilthey und die Philosophie der Gegenwart. Munchen, West Germany: Verlag Karl Alber, p. 97-125.

ing organs are related in a multitude of mechanical relays, impressions and reactions offering the interaction of two “exteriorities”. In this sense, corporeal expressivity would have to be the experience of these organic circuits, impressions and reactions, the sum of bodily mechanisms, light and sound waves, the distances between raised eyebrows and lids, and measurements of the movement of hands or the pivot of the head. The pure description of the sense experience would give us external relationships without any indications of interiority. In this sense, the outer would not constitute the expression of the inner and, hence, expression would cease to make sense.

If there is expression, then it must depend on interiority, which is distinct from the external bodily processes. Given the assumption of this distinction, the exteriority would have to be re-characterized. The exteriority would have to be understood in terms of a system of signs of interior states. This suggests that the bodily activities are “more” than mechanical functions and that the experiencer is confronted with “overabundance” of expression over impression and of meaning over physiology. Yet, if the dualistic principle is maintained, then an immediate question must be posed: “If the outer organs can experience only the impressional data, that is, the bodily movements, then how does the experiencer grasp the expressive characteristics through the senses?” After all, the senses cannot give more than the external processes. Such a conception of sensibility cannot suggest any event to be a sign of another event, and, above all, an event that is hidden behind and signified by exteriority.

To answer this question, the protagonists of the dualistic principle are compelled to maintain that the overabundance of expression over impression, although not experienced through the senses, except as signs to be deciphered, is present in its immediacy to the interiority of the experiencer. This immediate presence is what allows the experience of the expressions of the other. The experiencer can decipher the other’s corporeal movements, that is, the external processes as signs of an interiority, as being similar or analogous to those of the experiencer. It is then concluded that an analogical inference is performed, a kind of likening, through which the other’s external signs are understood as expressions of inner states. Each of us, it is said, has been at times angry or joyful, dignified or dejected, and, thus, has experienced the expressions in our own interiority. We have projected these expressive characteristics through our bodies and, hence, we are in a posi-

tion to read the same projection of other's as signs of their internal states. This is to say, when we see similar corporeal functions in others, when we note the same facial contortions in the heroic statues, in the masks of gods or in the portraits of the past ages, we infer through analogy that they too are or were possessors of similar internal states as our own.

Besides the problem concerning the impossibility of showing how the senses would be able to suggest more than the mechanical process of another corporeity, there appears another set of problems with analogization. If we feel anger as an interior state, do we, like some Narcissus, run to the pool to observe the external signs, the corporeal configurations as expressions of our internal states? Even if one were not a Narcissus, but an actor, or even a scientific researcher of expression, and were to rush with every interior experience of anger or joy to some reflecting surface in order to note the external signs of internal events, one could not obtain a precise picture. The attempts to observe one's own angry expression through the external signs would interfere and would offer an image of someone trying to observe an angry expression. Even if it were possible to constantly observe one's own interior states expressed in one's own external corporeal signs, the dualistic principle and the analogical inference would preclude our understanding of the signs and, indeed, on two counts: (a) the mirroring surfaces would offer an external set of impressions to a corporeal set of organs; hence, the interior subject would have to find another mode of analogizing, which ultimately would lead to an infinite regress, and (b) the external configurations present in the reflecting surface do not reveal that they are signs of the interiority of the observing subject and his/her interior states. Self-observation, thus, offers no solution.

The analogical inference breaks down even if we grant that the external senses, through some mysterious process, could read impressions as signs of internal events that are analogous to ours. Take, for example, the cases where degrees of expressive intensity are involved. A person, who feels well and who has a joyful disposition, perceives bitterness in another. Indeed, the person may have had disappointing hours in his/her life, yet, he has never been as bitter as the person he/she sees before him/her. He/she perceives an expression never fully experienced before either in his/her own interiority or through external physiological signs. And yet, he/she sees the bitterness without having to analogize or to recall his/her previous internal states of disappointment.

The question of the “assumption” of analogous internal states, suggested by the experienced bodily signs of the other, leads to the following considerations. It seems that there is no necessity for the experiencer to assume internally the states that are expressed by the other. To experience a sad expression in the face of the other does not require that the experiencer become sad, nor must the experiencer turn to his/her internal states in order to perform analogical inferences. It seems that while experiencing an expression of sadness, we are not required to read the corporeal contortions of the other as signs of the other’s internal states and then to infer from those signs that we too possess such internal states. Even if we were to grant that the corporeal expressions are signs of internal states and are required for the experiencer, we would have to admit that the expressions, such as sadness, are experienced prior to the experience of corporeal configurations as signs of internal states. The reason for this claim lies in the notion of a sign. The sign cannot be deciphered “in itself”; that is, it cannot be seen as a set of independent events to be interpreted in their own right. Rather, the sign must efface itself, become anonymous and must be overlooked in favor of the signified. The signified must assume priority over the sign. Thus, it is precisely the “overlooking” of the anatomical, the physiological, mechanical, the sense-impressional that reveals the expressive. In this sense, the expression must assume priority over the signs, and the signs, in their function, must become anonymous.

Although the thesis of exteriority as a system of signs of the interiority is untenable, it is designed to maintain and preserve the sensualistic theory, the physiologically designed corporeity as externality in distinction to internality. This thesis postulates two modes of perception—internal and external, wherein we encounter within ourselves the analogates of the inner states of the other, while perceiving external bodily signs by our external senses. It should be inquired why we would need this externality of signs if we are required to assume the analogous inner states of the other in our own interiority in order to grasp the other’s physiological movements as expressions of the other’s interiority? After all, we would have to assume the internal states before we could make sense of the external signs of the other; yet, if we do that, then the external signs, the corporeal functions become redundant. If the perceived corporeal expression does not make sense in itself before we can assume the required inner states, then such an

assumption must already be made before we can perceive the external aspects of signs of internal states. But this means that the expression must be read directly through the signs, abolishing the distinction between internal and external. The signs must yield to the expression; the latter must be perceived directly as “pain” or “joy” or “indifference”¹⁰¹.

Still, another variant of the dualistic thesis of expression is depicted in terms of *objectivation*. The indifferent sense experience, that is, the pure externality of things and others, is invested with expressive characteristics by the objectivations of the experiencer’s inner states. It is a process of objectivation of the internal states in such a way, that the states are projected and attached to the indifferent external sense data, lending these data an expressive character. This thesis results in the claim that the experienced expressions of the other are actually a multiplication of the experiencer. Yet, this notion of objectivation, or what some would call projection, was seen to be the origin of sacrificial uses, magical activities, totemism, fetishism, ancestral worship, symbolism and myth. At the same time, this thesis employs various magical terms to characterize this experience: *anthropomorphism*, *personification*, *besoulment*, all meaning some assumed inner human predisposition to project the conceptions, feelings, thoughts, desires and hopes onto the indifferent, “externally” perceived world. Although this thesis starts with a fundamental dualism, it too leads to the impossibility of grasping expression. Any expressive characteristics would have to be seen as projections of the subjective state. This means that what one person projects onto the indifferent material or corporeal processes of the other is not necessarily what the other experiences internally. If this thesis were correct, then it would follow that what I experience externally in sense impressions, as the corporeal processes of the other would assume expressive characteristics only and insofar as I project my internal states onto such impression and processes. But this means that my experience is not of the expressive characteristics of the other, but of my own internal states. With respect to the experience of expressive characteristics, this is pure solipsism. It precludes the possibility of the experience of the same expression by two persons; after all, while observing the corporeal-external processes of someone, the two perceivers (a) may project different expressive characteristics

¹⁰¹ Klages, L. (1970). *Grundlegung der Wissenschaft vom Ausdruck* [Foundations of the Science of Expression]. Bonn, West Germany: H. Bouvier, p. 70.

on the perceived corporeal processes, and (b) they have no access to each other's interior experiences, because any experience of interior expressivity would be immediately abolished in favor of the projections of one or the other perceiver. That is to say, while two persons were to experience the expressions of a third person, they would be projecting their own internal states onto the third person; at the same time, the process of projection would apply to the relationship between the two perceivers, because their experience of each other's expressive characteristics would be nothing else than the projection of their own internal states onto the external and indifferent processes of one another.

The preceding outlined arguments point to one conclusion: the experience of expression and, indeed, the expressive process itself cannot be founded on the dualistic thesis, regardless of how such a thesis would be interpreted – mind-body, internal-external, spirit-matter, psyche-physiology, etc. In principle, the dualistic understanding of experiential process leads to absurdities. It could be observed that the dualistic thesis is maintainable not on philosophical, but on dogmatic grounds, which favor the conception of corporeity as an anatomical summation of parts reacting to external disturbances; because such an anatomical entity does not have expressivity, then expressivity is relegated to “subjective” or internal states. Yet, this relegation is precisely what precludes any kind of justifiable understanding of the prevalent consensus that we constantly encounter the expressive aspects in our experience of the others. In brief, the dualistic thesis fails to explain expressive communication.

These, of course, are not the only problems encountered by the dualistic thesis. Although the experience of expression is never given with two sides, one perceptual-external, and one internal, requiring two modes of apprehension, if assumed, this theory would have to establish a third mode of perception, unifying the inner with the outer, a reading of the outer signs in order to correlate them to the inner states or processes. If from time immemorial humanity had been functioning with two modes of awareness, then surely it would have created two distinct sets of linguistic systems. Even if we have terms for the so-called inner states and perceptions, the terms are derived from direct perceptual experience, that is, immediate corporeal expressivity. The glowing love and the glowing fire, the icy silence and the icy winter are present prior to dualism.

The Immediacy of Expression

If the dualistic thesis leads to blind alleys, then the only alternative is to argue for the immediacy of expression, for the immediate presence of joy, pain, sorrow, indifference, anger, etc. The corporeal expression will have to be read through and intertwined in the corporeal activities. The very gestures, movements and configurations of the body are directly expressive. If the returning hero were asked about the facial and postural physiology of his beloved, who, in a crowd, gave him a passionate look, he would be unable to report the specific physiological features and changes that took place. She, in turn, could not reproduce at will the physiological requirements that would reveal the passionate expression. Thus, if the physiological data, the so-called externality, is not attended to, then the mechanisms either of analogization or projection are redundant. The corporeal expression must speak directly. It has long been noted that even an infant of 7 or 8 months answers with comfort and pleasure to a smile and with fear to a terrifying expression. Moreover, the infant can respond to a terrifying or pleasant voice even if the direct physiological characteristics of the producer of the voice are not present, that is, if the speaker is in another room. As it is well known, Erwin Straus goes so far as to suggest that the reading of direct expression goes across species barriers¹⁰².

The unacceptability of the dualistic theories leads to a conclusion that the experience of expression is an experience of direct expressive meaning. This is not to say that the experience of meaning is always clear; rather, the physiological-corporeal configurations have depths of ambiguities. The pleasant smile might clash with a cold gaze. The problem with dualistic theories is that they have detached the appearance from its meaning, the expression from its direct presence and attempted to reconstruct it theoretically from physiological and sensualistic elements. Expression is a meaning unit and the meaning is the very expression. One good reason for this position is that any theory that purports to explain expression in terms of any other components presupposes expression as obvious and as a criterion, by which to judge or interpret the physiological or sensualistic elements. Because this presupposition cannot be explained in terms of any

¹⁰² Straus, E. (1966). *Phenomenological psychology*. (E. Eng, Trans.) New York: Basic Books, p. 225.

dualistic theory, then the immediacy of expression is the more plausible position, which makes sense. Thus, corporeity is the very appearance, an expression of meaning, and the meaning is the expressive corporeity. This is the foundation of the understanding of expression and the condition for the possibility of the experience of expressions of others and the proliferation of expression through institutions.

It could be objected that the immediacy of expression would preclude mistakes, yet, as a matter of fact, we do make mistakes in our experience of expressions. Indeed, yet the errors are corrected not by analogical inferences or objectivations, that is, the correct deciphering of physiological signs, but by other expressions. The rejection of the primacy and immediacy of expression and the ability to experience its meaning is tantamount to rejection of thinking or sense experience simply because we make mistakes in thinking and in sense experience. Thinking can correct the mistakes of thought and sense experience can correct the mistakes of perception. If corporeal expressions were founded on dualism, then they would be arbitrary and local, having no universal style, no accessibility to “outsiders” and ultimately reducible to the privacy of the subject.

There is another thesis that maintains that expressions are intellectually mediated, that is, mediated by culturally instituted habits and conventions. Expressions are learned and, hence, are local. It is said, for example, that in distinct cultures distinct and various bodily gestures are used to reveal the same expression, such as an indifferent shrugging off of an accusation in one culture and a stony passivity, revealing the same indifference in another. Due to this difference in corporeal postures, it is maintained that the corporeal expressions are learned, mediated by thought and, hence, must be seen as signs of interior states or of institutionally acquired behavior. To counter this claim it is not necessary to repeat the problems discussed earlier of dualism and of detachment of signs from expression and meaning. The following arguments would indicate the inadequacy of this thesis:

1. Although physiological and material media may be varied, they can capture the same expression. The universality of expression is attested to by the fact that it is capable of appearing through various media.

2. Expressive meaning remains even if we cannot read it due to a particular mode of capturing it in a particular culture. No doubt, the media may mislead us and we may be compelled to correct our perception

through learning; yet, the correction assumes the immediate presence of the expression over impression.

3. If the expression is identical with the physiological changes and sense data experiences, learned within a particular culture, then expression is either abolished or subjectivated. If it is abolished, then no physiological changes would make sense; if subjectivated, then we are back to dualism. Although a third alternative is possible, it cannot explain expression, that is, the alternative, which would claim that the expressions are neither physiological, nor sensualistic processes, nor subjective experiences arbitrarily attached to external signs, but are rather culturally established phenomena. If the latter is correct, it is still the case that expression must be immediately read as a cultural phenomenon in the different cultural media. It is presupposed if the cultural media are to be understood as arbitrary signs of expression. To select the signs, one must be directly aware of the expression in order to make sense of the signs.

4. It can be argued that the learning of expressions is not mediated through culture or thought, but rather reinforced through other expressive gestures and actions. It is not the case that a parent says to the child that “when I make this facial configuration, it means that I am angry, and, therefore, when you want to let me know that you are angry, you must in turn make a similar configuration”. This, of course, would require that both stand in front of some reflecting surface in order to ascertain that the configurations are similar. Moreover, this would already assume that we understand the meaning of the configurations if any comparisons between them are to be made.

It could be maintained then that what we learn is not the expressive aspect, but the means of expression. But to learn the means we must have the experience of expression. The theory of learning of the means of expression (a) assume a dualism and all of its attendant problems and (b) must assume the primacy of expression and its experience in order to talk about the means of expression. This assumption of course leads us back to the same conclusion, namely, the immediacy of the experienced expression and its inseparability from the means; in this sense, the distinctions between the means and expression, between learning and immediacy, are undercut. Also surpassed is the notion of a corporeity, which is a physiology distinct from expressivity. To be corporeal is to be expressive, and to be expressive is to be corporeal.

The “Essence” of Expression

Although the expressive aspects of corporeity may be understood in terms of their intentionality (joy is joy about something), to capture the essence of expression, we must bracket the specific direction of expression and articulate the corporeal process as expressivity, communicative of the joy or heavy burdens of the world. A sign, expressing the weight of our burdens, or a relief, communicates our world even if it is performed in solitude. It is a spontaneous corporeal event presenting our state in the world. As Walter Otto suggested, expressive corporeity is primarily self-presentation and is paralleled by equally spontaneous comprehension of a situation. This spontaneity is found in ritual, dance and music, and it escapes any teleological orientation. It is a free manifestation, a play with one's own powers as they manifest the total context.

One basic expression revealing the way of being human is originally the upright stance, but not a still standing. Rather, it is upright stepping out, the celebrated dignity of the stillness of movement, playing such a significant role in cults. In it the elevation appears, the pride and holiness and the luminescence of human visage. As Dante said, “He abandoned the hurriedness which robs each action of its nobility”, and Petrarch praised the pacific and light movement of Laura, while Plutarch praised Sophocles for his still manner and movement. And in his characterization of high-mindedness, Aristotle pointed out that it is to be accompanied by the stillness and dignity of movement. This kind of movement is recognized as an expression of dignity and pride¹⁰³. Although it can be considered teleologically, more fundamentally it is a corporeal expression of a situation. It is the originary appearance of measure, earnestness, pride, greatness, elevation and dignity. It is not something learned, willed or consciously intended, but an originary phenomenon of being human.

For example, the festive walk, practiced in all cultures in various ways, is still known to us in the march of mourning. Indeed, such a walk is oriented toward the cemetery; yet, when we notice such a walk, when we hear the music, we recognize that, like all festive events, it too has its meaning in a total situation. We recognize the solemn walk and a solemn music. The

¹⁰³ Otto, W. (1974). *Die Gestalt und das Sein [Form and Being]*. Darmstadt, West Germany: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, p. 78.

music and its expressivity transform the participants into the right attitude. Yet, despite the wondrous creation of such tonality, its character and form are not invented by the composer; to the contrary, the music is learned from the shape of the expressive movement. From the very uprightness that we are, the music, like our feet, ties us to the earth and at the same time it is sadly elevating toward our head and the sun, the holy light.

Although expression appears as corporeity, it is not locked within the limits of physiological body. Every corporeal gesture, every movement forms a continuity, a flow of anger and joy, elevation and submission, producing a variant of itself and prolonging itself into a schema. An adjustment to one expressive configuration is an adjustment to a series of like configurations, where expressed pain can be pain expressed by anyone and in anything. If my expressed pain is a variant among other possible expressions of pain, then it is equivalent to and interchangeable with them. The particular expressions pass, but, in passing, they create a schema for continuation, proliferation and repetition.

While inhering in individual gesture, self-display of corporeity, the expression transcends the boundaries of anatomical individuality and captures others in its mood. This being captured by and being moved by expression is well depicted in phenomena, such as desire and eroticism, where one is transfigured, elevated, and ennobled¹⁰⁴. The expressive power was well depicted by the Greeks, who allowed themselves to be moved by its sway. This power best appears in Greek depiction of mythological figures. Although myths are usually seen as an ideological description of sociopolitical order, such a view fails to realize that myths have a more fundamental rooting in corporeal expressivity. Look at Hermes: his characteristics are all expressive and relate to the nocturnal domain, the dark side of life. Nonetheless, he is not an indication of the joyless nocturnal hours of forlornness, but of the enchanting solitude of wonder. Hermes is the way that darkness can bewitch the human by the sense of abandonment and, at the same time, by the experience of the expression of a luminescence that can show the way and lend solace to the abandoned. Hermes is the wonder of the night, pervading every facet and every domain of things mundane and sublime,

¹⁰⁴ Otto, W. (1974). *Die Gestalt und das Sein* [Form and Being]. Darmstadt, West Germany: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, p. 75.

pervading night's dangers and favors¹⁰⁵. In this sense, he is an expressive dimension, immanent to and appearing in all things, and yet transcending the characteristics of things. The human is captured by this dimension. And human experience assumes a different expressivity, when it is confronted by the expressive characterizations announced by Aphrodite. The mood across everything is different. It is the tenderness of everything calling to enchantment, to embrace and to sweet and breath-taking flow of all into all. It is an expression manifest across all things as attractive and harmonious. And she is contrasted to Artemis, the feminine. This goddess is the soul, the expression of wildness with its heights and depths, with her animals and tormenting beauty, with her rejecting look and maternal care and her blood-lusting hunt-lust, playfulness, tenderness, bright glory, inaccessibility and horror, all expressive characteristics. What the mythical figures suggest is the generality and, at the same time, the individuality of the expressive aspect of corporeity, an aspect that proliferates and can inhabit anything, can be manifest across the face of all events without being reducible to such events. Hence, the mythical figures can be seen as transcending the characterization of things in their anatomical properties; yet, as manifestations of expressivity, the figures are inner-worldly. The mythical figures are a way to manifest the expressive corporeal process without any admixture with anatomy or physiology. Such a process, nonetheless, can appear everywhere; in the faces of statues, where the great utopian dreams of days to come are inscribed in the uplifted postures of the "revolutionary" classes; the victories shine from the canvases, tensed with fierce steeds and proud warriors, while the defeats are spread across the canvas in prostrate bodies, all corporeal expressions. The expressive power of corporeity is the very locus of manifestation of expressions, which provide transformations from one expressive modality to another, from direct vision to institutionalized records of writing, where the same proud posture, the haughty gaze, the same sorrow of defeat, pervade the volumes of poetry, literature and even religious ritual. It is the same expressive power that manifests Greek movement toward thee-centrism, the pagan "enthusiasm" with arms spread and open toward the sky and the Christian despatialization and fallen submission in kneeling and prostration. From the donning of the mask, angry or benevolent, to the solemn magic of transforming wine into blood and bread

¹⁰⁵ Lingis, A. (1984). *Excesses: Eros and Culture*. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, p. 47.

into flesh, the expressive characteristics are what are directly manifest and what moves the experiencer prior to intellectualization, by capturing the experiencer in the mood that spreads without respect to the otherwise indifferent “reality”.

Corporeal expressivity, in brief, can assume any “embodiment”, because it is not something called “interior” or subjective, but rather directly present, inner-worldly and yet transcendent of materiality. This transcendence is precisely what is capable of affecting us, although the expressive dimension is primarily the self-manifestation of a corporeal being. The effectivity is not an intentional act, stemming from an interiority of a subject, but a movement of expressivity that tenses across our own gestures and visage. This means that the immediacy of expression is not so much faced or confronted as participated in and lived through. It is like the “lively” tune that sends our limbs into frenzy, or the Dionysian tragedy calling the participants into a movement. And it is in this movement that the participants are captured by the expressivity that transforms them into extra-human beings in the dance. Thus, the maidens danced the nymphs, while men were half-animal; this has nothing to do with animism and its magic. Rather, such dances are spontaneous expressions of being moved, being gripped by a presence of expressivity, where what does the gripping and the being gripped are one.

This conception of expressivity abandons not only the inner-outer dualism, but also the distinction between our corporeal expressivity and its characterization, and the expressivity manifest among the experienced phenomena: the fearsome storm and the fear across the face participates in one expressive movement; the lonely night and the lonely heart, the bright morning and the sparkling eye converge in the medium of expressivity that does not lend itself into separations. It could be said in terms of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of meaning that meaning is no longer an anthropocentric projection of the human; we find more meaning than we can project. The same can be maintained of expressivity: we find more expressions than we can project. While attempting to radiate an expressive joy across the morning sun and the shimmering tree tops, we are drawn into the expressed morning glory and find ourselves moved with the expressive presence.

Postscript

The primacy of expression is prior to signification and, resultantly, it is more participation than detached observation. It seems that the phenomenological conception of expressivity lends itself to the explanation of the experience of attraction between the humans and the world, an attraction that is the bond that makes things familiar, without the familiarity being our own projection. The peculiar characteristic of expressivity is that it is not an object of intentionality; if it is intended, pointed to, it evaporates not into “nothingness”, but into a movement that encompasses everything, including the intender. In this sense, corporeal expressivity is part of our immediate communication with the world’s own expressivity; to have the one is to have the other.

CHAPTER VIII

Phenomenology and Medical Imaging: Transcendental Reflections on CAD (Computer Aided Detection)

"I always saw better when my eyes were closed..."
(Feng Shui)

Introduction

Today, medical imaging is regarded as one the most advanced and theoretically challenging research fields, constantly modifying and improving medical diagnostics. On the other hand, it became the new "hot spot" for different scientific approaches to meet embracing investigations from cognitive sciences as well as new clinical applications¹⁰⁶. E. Husserl, in turn, designed phenomenology as the quest concerning the basis of any kind of knowledge (*Wissenschaft*) or, as Nicolas De Warren puts it, "how experience is at all "thinkable"¹⁰⁷, while facing the question of application phenomenology to other fields of research. Thus, phenomenology as the discipline investigating and describing various involvements (intentional acts) of consciousness (in its passive and active modalities) in constituting any kind of experience (theoretical, aesthetical, affective, volitional, etc.) had spread all over a number of disciplines, be it humane, social or in a smaller degree natural ones¹⁰⁸,

Medicine, though rather late, also did received phenomenological inputs, but usually those were concerned with the "humane" od medical matters, be it existential hermeneutics of decease (M. Heidegger, H. G. Gadamer) or various forms of existential therapy (V. Frankl, M. Boss, L. Binswanger)¹⁰⁹. This means that *empirical methods* of medical diagnostics based on imaging were left without any attention, while transcendental

¹⁰⁶ See in this regard Marcum, J. A. *Humanizing Modern Medicine. An Introductory Philosophy of Medicine* (Vol. 99). Springer, 2008.

¹⁰⁷ Warren, N. *Husserl and the Promise of Time: Subjectivity in Transcendental Phenomenology*. Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 11.

¹⁰⁸ See in this regard Thompson, E. *Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind*. Harvard University Press, 2007; Varela, F. J., Thompson E. and Rosch, E. *The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience*. The MIT Press, 1991.

¹⁰⁹ See in this regard Spiegelberg, H. *Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry; a Historical Introduction*. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1972.

findings of phenomenology were gradually overshadowed by the expansion of psychological and neurological methods¹¹⁰. Thus, our major point of departure concerning this investigation is a deep dissatisfaction with this one-sided reception of medicine in phenomenology, which missed the specificity of medical imaging and the role of the consciousness of radiologist completely¹¹¹. Husserlian approach, in turn, grants very rich analysis of noematic structures (*Noematische Sinn*) involved in the constitution of diagnostic acts, while determining particular satisfaction conditions for an intentional “object” of those acts to be identified as such and such (for example, “cancerous tumor”), which *evidences* if the diagnosis inherent in the judgmental act is veridical¹¹².

Intentional Analysis of Medical Imaging

Without Husserlian phenomenology it is hard to imagine how the very complexity of the realm of cognition, out of which diagnostic judgment emerges, could be uncovered¹¹³. One of the basic and all permeating features of this complexity is the dialectics between endless modalities of presence and absence in the constitution of all kinds of experience: “For Husserl, phenomenology has the task of tracing the essential interconnections of fulfillment among acts, reflecting on the interplay between presence and absence in intentional experience as a whole.”¹¹⁴ On the other

¹¹⁰ See in this regard Kornienko, V. N., Pronin, I. N. *Diagnostic Neuroradiology*. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2009; Price, D. D., Barrell, J. J. *Inner Experience and Neuroscience: Merging Both Perspectives*. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2012.

¹¹¹ Thus, though practical aim of this investigation is to improve differential diagnosis, but differently form physicians relying on their *intuition*, which in turn rests on average statistics of medical history analysis and physical examination tests results, we suggest that phenomenological analysis enables construction of more sophisticated imaging and eventually richer image analysis. This also reminds us the totally different connotations of the word “intuition” in the use of contemporary medicine and classical phenomenology.

¹¹² “Evidence” in Husserlian phenomenology is the act of experience, when the experiential articulation grasps thing as given. “Intuition” then marks experience of facts and, thus, opposes harsh Kantian constructivism (of the world). See in this regard Levin, D. M. *Reason and Evidence in Husserl’s Phenomenology*. Northwestern University Press, 1970.

¹¹³ See in this regard Geniusas, S. The Tremulous Grounds of Judgment: Husserl’s Discovery of the World-Horizon, in *Urteil und Fehlurteil*. S. Loidolt and S. Lehmann (Eds.). Vienna: Turia und Kant, 2011.

¹¹⁴ Crowell, S. G. Husserlian Phenomenology, in *A Companion to Phenomenology and Existentialism*. Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2006, p. 15.

hand, natural sciences (and relevant empirical methods) by the way of their attitude¹¹⁵ always were determined by the presence of the *posited* being. This means that CAD is bound to and is construed according to the generalities of *natural attitude* and operates according to the “first”, “natural” level of experience – *presence*¹¹⁶, which just means that it scans pixels of image without correlating this data with any other mode of givenness and thus is strictly limited¹¹⁷.

Soon after turning his attention to constitutive significance of directly non-present elements, Husserl was forced to distinct between several conceptions of *Imagination*, i.e. *Physical*, *Pictorial* or *Image consciousness* and *Phantasie*¹¹⁸. Because primal interest of this article lies in media as medical images, we will turn our attention to (physical) *Image consciousness* (*Bildbewusstsein*) because though both types of Imaging consciousness present an absent object “as if” it was actual, i.e., presentifies it (*Vergegenwärtigung*), the Image consciousness does so on the basis of perception (physical *hyle* of the image). However, we must not forget that crucial for any theoretical enterprise neutrality modification is performed by *Phantasie*, thus, bring-

¹¹⁵ “Natural attitude” in Husserlian phenomenology essentially designates *thetic belief*, which means taking world’s (including subjects-object dichotomy) *actuality* for granted. Another basic feature of this naïve, not articulated, yet intelligible, sphere is explanations based on causal relations between things.

¹¹⁶ It is true that usually you can apprehend just one aspect of the object at a time, unless you are a cubist, as Solomon nicely puts it paraphrasing F. Nietzsche. Jean Gubser, in turn, points out interesting moment in the history of art, when P. Picasso depicts time as painting all aspect of human body as appearing at once (see in this regard Gebser, J. *The Ever-Present Origin*. Trans. Noel Barstad with Algis Mickunas. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1991). We think this is a perfect example of artistic genius showing how space and time is available for perception only in present (whole) via endless presentations (“additional” temporal, spatial and thematic moments, which are meaningfully related to the primal impression of the “now” moment). This, in turn, raises the major question of whether can we “equip” CAD with such temporal depth?

¹¹⁷ Today, there is no general agreement between physicians concerning the utility of CAD. Proponents stress the future of image based technologies saving human resources and expanding detection of cancerous cases, while opponents point to a very low efficiency rate and high costs of exploitation. But the main disagreements concern the distinction between two basic criteria applied to CAD’s operations – *sensitivity* and *specificity*. *Sensitivity* measures the proportion of actual positives, which are correctly identified as such (e.g. the percentage of sick people who are correctly identified as having the condition). *Specificity* measures the proportion of negatives, which are correctly identified (e.g. the percentage of healthy people, who are correctly identified as not having the condition).

¹¹⁸ See in this regard Husserl, E. *Collected Works. Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory (1898-1925)*. Trans. John B. Brough. Springer, 2005.

ing two structurally different types of Image consciousness relatively close due to inspection of any concrete judgment:

“Likewise, we have actuality and inactuality within the sphere of impressional intuitions. The actuality then consists in the impressional intuiting pure and simple in its doxic modes — in certainty, doubt, deeming possible, nullity, and so on. The inactuality consists in the analogue of pure phantasy (and amounts to a *concept of imagination*, inasmuch as mere imagining expresses precisely the *neutralizing of actuality*). Hence all aesthetic image-consciousness (image-object consciousness) belongs here, insofar as pure image-contemplation is carried out.

Now every judgment has its inactuality modification. Actuality amounts to a concept of *originarity*.⁸¹ Judgment in the originary and proper sense is the actual act of judgment. Its inactual modification is the mere thinking of “S is P.” I can also do this when I have a conviction about something, but only in the following form: I extricate myself from actual engagement; I push the judgment back and establish mere thought on the basis of the same content.”¹¹⁹

Physical Imagination structures the apprehension of an image, but the intentionality of this image apprehension structuring is complex because here the subject is aware not only of the *sensible substrate* (which awakens the image in a perceptual moment¹²⁰), but also of the immanent distinction between *image-object* (what appears when we gaze at the picture) and the *subject of the image* (actual or ideal state of affairs – in the case of medical imaging – particular state of organs or bodily functions).

What is essential here is that the image serves as a trigger for the imaginative acts provoking the whole set of act-quality possibilities or *empty intentions*, thus, centering the general structure of the so-called *Consciousness of fulfillment*. “This emptiness is not, however, a sheer blank; rather, the content of the perceptual act prescribes certain possible fulfillings.”¹²¹ Simultaneous

¹¹⁹ Elliott, B. *Phenomenology and Imagination in Husserl and Heidegger*. London and New York: Routledge, p. 436.

¹²⁰ The affection that occurs in the *impressional moment* of the living present awakens retained intentional contents having an affinity to those in the impressional moment. Awakening (*Weckung*) makes these contents available, informing one’s present sense of the object by past experiences.

¹²¹ Crowell, S. G. Husserlian Phenomenology, in *A Companion to Phenomenology and Existentialism*. Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2006, p. 15.

presentifications (aspects of the same object or spatially and thematically related objects appearing “as if” present in actual state), which end up with fulfillment or disappointment, provoke further series of anticipations (passive, nonthematic noematic units) and expectations (noemas, which are determined by active ego involvement). For example, when radiologist asserts that “this part of tissue is cancerous”, the content of his/her assertion is presented in an empty or merely *signitive* mode (*Leervorstellung*). Eventually, the diagnostic task is launched while expecting for the moment in experience, when intuition fulfills the meaning of the assertion and the same “cancerous part” of that particular tissue would be given intuitively (evidently fulfilled).

This anticipatory structuring has been going on unnoticed too long in cognitive investigations. Further parts of the article will be guided by the question of what the noematic structure is, which should be the “object” of intuition and the *telos* of fulfillment in medical judgment?

Constitutional Analysis of Diagnostic Judgment

Judgment (*Urteil*) is one of the favorite Husserl’s examples of *active synthesis*¹²². This kind of intentional act is at once aimed at the *categorical object* (*Sachverhalte*), i. e. particular situation or state of affairs (in our case, organs or bodily functions) and structured according to one or another categorical form (constitutional relations, such as “in”, “under”, “and”, “near”, “one”, “many”, “if”, “not”, “some”, etc.): “Articulation of its perceptual content is the *telos* of judgment, the measure of its success or failure”¹²³.

Husserl took a big effort to understand this kind of articulation¹²⁴. Let’s take one example from medical imaging (breast x-ray – mammogram) and see how intentions directed to the depicted state of affairs (structured by several categorical forms) and contained in expression “*one mass in the center of the breast is a tumor and it is cancerous*” can be fulfilled (or disappointed) (Figure 1).

¹²² In the wake of I. Kant, Husserl distinguishes between the understanding of “judgment” as *Urteil* (a kind of “cognition”) and *Satz* (“proposition”). This “double character” of judgment that is its ontological factuality of categorical form and logical factuality of proposition must be acknowledged. However, only through phenomenological reflection we can identify logical meaning (*Bedeutung*) also as a phenomenological sense (*Sinn*).

¹²³ In phenomenology, neither objective temporality, nor causality cannot explain relations like this – their genesis has its own logic guided by noematic structure, thus, this is sense-based relation and not the causal one.

¹²⁴ Due to intentional acts, such as a lie, hallucination or illusion, the content of my judgment could be presented in a merely signitive way as empty presentation quite unreflectively.




Figure 1. Left breast mammogram. A spiculated tumor in the centre of the breast is a cancer.

For Husserl, the most important structural feature of *categorial intuition* is that differently from *simple sense intuition*, it is founded and it is founded mostly upon the simple perceptions (sense intuitions), such as geometrical shapes of a mass, and upon related depending moments, such as edges and density. The founding relation (*Fundierung*) also means that categorial intuition comes into appearance via several intertwined stages: at first, we apprehend the categorial object (“this particular mass in the center of the breast looks like a cancerous tumor”) in one undifferentiated glance becoming aware of the wholeness of the situation. The parts of this *Sachverhalte* are also intended, but only implicitly. Secondly, the object comes into intuition in an explicit manner, now focusing attention on its parts¹²⁵. This kind of partial objectivation is called by Husserl *subdividing act* (*Gliedernde Akte*), in virtue of which the same “object” (“tumor” with all its predicates) becomes intended through the medium of color, shape, density, etc. Thus, our interest is redirected to the sense contents, in which the situation is disclosed through the elements, which present categorial object one “after” the other. Finally, those two already mentioned stages of categorial objectivation become unified in a categorial object as it is given.

¹²⁵ For this step, Husserl introduces the necessary intentional operation – destruction (*Abbau*) of the categorial object in order that foundational moments of sense could be disclosed.

This transition from unstructured whole to partial intentions and back is governed by the *synthesis of coincidence* (as one modality of passive synthesis besides association¹²⁶), which “gives” the object in such manner that we are aware both that this same object has a shape or density in general and this kind of shape and density in particular. Also, this shows the *function* of sensuality in the framework of categorial intuition, i.e. to fulfill the founding intentions and present object as real, actual, thus, presupposing *adequate* judgment¹²⁷. But if categorial intuition, as it were, finally does not rest on simple intentions, but, in turn, on this very synthetic activity, what is this non-sensible content, which full-files categorial intuition?

If the objects of founding acts are synthetically placed into a categorial form, fulfillment for categorial intuition asks more than perception. Here, intuition can be interpreted as the second decisive break with the “natural” sphere after the fundamental conception of *Intentionality*. According to Lohmar, “the shift from unstructured perception to the subdivided perception is “double apperception”, because two different perceptions happened on the basis of the same content, different mode of the same object”¹²⁸. Thus, the content of intuitivity appears to be the very act of coincidence of the intentional moments. That means that *synthesis of coincidence* is responsible for two epistemologically decisive functions, because it enables to intuite categorial forms¹²⁹, and, secondly, though it’s “content” is given to us passively, afterwards we are able reflectively to split it into partial intentions of the “object” (situation structured according to one or another categorial form). Thus, not just the structure, but also the content differ categorial acts from simple ones.

Of the biggest importance for our topic is the fact that if fulfillment of categorial intentions depended only on sensual intuitivity of the founding acts, then some regions of knowledge, for example, axioms of mathematics,

¹²⁶ *Association* also serves as unification of the intentional content of different experiences in order to passively give identical objectivity.

¹²⁷ Contrary to correspondence theory of truth, where adequacy of ideas and things themselves was postulated, Husserl understands *adequation* as experience fulfilling sense experience – laying hyletic data over on “previously” intended meaning, like geometric figures sometimes coincide. This operation, in turn, enables to concentrate *attention* on the particular moment of subdivided act (color, shape, density, etc.), not the whole categorial thing.

¹²⁸ Lohmar, D. *Categorial Intuition*, in *A Companion to Phenomenology and Existentialism*. Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2006, p. 115.

¹²⁹ Another form of categorial intuition is *collection*, where synthetic intuition of an “and” relation (relating items even from different ontological “regions”) performs a fulfillment.

would not express evident knowledge, because their contents dwell via signitive intentions (intentions composed by systems of signs, but not by sensual fulfillment)¹³⁰.

Finally, we are ready to point out some suggestions based on phenomenological method to improve CAD's software¹³¹. All of them are structured according to Husserl notion of the *Consciousness of Fulfillment* and exhibit the dialectics between empty intentions and categorial fulfillments. Though some of them are more relevant for the improvement of CAD's application in medical imaging, others can be used in modifying modalities of medical imaging itself¹³².

Suggestions for Application

According to Husserl's epistemology of evidence, in any of its "case" (intentional act), reason via empty intending strives for evidence of the sort achieved in categorial intuition, in which judgments become confirmed or disconfirmed. This means that in order to widen usual horizon of possible diagnosis we must input into CAD's algorithms more specific, contextual features or empty intentions, which, in turn, would demand for the relevant conditions of fulfillment.

Question may arise what in the case of computer software should be the content of simple sense intuitions, which must fund categorial tasks? Husserl makes clear that empty intentions formulated as signitive tasks can be fulfilled by signs¹³³. Signs combine the expression, which, in turn, is constituted by objectifying or *significative intention*, which discloses the sense of an object in an expressible manner. According to Husserl, everything is expressible, which makes sense, thus, anything intentionally presented can be translated into the meaning of an expression. *Significative intention* constitutes the signification that founds the expression. This signification, in turn, is transformed into the determination of a sensuous sign in a signitive intention, as

¹³⁰ One exception could be Husserl's analysis of "authentic counting" (*Eigentlich* in its descriptive and not normative sense), using perceptual objects while teaching kids counting.

¹³¹ This, of course, must be translated into algorithmic language. James Mensch gives one example of *protention* turned into algorithm (Mensch, J., 2010, p. 65).

¹³² See in this regard Suetens, P. *Fundamentals of Medical Imaging*. Cambridge University Press, 2009.

¹³³ See in this regard Lohmar, D. *Categorial Intuition*, in *A Companion to Phenomenology and Existentialism*. Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2006.

the backbone of the expression. Thus, the meaning “gives” the object precisely as it was intended, and the object is the identity given in that meaning that discloses the object to us with all its significance. In short, the expression finally refers to the object precisely in the same manner as it is experienced.

Thus, empty intention can take a form of an image or command expressed in language, which in both cases can be translated into the realm of signs. On the other hand, we must take into account recent developments in other disciplines relevant to our investigation:

“Another project takes up directly from Husserl, and attempts to enroll the tools of contemporary mathematical physics to show that Husserl’s objections to the naturalization of eidetic contents were based on an outdated stage of scientific development, and that physics has now the means to detect the objective morphological structures in the natural processes subtending perception which alone can be put in correspondence with the eidetic contents. The optic flux is not an amorphous sheaf of energy; it possesses enough structure to allow the visual system to “interpret” the “sense data,” and today’s mathematical physics can provide an objective account of this interpretative process.”¹³⁴

To put it differently, if we translated the dependent moments (qualities, such as color or density) of categorial objects into relations between signs, we could form an analogy for sense intuition and appresentations, which accompany perception by the way of modeling significative intentions (disclosures of an objective sense of the relevant for medical diagnostics object) as a guiding vector for specific categorial tasks presupposing relevant anticipatory structuring. Here are four different examples showing how intentional analysis can be applied to the improvement of CAD’s performances. All of them are the instances of *consciousness of fulfillment*, but differ in relation to their “dominant” intentional acts and corresponding anticipation horizons. Thus, those four structures are both separated and intertwined:

• 1) Eidetic intuition

We start from the most celebrated example of Husserl’s *consciousness of fulfillment*, i.e. eidetic intuition (*Wesensschau*). Eidetic intuition and its

¹³⁴ Andler, D. Phenomenology in Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science, in *A Companion to Phenomenology and Existentialism*. Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2006, p. 390.

use via method of eidetic variation enable to “extract” the essential features of the particular phenomenon. First of all, eidetic intuition is not possible without the stage of splitting subdividing acts because we can get the ideal of color just running through the series of, for example, blue objects in perception or phantasy. Factual is suspended while freely varying one unit until the limits of its variability are reached. And vice versa, while knowing specific features in advance, we can detect them in casual formations and patterns. For example, systematically varying the idea of concrete shape, edges, shade or color, we recognize that there is a certain limit (facture, brightness, etc.), which would prevent us from continuing to identify particular feature as such. After eidetic variation, *identifying synthesis* or *recognition* can unify the object into a class and identify an empirical species (low density) or ideal singular (the square)¹³⁵ (Figure 2).




Figure 2. Schematic picture of radiologically detected masses. The suspicion of malignancy grows with irregular and spiculated margins of masses.

Task: Make explicit subdividing acts of a given categorial object and investigate them separately in order to relate general names (empty intentions) to specific unities (watch for the fulfillment of an empty intention by eidetic variation).

Anticipation structuring: Geometrical forms, lines, shades, density, edges (Figure 3).

¹³⁵ *Identification* is defined by Husserl as *Recognition (das Erkennen)*, meaning the appropriate form of fulfillment for objectifying acts. *Recognition* arises when meaning intention bases itself on intuition and thereby is related to an object. Actually, this brings Husserl’s vocabulary right into the realm of cognitive investigations, where various types of *Agnosia* are defined as fundamental lack of the experience of recognition (when we perceive an object but cannot relate it to other units of experience or ascribe particular use to it) are discussed. See in this regard Carter, R. *Mapping the Mind*. A Phoenix Paperback, 2010.




Figure 3 a) b). Right breast mammograms. Figure 3 a) portrays a spiculated mass – a cancer. Figure 3 b) portrays a well circumscribed mass in the breast representing a benign mass

• 2) **Categorial forms**

Task: Look for a particular categorial *relation* – “in”, “under”, “and”, “near”, “one”, “many”, “if”, “not”, “some”, which would determine the context of inter-relation between relevant organs and bodily processes (Figure 4).




Figure 4 a) b). a) Echogram on the left. A hypoechoic mass (suspicious for malignancy) in the centre of the picture. Without visualization of nearby structures and organs, it is impossible to localise the lesion. b) Abdominal CT image of the same patient on the right. A mass (small cancer nodule) in the anterior wall of the stomach that is easily localized because of the clear visualization of adjacent organs and structures.

Anticipation structuring: Abnormal changes peculiar to a certain subordination between organs and/or bodily processes.

• 3) **Image-consciousness**

Task: Appresent (expression, for example, name can bring the object to mind, which is absent in person) and compare a depicted image (image object) of the particular organ to ideal (normal or abnormal) state of the same organ (imaged object) (Figure 5).



Figure 5. Lumbar spine lateral X-ray picture. Compression fractures of lumbar 2 and thoracic 12 vertebra. Comparing with other, healthy normal vertebra, compressed ones are easier identified as not normal.

Anticipation structuring: Presentation of typical for some particular organ normal or abnormal modalities and comparison with the given one (presented) while anticipating “lay over”¹³⁶.

¹³⁶ Congruence (*Deckung*) as the relationship between an empty intention and fulfilling intention can be illustrated as such “lay over” between two geometrically congruent figures.

• 4) Adumbration (*Abschattung*)

The object is always perceived in a certain spatial perspective, under a certain aspect or shading – these are adumbrations or partial disclosures of the object¹³⁷.

Task: Compare a particular image of the inspected organ form a certain angle with expected normal or abnormal states in a manifold of adumbrations.




Figure 6 a) b) c). a) Chest X-ray picture with no obvious signs of lung disease. b) Chest CT of the same patient. A small mass can be diagnosed in the right lung interlobar pleura that could be identified only on axial CT images. c) CT of the same patient, volume rendering software program shows a mass separate from other structures, vessels that could be a malignant.

Anticipation structuring: Anticipate the state of organ or tissue, which would be normal or abnormal for that particular aspect, angle or

¹³⁷ *Noema* of perceiving organ adumbrates the hidden back side of it as a necessary part of this particular noematic structure and not by following any causal determination. It must be noted that the latest method of Digital Tomosynthesis in diagnostics can be very useful here, though it still has no application in CAD.

perspective. Compare different angles of the same organ, looking for the most accurate for the diagnostic decision (Figure 6).

The expected result of these diagnostic processes is *judgment*. For Husserl, judgment also exhibits complex structure. The first level of judgment is *experiential*, i.e. *subject is constitutionally* involved or related to the state of affairs judged. It is the apprehension of something (*Sachverhalte*) as something (“Tumor is cancerous” means to apprehend this tumor *as* cancerous). Only on the basis of such judgment as *experience* (fulfillment or disappointment) we can build “propositional judgment”, which would carry the propositional meaning expressing the state of affairs, fulfilling proposition as a noematic sense of a judging act¹³⁸.

We are looking forward to extend this investigation further, keeping in mind that appearances of cancer are evolving. On the other hand, perhaps one day we will ask what new ways of cancer detection can we expect to get from CAD itself.

Conclusions

- Husserl’s general analysis of the role of Categorical intuition and imagination play in the constitution of noematic horizon for the intentional act of judgment appears to be highly relevant for “regional” instances of knowledge, such as medicine, and for a specific categorical “objects” as objects of diagnostic judgments.
- Due to multidimensional mediation of *Pictorial image-consciousness* image awakens empty intention directed at the *categorical object*, which, in case of veridical judgment, must be fulfilled by *synthesis of coincidence*, using sense intuition of depending moments. Every new fulfillment (or disappointment) enrolls certain horizon of judgmental possibilities in the form of anticipations (empty intentions).
- This model can serve for the improvement of CAD’s software, in which case the role of input (empty intention) can be ascribed to *Signitive intention* – name, proposition or image, which refers, recalls,

¹³⁸ Here, Husserl uses Aristotelian term *Apophansis*. “Apophantic domain” is disclosed in an act of reflection, as different from the “just intending” of the state of affairs of which I judge. The *motive* of such reflection is that the truth (evidence base) of the assertion is called into question, therefore, the apophantic domain arises only when we have an operative interest in truth.

associates, compares and anticipates the patterns of tissue, mass, organ or state of organs according to particular categorial context of inner-body space.

- We suggest four models for a better detection and diagnosis of cancerous patterns via medical imaging. Each of them is based on different principle of noematic structuring (i. e., Eidetic intuition, Categorial forms, Image-consciousness and Adumbrational character of experience), but all express the basic principle of Husserl's *epistemology of Evidence*, that is correlation of empty significations with judgmental fulfillments.

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CHAPTER IX

Toward the Ethical Difference: E. Levinas

Introduction

The history of difference, separation, distinction, and the like, though subordinate to the primary history of identity, has a very long tradition in various forms in Western thought. In Western philosophical history, many thinkers were grappling with differences of one kind or another, trying to systematize their thinking and make order of the real. Despite these efforts, it is clear that *difference* itself had not become an explicit problem of philosophy. As long as difference is presented as a quality or as an opposition of components, then the differing of difference, the meaning of difference, or the way difference is given, is not truly thought.

The problem of difference was first explicitly formulated in Martin Heidegger's philosophy. To think difference in Heidegger is to concentrate upon ontological difference, the difference between Being [*Sein*] and entities [*Seiendes*]. In Heidegger's magnum opus *Being and Time* (Heidegger, 1977), ontological difference can be seen as the perspective of his thinking. The problem of ontological difference in this text is not yet explicitly or fully formulated, but problems are analyzed having this difference in mind. In lectures from his Marburg period, published posthumously under the title *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (Heidegger, 1988), Heidegger pays a lot of attention to ontological difference, naming and analyzing it, although it still remains not yet fully explicit and its relation to metaphysics is more presupposed than explained. The problem of ontological difference is explicated in later texts by Heidegger, after his well-known "Turn". In relation to the mission of philosophy, Heidegger makes clear that it is the ontological difference that makes possible or enables philosophy itself understood as the science of being and the possibility of raising the question of being. Heidegger accuses metaphysics for forgetting the question of being and questioning only entities and only about them. Though all metaphysical problems have been formulated by trying to explain or define being and, in this sense, were aware of the problem of being, they did so from the essentially inadequate point of view of a metaphysics of entities. For Hei-

degger, claiming that metaphysics had forgotten being means that it forgot ontological difference. To think being is the same as thinking ontological difference. Thinking of difference between being and entities in Heidegger's philosophy finally leads to the "principle" of difference itself.

In post-Heideggerian philosophy, it is obvious that the thinking of difference does not always mean an explication of or even attentiveness to ontological difference. In Emmanuel Levinas's philosophy, we find an alternative to ontological difference and one, which remains in critical dialogue with it. Even if at first it may seem that difference introduced by Levinas is overturning of ontological difference, it is, however, neither a repetition of the ontological difference, nor a reformulation of it, but while perfectly aware of it, a radical alternative. Levinas does not avoid ontological difference, but deals "inside" of it: by overturning it, changing the place of the difference, going beyond it and finally introducing a radical alternative to Heideggerian difference. Levinas's thought represents a shift away from the centrality of *ontological* difference to the priority of *ethical* difference. In his own way, then, Levinas returns to transcendence and metaphysics, but without falling prey to the sorts of criticisms raised by Heidegger.

Levinas, along with Heidegger, is considered one of the main critics of the Western philosophical tradition. In some way, Levinas's philosophy emerges from a Heideggerian context and a discussion with Heidegger's philosophy remains evident in most of Levinas writings. In interview with Richard Kearney, Levinas claimed that Heidegger's philosophy was a shock for him, that "one cannot seriously philosophize today without traversing the Heideggerian path in some form or other" (Levinas & Kearney, 1986: 15). In Heidegger's philosophy, Levinas sees the fulfillment of the entire Western philosophical tradition and, in most cases, critique of the philosophical tradition today means a critique of Heideggerian ontology. Levinas's main concern is not late Heidegger's philosophy, but *Being and Time* and his critique of it is explicitly developed even in his earliest two books, *Existence and Existents* and *Time and the Other*.

Levinas is attentive to the Heideggerian notion of philosophy, where the basic problem of philosophy is the question of being, the non-representational thinking of being and the notion of ontological difference. In one of his earliest texts "*On escape*", Levinas renews, as he claims, "the ancient problem of being qua being" (Levinas, 2003: 56). So, we could see that here

he, following Heidegger, turns back to the question of being as well taking into account Heideggerian discovery of ontological difference. Levinas underlines in Heidegger's philosophy two most important moments: the difference of being and entities, and the verblatity of being. In *Time and the Other*, Levinas points out that it is ontological difference which for him is the most profound thing about *Being and Time* (Levinas, 2005: 44-45). According to Theo De Boer, Levinas considers ontological difference "to be the rock-bottom of Heidegger's philosophy and embraces it as the starting point for his own thought" (De Boer, 1997: 116). Jacques Rolland in his commentaries for the article "*On Escape*" notices that "virtually all of Levinas's books begin by recalling, in various forms, the ontological difference" (Rolland, 2003: 99).

However, even if Levinas is attentive to the Heideggerian difference between *Sein* and *Seindes* as well as to the verblatity of being, he is no way Heideggerian. Levinas, like Heidegger, asks about being, but his question leads to a very different direction. Levinas is attentive to the question of being not because of a nostalgia and not because he is attached to being, but rather because he shows the necessity of *escaping from it*, which necessity comes not from a lack of being, but from another surplus, a non-ontological surplus. If philosophy is more than the raising of the question of being, and no one except Heidegger has really ordered that it cannot be, it need not, then, restrict itself to answering the question of being, but may go beyond it. In fact, in one sense, escape from or going beyond being, which Levinas names "separation" from being, is how the subject or existent emerges. For Heidegger, the problem of difference is discussed for the purpose of a care for being, to go from forgetfulness to answering the question of being, while for Levinas, to the contrary, one must first move from anonymous being to even begin to grasp the significance of entities, and most especially, to the "hypostasis" of the separate or independent subject. In contrast to Heidegger's thought, which is always a return (or, in truth, the never successful attempt to return) to the "always already" givenness of ontological difference, Levinas's thought engages the emergence and novelty of meaning in terms of the emergence and nobility of human being. So, even if we can claim that the problem of the difference brings these two thinkers together, at the same time it separates them. No less important, even when Levinas leaves "the climate of Heideggerian philosophy", he does not revert to pre-Heideggerian philosophy either (Levinas, 2001: 4).

Escaping Ontological Difference

The direction of Levinas's philosophy is to find meaning beyond ontological difference. Meaning beyond ontological difference is meaning beyond being. This attempt retrospectively can be seen in Levinas early writings as well as in his magnum opus *Totality and Infinity* and, finally, it is achieved in his book *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*. Here, he not only underlines the necessity to escape the being, but as well shows the way how it can be achieved.

According to Levinas, all Western philosophy, including Heidegger, did not sufficiently put into question the very fact of being. The fact that there is being was absolutely sufficient, a starting point as well as an ending point. "Western philosophy struggled for a better being, for a harmony between us and the world, or for the perfection of our own being" (Levinas, 2003: 51). Metaphysics from Parmenides and Plato was oriented toward ideal being and, as Levinas claims, "the insufficiency of the human condition has never been understood otherwise than as a limitation of being, without our ever having envisaged the meaning of 'finite being'" (Levinas, 2003: 51). Levinas's approach to the question of being is from the "other side". From the question of being, from the meaning of being, from the ontological difference, Levinas moves to the meaning of the concretely human. The meaning of philosophy for him is to search and discover the meaning of transcendence through ethics, to find the deepest meaning in the encounter with the other human being rather than in the meaning of the existence/being itself. For Levinas, this search for meaning is the way how Athens and Jerusalem, philosophy and Bible meet: "in both cases we are talking about meaning, about the emergence of meaning: would it be what Greeks called *ground*, or what is in Bible shown as relation with the neighbor" (Levinas & Guwy, 2007: 123).

If in his earliest texts "*On Escape*" *Existence and Existents* Levinas shows the possibility to escape from being as *il y a* and being as *existence*, while in the book *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence* Levinas deals with the being as *essence*: "the term *essence* here expresses *being* different from *beings*, the German *Sein* distinguished from *Seiendes*, the Latin *esse* distinguished from Scholastic *ens*" (Levinas, 2008: xlvii). For Jean Luc Marion, such definition of an *essence* names "brutal modification of the usual acceptation of the

term *essence*” (Marion, 2005: 314). Levinas underlines that being as *essence* is exactly the being of the Heideggerian distinction, i.e. being of ontological difference. It is “an abstract noun of action for being as distinguished from entities in the amphibology of being and entities” (Levinas, 2008: 194n7). Asking what we mean by saying “being” Levinas points out that the word itself is not unequivocal: “Is it noun or verb? Does the word being designate an entity, ideal or real, that is, or this entity’s *process of being*, its *essence*?” (Levinas, 2008: 23). However, even if together with Heidegger we try to see it is as a verb, it is always a noun as it is always “fixed”. The answer to the question “what is being” “is from the start in terms of being, whether one understands by it *entity* or *being of entities*, entity or being’s *essence*” (Levinas, 2008: 23). Here, Levinas deals not only with problem of language by introducing the difference between “saying” and the “said”. More important is that he shows that the question of being, *Seinsfrage*, for him is not a fundamental question of philosophy, but rather the question, which from the very beginning leaves no escape from the Western logic of ontology, where no novelty or adventure is possible. “If the question “what?” in its adherence to being is at the origin of all thought <...>, all research and all philosophy go back to ontology, to the understanding of the being of entities, the understanding of essence. Being would be not only what is most problematical; it would be what is most intelligible” (Levinas, 2008: 24).

So, even if the distinction of being and entities, the “amphibology of being and entities” for Levinas is important, it is not final and basic for his thought. For him, ontological difference repeats the same ontological logic of being, “belongs on the same plane as being” (Levinas, 2008: 23). So, Levinas attempt to go beyond being as well means going beyond ontological difference.

Good beyond Being

Levinas’s direction beyond being leads not to overturning or denial of the ontological difference, but beyond the very logic of it. In Levinas’s philosophy, “otherwise than being”, beyond ontological difference, is the *good beyond being*, *epekeina tes ousias* (Levinas, 2008: 95). For Levinas, otherwise than being is not an opposition to being (which would be the nothing), but the very *otherwise*. Negativity and the nothing for him belong to the same logic of being and as such it would not introduce an irreducible *otherwise*.

Even if in the Greek philosophical tradition Levinas sees the fundamental aim to reach unity, for him more important is the transcendence of the platonic idea of the good. Especially in *Totality and Infinity*, Levinas follows Plato and thinks beyond the totality of entities, thinks, that is to say, the good beyond being. For Heidegger as well Plato's idea of the good beyond being is important, but as Levinas points out, for Heidegger it is interpreted as being beyond entities (Levinas, 2007: 46-47). In *Totality and Infinity*, Levinas reminds us that Platonism in its different forms had an essential meaning for Western philosophical tradition. Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus were searching for "good beyond being". In the *Republic*, Plato tells that "not only being known is present in the things known as a consequence of the good, but also existence and being are in them besides as a result of it, although the good isn't being but is still beyond being, exceeding it in dignity and power" (Plato, 1968: 509b). Even if for Levinas, as for Plato, good is beyond being, Levinas rejects the *idea* of platonic good, while he adopts the platonic *beyond*. The platonic idea of the good is too abstract, too disembodied, one might say, while Levinas's conception of the beyond, transcendence, is concrete: goodness comes to the subject from the face of the other person. For Levinas, good is a moral term, moral in the sense of ethics, while for Plato moral good is just one of many characteristics of the form of the good, which is also beautiful, and true. For Levinas, good "is" not equivalent to or structured like being or essence. It is not denying of essence (or being, as Levinas in his later works shows that for Heidegger being is essence), but *dés-intéressement*, dis-interestedness, or *autrement qu'être*, otherwise than being, because it is being for the other (Levinas, 2008: 50). "[T]he exception of the 'other than being', beyond not-being, signifies subjectivity or humanity, the *oneself* which repels the annexations by essence" (Levinas, 2008: 8). For Levinas, otherwise than being is oneself free from the anonymity of being, from its indifference and entirely ontological responsibility as well as from its aesthetic play, which we can recognize in later Heidegger's philosophy.

Otherwise in Levinas philosophy introduces not a new ontology, but being-for-the-other, that is to say, goodness itself, which from the very beginning is always *moral* and not an abstract idea of the good. "To reduce the good to being, to its calculations and its history, is to nullify goodness" (Levinas, 2008: 18). Being for the other is ethical difference.

In the text “*The Trace of the Other*”, Levinas distinguishes two types of transcendence. The first is described by immanence, while the second, “transcendence of the second degree”, is transcendence of the Good (Levinas, 1986: 347). Good beyond being is neither idea, nor essence, but *beyond* in the sense of *better* (Levinas, 2006: 275). For Levinas, beyond [*au-delà*] is not another world beyond this world, but an irreducible transcendence, irreducible because moral (Levinas, 2006: 275). Good beyond being points to infinity, when “Heideggerian philosophy precisely marks the apogee of a thought in which the finite does not refer to the infinite” (Levinas, 1987: 52).

For Levinas, in contrast to Heidegger, the question of being is discussed not in a positive, but rather in a negative or critical way. He seeks to leave being understood as universality (Aristotle), and being understood as ground (Heidegger). For him, philosophy as ontology “is reduction of the other to the same” (Levinas, 2007: 43). Levinas seeks to go beyond one of the basic problems of the Western thought, the problem of ground. *Grundfrage* is considered as the fundamental question of philosophy from Leibniz to Heidegger. The question *Why there is something rather than nothing?* – what is the purpose, as it were, or the meaning of being to be? – emphasizes being as the main and only concern of Western metaphysics (Heidegger, 1998: 2), (Heidegger, 1995: 7). In addition, this question allows Heidegger to raise the problem of the ground seen as being itself (Heidegger, 1965: 92), and at the same time presupposes the real possibility of nothingness and alternative of the nothing and raised the question of the sufficient ground. Levinas already in his early writings under influence of Henri Bergson denied the real possibility of the nothingness. By rejecting the seriousness and importance of the possibility of the nothingness, the question of the ground as well loses its central importance. As Richard A. Cohen writes in his book *Levinasian Meditations*, Levinas exceeds this “the most philosophical of all oppositions, indeed the opposition that originally gave rise to philosophy and defined its parameters of thinking and being” (Cohen, 2010: 111). Levinas’s question is not “to be or not to be”, but an ethical question. He asks not why there is something rather than nothing, but why I should not commit a murder, do I have the *right to be*? That is questioning oneself and as well moving from the question of ground to the issue or really the moral imperatives of responsible being. It leads us from the priority of freedom to the priority of responsibility, from the true to the good. The

subject does not seek to be free – and for Heidegger the “essence of truth” is “freedom” – but to be responsible, responsible for others. Levinas affirms that the first question is not the *Grundfrage*, but *Why I do not kill* (Levinas, 1998). In contrast to Heidegger’s project of “letting being be”, for Levinas, the primary imperative is “letting be for the other” (Levinas & Guwy, 2007: 125) – “being for-the-other” prior to all else.

Levinas is able to make the radical claim that we must start from the goodness, but not from the creation of the world. “The creation of the world should start from the goodness. <...> the world exists and is created through ethics” (Levinas & Guwy, 2007: 129). Precisely the ethical dimension lets us see how the main philosophical question has been changed. The statement of being’s *other*, of the otherwise than being, for Levinas leads to the very difference of the *beyond*, the difference of transcendence, which exceeds not only ontological difference, but the difference of being and nothingness, as well. This refers as well to the “good beyond being”, which is also infinity, and which for Heideggerian thought is impossible, or merely “ontic”. “To be good is a deficit, a wasting away and a foolishness in being; to be good is excellence and elevation beyond being. Ethics is not a moment of being, it is otherwise and better than being; the very possibility of the beyond” (Levinas, 1998: 69). It is not denying, negating or dropping being as essence, but occurring otherwise, as being-for-the-other. Being for the other, goodness, cannot be explained through negativity. The main philosophical problem becomes not that of Hamlet or Leibniz, torn between being and nothing, being and not-being, but a moral concern regarding the right to be. By changing the basic philosophical question, changing the question of ground for the ethical question, first philosophy is ethics not ontology, even if ontology is not denied and will find its “place” in relation to ethics.

Ethical Difference

Raising philosophical questions beyond ontological difference is not an opposition, but a leaving of the very logic of that difference. But ethics is not therefore “irrational,” which would again be to define ethics as negation of being. This way, Levinas sees through ethics, from ethics as first philosophy and not as a secondary gloss on being. For Levinas, ethical concern for the other person is philosophically primary. Otherwise than being is an escape from the indifference of being, which for Levinas means the nobility of eth-

ics, the main moment of which is responsibility for the other person, concern for the suffering of the other, in the singularity of a responsibility, which is non-indifference. Otherwise than being, to be sure, but also better than being. Responsibility does not negate its other, but across language comes to the other in peace; it is a pacific relation. For Levinas, responsibility for the other is the difference of the oneself and the other, which is understood as the non-indifference of the Good (Levinas, 2008: 58, 123). Instead of a cognitive relation, whether scientific-representational or poetic-hermeneutic, Levinas introduces the relation of sincerity, proximity, which overcomes the indifference toward others of ontological difference. This non-difference for the other avoids the indifference of the ontological difference.

Non-indifférence signifies involvement and concern. As we can see from Levinas writings, ego from the very beginning is *indifférent* and this situation can be changed by meeting the Other. As Cohen points out, the word Levinas uses is not accidental: “non-indifference” implicates me as a being at first indifferent. I am blind and deaf for the Other. “The I’s concern for the alterity of the Other comes in a *non*-indifference, rather than in a primary concern, because precisely a natural and original indifference to the alterity of the Other must be disrupted” (Cohen, 1994: 165). That is, it is the Other – and not the question of being – who interrupts me and in such a disturbance the situation of significance is changed forever.

Heidegger’s philosophy is concerned about being, but that leads to an indifference toward one of the most essential distinctions: distinction between good and evil. Ontological difference is attentive to being, but it remains indifferent to the Other. Of course, it would be too strong to claim that in Heideggerian philosophy one finds an explicit justification of evil, such as one might find in Nietzsche, however, the difference between good and evil does not play a significant role. Ethics is interpreted there as “normativity” and is relegated to the “ontic”. What is foremost is “letting be”, openness of the being, where everything is necessary and justified to the extent that it helps this unfolding. In some postmodern interpretations, we can find that this Heideggerian position is taken as most ethical – letting things, nature and event “be” (Lingis, 2009). From Levinas’s position, we see that that would bring us back to irresponsibility, to meaningless existence, to *il y a*. Being is whatever happens, happens. In contrast, Levinas finds meaning not in being, not in the openness of being, being’s move, but in relation

to the Other. Only through the non-indifference for the Other we can escape the indifference of the ontological difference. Non-indifference in this case is primary, but primary not chronologically or logically, but hierarchically – the moral priority of the Other. The Levinasian notion of responsibility is so radical that it is not just responsibility for the Other, but responsibility for the other's responsibility. It is a truly infinite responsibility. For Levinas, in face of the Other I am more responsible than I as a finite human being can even be responsible: "The more I answer the more I am responsible" (Levinas, 2008: 93). As a desire, responsibility comes not from a lack within the subject, a need, but from the surplus, infinite election by the Other, and, hence, as a desire, desire for "the most Desirable". The relation with the other cannot be reduced to the relation of the object-subject, the other is not the object I control or manipulate. By meeting the other I meet the idea of Infinity (which is as well the possibility of my infinity). The abstract idea of infinity here is met not abstractly, however, but through the concrete vulnerable face of the other, and it is not in an ontological, but in a social level.

Because of the infinite responsibility for the other, there is no longer the possibility (logical) of identification with oneself. The other disturbs the very structure of subjectivity. The true subjectivity is ethical and comes not from me, my pleasures, my sentiments, my choices, but from the other. I am a "hostage", as my responsibility comes not from my free choice, but before any choice. I am chosen by the other, I cannot escape "the responsibility under my skin". I am "persecuted" and "obsessed" by the Other and through that I find my genuine self as responsible and guilty. In this responsibility, nobody can substitute for me. So, this responsibility is also an "election". The necessity to substitute myself for the other and to stand for the Other, to make the other's needs my obligations, comes from the infinite responsibility.

This is specific intersubjective relation, which is not symmetrical. The difference of the other and the priority of the other are seen – in the first person singular – by the structure of the responsibility. The moral subject is responsible, but the appeal of the other, the meaning, which comes from the face of the other, is prior to the meaning I have from my own devices, as it were, does not depend on my initiative: "I am obliged without this obligation having begun in me, as though an order slipped into my consciousness like a thief, smuggled itself in" (Levinas, 2008: 13). It is

not a freedom, but responsibility, which defines me: “This antecedence of responsibility to freedom would signify the Goodness of the Good: the necessity that the Good choose me first before I can be in a position to choose, that is, welcome its choice” (Levinas, 2008: 122). The obligation comes not from subjectivity by itself, however, wide the immanence of subjectivity be interpreted, including its worldliness, but from outside, and it shakes the traditional notion of subjectivity and as well shows Levinas shifting away from the Parmenidian notion of the one. I am chosen by the other – the initiative comes from the other, and the chosen finds himself passive and “obsessed” by the other: “a responsibility, an obsession with the other, being-one-for-the-other, which is the very birth of *signification* beyond *being*” (Levinas, 2008: 90). It is inversion of consciousness, passivity prior to any passivity: “The intention *toward another*, when it has reached its peak, turns out to belie intentionality. *Toward another* culminates in a *for another*, a suffering for his suffering” (Levinas, 2008: 18). This demands a modification of the phenomenological method: the structure of intentionality loses its primacy. However, it is not only the question of the method – it has a deeper meaning. In intentionality, Levinas recognizes the moment of recognition and representation, while inversion of intentionality opens being for the other. Passivity here should not be understood as an opposition to activity. It is an absolute passivity. Western philosophy, as Levinas sees, “remains faithful to the order of things and does not know the absolute passivity, beneath the level of activity and passivity, which is contributed by the idea of creation. Philosophers have always wished to think of creation in ontological terms, that is, in function of a preexisting and indestructible matter” (Levinas, 2008: 110). It is passivity, where Levinas finds an anarchical trace of God (Levinas, 2008: 196n21). It is creation created through obligation toward the Other.

The impossibility to escape the other is ethical rather than ontological: “If there were real impossibility, responsibility would be only an ontological necessity. But a “purely ethical” impossibility is not a simple relaxation of an ontological impossibility” (Levinas, 2008: 198n2). In our everyday lives, we always have possibility to turn away from the other person, to avert our gaze, to pass the beggar by, to refuse to aid the down-trodden, and we do. But it remains nonetheless an ethical situation, where even being ignorant of (for) the other we are already in relation and we are

already responsible. Levinas introduces ethics, which is not based on norms or rules. Its demand exceeds any rules.

For Levinas, relation with the Other is beyond ontological structure. By calling relation between me and the other with the other *séparation*, Levinas underlines the ethical meaning of *séparation*. It is respect for the other, for his radical otherness. The transcendence of the others establishes insuperable distance. Thus, the intersubjective relation no longer follows the logic of totality, where parts are defined by wholes or species by genera. Each encounter with the other is always new, the difference is not given, but found every time again. Otherness is not an attribute, which can be added to the other, which would be an entity like me, another me. It is an absolute difference. By criticizing Heidegger, Levinas draws our attention to the following: “The relationship with the Other is indeed posed by Heidegger as an ontological structure of *Dasein*, but practically it plays no role in the drama of being or in the existential analytics” (Levinas, 2005: 40). *Dasein* relation with the other, *mitsein*, is subordinated to being a structure of *Dasein*. In *Totality and Infinity*, Levinas underlines that he is opposing Heidegger, as he “subordinates the relation with the Other to ontology <...> rather than seeing in justice and injustice a primordial access to the Other beyond all ontology” (Levinas, 2007: 89). Understanding of being (and of the ontological difference), but not insight into the ethical difference, is the main feature of *Dasein*. *Dasein* “is” as an understanding of being. As long as understanding and contemplation is the main and primordial relation with the other, we are in the field of totality: “comprehension, in Heidegger, re-joins the great tradition of Western philosophy: to comprehend the particular being is already to place oneself beyond the particular. To comprehend is to be related to the particular that only exists through knowledge, which is always knowledge of the universal” (Levinas, 1996: 5). For Levinas, the escape from totality occurs as ethics, acknowledging the primacy of the other as moral obligation toward the other person. Thus, it is in ethical responsibility that Levinas sees the overcoming of totality.

Furthermore, Heidegger’s notion of being’s historicity eliminates the ethical question of responsibility. *Dasein* is limited by the events of being itself, and, by this finitude, it is thrown into history, which it can at best make its own. The openness of being as the historicity of history is oblivious to the difference between good and evil. “When Heidegger call attention

to the forgetting of Being, veiled by the diverse realities it illuminates, a forgetting for which the philosophy developed from Socrates on would be guilty, when he deplors the orientation of the intellect toward technology, he maintains a regime of power more inhuman than mechanism <...>” (Levinas, 1987: 52). An anonymous being is ethically indifferent, indifferent to guilt and responsibility. Levinas sees that: “the well-known theses of Heideggerian philosophy – the preeminence of Being over beings, of ontology over metaphysics – end up affirming a tradition in which the same dominates the other, in which freedom, even the freedom that is identical with reason, precedes justice” (Levinas, 1987: 53).

For Heidegger, there is no difference between events in being as long as they help it to unfold. The highest imperative is to let *Being be*. But from Levinas point of view, it lacks the most essential and most precious element, that is, the moral dimension. Opposite to Heidegger, Levinas shows not only difference between being and entities, but by introducing ethics shows difference in being itself, a non-ontological difference in ontology – that is because of the uncovered difference between good and evil and the face of the other.

Otherness for Levinas is absolute otherness, while ontological thinking, effacing this is ignorant of it, ignorant in the sense of ignoring its genuine significance. If Heidegger’s fundamental ontology questions beings, Levinas is questioning responsible subject, the subject “put into question” by and for the other person. It is not that Levinas denies ontology or understanding. Rather, they are not enough. “I do not only think that he is, I speak to him” (Levinas, 1996: 7). Encounter with the other is beyond understanding and cognition, it cannot be represented.

In Levinas’s philosophy, the difference between saying and the said could be seen as one more way how to leave ontological difference. For Levinas, responsibility for the other is saying before the said. In Marion’s view, “ethics is instituted by a new difference, a difference of the second degree, between, on the one hand, the entire ontological difference and, on the other hand, the Saying” (Marion, 2005: 315). The other appeals to me as his otherness would be my concern. His appeal is absolute, shattering being. It is “inversion of intentionality” (Levinas, 2008: 47). It is the primacy of the Other. The face of the other is always saying. Saying is such a proximity to the other, where external features of communication, the contents, the

“what,” are no longer of sole importance. One must first hear what is said. Response is responsibility.

Discussion of the question of being already showed that for Levinas everything that appears in *logos* is ontology. The said is the noun, there is always some order to it. “The birthplace of ontology is in the said. Ontology is stated in the amphibology of being and entities. Fundamental ontology itself, which denounces the confusion between Being and entities, speaks of Being as an identified entity” (Levinas, 2008: 42-43). For Levinas, the difference between saying and the said exceeds the logic of ontological tradition and ontology itself. Saying for Levinas is beyond amphibology of being and entities, prior to essence and identifications. In the Western tradition, knowledge is a sign and norm of spirituality, but by this very exaltation of knowledge transcendence – ethical transcendence – was eliminated from understanding as well as from philosophy itself. But “saying enigmatically and diachronically signifies transcendence or the Infinite, the otherwise than being and the disinterestedness from essence” (Levinas, 2008: 154).

For Levinas, saying becomes the passivity of passivity and being for the other. Saying is the being obsessed by the other. At the heart of the passivity of saying is sincerity. In obsession, difference shudders as non-indifference (Levinas, 2008: 83). The other is in proximity as much as I am responsible for him. As Levinas says, “sincerity is not reducible to anything ontic, or anything ontological <...>. It is not an act or a movement, or any sort of cultural gesture; they presuppose the absolute breakthrough of oneself” (Levinas, 2008: 144). This kind of relationship with the other affects a breakthrough and goes beyond ontological difference. So, here, ontological difference is overcome by proximity and sincerity. As Marion says, “for Heidegger, anxiety leads into the ontological difference, for Levinas, sincerity is excepted from it and liberates from it” (Marion, 2005: 318).

We should keep in mind that Levinas is not only trying to go beyond ontological difference, but, positively, to show the primacy of ethical difference, the primacy of ethics over ontology. Proximity and sincerity preserve the difference of the other and go beyond ontological categories. Levinas reminds us that the other too often is understood “whether as an obstacle to freedom, intelligibility or perfection, or as a term that confirms a finite being, mortal and uncertain of itself, by recognizing it, or as a slave, collaborator or God able to succor” (Levinas, 2008: 15-16). For ontological tradition,

as Levinas showed, proximity was understood as the limit of the adventure of essence (and at the same time being), while it was not a function of being. But genuine proximity – the “face to face” – is possible only by being responsible. “The proximity of the neighbor is my responsibility for him: to approach is to be the guardian of one’s brother; to be the guardian of one’s brother is to be his hostage. This is immediacy” (Levinas, 1998: 72), contact with the other is tenderness and responsibility (Levinas, 1987: 116). In proximity to the other, the otherness of the other remains, and I do not disappear in the other, as well. It is at once relation and non-relation with the other.

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CHAPTER X

Concretization of Intersubjectivity

What today constitutes philosophical and scientific anthropology is a conjunction of most diverse views: biology, psychology, ethnology, cultural morphology, typology of world views, and so forth. With all this expanded knowledge about the human, our age knows the least about the human and no age was more in doubt about who we are than ours. Although the question concerning the human may seem to be isolated, it is connected with our conceptions of society and history, and indeed, communications. The problem for the latter lies in the question of individual and society, of person and culture. Although we have discussed the correlation between the individual and the sociohistorical, we have not shown what constitutes the individual. For phenomenology, this omission is not warranted if its basic conception is an analysis of all areas of experience and all presuppositions. And the individual is presupposed in all the attempts to deal with communication and interaction.

There is a tendency to speak of the changing “view” of the human due to the discoveries of various empirical sciences. This “view” is, in fact, open to further changes, and in this case it might be that in the future what we now call the human might not be recognizable. And yet, we tend to speak without any reservation about the human of the past and the future, as if we possessed an understanding of something about the human that is a priori and essential, something that is irreducible throughout all of the promises of empirical sciences and social reconstructions. Sciences will not admit to this kind of “essential” outlook. They will simply say that the task is to note what humans were during particular times and places and what they are now. Yet, how is it that we speak of the humans in the past who were “different” and of the humans in the future who will be “different”? This opposition between an unconditional, although implicit universality, and the empirically acquired knowledge is present in all of the contemporary researches concerning the human. All that empirical science can say is something presumptive and without unconditional universality, and yet, what it seeks is accepted silently with an unquestionable certitude. While searching for an answer to this dilemma, Landgrebe pointed to the Kantian tripartition of the philo-

sophical inquiry into “What can I know, what must I do, and what can I hope for?” and adds a fourth one: “Who is the human?” Landgrebe focused primarily on the human in his action, his practical world orientation¹³⁹. Because all activity is goal oriented, one must have an insight into the domain of goals and their order with respect to the highest goal, the highest good. This cannot be an object of theoretical knowledge, but of practical awareness. From this follows a “practical” view of the human. But this practical view assumes an implicit understanding, prior to all philosophical reflection that we all have of ourselves in our actions and aims. This implicit understanding is prior to any specification into domains, to which the human might belong. From this follows that the a priori and a posteriori can be variously articulated and within which various empirical and methodological conceptualities can be correlated. Of course, this implicit “background” understanding and its implicit understanding of the world was rejected by the middle of the 19th century in favor of social and historical immanentism. All we can know is the sociohistorical constitution of “intersubjective reality”. Yet, all such attempts to immanentize and, hence, to avoid presuppositions is founded on presuppositions. Take, for example, A. Gehlen’s theses of life’s self-formation for survival: it constitutes a point of relationship, from which all claims about the human must flow. Yet, this is a trans-empirical assumption with necessary and universal validity-claim that cannot be justified. This means that any attempt to avoid presuppositions that are not empirically founded is self-defeating. Moreover, the very methodology is formulated by us and, hence, it is our view of the world and ourselves. How can the methodological question be answered if there is no “leading” view of what the human is? Without it we cannot distinguish the region of what is to be researched as human and what is not, what human communication is and what is not. If one does not offer essential differentiations of regions, then one cannot claim to add any essential knowledge through empirical or cultural research concerning the human and one is in no position to determine the appropriateness of a method. For phenomenology, methods are not invented arbitrarily, but must correlate to a given subject matter. If methodology does not distinguish between subject matters, then it has no criteria and becomes an all encompassing abstraction that pretends to fit every subject matter. The problem of theoretical and, indeed, empirical anthropology is

¹³⁹ Landgrebe, L. (1968). *Phaenomenologie und Geschichte*. [Phenomenology and History].

the problem of the “object” of their investigation: the object is ourselves. Before we ask a question as to who we are, we already address the world as regarded from a first person singular in relation to, and distinction from, other persons, and orientation to a common world. The singularity and all the relationships are given, yet left unexplicated. How does the singular individual recognize itself as distinct from others, as a self? The relationship of the individual to itself is one of the relationship to others, that is, how the others see one. It is a mediated knowledge. The immediate access to the individual is one of reflection, and the latter is initially a reflection from a presupposed other, who is different and who is equally cognizant of itself. We have argued that the individual is part of a poly-centric field of experiences, and the latter are in part shaped by traditionally transmitted linguistic systems and modes of communication. Thus, the individual experiences are extended by, and differentiated from, others and are mediated by the experiences imbedded in sign systems. Our phenomenological analyses made a good case for this complex view. Yet, further analyses are required to concretize the communicative process and correlatively to discover the practical domain, in which self-recognition, recognition of others, and their differences and commonalities are articulated. In addition, our previous analyses had a presupposition: temporal continuity of the historically transmitted experiences. This presumption has been challenged by a variety of theoretical movements, most preeminent among which is the elusive postmodernity. This inner core is called by Husserl “transcendental subjectivity” and constitutes the basis of the world for me and the way I encounter others. What is peculiar about this “subjectivity” is that it contains the world and the others in its immediacy to itself. Thus, “I bear the others in me”, but in such a way that this bearing in me is experienced as mutual. This is the reason why the transcendental Ego is indeclinable and is ego only equivocally. In this sense, the world is also singular and a plurality of worlds is senseless. The question of the systematic “locus” of the object of anthropology is falsely stated when it is derived from an absolute universal “outside of me”. As a singular, I am indeclinable, a singularity that is prior to the distinction of individual and plural. Thus, philosophical anthropology does not have an entity as its theme, not a generic entity with essential universality, but the indeclinable singular. The interrogated is not a universal “what” or an “essence”, but the interrogator. In the relationship that the singular has to itself

is the ground for the possibility of differentiation of the a priori universality and empirical specificity. Hence, the “absoluteness” of the singular is neither the generic-essential universality, nor empirical individuality. The singular is in a constant activity that can never be finally fixed or deciphered; it constantly surpasses itself and its achievements of world orientation. Its indeclinability correlates to the given, which too is inexpressible and requires a continuous change of presentations, which are to be surpassed. The ground that lends the singular experience is beyond universality and specificity. In this sense, it cannot be understood metaphysically as the absolutely universal. Landgrebe found a correlation of the indeclinable singularity of the human core prior to the search for the a priori universal and the a posteriori empirical to the inexpressible “given”, which has not yet been differentiated into a priori universality and its specific instantiations. Like the singular, the given too escapes constantly the presentations, calls for more and opens the activities of the singular object. It seems that in this sense the singular and the given cannot yet be clearly distinguished because their separation would presuppose a division of regional ontologies. Here, the self and the world are one¹⁴⁰. The problem is that the functioning of the transcendental life is anonymous and is not indicated by our being a child of this world. How is it that this transcendental domain is “liberated” from its anonymity? Landgrebe suggested that it is necessary to return to the initial experience, in which each experienced moment implies the world horizons. Moreover, what is implicitly in the consciousness is a genesis, on the basis of which we come to our awareness. In this sense, our awareness of the world is not direct, but mediated through our generative life. This is to say, how something is given and becomes mine points to history, in which all of our meanings have been constituted. Our awareness is always shaped by the history of sedimented experiences, and this history is nothing else than the history of our world. This history is an event that is “in us” and it is implicated in every decision for universal reflection. This implication is found in our aims, limitations and activities. Philosophical reflection, thus, calls for history. Our world has historical horizons. But if this is the case, if the process of historical constitution of world horizons is relevant for our coming to the transcendental re-

¹⁴⁰ Landgrebe, L. (1982). *Faktizität und Individuation: Studien zu den Grundlagen der Phänomenologie* [Facticity and Individuation: Studies in the Foundations of Phenomenology]. Hamburg, West Germany: Felix Meiner Verlag.

gion, to what extent are we free to take a critical position to it? Can the historical world be surpassed? Moreover, the reflection is accomplished by the individual and, indeed, a reflection that individuates; but this individuation owes its singularity due to self-separation from others: I bear the others within myself, said Husserl. But in this sense, the singular emerges from the historical horizons of the world and finds the others there; thus, in its own responsibility, it has already taken up the responsibility of others by having taken a position to its own experiences. This is the condition for the singular experience, which is there only in the differentiation from others. This capacity of self-knowledge is a presupposition for a critical reflection on all that is transmitted as valid. This singular certitude is the certitude of “absolute experience”. It is transcendental experience because it is an unavoidable ground for anyone taking a position to any objectivity and to experience itself. The historical flow of the world contains the possibility for individuation. This reflection finds its motivation only in its history, in which reflection occurs. But precisely the scientific history was a teleological striving for knowledge and at the same time for practical responsibility for the use of such knowledge. If this is forgotten, then the world becomes alien to the human. If knowledge becomes detached from responsibility, as has happened in our modern history, then this history contains the motive for the transcendental turn and the singular reflection regarding the validity and limits of such knowledge; this is a teleological question, and all practical consciousness is teleological, and the teleological structure of history is founded on the teleology of such consciousness. Being part of this history, the subject is also history allowing for reflexivity, which reveals the true autonomy lending the human a meaningful possibility of absolute self-formation and the formation of the historical world. The subject has a passive and an active history and the absolute sense of the world is the conjunction of the two. It is absolute in the sense that any claim to something given must go through the analyses of experience that validate the claims, and the latter can be upheld only to the extent that something is accessible to experience and that experience does not imply existence. Phenomenological reduction frees us from the question of something “behind” the world constituted historically and inaccessible to experience. Indeed, it is possible to make historical claims and claims about the past. Yet, such claims are effective only to the extent that the experiences can be recalled. The question is how such recollections

constitute a common history? How can one's recollected experiences become those of the others?

Husserl attempted to answer this question by the "passive" side of experience. The latter is also the "natural side". This side is our experience of corporeity, of motility that is ours and that too has its history; but my corporeity as mine is experienceable only on the basis of it being distinguished from others. What makes corporeity individual is not explicable through organic constitution, but only through the egological claim of "my body", my movements. This suggests that consciousness too is an event *sui generis*, which cannot be derived from something that is non-consciousness. Although consciousness is always corporeal, it is not explainable by any rules of organic development. The emergence of individual consciousness is but a common sedimentation in the perceptual presence of corporeally instituted structures, such as movements, sounds, marks, accounts, and institutions that have their source in the past. In this sense, the mutual effectivity moves through the passively pre-given background, or the "natural side" of subjectivity. The singular, with its movements, as *sui generis*, is also an absolute beginning. Yet, how can this be if the singular is there only in distinction from others and on the passive background of historical sedimentations. The individual not only lives in a tradition; it also takes over or rejects the tradition; it assumes a position to the tradition and in this positional reflection it can institute novelties. Only this allows for history. Yet, if history is without facticity, how can we speak of a priori presuppositions of history, that is, if it is impossible to raise questions beyond history, are we not entering the sphere of relativity? What this question implies is how is it possible to accommodate the facticity of history with phenomenological claim of essential and universally valid insights? Husserl has seen this problematic. Historical facts are understandable from a priori insights into essential structures; yet, the a priori presupposes historically factual awareness. Here appears a basic problem within the context of our previous discussion of history and the individual, specifically the efforts by science to explain the individual historically. Is not all science founded on idealization, which is also in historical space; does this not presuppose a history as an a priori that is factual, and that is itself an idealization? This is to say, the thought of a priori is a constitutive product of history, which itself is factual. Although Husserl has not given an explicit answer to this problem, he has some suggestions for its

resolution. He asks: what would happen with the a priori of all the a priori sciences if humans were unable in principle to constitute a horizon on the basis of free variation in order to discover the invariant world structure? If this possibility is excluded, then it must be shown that humanity still has the capacity for this variation even if it is not factually developed. What this means is that the apodictic content of the a priori of history belongs to the capacity of reflection on the thought that establishes the historical a priori. This thought appearing “in” history belongs latently to humanity. This is the essential characteristic, which is also a historical fact. The thought of this a priori is developed in history, but this development is not an invention, but a discovery. This brings us back to the problem of the relationship between transcendental subjectivity and history. To notice the priority of history over the individual is to introduce reflection. It is this reflection that allows us to take the position to history and tradition that includes others. To take a position to history is also to take a position to one’s own history and future. How is one’s own past and future unified with those of others? Husserl had attempted to answer this question teleologically, that is, on the basis of the intentional structure of consciousness. Whether this is adequate for the understanding of the unity of history cannot be answered. What must be offered is a precursory ground that would show on the basis of time analyses the temporal structure of teleology, and thus, of historical time as well as reveal the basis of Husserlian a priori. Such analysis was not offered by Husserl. Landgrebe’s answer rests on the “passive” side of our awareness, that is, the natural side of corporeal functions of kinaesthesia, which are related to the sensible environment and to others. This turn rejects any empiricism and idealism. This relationship to the surroundings is a fundamental structure of the lived world and constitutes a common time of our daily activities. The common time is not a product of objectivating achievements of apperception, but already sketched in the passive background of subjectivity, which we share with others. The passivity in this context does not imply an inactivity, but a process that is so fundamentally taken for granted, that it is hardly ever noticed. Of course, this common time is not purely subjective because it is shared by a community of engaged subjects. This is nothing else than the time of history prior to the abstract measure of time of historiography. It is accessible to anyone in recollection, which is not an arbitrary fantasy, but implies what has been experienced by someone. Without such a

recollection, there would be no planned activity and orientation in a situation. The situation is an all-encompassing concept revealing what for us is already there. The situation includes its recollections and implications for future activity. How come we are in this situation, what mistakes were made, and how are they to be corrected? Here, recollection is already in action. But recollection does not “represent” everything and anything, but what is significant for the present action. It is selective, and in this selectivity we build our history. But this means that history is not a causal succession of events, having no disruptions, but is constantly reconstituted in recollections and expectations. History is “given” only at the present in constantly new ways. History is not linear because (a) each present has its temporal horizons of the passing and coming, of the sedimented past and expected future—this is the “depth-dimension” of the lived history, and (b) historical time is not a line because a line is conceived without breaks. But historical time is not a form in which historical events take place. History is built, changed and corrected. This is to say, the unity of history is constantly built and rebuilt and is not given as an a priori form, even if it is a factual a priori. Husserl, in his *Krisis*, still posited the “infinite idea” of history as linearly teleological, despite the fact that his time analyses had already constituted a radically different ground for history¹⁴¹. Although his insight into teleology stemmed from the teleology of subjectivity, his project of historical teleology stems from the collapse of the European world in World War I. The technologizing barbarism leads to a common history not in thought, but in practice. The question then is to discover the origins of this historicistic barbarism and to discover whether this barbarism can be overcome in order to lend human life some sense in historical teleology and responsibility. *Krisis* is not a metaphysical question, but a practical question of philosophical responsibility. Husserl was completely aware of the problem: the reflective act of orientation reveals something that is already “ontified”, whereas the act of this orientation is something of which we are not aware, and hence, it is not the originary phenomenon. The wondrous being for oneself in the living present can never be a phenomenon. It becomes only such when it is ontified in reflection. Reflection orients itself toward something that has already occurred. It is a tracing of a functioning that cannot be incorporated by reflection. At the moment of

¹⁴¹ Husserl, E. (1970). *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. Trans. by D. Carr. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.

reflection, the functioning has become something other, namely the occurrence of the reflective act that is not objectively present. This is the ultimate limit that reflection cannot transgress.

The absolute streaming, the original passivity as the ground, is absolutely anonymous. What is this transcendental subjectivity, what are its activities? In its anonymity, it escapes any sense-constitution, any apperception. If it cannot be grasped in terms of apperception, then must it be creation? To understand this more precisely, we must find another, more concrete basis. This basis belongs to the functions of passive, that is, bodily unmediated engagement with the world, pre-constitution, and thus, to transcendental subjectivity; body is not constituted but constituting. What is the relationship between corporeity and temporal self-constitution? Although Husserl initially spoke of the hyletic data as a formless stuff, as a primordial impression, this view was surrendered in the *Krisis*: in the depth source of pure experience one may not take a recourse to the supposedly immediate impressional data as if they were the immediate given characterizing the lived world. How this correction of hyle results from the analyses of kinaesthesia has been shown by Claesges¹⁴². In *Ideen II*, Husserl has also suggested that the kinaesthetic abilities are to be traced back to the primordial abilities of the subject.

What is at issue here is that the primordial datum is apperceptive and is temporally constituted. The impressional datum already has a form and content and both are mediated by the constitutive activities of temporalization. These activities could be called protension-retension and their synthesis in the streaming present. But this is an abstraction because it disregards what is synthesised with this process. Initially, Husserl thought it was a datum, such as a tone or a color, but it must be recalled that to grasp them one must orient oneself to them. This is to say that the passive syntheses must be associated with the kinaesthesia; without apperceptive impressions there is no time constitution, but without kinaesthesia there are no impressions. The impressions are always synthetic unities of kinaesthesia. In this sense, kinaesthetic consciousness is time consciousness. The impressions originate with kinaesthetic process, without which there is no streaming present. But in this case, the constitutive activities are creative.

¹⁴² Claesges, U. (1964). *Edmund Husserls Theorie der Raumkonstitution* [Edmund Husserl's *Theory of the Constitution of Space*]. The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff.

In this sense, corporeity is not constituted, but constitutive. It is a system of empowerments, to which the sense fields are coordinated and, as such, belong to the transcendental subjectivity. What can become a datum for me is established by the relationship of sense fields to corporeal organization. In this sense, the hyle comes from me. But this makes precedent of corporeity as “I can”, that is, a practical consciousness. It is something that is at my disposal prior to it being an object. The consciousness of corporeal empowerment is genetically prior to the developed ego consciousness. The discovery of the “mine” precedes the discovery of the ego. The experience of this corporeity is not “inner”, but rather kinaesthetically situated; it is a primordial opening up of the world and it can never be fully exhausted by reflection. This is the nature side of the transcendental subjectivity. Here, the world and other relationship are pre-delineated in the passive process at the “natural” side of the transcendental subjectivity. This means that this subjectivity does not have nature as something facing it, but something that is immanent in this subjectivity. How are we to understand this? Obviously, the primordial streaming event is creative. Nature is understandable only in relationship to our corporeal kinaesthetic activities of constitution. We know of it only as much as it announces itself in our corporeal events. All our knowledge and all our theories are related to this event. This event is something that is at our immediate disposal in distinction with events that are not so disposable and that are “external”. But this “external” that affects us is not something that has its basis in something foreign (Kant’s matter as a sign of something unknown that affects us), but rather belongs to the transcendental becoming itself. This is the creative process that escapes reflection. It is “indifferent”, that is, a groundless ground. Yet, it bears in itself a principle of individuation, although in its anonymity it cannot establish individuation; it pre-establishes an organization that can be claimed as “mine”.

Subjectivity is not individuated through corporeity, as Merleau-Ponty had thought, because what is presupposed is that someone is bodily and learns to “use” it before one discovers one’s ego. It is not the body that discovers the ego, but the ego that discovers the body as one process. The ego can be “pure” because it is not produced by the body, but rather that through which the body is “mine”. The ego discovers itself in the transcendental genesis as a transcendental history. But it is discovered as an ungraspable residuum. This residuum can be grasped only as something atemporal. This

cannot mean that each affectivity is contingent in relationship to the stream. Not every affectivity, emerging in the genesis, takes place through this “anstoss”, because each hyle is already a sedimented history. The atemporality of the anstoss can only mean “absolute facticity”. It is not contingent in the sense of *factum brutum*, because the contingent and the necessary comprise a constituted distinction and emerge from the reflection on the conditions of becoming. In this sense, there is no accident in the absolute facticity of the primordial stream. But it is not a necessity either, because all necessity is constituted by eidetic variation. Thus, it is beyond the universal and specific, *eidos* and *fact*. The ego is an absolute facticity just as is the primordial stream. This is how we are to think the constitutive event as creative. The being of each singular is not derivable from an event that would allow the emergence of singularity. It is rather itself absolute and, thus, absolutely responsible. To push our analyses further, we cannot deal with the logical problem of individuation, in which the individual is a “case” of a universal; rather, it raises a question of the individual in a historical problematic. Is individuation a product of sociohistorical development, or is the individual a condition for such a development? Husserl said that history is the grand fact of absolute being. This is in distinction to Husserl’s notion of fact of the *Ideen*, where fact is contingent. But the absoluteness of history is not something accidental: it must be necessary. How is this absolute being related to individuality? Husserl has traced this question, in his way, as a relationship between the transcendental and the mundane. He finds the difficulty in the equivocation of the meaning of Ego. The transcendental ego is such only by equivocation. The transcendental absolute, which is transcendental intersubjectivity, has its ground in itself; hence, its necessity is not one of essence, because the latter is correlated to the fortuitous facticity. The retrogression to the depth dimension of intersubjectivity as the primordially streaming activity is the self-temporalization of transcendental intersubjectivity, which is the ultimate point of self-certitude of intentional activities and implications. Here, the absoluteness means that reflection reaches a dimension that cannot be transcended or subtended. With this dimension the question reappears: to what extent can this primordial stream be thought of as a diffused stream that constitutes a condition for individuation? Or is it the case that this stream is possible only through the facticity of the singular? Husserl’s assumption is that this anon-

ymous primordial stream can be constantly discovered through transcendental reflection. But the question remains whether the primordial stream has individuality or is individuality postulated in it by Husserlian analyses. If the primordial stream is teleological, then it must be seen as if the individual ego has dominated it at the outset. Is it possible for transcendental phenomenological reflection on the constituting functions of the subjectivity to lead to something other than postulates if it does not wish to remove itself from phenomenological understanding and engage in speculative constructions of the absolute? What must be accomplished is a delimitation of individuation as an absolute fact. Husserl's analyses had suggested that this absolute fact is beyond contingency and necessity; but he left it at that. The question can be approached through the discussion of the problem of the contingent facticity of the world. This discussion relates to Luhmann's theory of evolution of social systems. Luhmann has shown that the genesis of facticity emerges with the modern times, in which the classical eternal truths have been dethroned¹⁴³. Final blow was offered by Kant. This led to the loss of all norms. If the basis of norms has been dethroned, then it seems that the human becomes the basis of all norms. Luhmann saw Husserl as drawing this consequence, where the objectivity of truth is understood in its intersubjectivity; from there, Luhmann draws the conclusion to the contingency of the world. The absoluteness becomes the absoluteness of the factual individual and inter-individual relationships: contingent absoluteness. This being the case, that is, the contingent world is correlated to the contingent mundane intersubjectivity, it can be said that the intersubjective discovery of "natural laws" reveals the cosmic history. But that this history of cosmos is grasped is itself a fact and that this fact can understand history depends on the historical contingency of the human being, who began to understand himself as contingent when he dethroned the eternal truths. What this means is that the contingency of the human cannot be reduced to the contingency of the cosmos, but conversely, the experience of human contingency is the condition for thinking the cosmos as contingent and from there to develop the thought of the history of cosmos. But what does the experience of contingency mean in relationship to "absolute experience" leading to the notion of the individual as an absolute facticity? In

¹⁴³ Luhmann, N. (1982). *The Differentiation of Society*. Trans. by S. Holmes & C. Larmore. New York: Columbia University Press.

what way can our understanding concerning the absolute fact be made more precise when its transcendence of necessity and contingency is not to remain a mere negative claim? How are we to show that the understanding of contingency can be found only in the individual experience and from there to develop the understanding of history as the grand fact of absolute being? The reflective turn on the achievements of the consciousness-phenomena, inclusive of the identity of the ego, the “I think”, leads to the discovery of the fact of the “I think”, which also constitutes its limits. But reflection cannot determine what this fact is as “absolute”. The analysis of the intertwining of intentionalities and functions cannot determine the absoluteness of the facticity, because it remains within the context and limits of these activities and intentionalities. Thus, there is a needed step beyond the reflective activity that would show the facticity. This requires a formal “pre-project” of the basic structure of human existence. The opening of this dimension is not an arbitrary undertaking, because humans in all times and before all philosophical reflection have had an understanding of it in myths, stories and “explanations”. In these, the human being speaks of himself not determined by theoretical interpretations. What belongs to the facticity is the ability to be; hence, this facticity is distinguished from the *factum brutum* as a case of a category. The factual human does not experience himself as a mere fact, but understands himself in his abilities. What precedes all acquaintances with the world is the ability for self-motility. This movement occurs from the here and now, which are not insertions in temporal spatial loci, but from which the world is opened in tasks, activities and receptivities. In this sense, Husserl has seen corporeity as an absolute null point of all orientations, to which all spatio-temporal events are related. Yet, he has not included this in his explication of the absolute fact of history. In this sense, his *Krisis* work found no basis to connect the problem of the teleology of history with the lived world. Although Heidegger has numerous suggestions concerning the “facticity” of the *Dasein*, he has not been able to show what constitutes the facticity as a singular and inexchangeable process. If history deals with the singularity and irrepeatability, the hermeneuticists following Heidegger have not shown the basis of this individual singularity. The transcendental domain, which in its self-temporalization accounts for the syntheses of the ego, is world constituting.

This is to say that it maintains open horizons, which are “mine”, “ours”, or “anybodies”. Without this horizon, the meaning of the term “world” is indeterminate and empty. This world constitution belongs to the ego itself and is the condition for any communication whatsoever. If it were not there, we could not understand the others as “like us”. But how does this lead to facticity? In this self-evident constitution, Husserl had noted the central problem of phenomenological reflection. It is a problem of its insurmountable limit.

What is revealed on the basis of transcendental reflection is the *eidos* Ego, encompassing all of its constitutive functions. The concepts of these functions are unconditionally universal, with universal validity. The singular becomes an example of eidetic structures. But the view was surrendered by Husserl. The *eidos* “transcendental ego” is unthinkable without the transcendental ego as being factual¹⁴⁴. This ego is one of enablement, which has been factually achieved. In this sense, the ego must be called “absolute fact”. Its necessity is not essential necessity correlated to contingencies. More precisely, it is neither a contingency, nor a universal necessity to the extent that it cannot be explicated by essential structures and cannot be reduced to circumscribed facticity. All essential necessities are moments of this facticity, ways of self-understanding.

What follows from this absolute fact as a limit of reflection? Any essential or contingent determination of this facticity turns out to be inadequate. In this sense, it is a “groundless being”, because it belongs neither to essentiality, nor to contingency. Transcendental phenomenological reflection reveals conditions, for the possibility of any experience, that are not attainable by argumentation. Reflection does not constitute them. They are functions and activities of consciousness, with which we are tacitly acquainted. Hence, the fact of these functions is not an unarticulated dumb ground, but yields itself to reflection for explication. One is already a child of the world and, although questioning the correctness of some views and facts, it does not question the world. It is a worldly attitude, in which we live. The thematization of this attitude is a first step in phenomenological reflection. To take a position to it, one must distance oneself from it through bracketing. This reflection neither constitutes, nor abolishes this base; rather, it

¹⁴⁴ Husserl, E. (1973). *Cartesianische Meditationen*. *Husserliana*, Vol. XV. The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, p. 385. English language version (1970), *Cartesian Meditations*. Trans. by D. Cairns, Trans. The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff.

makes it thematic. It is the thematization of the belief in the world. Belief is not an opinion that can be subsequently affirmed or corrected. It founds all opinions, and is not given to a judgmental certitude. All our intentions are related to it as a tacitly presupposed framework and content. This is the unthematized “lived world”, which was skipped over by Descartes, although assumed by him and in all subsequent discussions. Husserl brought to awareness what the modern tradition had lived, but left undiscussed. The thematization of the lived world is not a description of the modes, in which the humans live their daily lives, their conceptions, wishes and engagements. These have been considered by numerous philosophies and sciences from various perspectives. Each of us has a lived world, a history, and this can be investigated by empirical sciences, such as sociology. But this is only the first step for the thematization of the lived world. The latter grounds the possibility for comparing the social and cultural lived worlds. Phenomenology aims at the concrete transcendental functions and achievements that comprise the conditions for the appearance of these worlds.

Hence, the empirically pre-given worlds will be clues to these functions. If these worlds are different, then their understanding assumes a commonality, on the basis of which they can be compared. This vantage point cannot be acquired through comparisons, because it is the condition for comparisons. If the basis on which our lived relationship to reality is a belief that cannot be interrogated through epistemic means, then the investigation calls for the manifestation of intentional functions, in which this basis is constituted. In these functions, one then can show what is common to all lived worlds, what is invariant in all of the variations, and hence, what constitutes the conditions for communication.

This invariant is the more fundamental lived world and this is the a priori, which cannot be eradicated. The “intentional” activities constituting this lived world and at the same time specifying it in historical, social and cultural variants are the “pre-historical” conditions. This lived world is not deducible from the factual worlds of the “we”. As time and history constituting functions, they are not historical, but are the ground that founds the question of the belief in the world. This dimension will allow us to speak of the “I am” as an absolute fact.

Even in an uncritical attitude, the world belief is not an epistemological affirmation, and neither is the self. They accompany all we do and un-

derstand. Reflection cannot ask “that” they are, because any such question presupposes the facticity of the questioner. And the questioner is always tacitly aware of this absolute facticity. It is the null-complex, from which such questions emerge and from which specific space and time configurations are comprehensible. It cannot be escaped and interrogated from “outside”. This null-complex is revealed in the simple corporeal gesture of pointing. This gesture is a corporeal movement, which is set spontaneously as “mine” and is not exchangeable with anyone else’s movement. And the corporeity is “mine” not as a possession of a “spirit”, but in which I am totally immersed and limited. Even a child explores the world corporeally through movement as a way to “effect” something. This initial effectivity is the transcendental source of effectivity as such. It is an ability to relate and effect before any reflection and a capacity for its own concrete “knowledge”. In this experience, there is an implicit source for the distinction of what is mine and what belongs to others; it is the most fundamental concept of property. What one can is empowered by the pre-reflective corporeal motility, and this empowerment is the source of our conceptions of power.

Although pre-reflective, the corporeal movement constitutes self-reference. In a missed attempt to reach something, the attempt is repeated; in this sense, movement already contains initial self-reflection. One could say that the initial reflexivity is expressed linguistically in the phrase “Can I do this?” This reveals not a dumb facticity, but an already articulated field of abilities and limits. It is the limit of “enablements”, of something that “I cannot do”. What I cannot do is not a dumb limit given kinaesthetic corporeal reflexivity, in a testing that implicates the corporeal abilities. Thus, the relationship to the absolute facticity is founded on a precedent affirmation of the unquestioned belief in the world. The latter not only implies our enablements toward all that comprises our world, but also a variously articulated relationship to the absolute limit of our abilities. The relationship to this limit might not be recognized, but rather “suppressed”. Suppression in this sense means that the call to engagement is not accepted, but deflected. This appears in revolts against everything that questions human claim to absolute self-mastery; it can also appear in the various suppressions of death. The absolute facticity as a limit is thus an articulated, meaningful limit. It manifests itself in its pre-reflective kinaesthetic reflexivity. This position undercuts any scepticism, because the null-complex of corporeal kinaes-

thesia includes the primordial relationship to and a meaningful communication with the world and our primordial belief in it. The reduction, then, leads to the web of concrete intentional functions, which are completely intertwined in the lived world. But these functions are such that they can be done by everyone and, hence, already include the others. The other is pre-reflectively present in his yielding or resistance, in the yielding of or opposition to the past others, who are part of experience.

Hence, the others in their facticity also constitute my limits. The transcendental effort to decipher “my” factual history includes the histories of others that can be opposed, reworked, or extended, and, in this sense, included in my history of “enablements”. But this means that history is not a fixed structure or condition, because it is related to the facticity of the individual in his null-complex of orientations and spontaneities. History can be “novelized” from this null-complex. In this sense, there is no serial history. If there is a principle of correlation of various lived worlds, this principle is to be sought in the enablements and their limits that constitute the ground for the understanding of what they “can do” or “cannot do”. The question of the abilities, of what one can and cannot do, leads to an answer of individuality and community at the practical level. If individuals communicate and, thus, presuppose some commonality and some differences, then such communication has to rest on direct phenomenological evidence of corporeal interaction. As already hinted earlier, from childhood on, the world is explored through bodily movements, revealing the abilities to do something, to reach, push, pull, handle, and let go. By exploring the world, we equally explore our movements and abilities in a way that there is a direct inner-communication with the world. Concurrently, a process of reflexivity arises in missed and prolonged efforts to effect some aim.

A missed reach, an unattained object directly reflects on the movement eliciting either prolongation or variation of the movement to reach. This reflexivity constitutes three important experiential factors: (a) the active abilities are not a one-to-one reaction to a stimulus, but a self-articulating field of activities, (b) the object is not given as a brute fact, as a thing with pre-given characteristics, but as an explorable and variable system in a horizon of possibilities, and (c) a tacit “self-recognition”, a concrete awareness of what one can and cannot do. This is not to say that the reflexivity of movements institutes an ego or an “inner” subject. The movements, and the

explorable systems, are neither extrinsic nor intrinsic, but sediment themselves into recognizable and repeatable functions and relationships; these comprise an initial “practical” self.

This initial step to individual self-recognition includes two other moments: (a) the commonality of an action with another person, and (b) the separation of this commonality into “mine” and “yours”. This is to say, there appears a direct intercommunication at the level of movements and activities between persons. When a child reaches for something and fails, the mother reaches further and hands the object to the child, and thus, reveals a common reaching activity and yet the differentiation of the activity into the mother’s “I can” and the child’s “I cannot”. Such an awareness of commonality and differences can be varied across numerous contexts and increasing complexities. In a simple action, I recognize what I cannot do because I tried and failed where I saw others succeed, and thus, have recognized my abilities. In more complex cases, involving a performance of a common task, one is engaged in a “bodily dialogue” of activities.

In moving a load, the other sees where I am inadequate and lends me a hand, and thus, helps me in the task and yet does so from another angle, from a different leverage point, and hence, comprises our differences in a commonality. Such performances can be called “filling in”, where one’s abilities are needed, where the gaps in the abilities of the others appear and where the message of what to do is communicated directly through the requirements of the task and the movements and expressions of the other. Once again, the task is not simply a fact, but a system of interrelated requirements correlating to abilities that constitute the identities of and differentiations among individuals. The individual is thus a system of sedimented activities, having commonalities with, and distinctions from, others.

The correlation of developed abilities to common tasks and to the abilities of others is coextensive with the expressive corporeity and with language. In one’s action, one communicates with the other in relationship to the tasks and expresses this relationship through body gestures and formations. One can see in the other’s body shape and expression that he is straining, wondering, resolved (even if unable to do the task by himself), and even indifferent. In brief, the structure of the task, its systematic requirements, are expressed in the performer’s body, revealing his attitudes and abilities for all to see, and even communicating the demands on others’

abilities to lend a hand, to fill in, to extend his abilities by different abilities, and hence, to relate and at the same time to individuate him and the others. Although such a communication assumes common tasks and common abilities that differentiate themselves into unique individual sedimentations and systems, the abilities have another commonality that is part of the active communication with the world and with each other. Obviously, the abilities that each individual develops are not one-to-one reactions to specific characteristics of objects, but have a generality that is neither a summation of individual facts or functions under a concept, nor is it a structure from which facts are deducible; rather, an active function can extend across typologically different factual systems. In face of a task, such as pounding a peg into the ground, the hand is a general function that can pick up a stick, a stone, a hammer or a shoe in order to accomplish the task. The generality of an ability communicates across diverse factual systems their practical analogies. This is to say, although typologically distinct, they can function as analogates of each other because of a general ability to pick them as replacements of one another in face of a task. The stone is like hammer and like a stick, because my hand communicates their analogical function on the basis of a task and an ability: I can use either of them to pound a peg into the ground. Thus, the very function of our acquired abilities has a generality that can be extended to others and the structuring of their abilities that can equally communicate analogical performances. The performances themselves become extended analogically from person to person. Such an analogical inner-communication at the level of practical activities comprises the ground for the understanding of concrete and context bound meanings. Indeed, without the language of abilities or of intimation of concrete interaction with the world and with each other, the theoretical discourses would not make sense. We shall treat this question of sense subsequently. Given the phenomena of individuation in concrete action and practical communication through tasks and abilities, we are in a position to argue against a theoretical interpretation of history and the assumption that history offers continuous linguistic and institutionalized domains of communication. History is built by practical activities and what is fundamentally transmitted from person to person and generation to generation are tasks and abilities that have no necessary continuity. To fully grasp this, we must bracket the theoretical time founded on the ontology

of the continuity of nature. What remains after such bracketing are human tasks that constitute purposes, hopes, and even progress. We are concerned, then, with the effectivity of our actions and abilities in face of the tasks and aims. Some initiated tasks may surpass our ability to complete them, and hence, they are dropped in favor of other tasks. In this sense, there are discontinuities in the meaning of activities and, in face of other tasks, in their restructuration. No doubt, increasing and changing abilities may communicate that the previously discarded task is now within the ken of our acquired abilities. All the failed efforts to fly, all the winged leaps from cliffs that ended in failure and were abandoned, were resumed subsequently with success. In this sense, the historical time is coextensive with our abilities and tasks, our purposes and aims.

This means that the understanding of history is possible in terms of a teleological finality that mediates between expectations and factually initiated activities. The telos is not given in judgments, but in hope and belief. This is to say how history, as it acquires continuity through our activities, and thus, becomes a world history with a common aim, cannot be deciphered from a posited univocal future. Can one aim guarantee continuity of different activities? If history is founded upon our practical activities, then there must be an understanding of time related to such activities. For tradition, so well expressed in Kant, the only time is the form of "one after the other," which constitutes a linear succession of impressions and representations. But this is not an adequate form to understand the time of action. Husserl, and following him Merleau-Ponty and Straker, have offered us a time analysis that is more helpful and that avoids the simple succession of events in a pre-given form. The common element in their discussion of time of action is the concept of field and horizon that are not located in a pre-given space and time, but are oriented. One cannot say that activities occur in time or space; rather, the activities build their own spatial and temporal horizons of possibilities, among which we select our aims and hopes, our tasks to be accomplished, and the appropriate means and actions for their fulfillment. The experience of the present is based on the experience of the expected, which is not yet represented, but is directly present as the field of action.

What is relevant for the understanding of history is the notion of action, orientational stress of which is on expectation, comprising the field

for aims. Expectation is what opens “hope”. But what is open is founded as a possibility of our corporeal enablement in the practical sphere. This orientation is the condition for possibilities as aims and their realization. And this is what constitutes the “teleological” nature of the human. If history originates with human activity, then the experience of its becoming contains a teleological principle at the most fundamental level. And at this level one is already situated, that is, lives among facticities and a fluidum of views and meanings that are historical and that enhance or hinder our activities. What can we expect from this situated present? Although this is a simple question, the philosophers of history had never asked it.

All striving that aims at maintaining the vanishing past needs to maintain it in order to be able to fulfill expectations. One has a basis of sedimented enablements, from which to probe the expectations and, in fact, raise questions in case of difficulties, such as how did it come about that we got ourselves into these difficulties? Here enters recollection both of the individual and of the community. Recollection does not reveal all that there is, but only what is significant for the present activities in the context of tasks and possibilities. The things of the present will be seen in their oriented context as yielding and valuable hinderances, and hence, will open the recollections of their coming to be in this situation. But if history constitutes this way of recollection, then it means that the time of history is not something continuous, a homogeneous form, or a sequence of events constituting a gapless causal succession. As the Greeks asked, the question is not of cause, but of *aitia*-responsibility-owing to what. The question then is not how history happens on the basis of events, as if in our experience we had a gapless interconnection of causal series of events, represented in a sequence of impressions and thoughts. Rather, the question must be subverted: how do we come to the conception of an uninterrupted temporal series as the form of causally understood process of continuous events from our originary experience of temporality of activity? Continuity is thinkable in terms of finality, not a finality of divine predestination, but one that is decided on in the freedom of our activities. The events present in the situation are interrogated with respect to what possibilities they lead to and what possibilities they deflect in our activities. This teleological meaning is not a subsequent imposition, but is present in the originary experience of activity and the objects oriented within the context of activity. How are we

to grasp the continuity of history? As a unity of events, as they appear in the consideration of possibilities of action in a situation with regard to the conditions, under which the events have become visible, the events for us and how they are reestablished in our affirmations and activities become parts of the enablement for the future.

There are various consequences stemming from this level of activity as practical communication. First, the communicative practice is a concrete corporeal action that individuates and is coextensive with the actions of others on the basis of common tasks. Second, tasks and activities are oriented toward completion, and hence, include human hopes and aims. What they communicate, and hence, what communication at this level includes, are responsibilities. We select the possibilities of orienting the factual systems and we are responsible for what they mean and how they are structured. Third, different possibilities and tasks, calling for different activities, need not be continuous or homogeneous with other tasks and activities, and resultantly, we cannot speak of the historical time or the aim of history and communication. Fourth, the communicative activities, that is, the corporeal practical engagements, yield commonalities of abilities that, although inter-corporeally coextensive, do not necessarily imply a historical continuity. Fifth, although such continuities, differentiating themselves into individual variations of “I can” and “I cannot”, comprise the factual domain, their facticity is neither one of universal necessity, nor of simple datum. Rather, they are open and variable systems of practical experience. And it is precisely this practical experience that offers a concrete understanding of communication. It is necessary, therefore, to phenomenologically show the inadequacies of the claims of various theories, specifically the theories that purport to challenge phenomenology on the grounds of concrete historical contexts of linguistic interpretations and rules.

CHAPTER XI

Critical Evaluation of Criticisms

The practical domain of communication depicted earlier has to be deepened along with a number of critiques of some recent theories of communication, specifically those that consider language and interpretation to be the basis of communicative understanding. In addition, some of the linguistically based theories appeal to scientific explanations of human interaction, and thus, use the formal systems as the most universal means of transmitting information and of explaining phenomena. Upon closer analysis, the explanations are completely abstract from daily discourse and experience. This is one of the unique claims of scientific thought: it purports to deal with the concrete, and yet, it offers radically abstract and formalized systems. The answer, of course, is in the demonstration that such systems are applicable to concrete activities and practical purposes. This claim lends credence to the views that an understanding of situations and contexts is a sociohistorically learned adaptation of rules, of interpretations of normative and theoretical structures, resulting in a conjunction of theory and concrete actions. Such claims are possible on two traditional assumptions: first, an application spells dualism between form and content, thought and reality, structure and manifestation, and second, the conjunction is possible in an instrumental sense, that is, science is not a theoretical explanation, but an instrumental system for the mastery of nature in favor of human purposes. In both cases, the outcome of this conjunction is metaphysical virulence, that is, metaphysics, as a normative construct, is used to change the world to fit the metaphysical constructs. In this sense, the abstract, formal systems, inaccessible to any perception, assume an inordinate preeminence against the concrete experience, because the formal systems become reality by being instrumental¹⁴⁵. As most serious researchers have seen, science no longer explains and makes events happen. There is, in fact, a current tendency, resting, perhaps, on the modern conception of the instrumentality of science, toward practical basis and explanation of human activities. Most diverse theories, from neo-Marxism through communicative competence, to postmodern concep-

¹⁴⁵ Volkmann-Schluck, K. H. (1965). *Eiriführung in die Philosophie* [Introduction to Philosophy]. Frankfurt am Main, West Germany: Vittorio Klostermann.

tions of the production of truth, assure us that their theories are praxis laden. These theories equally claim that human activities are imbedded in a human world with its historical horizons. One specific characteristic shared by such trends is the claim that their conceptions of praxis are based on concrete historical contexts, allowing for interpretive discourse of scientific thinking and formal rules, and that such discourses offer a concrete domain that can avoid the pitfalls of some of the transcendental phenomenological trends. The latter are deemed to be idealistic and solipsistic. If communication is possible, then its basis stems from historical situations – particular forms of language, interpretation and understanding.

It is argued that phenomenology's focus on the "objective" given disconnects the given from its context, its social and historical interpretations, and assumes that such a focus offers universally acceptable claims. Moreover, the presumption of objectivity leads to the view that the individual is in a position to observe the given without any relationship to others and without any introduction of interpretations by historically acquired languages. In communicative terms, the charge against phenomenology states that one cannot be a pure observer of the given without any admixtures of others and various intermediaries, such as language. Only the historically and socially acquired common usages and practices allow for the understanding and the communication of the given. The actions and practices of the individual are examples of the common practices, customs and usages, that is, he is a representative of something intersubjective and common.

Despite the phenomenological arguments for the primacy of signification, of meaning as phenomena of experience, the attacks on phenomenology insist that meaning is linguistic, and the latter not only transcends the individual, but allows him/her to make sense of himself/herself. Moreover, the phenomenologically conceived perceptual object, with its spatiotemporal horizons, is deemed an inadequate point of departure, requiring a historically effective consciousness, an objective spirit, encompassing institutions and individual activities one is born into a communicative system. The individual lives and acts, thinks and feels in the sphere of commonality of rules, plans and customs, reaching into individual motivations. Thus, every plan, every explanation, is group specific. This supposedly comprises a more encompassing and concrete domain. The individual activity is a situational application of the modes of prescribed activity. In essence, the

sense interconnections of a tradition appear in a common praxis, constituting a form of life and a life world, and precede the individual. It follows, then, that the genesis of experience inheres in the common forms of historical life, institutions and traditions that have far surpassed the individual. In Kantian terminology, without them human activity would be blind, and with them, it is directed by an authority of a tradition. The intentional activities of the individual are situative specifications and individuations of a historically and socially pre-given intersubjectivity and life world. The latter are the subject, whereas the individual is their determinate object. We encounter, here, a peculiar circularity. The common meanings must already be in place and understood if (a) the individual is to make any sense of events, and (b) if the sense of practical activities is to be grasped. But this suggests that meaning can be derived only from the already pre-given common meanings. For phenomenology, the issue is with the “derived” and the “only”. If it is presumed that an activity is understandable because it is a logical derivation from pre-given meanings and sociohistorically established rules, then one would have to account for various interpretations of the “same” meanings and rules. The variations would have to be attributed either to the incompetence of the individual, or to another level of language, that is, the interpretive level, or to a silently experienced domain that makes sense of the meanings and rules simply by being their unacknowledged source. The latter would have to make sense on its own if it becomes an interpretant of the sociohistorically found common conceptions. The making of sense that can specify and concretize the conceptions apparently must be a process that is not blind and is in a position to “know” how to communicate with the world and how to “apply” the sociohistorically acquired common meanings, concepts and rules. The issues are by now quite complex, and their resolution by those, who argue against phenomenology, takes recourse to a pedagogical thesis¹⁴⁶. The thesis purports to explain the conditions for the possibility of the individual’s awareness of proper, concrete activities. It is said that an activity makes sense, is meaningful and proper because of the teaching of customs, concepts and orientations to the next generations. Granted, but pedagogy is what here be-

¹⁴⁶ Dilthey, W. (1921). *Der Aufbau Geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften*. [The Constitution of the Historical World in the Human Sciences]. *Gesammelte Schriften*, Vol. VII. [Collected Writings]. Leipzig, East Germany: Teubner.

comes problematic, because it too must presume the priority of history that far surpasses the abilities of any pedagogical undertaking, and indeed the pedagogical practice would have to make sense only under the dictates of the historically transmitted meanings and rules. Hence, the very practice of pedagogy is one mode of individuating the common meanings, one variety of interpretation that cannot claim to be in a position of transmitting history per se. Moreover, even if we were to grant that the historical meanings, customs and institutions contain learned generalizations from individual cases, we would have a reversed problem: now we would have general rules or concepts and meanings of individual cases abstracted from their contexts. Yet, it is precisely the context boundedness that is being advocated by the historical, anti-phenomenological thesis. The only way that such a thesis could escape this dilemma is by assuming the generality of contexts, and thus, by abolishing any claim to concreteness. This is to say, if one is compelled to generalize the contexts, then one is simply postponing the issue of concreteness and specification. It is precisely the efforts to avoid the transcendental, consisting of experiences accessible to anyone – even if never completely – that lead to such dilemmas.

Yet, even if we assume that communication is possible on the basis of historically achieved intersubjectivity, with its mutual and universal understanding, we would not be closer to answering the question of such a universality in understanding. In what ways could history contain some type of commonality and universality, when the proponents consistently claim that all abstract and universal conceptions must be derived from, and reinterpreted back in terms of, the concrete historical contexts? This seems to be an admission that historical process consists of contingent events, unless, of course, one has tacitly granted the transcendental generality of experience accessible to everyone. The sly move of the historicizing theses appears obvious: assume the generality of the transcendental awareness, as depicted earlier at various levels of communication, reduce it to the property of a particular, factual being, and then argue that such individual cannot yield commonalities of communicative meaning accessible to others without the props of historically effective consciousness.

The dilemma of historically effective consciousness, with its claim of intersubjective communication access, is that it is particular, perhaps having no two situations alike, and thus, it must import generalities from an ex-

periential domain in order then to discover them in such a consciousness. If it is claimed that the historical subjects are contingent, and particular, then the question as to the possibility of comprehending the historically transmitted generalities cannot be answered. Neither such a factual subject, nor even an intersubjectivity of such subjects, could presume to grasp more than they are, unless, in fact, they are more, that is, experiencing subjects, who are related to, and engaged in, a transcendental generality prior to any factual singularity or generalized universality. No doubt, there is a historically transmitted knowledge and, as we noted earlier, a poly-centric, corporeal subject, but the conditions of the possibility of awareness of this transmitted knowledge are not necessarily historical. Historical experience presumes the transcendental in order to make sense of its ability to locate and transmit the universal¹⁴⁷. Indeed, the very arguments for the priority of historical traditions and intersubjectivity are transcendental.

Our arguments against the priority of intersubjectivity are not designed to reject it, but to show that the historical base for intersubjectivity leads to blind alleys. There appears a tacit assumption that the individual is contingent and totally incapacitated without the intersubjective, that is, the individual is contingent, whereas the intersubjective is a necessary condition for the former. But the necessity of intersubjectivity, as something above the individual, implies that the former is not historical, but transcendental, and thus, requires transcendental subjectivity for its access. In turn, if intersubjectivity is seen as a historical accumulation and transmission of accumulated practical and epistemic views, then such a history could not offer any general conceptions, under which the individual could be subsumed. As noted in our previous chapters, communication is an accepted occurrence; this implies that intersubjectivity cannot be an aggregate of either contingent, totally time-bound factual individuals, with their specific psychosomatic functions. On this basis, intersubjectivity is precluded at the outset. Indeed, the contingency of history would be exposed to the same charge. Resultantly, the possibility of intersubjectivity can be maintained if it is taken at the outset to be transcendental, offering an access to eidetic generality that subtends both the facticities and the universalities and is accessible to any subjectivity. This conclusion is revealed even by those,

¹⁴⁷ Landgrebe, L. (1968). *Phaenomenologie und Geschichte* [Phenomenology and History]. Darmstadt, West Germany: Wissenschaftliches Buchgesellschaft.

who argue against phenomenology. When one claims that all subjectivity is within the horizon of historical intersubjectivity, the claim has an eidetic generality as a basis for communicative understanding. This is to say, such claims are transcendental, and thus, accessible intersubjectively by various subjectivities.

There is still another dilemma for communications. Assume that there are traditionally pre-given and learned rules of language, present in their intersubjective universality, and then applied interpretively to situations. The communicating individuals, using such language, do not somehow discard it and its rules, meanings and concepts during application. Even if one had a dual language – and there is no indication of this being, the case – one with traditionally acquired intersubjective rules, and one that is spoken situationally, the latter would turn out to be equally historical and traditional, with its general rules and usages, calling for specific interpretation during application. Hence, the issue of concrete, situational specification is not resolved, but merely postponed. Any linguistic usage, its rules and prejudgments, takes for granted a general understanding of the meaning of situation, context and concrete action in order to speak of concrete specification of communicative practice. But this implies that if the historical and intersubjectively understood language does not have within itself the requisite concreteness and specificity, then the latter is presupposed and must originate from another source. After all, the transmitted language can be specified concretely not in any arbitrary way, but selectively. The selection presupposes that we already understand the concrete situation, the context, wherein to order the specifications of a language properly.

The proper ordering depends on experience of concrete domains that are not simply cases of traditional categories and rules, but systems of factual experience founded on situated and significantly interconnected corporeal functions. The presumption of the priority of the intersubjective, the social, and the historical over the individual fails to account for a number of important issues. First, the practical engagements and the concrete contexts cannot be understood; second, the singular, the individual, becomes absorbed into a domain that he can neither survey nor manage; and third, the experience of the other is taken to be self-evident. Yet, this experience is most complex and difficult to decipher. In previous chapters, we have argued for a practical domain, wherein the self and others acquire their

mutuality and differentiation, comprising individuation within a unity. This domain was seen to be corporeal and coextensive with the systems of meaningful activities and enablements. Yet, the latter are not facts, but systems of kinaesthesia, possessing a generality that is neither a universal abstraction, nor a datum. The generality, moreover, has another dimension: orientational schema. Although the physiological body might be located in a homogeneous space and might consist of a symmetrical structure, such a body and space cannot deal with orientations. Space consists of indifferent points that cannot be assigned meanings, such as “here-there”, “up-down”, and so on, unless one borrows such meanings from a functional body. The latter is the condition for the possibility of structuring and communicating a world of places and locations, of ups and downs, lefts and rights, forwards and backwards. The asymmetry of the functional body disrupts the homogeneity by communicating directions, orientations, and thus, instituting a practical world. It is to be noted that functional directions are not exchangeable. What is up front, reachable by a forward movement, is distinct from what is in the back, and the latter can be reached best by a reversal of directions. The same can be said of left-right compositions.

Excellent phenomenological and critical analyses of the functional body are available in Straker’s work and need not be repeated. We only wish to indicate the experiential fact that such a body is a setting for practical understanding and its functions are involved in numerous linguistic conceptions and rules. A brief indication of such functions ought to suffice. We note, for example, that many linguistic expressions in politics and mythologies, in sciences and daily activities, are structured by the left-right orientations. Leanings to the left or right, to the radical right, to the extreme left, are common in daily discourse, and yet, without a functional body, such terms would have no sense. One can easily trace an entire history of this bodily function in numerous expressions, and indeed, in most important locations of human figures. The same could be said of the vertical orientation, up-down or high-low. When we speak of social status, of degrees of significance of theoretical functions, when we designate offices and their hierarchical rank, we are constantly using the language of an uprightly functioning body¹⁴⁸.

¹⁴⁸ Straker, E. (1987). *Investigations in the Philosophy of Space*, p. 62-71.

Perhaps the most preeminent corporeal function, appearing in linguistic compositions, is one of the differentiation between the frontal and backward movements. The frontal movement is most favored in practical activities. Indeed, the practical activity is most preeminently a frontal activity, even if minimal backward movements are called upon as compensatory requirements, and does not contend with objects behind as with those found in the lateral and frontal regions. The language of means and aims, of goals, is dominated by concrete frontal activity. It must be understood that it enters not only into spacial terminology, but also into temporal conceptions. We are leaving the past behind us and are moving forward toward the future; we look ahead to better days, participate in the forward march of history and progress and face the tests and goals of tomorrow. The very language of overcoming, transcending and surpassing, is a frontal language. This suggests that the very conceptions of history, the rules of language, the interpretations of significances, hierarchies and ranks, and even the contexts, assume the concrete meaning of the asymmetrically functioning and active corporeity. Such a corporeity is the concrete context, and thus, escapes being a singular fact subsumable under a universal rule and possesses its own generality. In language, this generality appears in all spatio-temporal contextualization, and hence, it is even the ground of concrete understanding of history. The application of discursive rules, images and customs makes sense in a situation because the situation itself is a meaningful corporeal context with functional and oriented differentiations.

This concrete systematics of communication structures a practical domain of oriented places. Use objects and functions, inclusive of bodily activities, have oriented places. The places depend on customary conveniences for activity. Something useful is found “where it belongs” and is easily accessible. Use objects are not found in a point of a homogeneous space, but in a place with a slack that allows changes without the object leaving its place. It is on the desk, in front, and a little to the right, and it is accessible to correlations with other objects in the vicinity. They are interconnected significantly and function under the practical transpositionality discussed in the previous chapter. Places with their slack include dimensional corporeal activities that lend and, in turn, require the accessibility of objects. The latter cannot be too far, out of reach, or too close, crowded and obtrusive, and thus, a hindrance to activities.

The practical world of oriented places is much broader than the situation structured by the direct activities of the body. Every place of practical objects can be comprehended as an oriented and flexible structure in correlation to other such places, comprising an oriented system of flexible and functional interrelationships. Things have a place on the desk, the desk is in the house, the house is in Chicago, and so on. The movement in this flexible system of places is communicated on the generality of the bodily functions. One leaves some place “behind” and goes “ahead” to another place, and if one is in a hurry, one avoids excursions to the “sides”. Regardless of how vast the places become, they never lose the corporeal system of functional communication: we are leaving the coast of United States behind and are heading toward Europe. Obviously, we should not confuse functional orientations with some inner bodily characteristics. Orientations are completely intertwined with the practical world and correlate to the places and systems of interconnected and oriented objects. To use the language of Waldenfels, the corporeal orientations constitute an “in-between” domain, wherein even the physiological body is located and articulated¹⁴⁹. Initially, we suggested that experience means, signifies and provides an interconnected, sense-making process. Thus, when we spoke of the experiential constitution of a physical object, appearing from various sides, we silently assumed a practically orienting body. Objects “in themselves” do not have sides, tops, bottoms and ends; they are constituted on the basis of bodily orientations. The desk has a top because we are upright, it has sides because we assume a corporeal position and action from a particular vantage point. This is to say that although the theoretical constitution of the experience is comprehensible and can be transmitted by an intersubjective, historical tradition, the comprehension assumes a concrete system of practical activities that already makes sense and allows the “reading” of the transmitted conceptions. Thus, one may learn the formal rules of playing chess, but such rules are understandable and communicable only in a context of functional orientations: forward movements, diagonal movements, retreats and advances are bodily orientations. The Wittgensteinian theory of the lived world as a “language game” with learned rules and grammatical sequences would be completely incomprehensible to a being that did not structure its practical world along our functional systems of action. A sequence of gram-

¹⁴⁹ Waldenfels, B. (1971). *Zwischenreich des Dialog* [The in-between Region of Dialogue].

matical composition, either from left to right, right to left, or top to bottom can be communicated and applied because of the tacit communication of the practical body. In fact, our unquestioned experience and discourse, concerning the social architectonic, inclusive of routes of communication and commerce, are modeled after the functional body.

Houses have fronts, sides and backs, we sit in the front or back seats of vehicles, and the latter have forward and backward movements and locations, and our numbering of houses on streets is “up”. Phenomenology, thus, contends that our practical experience of bodily structurations is one of the most fundamental domains in the comprehension even of the “higher” theoretical constructions.

Given the level of practical activity and its oriented and flexible system of places, there is equally a flexible and oriented system of time that is also fundamental to communicative interaction. In our critique of the preeminence of traditional and historical conceptions, we have suggested that historical time needs not be based on an abstract and theoretical concept of continuity; rather, if we build history, then historical time and what it communicates must also be built on the basis of activities. We have noted that the dialogical interaction, even at the linguistic level, is not composed of a sequence of words or statements, but is made possible by a structuration of a common theme across passive-active-passive phases that unite and differentiate the dialogical partners. Such phases constitute a flexible temporal field that offers options and possibilities. The possibilities appear within contexts of relevant events and the latter signify options for possible changes. This is to say, the field has horizons, wherein events signify possibilities of activity and handling of such events. Thus, one event may suggest various possibilities, whereas numerous events may focus on one option. This abolishes a causal notion of activity and institutes a field of shifting selectivities, constantly articulating the various options of the “future”, although the latter is not simply something that we expect, but figures already in what we do at the present.

Just as with places, times are equally structured in accordance with practical activities and corporeal orientations and are divisible into various nearnesses and remotenesses within the contexts of tasks. Something will take a day to do, something will require a month, and functions and events are assigned their locations within the allotted temporal field. Some options

are excluded as too time consuming, some are modified, and others may be combined. Such structuration is a highly complex experience and language is inadequate to follow its complexities. To grasp such a state of affairs in communicative praxis, we must reintroduce the previously discussed practical reflexivity, although now at the level of practical time. Our activities reflect one upon the other in practical terms of what we can and cannot do, what can be repeated, and what is not worth the effort. Such reflexivity takes for granted temporal communication. While undertaking a task, we set a temporal field for its achievement, such that the “future” possibilities of completion reflect upon the selection of activities at the present; one cannot take up another task today, or one cannot take 3 days off, because such options, reflected from the possible completion of the accepted task, must be excluded. In turn, within the temporal field of action for the completion of the task, there arise “inner-reflexivities” of possibilities of selection of actions and of numerous objects and instrumentalities for the task. If one must finish the task in 1 month, then one must accomplish the requisite actions in 2 weeks to get to the end of the task, but this means that by next week certain things will have to be in place if the 2-week work is to be attained; all this leads to reflexivities of time in time, of complex possibilities within possibilities, comprising the temporal field of action. One does not perform an action at the present and then another action at the next moment; each action, and every implement, object and event, have complex temporal interconnections that structure those actions, objects and events significantly¹⁵⁰. In short, practical activities are composed of a practical system of inner-communication.

Obviously, any sort of location of an event “in history” presupposes the event’s concrete location in the oriented world of places and times, of options taken and options rejected, and not in a world of homogeneous space and uni-linear time. Again, we encounter particular phenomena, previously described as concrete, yet general, given, yet not given as a brute fact or a datum. These phenomena were called “eidetic” because of their concreteness, and at the same time of their generality. The flexible and inter-related systems of places and times are concrete and completely coextensive with and intertwined in activities and tasks, and yet, they have an eidetic

¹⁵⁰ Luhmann, N. (1968). *Zweckbegriff und Systemrationalität* [The Concept of Purpose and System Rationality]. Tübingen, West Germany: J. C. B. Mohr, Ch. 4.

generality that is accessible to everyone. Whether one points to something and, thus, establishes a direction from here to there, or whether one says that a certain activity should be postponed until tomorrow because other things have to be done today, one is communicating concretely and in a sufficient generality that can be loosened up, made more flexible, complex, or tightened up, without reaching any geometric or digital precision. Indeed, in the world of action and practical communication, such precision is comprehensible in a context of places and times, tasks and possibilities, and hence, constantly situated and transgressed toward the field in which it makes sense.

The inexactitude and the flexibility are the initial experiences of the factual systems, that is, every fact is a system of explorations, implications and interconnections. Such systems exhibit characteristics of things that are “loose”. Things appear with what Straker calls “morphological” features¹⁵¹. Communication at this level is structured between the universal, ideal, rule-like structures and the pure factual data. The ideal, geometric and mathematical, do not picture, suggest or represent anything in the practical world. Although they can deal with enumerable facts, the understanding of such facts is contextualized in practical systems, and thus, assumes in-between experiences that have a looseness, a play, both toward exactness and ideality and toward pure datum. If the ideal systems are to be situated, they assume the experience of morphological features. Indeed, our languages communicate morphologically; we speak of sizes, shapes, comparative differences, sketches, outlines and contours that have singular and factual generalities. We speak of oblong, rectangular, egg-shaped, flat or wavy, straight or curvy, smooth or rough characteristics; they are accessible to corporeal and active processes and have fitting, unfitting, appropriate or inappropriate relationships. We can say that the table is too big for the room and that the pot is too heavy for the stand, without going into precise measures. Their being “between” ideality and pure datum allows for flexibility that can range from broad generality to increased specificity without a loss of their morphological functions. Obviously, such flexibility is important in the practical domain, where things have to be adjusted in their places and relationships.

We should avoid confusion by stressing the distinction between “facts”, “idealities” and morphological characteristics. Facts are located in homo-

¹⁵¹ Straker, E. (1987). *Investigations in the Philosophy of Space*.

geneous space and time and have two levels of characteristics: the impressional, given through the so-called five senses, and the quantitative, given by the system of measurements. Idealities, as we saw in previous chapters, can be communicated without any specific relationship to things; we can deal with numbers, geometries and logics, without referring to anything in the world of perceptual processes. Morphological features are experiential explorations that do not coincide with impressions or with ideal structures. One cannot speak of an ideal egg-shape, or perfectly rough surface, or an absolutely crooked street. The looseness of such features is what allows for communication in the practical domain. Indeed, one's experience of something egg-shaped is very specific, and yet, its generality is sufficient to warrant a commonality that accommodates unique differences without a loss of a given morphological composition.

Finally, the practically communicated world is peculiarly relative because this relativity does not preclude communication. The practical experience seems to be the locus that provides the intermediary, the in-between domain that does not demand an abstract *lingua universalis* or its reverse, a sum of facts for a successful communication. Rather, it is flexible, yet comprehensible processes, involving functional corporeity and its structuration of contexts. When we speak of relativity, we must also speak of these corporeal functions in relationship to the morphological features of practical things and surroundings. If we ask about the experienced size of a thing, we must understand that the size is not a property of the thing alone, but is a functional relationship between the body, the thing and the surrounding context. The object looks big because we are next to it; if we move away from it, the object looks smaller, and if we climb a hill, the object looks "insignificant". This suggests that phenomenology does not give an absolute credence to objects and their "inherent" qualities, but is very keen on the practical, and hence, the relational and morphological characteristics that belong in concrete settings and engagements. Such settings are sensible, corporeal experiences in practical action and provide the already assumed meanings of factually interconnected events and actions, within which contextual generalities the historically and intersubjectively transmitted conceptions assume their concrete communication.

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