Oligopoly problem in the European Union competition law: game theory perspective
The problem of tacit collusion in oligopolies ranks among the most perplexing legal issues in cartel theory. Despite decades of legal and economic research on the subject, there had been no major legal breakthrough for a while. With that in mind, this doctoral dissertation undertakes to develop the game theory perspective in the EU competition law. By invoking central ideas in game theory, including Nash equilibrium, Shapley value, folk theorem, focal points, cheap talk, self-enforcement, stick and carrot, grim trigger strategies, prisoner’s dilemma, and others, it shows how game theory can facilitate legal analysis. This new interdisciplinary research direction can be called the law & game theory approach. In fact, the main statement here is that the economic analysis of law (the “law & economics” approach) should be complemented by the game-theoretic analysis of law (the “law & game theory” approach). The work also contains several original legal solutions for improving the enforcement of Article 101 TFEU and better distinguishing between proscribed agreements and/or concerted practices and legitimate conscious parallelism. On the whole, this doctoral dissertation is the first systematic legal attempt of bringing non-cooperative as well as cooperative game theory closer to competition law and legal audience.