Aspects of legality of unmanned combat aerial vehicles under international humanitarian law

Abstract

This thesis analyses the question of legality of unmanned combat aerial vehicles (drones) in accordance with international humanitarian law. Hypothesis is raised that drone is no different from other means and methods of warfare. In an effort to confirm or deny a hypothesis, thesis is divided into three-fold analysis: legality of UCAVs as such, legality of the use of UCAVs and the legality of UCAVs’ operators are examined. First part of thesis starts with historical overview of UCAVs, the reasons of their increasing attractiveness, definition and determination of level of autonomy. Second part of thesis embarks on the analysis whether UCAV as suchis lawful under the international humanitarian law. Examining and comparing provisions of Chicago Convention and HPCR Manual, it is proven that drones are carriers of missile and should be considered state military aircrafts. In its entirety, drone is a ‘mean’ of warfare under IHL, but by nature it is not designed to cause excessive civilian casualties or superfluous suffering therefore and is not unlawful as such. However, the payload employed with UCAVs is aweapon and their use (‘method’) might render them illegal. This is a subject-matter of a third part of thesis. Hereby, the issue is divided in two parts: ‘who may be targeted?’ and ‘how one may be targeted?’, the former reflecting principle of distinction of IHL and the latter – principles of proportionality, military necessity and precaution. The content and scope of these principles are analyzed as well as their practical implementation in the context of UCAVs employment. Last – forth – part of thesis looks into question whether operators of UCAVs of non-militarynature are lawful. Specific concerns about their status and ways to legalize it are examined. In the final part, conclusions are drawn on the grounds of a research made. At the same time the hypothesis is found to be proven. Thesis concludes that it is not entirely true to state that drones do not satisfy principles of jus in belloand therefore are unlawful. UCAVs bear technological and military advantages in safeguarding these principles, but due to the encumbering nature of battlefield UCAVs are employed in and secrecy of operations, clear-cut answers cannot be provided. Moreover, sound implementation of these principles is also critically reliant on the information available about the target at the moment of strike. Therefore, case-by-case approach assessing these principles issuggested.