Teisinių technologijų (LegalTech) centras / Legal Technologies (LegalTech) Centre

Cyber defence / security is a critical component of civic resilience, ensuring the protection and continuity of essential services and infrastructure in the face of cyber threats. As societies become increasingly digital, the potential for cyber attacks on public systems, such as utilities, healthcare, transportation, and government services, grows. These attacks can disrupt daily life, compromise sensitive data, and undermine public trust. But what happens in a national emergency? How is cyber security and disinformation considered from a civic cyber resilience perspective? What are the expectations of citizens in the first 72 hours of a national emergency? The paper will evaluate cyber advice offered to the citizens of a number of European countries. The evaluation will focus on the national advice offered from a technological, legal, and societal perspective. The analysis will focus on the different approaches of six European countries and what can be learned from these different approaches regarding Civic Defence and Resilience.

Abstract Background: Historically, pregnant patients have not been included in clinical research, as the risk of damaging the healthy development of the fetus was considered too high. This practice is changing, and the applications of artificial intelligence (AI) to pregnancy research offer a wide range of solutions that are expected to help closing the knowledge gap regarding how best to treat pregnant patients with cancer. The AI tools currently available offer support in screening, diagnosing, treatment planning, and patient counselling. These AI tools, however, were not developed by clinicians or medical researchers; thus, close collaboration between clinicians and the developers of AI tools is urgently needed. Methods: Many of the questions that emerge when AI is used to better approach a pregnant patient with cancer are not technological. Instead, these questions concern value conflicts that cannot be solved by technological tools alone and where wider public debate and agreement are required. How should AI tools consider the developing fetus and its pregnant mother? Should both the pregnant person and the developing fetus be regarded as patients or research participants? What kind of relationship between the two should be incorporated into AI algorithms? This article provides an in-depth interdisciplinary analysis of the above questions and concludes with recommendations for the immediate future. Results: Key recommendations include (1) adhering to existing biomedical ethics principles of respect for patient autonomy, including the relational context; the balance of maternal and fetal beneficence; protection of the vulnerable; and reasonable resource allocation in the given circumstances; (2) when recruiting pregnant patients to research studies, focusing on building pregnant patients’ trust in clinical research and on enhancing pregnant patients’ knowledge so that they feel able to understand and adhere to clinical research requirements; (3) various AI tools can help health care professionals and researchers to plan clinical studies and to create patient- and clinician-directed educational and decision-making tools, while also making them more accessible. Conclusions: Wider cross-disciplinary debate is still needed in order to establish how AI systems and tools for cancer treatment during pregnancy and pregnancy research in general should regard pregnant patients and their developing fetuses, especially where moral status questions are concerned.

This paper presents a comprehensive analysis of hybrid threats, a pressing issue in the contemporary security landscape. Hybrid threats, which involve the integration of conventional and unconventional tactics by state and non-state actors to exploit vulnerabilities and achieve strategic objectives, are a clear and present danger. This paper delves into the nature of hybrid threats, their characteristics, common strategies employed, and the implications for national security. By understanding hybrid threats, policymakers and security practitioners can develop effective countermeasures to mitigate their impact. This paper also presents a case study in relation to space and cyber security, focusing on the Viasat cyber security incident.

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, many jurisdictions around the world embarked on a path towards the speedy digital transformation of their corporate governance regulations. Lithuania is one of the countries where electronic participation in the general meetings of shareholders was stipulated back in 2009. Based on the experience gained during the pandemic, this was substantially changed in November 2022. This development raises the question of whether these novelties will suffice, or whether the further enhancement of Lithuanian company law is required. Therefore, this article aims to study the regulation of electronic participation in corporate bodies in Lithuania in a comparative context and to suggest improvements. To achieve this goal, two EU jurisdictions were selected for comparative analysis: Estonia and Germany. In addition, two surveys were carried out among Lithuanian law firms: one in 2022 and the other in 2023. Our study shows that practitioners treat the new amendments as sufficient and effective, but some amendments regarding the identification and verification of shareholders would be welcomed.

Straipsnyje apžvelgiamas naujasis skaitmeninių pinigų konceptas. Remiamasi Europos Sąjungos teisės aktais ir analizuojamos Europos Centrinio Banko (toliau – ECB) išleistos naujienos, pristatančios skaitmeninio euro projektą kaip potencialiai naują mokėjimų priemonę. Gryniems pinigams būdingos savybės svarbios taip pat kaip privatumas, tad analizuojant pinigų sampratą atsižvelgtina į tai, ar privatumas bus užtikrintas nuolat kintančiame skaitmeniniame pasaulyje. Perkėlus vis daugiau paslaugų į elektroninę erdvę pasikeis jų reikšmė pavieniams vartotojams. Skaitmeninis euras būtų centrinio banko išleisti skaitmeninės formos grynieji pinigai, prieinami visiems euro zonos vartotojams. Skaitmeninis euras būtų visiems prieinama nemokama elektroninė mokėjimo priemonė. Ja būtų galima naudotis visoje euro zonoje. ECB teigimu, skaitmeninis euras būtų saugi priemonė, privatumas būtų užtikrintas. Spartėjant visuomenės skaitmenizavimui skaitmeninis euras būtų dar vienas mūsų bendrosios valiutos raidos žingsnis.

This paper provides a comprehensive overview of the cyber landscape in Belarus, with a focus on the Belarus government's use of cyber activities from an offensive and defensive context, the emergence of opposition cyber activities, and the broader implications for cybersecurity and legal compliance. In the course of the research, researchers try to assess Belarus as a source of cyber-threats, both domestically and to neighbouring states (especially those supporting Ukraine). The first section of the paper outlines the Belarusian government's engagement in cybercrimes against its citizens, especially under President Lukashenko's regime, highlighting extensive online surveillance, repression, and the escalation of these activities following the 2020 presidential elections. In this political context, Belarus is also examined as a country initiating and/or contributing to Information Warfare activities, which are mainly directed at western countries. The second section of the paper delves into Belarus's cybersecurity legal framework, examining various national strategies and concepts, the absence of a formal cybersecurity strategy, and the focus on 'information security' as part of national security. The third section presents case studies of cyber activities in Belarus, contrasting government-backed hacking efforts with those of opposition groups like the Belarus Cyber Partisans. It explores the Partisans' attacks on state infrastructure and information leaks as a form of protest against the government, and the pro-government hackers' disinformation / information campaigns website defacements, and data breaches, particularly targeting Ukraine. This section highlights the evolving nature of cyber conflict in Belarus, where both government and opposition forces use cyber tools for political ends, reflecting broader geopolitical tensions in the region. This part of the report compares the Belarusian pro-government hacktivist and Cyber Partisans groups, their activities and manifestations within the country (inside), as well as the cyber threats they pose to foreign countries. The article attempts to answer the question of what kind of threat Belarus as a country poses in the context of cybersecurity, hybrid-cyber threats. This country is often included in Russian hybrid-cyber threats strategies, Belarus entities also work with Russian and sometimes Chinese groups in undertaking cyber activities against other countries.

On 24 February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine. The Russo-Ukrainian War is the largest war in Europe since World War II. The aim of the paper is to look at how politically motivated hacking by Russia has been used as part of the Ukraine situation with a focus on the different attack types since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The paper will focus on the different groups acting on behalf of Russia, their actions, and techniques. The paper will discuss what their actions mean for the future of cyber conflicts.

For many years, paper was the main format for the registration of companies. The Digitalisation Directive, adopted in 2019, obliged European Union (EU) Member States to provide founders with the option to form private companies digitally. Although for Lithuania, where online formation of legal entities had already existed even before 2019, these regulatory developments did not bring about radical change, they forced the national legislator to introduce the required amendments. This article aims at studying the provisions of the Digitalisation Directive and the results of its implementation in Lithuania to suggest possible improvements in the online registration of companies. The laws of both EU jurisdictions (Estonia, Latvia, and Poland) and one non-EU jurisdiction (Ukraine) with experience of online registration of companies are investigated in comparison with Lithuanian law. In addition, the results of a survey Among Lithuanian law firms are presented and contribute to the analysis and interpretation of the legislation at hand. The article’s conclusions about the state of implementation of the Digitalisation Directive and the recommended steps beyond the Directive’s transposition provide for further enhancement of statutes and practices in this area.