Konkurencijos ir pirkimo apimties poveikis kainai viešųjų pirkimų konkursuose

Viešieji pirkimai yra svarbi ekonomikos dalis, Lietuvoje sudaranti 10 proc., o Europos Sąjungoje net iki 16 proc. bendrojo vidaus produkto, todėl moksliniais tyrimais pagrįstos išvados dėl šios srities tobulinimo gali turėti labai didelį poveikį valstybei. Vienas esminių viešųjų pirkimų elementų yra kaina. Tai kintamasis, kurio perkančioji organizacija negali pasirinkti, tačiau gali paveikti. Šiame straipsnyje siekiama pagrįsti modelį, kuris paaiškintų, kaip konkurencija ir pirkimo apimtis (veiksniai, kuriems perkančioji organizacija gali daryti įtaką tiesiogiai) veikia kainą viešųjų pirkimų konkursuose. Sudarytas modelis remiasi aukcionų teorijos ir pirkimų valdymo mokslinės literatūros žiniomis, taip pat grindžiamas viešųjų pirkimų rezultatų tyrimais.

Third hypothesis states that the competition (the number of bidders) depends on the purchase volume in public procurement tenders done through the central purchasing authority. The unit of analysis in the research is tender results which consist of several variables observed: the unit price (pw), the quantity (q), the number of bidders (n). The analysis focused on public tenders which are done through the central contracting authority because technical specifications of these tenders are standard and can be comparable. 3 groups of goods with the same technical specification were selected for the analysis. Correlation and ANOVA statistical analysis were applied to test hypothesis. The results of the statistical analysis revealed that the winning bid negatively correlates with the number of bidders in a tender. It was noticed that the average of winning bid has a statistically significant negative trend, when the number of bidders is rising. The results of analysis showed that in the first group the average of the winning price falls by 10% when the number of suppliers rises from 1 to 2, in the second group the winning price falls by 20%, in the third – by 7%. Some unexpected results were received from the test of the second hypothesis. Significant relationship between the winning bid and the purchase volume was not confirmed statistically The results can be explained by the insufficient competition. According to the theory in case of fierce competition bidders should set the price in relation to the competition and costs. If purchase volume impacts impacts the cost of all bidders the winning price should change also.