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Teiginio elementų aiškinimas scholastinėje logikoje Lietuvoje XVI a. antrojoje pusėje
Date Issued |
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2005 |
Šiame straipsnyje analizuojama teiginio elementų – daiktavardžio ir veiksmažodžio – koncepcija, atrandama pagrindiniuose išlikusiuose scholastinės logikos Lietuvoje XVI a. antrojoje pusėje šaltiniuose – Martyno Smigleckio ir Jokūbo Ortizo logikos paskaitų rankraščiuose. Aptariama šios koncepcijos vieta bendrajame scholastinės logikos kontekste. Prieinama prie išvados, kad interpretuodami antrosios intelekto operacijos – teiginio – elementus, Ortizas ir Smigleckis iš esmės nuosekliai laikėsi scholastinės tradicijos bei tapo vieno klasikinio scholastinio disputo dalyviais.
In the interpretation of essential elements of second operation of human intellect representatives of scholastic logic in Lithuania in the second half of the 16th century Marcin Úmiglecki and Diego Ortiz followed the classical scholastic view, i.e. these scholiasts regarded the noun (nomen) and the verb (verbum) as the basic elements of proposition. While analyzing the vocal (vox) as the common gender of both the noun and the verb, Úmiglecki and Ortiz joined a classical scholastic dispute concerning the relation between vocals and things. In such a quarrel Úmiglecki held a scotistic position asserting vocals to signify immediate concepts of things and only indirectly the things themselves, whereas Ortiz stuck to a thomistic view maintaining that an immediate and adequate signified of vocal is the thing itself conceived by human intellect. Interpreting the status of the vocal, our logicians followed the traditional scholastic view that vocals are artificial signs predicated to things on the basis of a certain similarity to those things. Finally, the analysis of essential properties of noun and verb by Úmiglecki and Ortiz did not deviate from the scholastic tradition, either. Within its frames, the noun was regarded as an artificial sign of a certain substantial nature. The verb in turn was considered an artificial sign of a certain attribute peculiar to that substantial nature. On the ground of these essential properties Úmiglecki and Ortiz traditionally regarded the noun and the verb as the subject and the predicate of the proposition.