Europos Žmogaus Teisių Teismas – konstitucinė justicija prieš individualią?

Europos Žmogaus Teisių Teismas kaip sėkmingiausias individualios justicijos garantas pasaulyje susiduria su rimtomis krūvio problemomis. Teismo veiklos reformos yra neišvengiamos, bet jų pasekmės individualiems pareiškėjams dar nėra visiškai aiškios. Straipsnyje siekiama nustatyti ir įvertinti konstitucinės justicijos požymius Teisme bei Žmogaus teisių konvencijos 14, 15 ir 16 protokolų galimas pasekmes individualios justicijos įgyvendinimui.

The article is composed of three constituent parts. Firstly, the author seeks to determine how far the Court has developed towards a body of a constitutional justice. Secondly, the author analyses the tendencies of constitutionalisation of the Court in the context of most recent reforms. Lastly, the author presents arguments for and against constitutionalisation of the Court from the perspective of an individual. Having analysed the history of the Court’s establishment, its’ mission, functions, role, objectives of the Convention itself, doctrines and principles applied by the Court, as well as the nature of its decisions and other factors, the author states that the nature of the Court is heterogeneous, thus, it captures the elements of both types of justice. However, what is clear from the recent Court reforms is that the constitutional justice elements take the lead, in particular through introduction of pilot judgment procedure and various restrictions on individual petition (including those that may arise as a result of effectively applied advisory opinion). At the same time, the Court so far is not empowered to repeal or invalidate the legal acts infringing on the obligations under the Convention, it leaves extensive discretion to national bodies and grants an individual relief. Though this is not yet discussed to such an extent, but thinking ahead, resorting only to constitutional justice in the Court without maintaining individual justice in the future would neither be practical nor feasible, as assessment of compliance of states’ obligations can only be made with minimum concreteness, possible only in an individual case.