The challenges for co-existence and harmonization of different nuclear liability regimes in the European Union

Abstract

Modernization of the two - Paris and Vienna - international nuclear liability regimes, in terms of linking them together, adapting them up to current development trends and by adopting a separate new global-type regime - all in the hope of enhancing the protection of victims of a nuclear accident - , has not produced those results which have been initially expected. The attempts in attracting a sufficient number of adherent countries, in particular in relation to 2004 Paris Protocol, 2004 Brussels Protocol as well as the 1997 Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC), have not been successful in order for t+h0+ose instruments to come into force either. Mutual risk sharing mechanism on a worldwide level, which is proposed by the CSC, has been viewed by many countries with some scepticism, whereas the regional risk sharing mechanism, such as the supplementary compensation regime under the 1963 Brussels Supplementary Convention, proved to be acceptable for most of the eligible European countries. Similarly, the adherence of the 1988 Joint Protocol as well as to the 1997 Vienna Protocol has not been widespread enough so that all eligible countries would jointly shift to the more advanced level of nuclear liability regulation. Since both France and the USA are entrenched to their own positions —one being a proponent of Paris Convention as well as 1988 Joint Protocol, and another - of the CSC, it may be rather difficult, at least in a short-term perspective, to achieve some tangible progress in establishing some single nuclear liability regime globally. In such a context the shift to harmonization of nuclear liability regimes at regional level, and within the European Union in particular, is the probably the most efficient way to go forward.