Sukcesy i porażki polskiej polityki europejskiej w kontekście kryzysów UE

Abstract

This analysis covers issues related to Polish European policy in the context of the European Union crises, however – since it concerns the period 2004–2014 – it covers mainly the financial and economic crisis. The study attempts to both theoretically analyze the crisis conditions and anti-crisis policy of the Member States as well as answer research questions about the successful and unsuccessful anti-crisis measures. The contexts is here both Polish as well as European, and it refers to steps of Polish authorities to overcome the crisis. The key assumption is the significance of the lack of Poland’s membership in the eurozone for anti-crisis measures in the economic crisis, but also for the context in which the Polish government managed the crisis. At the same time, remaining outside the eurozone may turn out to be a major obstacle to Poland’s participation in the fight against the European Union’s identity crisis and its in-depth reform. The successes and failures of Polish European policy in the context of the crises show that a certain reactivity of the Polish European policy during the crisis on the one hand and awareness of the need to co-shape it at the European level put Poland among countries with great potential to shape the future of the EU. It is possible, however, only under the condition of demonstrating the political will to adopt the euro, cooperate with the largest EU countries with common currency and unified institutions, and increase administrative resources for more efficient coordination of the European policy. Setting ad hoc goals of the Polish European policy (such as the largest share in the use of structural funds) is not enough, any more, despite the fact that during the crisis it seemed to be quite an efficient strategy of Poland.