Independent regulatory agencies : possibilities to identify the peculiarities of their activity and their position in the system of Lithuanian public administration bodies
Mykolo Romerio universitetas |
| Date Issued |
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2009 |
Tai apsunkina galimybes apibrėžti Lietuvos reguliavimo institucijų sistemą bei suvokti šių institucijų veiklos ypatumus. Nors Vakarų mokslininkai kartais abejoja, ar reguliavimo institucijos priklauso viešajam sektoriui, vadinamajam „pilkosios zonos“ sektoriui ar privačių interesų vyriausybės sektoriui, dauguma minėtų Lietuvos institucijų veikia viešojo administravimo sričių ribose, nes atlieka administracinį reglamentavimą, teikia administracines paslaugas, administruoja viešųjų paslaugų teikimą. Kokia pagrindinė priežastis atsirasti nepriklausomoms reguliavimo institucijoms ir kodėl politikai turėtų būti suinteresuoti jų steigimu? Pirmiausia, perduodami reguliavimo funkciją atskiroms institucijoms ir juose dirbantiems atitinkamos srities profesionalams, politikai padidina reguliavimo patikimumą. Antra, tokių institucijų nepriklausomumas neleidžia keistis reguliavimo politikai taip dažnai, kaip keičiasi politinė dauguma. Trečia, nepriklausomos reguliavimo institucijos, kaip teigia F. Gilardi, paplito tarptautiniu mastu, nes vienų institucijų steigimas vienoje šalyje skatina tokio paties statuso institucijų steigimą kitoje šalyje.
Over the past twenty years regulation has gained an unprecedented place in European countries. In effect, the rise of regulation has been accompanied by the rise of a new type of institutions, namely independent regulatory agencies. Western scholars use a lot of terms in defining this type of institutions, i. e. QUANGO (quasi-autonomous non governmental organization), NDPB (non-departmental public body), EGO (extra-governmental organization), NGO (non-governmental organization), QAO (quasi-autonomous organizations), SAO (semi-autonomous organization). But the most frequent term is IRA (independent regulatory agency). They define this type of institutions as public organization with regulatory powers that are neither elected by the people, nor directly managed by elected officials. M. Thatcher reveals certain requirements for inclusion as an IRA. First, the agency has its own powers and responsibilities given under public law; second, it is organizationally separated from the institutions of executive power; and finally, it is neither directly elected nor managed by elected officials. Additionally, they implement quasi-legislative and quasijudicial functions. There are such institutions in Lithuania, too. For example, the Competition Council, the Communications Regulatory Authority, the Securities Commission of the Republic of Lithuania, the National Health Board, etc. Scientists, politicians, and public servants entitle them as institutions accountable to the Parliament or President. The authors of this article try to answer to some questions. First, what is regulation and what is an independent regulatory agency? Second, why regulatory agencies must be insulated from political influence? Third, how is it possible to define the organizational form of such institutions in Lithuania? Fourth, what is the exact place of such institutions in the system of public administration bodies of Lithuania?