Jablonskis, Martynas

The problem of tacit collusion in oligopolies ranks among the most perplexing legal issues in cartel theory. Despite decades of legal and economic research on the subject, there had been no major legal breakthrough for a while. With that in mind, this doctoral dissertation undertakes to develop the game theory perspective in the EU competition law. By invoking central ideas in game theory, including Nash equilibrium, Shapley value, folk theorem, focal points, cheap talk, self-enforcement, stick and carrot, grim trigger strategies, prisoner’s dilemma, and others, it shows how game theory can facilitate legal analysis. This new interdisciplinary research direction can be called the law & game theory approach. In fact, the main statement here is that the economic analysis of law (the “law & economics” approach) should be complemented by the game-theoretic analysis of law (the “law & game theory” approach). The work also contains several original legal solutions for improving the enforcement of Article 101 TFEU and better distinguishing between proscribed agreements and/or concerted practices and legitimate conscious parallelism. On the whole, this doctoral dissertation is the first systematic legal attempt of bringing non-cooperative as well as cooperative game theory closer to competition law and legal audience.

The problem of tacit collusion in oligopolies ranks among the most perplexing legal issues in cartel theory. Despite decades of legal and economic research on the subject, there had been no major legal breakthrough for a while. With that in mind, this doctoral dissertation undertakes to develop the game theory perspective in the EU competition law. By invoking central ideas in game theory, including Nash equilibrium, Shapley value, folk theorem, focal points, cheap talk, self-enforcement, stick and carrot, grim trigger strategies, prisoner’s dilemma, and others, it shows how game theory can facilitate legal analysis. This new interdisciplinary research direction can be called the law & game theory approach. In fact, the main statement here is that the economic analysis of law (the “law & economics” approach) should be complemented by the game-theoretic analysis of law (the “law & game theory” approach). The work also contains several original legal solutions for improving the enforcement of Article 101 TFEU and better distinguishing between proscribed agreements and/or concerted practices and legitimate conscious parallelism. On the whole, this doctoral dissertation is the first systematic legal attempt of bringing non-cooperative as well as cooperative game theory closer to competition law and legal audience.

Tyliųjų susitarimų problema oligopolijose – viena sudėtingiausių kartelių teorijoje. Nepaisant dešimtmečius trunkančių teisinių ir ekonominių tyrimų šia tema, jau kuris laikas nepasiekiama didesnio teisinio proveržio. Atsižvelgiant į tai, šioje daktaro disertacijoje siekiama išplėtoti lošimų teorijos perspektyvą ES konkurencijos teisėje. Remiantis pagrindinėmis lošimų teorijos idėjomis, įskaitant Nešo pusiausvyrą, Shapley vertę (Shapley value), liaudies teoremą (folk theorem), židininius taškus (focal points), tuščias kalbas (cheap talk), savaiminį veikimą (self-enforcement), stick and carrot bei grim trigger strategijas, kalinio dilemą ir kitas, disertacijoje atskleidžiama kaip lošimų teorija palengvina teisinę analizę. Šią naują tarpdisciplininių tyrimų kryptį galima pavadinti "teisės ir lošimų teorijos" požiūriu. Pagrindinis disertacijos teiginys – ekonominę teisės analizę ("teisės ir ekonomikos" požiūrį) vertėtų papildyti lošimų teorijos teisės analize ("teisės ir lošimų teorijos" požiūriu). Darbe taip pat pateikiama net keletas originalių teisinių sprendimų kaip pagerinti SESV 101 straipsnio įgyvendinimą ir geriau atskirti draudžiamus susitarimus ir (arba) suderintus veiksmus nuo teisėto sąmoningo paralelizmo. Ši daktaro disertacija yra pirmas sistemingas teisinis bandymas priartinti tiek nekooperacinių, tiek kooperacinių lošimų teorijas prie konkurencijos teisės ir teisinės auditorijos.

This thesis is based on the main idea that game theory may significantly contribute to solving collusion problem in oligopolies, which is the object of this thesis (so-called “oligopoly” or “parallelism” problem). The thesis aims to answer whether, how and to what extent game theory could do so under the European Union competition law. This aim is achieved by analysing: the concept of concerted practices, exchange of information, leniency and imposition of fines (this defines the scope of application of game theory). Thesis greatly contributes to the scholarship debate on complex oligopoly problem. The merit of this thesis is obtained significant novel results: novel solution on how to delimit concerted practices and conscious parallelism; novel outlook on “leniency as a punishment”; novel justification of imposition of equal, joint and several liability (in duopolies), as well as joint and several liability (as universal solution) in parallelism cases, and many more. These results are obtained through an interdisciplinary analysis. Thesis’ conclusions show how it would be possible to increase the effectiveness of public enforcement of the European Union competition law. This research stands out and goes beyond “classical” legal analysis of oligopoly problem. In doing so, this thesis fills a gap of the absence of such research in the field and significantly contributes to the better understanding of oligopoly problem.